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INTRODUCTION
AID's Office of Ur~~ Development became interested in intermediate
or ·secondary· cities d.ll ing the early 1970s., 3 time when urbanization
was just emerging as a c~ncern for international agency assistance. By
and , arge these agencies had been preoccupied with rural development and
sectoral issues of industry, transpo~tation., later supply, marism,
etc. Ur~anization itself was largely perceived as a negative phenomenon
a·nd migration to cities, flagged as a prQCess to be halted or retar-
ded. Direct interest in cities., as such., was primarily focused on the
large primate centers. It was expressed through applicatiG>n of tech-
nical and financial assistance to alleviate t~eir most serious problems
(e.g. insufficient housi!19 and mWlicipal services) a'ld to for.mulate
C<l>ntrols over expansioo. Racal development was the preferred strate9Y
for containing met o~litan growth.
By the early 197Qs, however, intermediate size and smaller cities
and towns were beginning to attract attention in their own right, alonq
with rural areas, as policy-makers in several aevelQping oollntries em-
barked on efforts to decentralize development oatside the major metro-
politan regions. The approaches varied., from simply setting liP deceA-
tralized branch Qffices Qf government agencies tQ studies Qf geograph-
ical allooatiQns for particaJ.ar funds, ad hoc investments in individual
urban projects for secondary or smaller cltieE and towns and eVeR more
br0adly oonceived spatial planning with the Qbjective Qf creating new
·poles· of gr0wth.
In viewing these effQrts, the Gffice Qi UrNn DevelQPlftent lMlieved
that existing secQndary centers, with thi!ir already-established eCGmQllic
1Mses and essential infrastrlictare systems., CGyld play a key r<Jle in
strategies tG> divert maj0r new devel<Jpment fr~ the primate metrQpGlita.n
an'a, thereby contri1;)utiACJ t<J a ItDre equitable distribl.~tion <Jf inCQ1lM!
and services thr<Jl\1ghQut the CQy.ntr ies in question. These cities esuld
becG>me alternative met.cGpolitan centers, exerting their awn magnetic
att.raction f(!)r cOlftlftereial and induF+-rial investment ana papulatiQr.
They wr,)ylli alsQ be able tG l/>rGvide their respective hinterlands with
access tG a significantly br(!)adened range Qf sooial, eduC'atiC":tal, per-
sQRal, and budness services. NrHeover, they Gffe·red at setting fGr int-
pr0ved administratlQn Gf 90vernmental services.
In 1974, the Gffioe ~psnsGred an explQrat.c~ry investigation G£
secondary ¢ities and GeIIIIliHien-M the pre9fllt WI He-rs s eK-Mli:1W the
exper ience in three cauRtr ies where eAha·nced devel(!)p!fte"t (!)f intermediate
size cities was a pelicy gGal Gf national 90vern~nt: Brazil, Tlirkey,
and Malaysia. Gne 0f the key findings of this stlidy, Land Use and the
Intermediate-size Cit @f aevel(!) in C<!>untries, was that many secGndary
eenters were beginning to experlence t e same rapid expansi<!>n that char-
acterized metrGlpalitan IegiQAs. Indeed, their still-fragile P0tential
fer pr<!>ductivity was l-)eing threatened by difficulties in securing apprG-
~iate, ~l1-located e::ites f<!lr devel(!)pment at aee..:ptable prises,
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inadequate infrastructure and insufficient administrative capacity.
These issues were not dissimilar to those pr~vailin9 in the metropolitan
centers; yet the smaller cities were unable to command even the more
limited technical and financial resources they reqtlired to cope with the
problems. The study recommended that international agencies could make
significa,nt contributions toward improving the situation by broadening
their minimal o:imlJfIitments to Ilrban assistance - specifically, to inc-
lude technical advisory services in land use analysis a,nd prQjeet i~n­
tification fc~ some of the most promising secondary cities.
The Ofiice of Urban Development followed through by initiating a
set Qf modest "pilot" technical assistance projects in Leon" Nicaragua:
Chonbllri, Thailand; and Tamale, Gha·na. Each project entailed aeploying
a single expert, with shcrt-term consultant support, tc work with local
and n&tional authorities on land ase and project identification matters
for a period of one and a half to NQ years.
In the seven years since that early USAID-initiated staGy, inter-
natiG>nal interest in secondary city development has blirgeoned. Addi-
tional offices within AID.. the WOrld Bank, the Asian Development Bantt
and others began to see pGtentials not perceived earlier. '1'(:) a great
extent this interest stemmed from an almost collective rl!C09nition that
increasing acbanizatiam was an immlitable fact of ecGmomiG: development.
Improved c0nditions in raral areas resulting from eievelQpment eff<nts
were leading t3 just as much mig~atiG>n in search of greater opportunity
as rural poverty had ei0ne. Those c0untries whose over all economic con-
diti0ns were impr\,)ving, Lnvariably displayed increases in the rate c:>f
liC~anization and the number of communities possessi:'\C) araan character-
istiG:s.
In additien tc:> reC09nizing the signifi¢ance cf .zities in their <lIWn
right, more sophisti¢ateci interlllational Gbservers began tG a<:::<::ept the
importance of tGWRS' ancl cities' rc:>les in oontinueef raral improve1ftent --
as markets for proouce, prooes$ing centers? and sources of jGbs and
services.
As these nere realistie Pl!l'ceptiGns emer~eef, h>oth <J0untries an...,
lntel'national agefleies be(Jan to take more penetrating lGGks at the
smaller ¢ities themselves, dise0vering that & host of defieieneies -- i~
w.tel', sewer, heal th anef Gther SHVices, in she1ter, in fiscal capac i ty ,
in administrative eapaeity anef in the aBility to aglJt'egate land fGr iJ'tB-
lie i~~r@v@ments were iss~es meriting attenti@n.
0ver the past seven years, maAy natiGnal 90vernmeAts have acceler-
ated efforts tG imp>rGve seeGndary cities. The international agf:!ncies
have alsa produced finaneial and teehr'li¢al aid GIll a wide variety Gf
frc:>nts, an array af mGnetary and pr0fessi0nal c~itmeAts whish far ex-
eeed USAIB's ~tlays fGr its three pilGt ~(G1rams. The 0ffice 0f Urban
Beve10pment has itself C!!Gntinued t~ pi@neer with researeh -- iAtC3 the
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role of urban functions in rural developme.,t, improveme:'lt Qf l-ocal
governance and finance, and the economics of secor.dary c~ties.
Given this new level of national and international interest, it is
timely to examine the experience to date, to identify appr@aches, issues
and accomplishments and to suggest some principles for what is ~oming
a significa,nt focus for development support during the c.ecade Qf the
1980s.
This "new· study of secondary cities will review aspect~ Qf recent
policy and programs that address secondary or intermediate city issues
and will poir.t out pr~ising directions for the futu.re.
l'ecen t Expel: ience
Given the increased r.QmJlli tments by developing countries and
international institations to su.PPGct secGndary city develQPlllent, the
stl1dy seeks tG answer a number of qtJestions:
What apprQaches are variQUs countries taking to sapport their
commitments to secondary G:ity development, in QrganizatiGml' in
investment, and in trainir\(J personnel to implement their poliG:ies?
What rQle li:;)es land lise planning play in prepar ing the basis for
imprQvements and f3r channelir\(J growth at the secondary city sG:ale?
What CGncepts are employed in the practice of land u.se planning?
HQW is physical Qr land lise planning related to other man~ement
and development activities in support of secondary city grQWth?
What steps are countries ta«iAg to expe4ite the availal3i1ity ef
land fer necessary expllAsion and redevelopment?
What issl!es are emerging (e.g. instit\ltiG':1al, fisG:al, managerial)
as these seaondary city aevelopment effGrts unfGld?
Strategies fQr the P.l!tl!re
Given increasiRe! international s\lpp0rt <!If naU@Ral efforts to
strengthen sec(!)Adary cities the stl!dy seeks t<ll recQmmeAd S0me pr(;)lli8ing
direG:ti0ns for the flltlire. It adclresses the f<!lllQWing qqestiGns:
What Gffers of assistance welild I3e fttOst apprGpriate I!)y inter-
natiGnal agencies wishing to flirther natiGna1 ~Bjectives t~ imprGve
services and IPrGduG:tive G:apacity in seeGAdat"y cities: !()ans fen
iAvestment in infrastr\:lctlice, helising, indlistry, etG:., technical
assistance <!If varial;ls kinds, trainin~ in management, p\:lBlie
finance, etc.?
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Do land use issues L" t.":lese cities pres~nt opportunities where
interr.ational agencies miqht strategically and appropriately offer
assistance?
Land use "programming" is an approach that links J:t1ysical planning
to project implementation. Conceived in connection with the ear-
lier JSAID stooy of intermediate size city problems, and later the
basis for that agency's pilot technical assistance projects, its
objective was to provide an overall guidance instrument for land
development decisions and devise practical, short-term investment
ideas as well as other projects based on that guidance. Is this a
valid concept for addressing growth iss~es in secondary cities?
Th is present study encompasses a number of sources: rev i ew of
Ii teratu.re and field reports from the AID pilot projects., a fIlIarch 1981
seminar of participants from these projects and international agency
officials concerned with sec0ndary city deve10pment, a parallel inves-
tigation by Dennis Rondinelli of Syracuse University intG the economic
and social characteristics of secondary cities and policy issues raised
by national and internatiamal agency interest. The tlKi)st important
S0urces, h0wever, are case studies 0f five countries which have an on-
going oonunitment to secondary city develQpment: Brazil, IndG>nesia,
Kenya, KQrea and Tunisia. Field studies were made in the slJmmer and
fall of 1982 to learn how each ceuntry was pr0Ceeding in its effGrts to
stimulate deve10prnent of urban centers outside the main metropolitan
regions, and what r0le the planning, assembly and management Qf land
was playing in the process.
In presenting this material, it is well to note that any attempt to
draw generalizatiQns ab0ut complicated societal issues from limited in-
f0rmation proceeds at its own peril. This is oot our intent. we hope
instead tG identify dimensiGns Gf issues and p0int Qut promising avenues
f0r interventi0n that may have a br0ader applicability.
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Chdpter I: Characteristics of the secondary City and Reasons for
lnterver:tion
This back9ro~nd chapter on the cnaracteristics of secondary cities
provides a rationale for their incl~sion in national development poli-
cies. It brings together segments of oor awn earlier work and insiqhts
from Rondinelli 1 s recent research. ·Developing and Mana9L.1U9 Middle-Size
Cities in Less DevelGlped Coantries·, written for the Office of urban
Development.
1. Definitions
JGlhn Fr iedmann s~mmari zes the view Qf many 1l1r ban theor ists w;'-'" his
comment that: "InterregiG>nal balance ..'nQ a hierarchioal system of
cities are essential conditions fQr national aevel(j)pment".l OUr par-
ticular c(j)ncern is with th(j)se arban cent-.ers which hQld i?Qsi ti(j)ns in a
natiQn's ·hierarchy" of cities just below the level Qf the primate met-
ropolises, am jast abG>ve market cOJllftanities and small tG>WnS which are
primarily service centE:rs for raral areas. The spectrllJl is wilie, and
the econamic, social, and. physical characteristics Qf "secondary" (j)r
"intermediate" cities diverse. The CQ1IIIft(j)n thread is that these centers
ace -- G>r }'lave the potential to ~ame -- nooes of diversified eC(j)nomic
devel(j)pmen t that ar e al t.ernat.ives t.Q investment. and J?C"palation ooncent-
rat.ion in the majQf metropolitan centers.
There is a constant temptation in discassi"9 "sec(j)ndary· cities to
ase a threshold of popalation size as the basis f(j)r definitiGn. Rondi-
nelli sets a flQGr Qf lQO,GGO fQf the communities he has investigated:
\AlthG>ugh this classificatiGR may exclade tQWns in sQftle
pacts (j)f the develGlping wrld that governments may con-
sider to be micidle-sized and that indeed may have \lcban
eccnomiG and ~cial oharacteristics, it Gffers a high
pi:'G>BabilP:y (l\{; encontpassing the large majorit.y Gf <::i ties
that perform intermediate urban flm<::tiGns in cSevelGlping
natiGlns ••• The upper limit Gf the range Gf poP\llatiGn sizes
fGr mici1le level a:ities, 1mIlst, Gf coarse, vary alllGng
countries.
S\lch c1assificatiGln acoording to scale is oonvenient for Rondi-
nelli's discussiC3lll. Yet, many canlftliRities with fewer than lOa,aOO
J1"!Glple 00 perferm 1!l'l!lan administ.rative and ecc!>nQftlic fl:1netiGlns and eta
require l:1£ban services (water and sanitatian systems, s~lid waste
1. Joon Friedmann, Regional Development PGli<::y, a Case Study ef
Venezl:1e1a, camBridge, MIT Press, 1966~ P 28.
2. Bennis R('!>ndinelli, Beve1oJ,?in, and fIIlanaiin, fIIliddle-Sized Cities il'\
Less Beve10p!d CGl~ntries, USAIB 7 0ffiee of Url!lan Bevelepment, 1981,
pp. 45-46.
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disposal, communications, transport and terminal facilities, e::munercial
centers, etc.) to perform these functions effectively. A great deal
depends on the popUlation. econ\Jl1lic, and urbanization patterns within a
particular country. A CQmItII1."'lity of 25, aoo may be a "secQndary" city in
Swaziland, but IElt in Brazil. several oountries have formal urban
decentralization programs directed at communities well below lQQ,QOO in
population.
we prefer the more functiQnal distinction of the earlier Rirtin
stady, i.e. that the complexity Qf the cities' economic and social
relationships is ncre significant than the number of inhabitants so far
as their potential developmental role is concerned. While they may have
grown Qriginally throogb their functions as regional markets and/or PIQ-
vincial capitals, they have taken an additional fanctiQns as producers
of g<Xi>ds and services for both their res?eCtive regioo.s and export tG
other re9iQns and abrQad. Investment in these places CQuld be pivotal
in a strate9Y tG diversify and geographically broaden a national
econany.
These CQmmunities QemGnstrate that contemporary ecQnQmic diversifi-
catioo, imprQved incGJllle distribatiClft., and liroan attractions fex rliral
~'1Iigra·nts can exist ootside the tradition .... l _in metrQPGlitan centers.
Fre. the standpoint of administration am land lise CQntrGll, their phy-
sical develQpment is still a CJQod deal !'Gre manageable than the majQr
metropolises whQ8e interniil: densities and peripheral sprawl have drawn
the at tentiQn Qf central lJ0Vernments and internatiQnal agencies alike.
At the same time their rapid eJrGWth jlistifies claims for help in P['~
viciin<) infrastrlict1l1re, hGlisin~, and set'vices - claims that p1i"C the
interJn@diate lZities in ciirect comretitir-m with the majex metrQPGlises
for limited pwblic funds anci skilled administrative manpower. This
sit1l1atiQR si:.rains the capacity of nati0nal reS0\U:oe management and
requires reG:GnciliatiQn among pl:)li ticians, Planners~ and governmental
agencies at the natiQnal, regiQnal, and lQcal levels.
The Rivkin stl:ldy cit@d ab0ve set forth f01:lr reaSGns for specifi-
ea11y incll:lding secondacy eities and addressing their f·r0blems iit th-e
fQrmulatiQn Qf natiQnal deve10pment peliey.
A. Rapidity 0f ~ulati0A Wr0wth. The need GO absQ[1J massive
pQPI:llatiQn gCGWth, fac in excess of rates ever befQre experienced., l,Nts
demands 0R facilities and services that cannGt be met by preseftt eapa··
eity Qr by past practiees 0f eJradl:lal HtensiGn·. B0\IS1.ng sites ml:lst ~
fGl1nd., a resid@l\tial bliilding indl:lstry melJilized, and schools, health
services and OGmmercial facilities created from whale elGth.
B. Presence ef iIGwing indl1strial 0r agricl:lltl1ul l;?reeessiA,
activities. Thes@ <Jan activities themselves require adeql:late sites and
se-rvices. Onee they reach a eerU in seale, ane illary er CGmplem-entary
3. Rivkin Assoeiates, Land ese and the Interme(U'lte-Siz~ City in.
BevelQ,ing CQl1fttriee, Mew YGrk, PraelJer, li'f6, p. 4~
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economic enterprises are attracted. Sites and services for these are
required as well, and the pcQCess of creating industrial estates ~r ac-
commodatinc a o,mpJ ex or commercial services is far mere involved than
plar~ing facilities for a single plant. The linkages among these econo-
mic activities are critically important, forcing ever-mere attention to
di3tances, land use re11ticmships and urban transport for materials and
labor.
C. Increase in the physical "trappings" of modernizatjon.
Automobiles, mUlti!;tory buildings, supermarkets and such are signs of
bot.h economic complexity and rising aspirations on the part of the pop-
ulac~. They cannot be supported by a rudimentary street system or prim-
itive sanitation devices.
D. Gr0Wing threats to the community's environmental ambience.
Environmental amenities -- open space, scenic views, beaches, woods and
easily ac~ssible cowntryside -- which compensated for relative economic
de?rivation at an earlier a~ less pressing stage of development are in-
:c~asin9ly threatened. As the gr0Wth pressures mount, conflicts and in-
adequacies intensify and orderly absorption of new development seems to
5efy achievement. Without pI:lblic actiQn to protect clean air and water
and maintain areas of natural value for recreation Qr simply visual re-
lief frGm the man-made character Qf the urban envirc:mment irreversible
degradatiQn will occur. Loss of t~ese amenities will have ramificatiQns
beyGnd aesthetic "lues and even pl:lblic health, for they are part Qf the
p>2ckage of assets the city cctn offer to p<:>te:ltial in17estc)Cs and resi-
dents. Witho,.t such advantagces the secondary city's GCmpetitive posi-
tion relative to the prime ~~tropolis is significantly weakened. 4
Since these <;::~servations were made, Rondinelli and others have
amassed Qata tuat indicate a prG>liferating nl.:lmber of cQJIlIIluni ties in
these circumstances.
United Nations dell109raJPhic surveys indicate that the number Gf
intermediate cities -- those between lQa,Oea and the lUCJest city
i~ the country -- mare than dGubled between 1950 and 1981, lr<::>m 301
tG 644. In Africa, the ~iddle East and South Amer ica the number G>f
intermediate cities mor~ than tripled. By 1980 there ftre 81 in-
termediate cities in Africa cGmpared tG 22 in 19S0~ in the Micildle
East the !"lumber increased frGlm 19 tG 66 and in SGuth America there
wele 110 such cities com}1)ared to 34 in 1950. In Central America
middle-sized eities incr.eased frGm 13 tG 37, and in Asia their num-
I:>er grew I:>y nearly 65 ~rcent t!0 aBGut 350 over the three deeades.
Some develGlping oountries reoorcled sharp incrt!ases in their numbers
Gf middle-sized cities since 1950. The number grew frG>m 5 to 14 in
Egypt,S t.0 22 in Ni')t!ria, 7 to 17 in SGl!th Ker\.?a, 76 tC3 144 in
Indi.a, 8 to 20 in Pak ... stan. and 6 t~ 15 in th~ Philippinel4. In
Iran t.he "lumber Gf middle dties increased from 7 to 24 and in Tur-
key fr~m 7 to 20. Mexico'S intermediate cities increased fram 11
4. Ibid, pp. 17-18.
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in 1950 to 30 in 19S0. During the same pe~iod they increased from
12 to 43 in Brazil and i to 23 in Columbia.
II. Recent Research
While secondary cities are rbecoming a larger factor in the urban-
ization picture ir. many countries r the optimistic portrait of their pre-
sent contributions to national development has been dampened by evidence
revealed in Rondine11 i.' s research. l'1any of these cities are staqnatil29
-- mired in a vicious cycle of inadequate services r poor administration~
weak financial capacity and lack Qf investment. Rather than attractill9
the hoped-fQr ecQnomic growth and diverting migrant PQpu1ation from the
primate cities1' these secondary a,nd intermediate size urban areas have
been unable to (Wercome impediments tQ more active deve::.opment. They
are characterized by high unemployment a~ marginal enterprise, as well
as dependence on national treasl1ries whence comes the principal support
for their minimal levels of services.
The ge~era1 picture that emerges of middle-sized cities in
developing countries is that they are growing rapidly in population
in lftC:)st nations, and in number in a few; that their e<:Qnomies are
becoming increasinCJly diversified1' especially in nonagricultural
sectors; that they sl1pport larg~ numbers Qf small-scale mmmerc;:ial
and manufacturing activities~ that they perform a mix of I1r~an and
rural £unctiQns; and that they provide services, facilities, empo-
1Qyment QPPGrtunities and marketing and trade servic;:es that are
more accessi~le to a larger number Qf Pf!Gple than thQse in smaller
tQwns and rlual areas. Yet, the impressiGJR tltat also emerges is
that middle-sized dties play a relatively waf( r()le i-n national
development ••. In most cQuntries they account fQI a SIIlal1er per-
c;:entage Qf the I1r~an pG>ptilation than the largest metrG>politaft cen-
ter, tt.ey Itave grQWft relatively slowly eompared bO the largest
metr0fGlis, they have absorb@d a smaller portion ()f ur~an. Migrants1'
and their ,rQspects fQr relieving P0pulatiGJR pressl1res GJR the lar-
'fest cities seem relativeIl limited in much of the ftvelapinej .arid
if clJrrent dem0graphic tr@ftds hold for the test ()f this cefttllry.
l'1iddle-sized cities provide s\:l~stantial IIIlGl1nts (i)f emp1Gy111ent in
agr ieultllIal [Drocessing, cc:Jlllllercial aAd servic::e activities aond in
eQtt8C)e and artisan industry for their (JWft resill&nts, I!Nt haft
limited eapaeity be) absorD large mtmbers Gf rUl:al migrants. TMir
share of ma'Al1factl1ring activitil!s is often fal: SRla11er titan tAat Gf
the largest eHies, anet their aDility bG ecMftpete with the Major
metrQ)pGlises reINins wa.le. Many micicUe-8ize4 ¢1ti~. remaiR par-
tially nt:al iA ee0AGmie ~a8e, lifestyle, aM ~ysieal eh.!~ter­
istics~ the qual ity C!>f their social services and facilities remains
far bel~ that of the major metropolitan areas~ and their share Gf
cemmereial and serviee act! vities often seems tC3 be c1isprolMrtion-
ately l~ campared tG their share Gf pepu1atiC!>n.
5. RGnd ine111, 0, Cit., p. 44 .
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Why have middle-sized cities remained a relatively weak compo-
nent of the u=ban settlement system in developing nations? The
reasons differ from country to country, but one frequent and common
reason is that these cities have received a disproportionately low
share of national investments in infrastr~cture, services, industry
and other activities compared to the largest city in the country in
nearly every developing nation. The competitive advantage that the
largest metropolises, and especially the national capitals, main-
tain over intermediate cities is not due entirely to superior loca-
tion or efficiency, but to the fact that national governments in
many developing countries have favored the largest cities in the
allocation of the kinds of investments that support industry, cre-
ate job opportunities, provide better ~alth, ed~cational and
social services, and offer amenities that attract hiqher skilled
and better ed~ated workers, foreiqn and oomestic investment, and
entrepreneurs. i
Rondinelli goes at to examine a wide variety of data on population
and economic development of secondary cities. His conclusions represent
a <X>ncise statement of the prQspects faced by cotmtries and interna-
tional assistance aqencies whQ embark on policies to encourage secondary
city development.
In brief, the case histQries and studies Qf sp.condary cities in
developing cQuntries suggest that they can perform a wide varie-
ty Qf SG>Cial, ecQnQmic and service functions that are important
to regional and national development, although all secondary ci-
ties do oot pl!rform all of these functiQns Qr perf0rm them
well. ll'Greover, lJAder prQper cQnditions, secQndary cities can
be forces for the development of their hinterlands and for inte-
grating urban and rural areas within develQpinCJ reCJiQns ••• A
well-distributed system of secondary cities seems to be needed
to ensure that the benefits of lJrban qrowth spread to t0Wns and
villaqes in IlJral regions. 8ecQndary cities; in turn, must be
linked to srr.a1ler cities and market centers for inn<l>vations and
eooRQmic stimulants to make their way "tiQwr." the hierarchy <l>f
settlements and "outward" fran the urban core ••• The creation of
a system of seooRdary cities may a11<:* these larger Ilrban cen-
ters to increase the access of rural people t<l> their Ilrban ser-
vices and facilities, job opport~ities, and amenities mere
effectively.
But whether secondary cities grow spantane<l>llsly <l>r their
growth is stim~lated ~ CJ0vernment investment, their development
creates new problems as well as new oppertunities, and both mlJst
be considered in international assistance ~rograms and Aa ':ional
development strategies. 7
6. R0ndinelli, 0p Cit., pp. 94-9~.
7. I~id., p. 239-41.
Political factors, as well as economic, are forcing an increasing
number of ~lintries to formlilate decentralized development strategie~.
OUtlying regions are aware of higher incomes, 1'ICre consumption goods,
better services at the metropolitan centers. They want some of their
own. There is presslire to distriblite the benefits of development.
Everywhere the word is ~balance". The precise meaning varies from place
to place as do the measures taken to achieve it with respect to the
secondary cities.
As some countries evolve secondary city policy, they are as con-
cerned with removing obstacles to economic and social developlnE;nt as
wi th channellin~, the l;t1ysical manifestations of growth already tmder
way. The frame of reference varies from country to country, depending
on over all development strategy and available resources. Some look
toward long-range flitlire growth for the secondary cities: some, toward
more immediate development investments or toward improvements in present
living conditions.
Indonesia's program, f~r example, is largely remedial -- providing
water slipply, waste disposal and treatment and holising rehabilitation in
cities where these corrective measares are needed as a prelude to in-
creased economic development. In Tlinisia, the central government is
gearing its new five-year plan to direct invest into sm~ller intermed-
iate size cities and towns where there is little productive capacity at
present, essentially by-passing the two principal secondary cities of
Sousse and Sfax. These which are classed with Tunis as "high incane"
urban areas, able to function with little GlQtsi<Se assistance. Korell's
mlilti-faceted program is directed toward both growing II.",", sta9natil'llj
cities in an effort to create what Friedmann terms "an ir.tegrated space-
economy". Retarding the expansion of Seoul and 'Susan is the G:~ief Gb-
jective there.
The natlire of these efforts, the principles l1)!)0n which they u:e
based, the isslies they raise, a,nd the particular rGles Gf lanet lise
planning are discussed in the Chapters II and III.
Chapter IV cGnsiders the rGle for assistance by internatiGnal a94!n-
cies in prGmoting secondary city develGpment. Its CGnclusiGns are hea-
vily influenced by the lessons Gf AID Gffice (!)f Urban gevelGpment' s land
use prGgramming demonstratien as well as the recent efforts (!)f the CGun-
tries which have Been the sabject of special case studies f(!)[ this pre-
sent _rk.
Chapter II. OVerview
Case studies from fi?e countries -- Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea
and Tunisia - are the chief source of information on t~e nature t;)f con-
temporary proqrams for secondary cities of the deve'.oping world. Each
of the nations examined here has established some form of national urban
decentralization policy supported by programs to strengthen secondary
cities. This is the common thread.
The countries differ markedly in such matters as geographic loca-
tion, population size, level of economic development, level and scale of
urL"C'nization, and previous experience with efforts to improve secon.dary
citi ..."!. Indeed, in certain of these aspects they fall along a conti-
nuum. Brazil and Korea are relatively prosperous and urbanized. Both
have cor~siderable prior experience in development of secondary and in-
termediate size cities. Kenya is the least urbanized, has extremely low
per capita GNP, and little prior activity to encourage decentralized
urbanization. Tunisia and Indonesia cx>me between the extremes in each
of these factors. The sample of countr ies is not "representative" in
all respects. Yet the variety of settings and circumstances examined
can provide some important insights into how the developing world per-
ceives and addresses the basic problem.
This chapter reviews the range of approaches, experiences, and les-
sons. The individual cx>untry studies that follow it provide more exten-
sive assessment of the policies and programs and their respective
settings.
The following table Provides some base da ta on the countries:
Country 1980 Pop 1978 ~p Ann (JIlp , PoP , Orb PoP Cities
(million) Per Cap Growth Urban in Primate 100,000+1
Brazil 119.5 $1,570 4.9 67 16 68
Korea 36.6 1,160 6.9 65 41 35
Tunisia 6.0 950 4.8 52 31 3
Indonesia 136.0 360 4.1 20 23 27
Kenya 15.5 330 2.2 14 57 2
1. Secondary cities only, excludes primate city.
Regions represented extend across the developineJ world: Northern
and East Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Populations range from rela-
tively small (Tunisia) to relatively large (Brazil and Indonesia).
Levels of development are from quite low per capit~ GNP (Kenya and Indo-
nesia) to what the World Bank considers "middle income" (Tunisia) to
Brazil and Korea whose per capita GNP's are among the highest in the de-
velOJ.ji.ng world. Levels of urbanization also range from two predolninant-
1y rural countries (Kenya and Indonesia) to two which have clearly made
the transition to predominantly UEban nations (Iorea and Brazil). Each
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country has a dominant -primate- metropo11tan region, although in Kenya
the population of Nairobi is still under 1,000,000 while both Brazil and
Korea each have two mega-cities (Rio and Sao Paolo, Seoul and Busan).
Brazil and !{orea are the most urbanized with the largest number of
cities ~·er 100,000. Kenya is the least urbanized, ~~th only two cities
other than Nairobi at the lOn,aOO-p1us level.
While development characteristics vary, all the five oountries
share a similar feature of inter-governmental relationships. The cen-
tral government is the principal source of public investment capital 50r
secondary cities. Except for Brazil, which has a federal form of
national government, and large independent states, all the oountries
have administrative systems characterized by highly centralized con-
trol. Even in Bra:i1, however, state and local governments are depen-
dent on central autl.or i ties for major supplements to their constrained
capital resources.. Centralization of the principal scarce of public
capital investment, ard commensurate central government direction of the
local development precess, is characteristic of the developing world,
and in this sense the sample is representative.
I. Basic Approaches
Each of the five coantries has articulated national policy to fos-
ter decentralized urbanization, committing special earmarked funds from
the nation&l treasury for communi ties outside the primate center. The
natare of these formal commitments differs considerably as each country
seeks its own formula related to political ~~nditions, available resour-
ces and the scale of urbanization. The two most develoPed nations, Bra-
zil and ]forea, have been in the business of formal \irban decentraliza-
tion for many years. Their current policies and programs represent the
latest evolution of efforts with long histories. For Kenya, the least
developed, the formalation of a secondary city policy with commitment of
program funds is quite new.
In every case, however, an extremely high level of technical and
analytic skill by native professionals has been involved in the framing
of policies and programs at the national ll!Vels. Only in the two most
deve:1oped, Brazil and Korea, is there a reasonably adequate cadre of
trained professionals and administrators at the local ll!Vel to partici-
pate in the policy and program form\ilation and to carry throuqh with
implementation.
A. Selectivity
T~e greatest danger in an effort to establish balance between
the primate centers and other areas is dispersion of investment rp.sour-
ces. There is a temptation to move too quickly in too many places, pro-
viding bi ts and piec:es of special assistance in the hope that poll tieal
pressures can be muted and that self-generating development in outlying
areas will miraculously occur. While selection of a limited number of
target eenters in which to cencentrate investment resources may be more
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appropriate from a development standpoint, it carries inevitable politi-
cal per ils and the possible charge of exclusivity. Many nations have
been through a struggle between dispersion and selectivity, especially
in the early stages of grappling with the issues.
Each of these countries has attempted to be selective in identi-
fying target areas. Yet the degree of selectivity, along with the deg-
ree of realism about accomplishing objectives wi thin a stipulated time
frame, appears to be airectly related to current levels of development
and previous experience with attempting diffusion of economic growth.
Thus, Brazil and Korea have really been selective in identifying a lim-
ited number. of target centers for application of investment, technical
assistance and training over a five-year P'!riod. Kenya's concept con-
siders projects in a very large number of c~nters relative to its avail-
able resources and technical capacity. Many of these places are quite
small. Tunisia and Indol1esia are between the two extremes.
All three of the lesser developed countries have established pro-
ject implementation or other development objectives far in excess of
what can reasona~ly be accomplished in the foreseeable future.
1. Brazil
Brazil has selected 10 cities out of 200 in the 50,000 -
500,000 populatioo class as the focus of a comprehensive, federally
assisted program of economic, infrastructure, and technical skills deve-
lopment. The World Bank is providing $80 millioll of financin.g for that
program which, over a ~ive-year period, will channel a total of $200
million of funds to the s,'!lected cities.
Brazil has had oonunitments to decentralized urbanization for two
decades, yet this is the first effort to combine precise targeting with
a wide array of assistance measures. During the 1960s the country began
to provide special support to secondary cen.ters. A special training and
research institution was established (IBAM) with USAID assistance to up-
grade the skills of municipal administrators. Dozens of cities received
planning assistance under the SERFHAU program which made consultar.t pro-
fessionals readily available. The National Housing Bdnk (BNH), armed
with resources of the workers' pension funds, began to place housing and
infrastructure investments in cities throughout Brazil.
Since the early 1970s the country has had a formal national policy
stressing IJrban decentralization. Even as these separate efforts were
IJnder way. it became clear to both Brazilian authorities and the World
Bank that an array of linked investments and technical assistance mea-
sures would be a preferable approach, and th:t the formidable problems
of coordination and of allocation of limited r'sources mandated that the
new "integrated" approach be tr ied out in a few cormnuni ties only, at
least initially. Thus ten cities, which seemed to have both plromising
development potential and influence on a larger rlJral hinterland, were
chosen as targets for the comprehensive program.
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2. Korea
Korea's experience has been similar to ~razil. There the new
five year national development plan. sPeCifically target.s fourteen urban
areas of more ttan lOQ,QOQ population for 3 battery of development
incentives and public sector investments. Approx;mately $800 million of·
capital investment will be allocated.
Due to the rapid gr)Wth of Seoul (now over 6 million) and its vul-
nerability (less than 40 miles frOll. the North Kcrean border), garea has
been stimulating decentralized urbanization since the 1960s. Express
highways have link'E"1 cities throughout the countr~~ with each other and
Seoul. Major industrial inv~stments have built up Busa." as a second
"primate" and resulted in rapid growth of industrial centers such as 01-
san and Masan had but a few thousand r-sidents a decade ago. A natio~al
land development policy callinq for contairunent of the capital and dis-
tribution of investments elsewhere has been in effect for over a decade.
These measl1res have clearly had results. Seoul has continued to
grow, but at a lesser rate and it no longer gets the bulk of new indus-
trial ir~'1estment and employment. Many other cities have become commer-
cial and ':'ndustrial contr.ibutors to the country's nmarkable economic
progress.
Nevertheless, Korean officials and researchers have become aware
that many cities with potential lack critical infrastrllctare, housin,!,
and social/edacational services to be competitive with Seoul for i~vest­
ment a~ skilled populatial. This is the background of the National
Planning Board's dl!cision - still to be ratified by the President and
Cabinet -- to identify a limited number of places as targets for special
coordinated assistance during the next plan period. Whether fourteen is
too many, or the specific locations proposed will be those finally cho-
sen are among the issues to be debated before the pelicy is formally and
officially adopted.
Tunisia is less developed than either Brazil or Korea, but its
population is n0W more than 50 per cent urban and it is considered a
"middle income" country by the World Bank. It, toG, has had a history
of urban decentralization ~fforts, but not nearly as "formal" or exten-
sive as the other two. In the 1960s, the Tunisians, assisted by inter-
national development agencies, were fanneling investments ol1tside of
Tunis into the promising tourism/agricultu"al/indl1strial region along
the Mediterranean coast. Two urban areas in particl1lar, Sousse-Monastir
and Sfax, were the beneficiaries and are now highly productive, rapidly
growing ~enters with a wide array of urban services and facilities.
Tl1nisia suffers sHious imbalance in the looation of natl1t:al re-
sources as well as incomes, and there is considerable politi~al pressure
to place investment in the ~lJntry's interiGr communities. As in Korea,
a new five-year plan is bei~! drafted, stipulating priorities for
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lagging regions and interior cities and developing a series of restric-
tions to deter further investment in Sousse and Sfax as well as Tunis.
USAID has made loan rommitments for housing, infrastructure and serv:'ce
investments in seven small communities of 2,000 - 45,000 popuiation).
The World Bank, in addition to investments in Tunis and Sfax, will be
assisting a special centrally-based community loan fund to place and
manage investments in urban projects throughout the rountry.
The Tunisians are extremely wary of th€ "targeting" concept. While
they have created a new institution to deal wi th the regional physical
implications of the plan, officials discuss d~signing programs for all
or "many" interior centers. The dimensions of urban assistance have }~t
to be defined, but the Tunisians seem to b! considering a dispersed
communi ty development effort which will severely stretch available re-
sources and skills. This approach is being considered C1espi te the
opinion in some official circles that very little economic developm~nt
can be expected unless individual communities have full complements of
infrastructure, social, and recreational services.
4. Indonesia
Indonesia has a large number of seoondary cities (27) but a
per capita GNP which places it among the poorer developing nations. It
must deal with rapid urbanization in many places, but using relatively
meager resources compared with Brazil, Korea, and even Tunisia.
The Indonesians are, at this point in their development history,
more concerned with creating minimally adequate levels of water, sani···
tation, and basic human services in their cities, than with stiml1lating
economic development. Indeed, they envision creation c:>f these minimal
levels as a necessary prerequisite to ecc:>nomic grc:>wth. Thl1s they are at
a different stage in their urbanization policy than Brazil, !c:>rea, or
even TlInisia.
Despite the pc:>litical and human pressures to distribute limited
investment resources, the Indc:>nesians ha~ made a ser ic:>us effc:>rt at
selectivity in their prc:>gram: available investment funds are tc:> be con-
centrated in ten major cities, 50 cities of 50,000-100,000 PG>pulatic:>n,
and 400 smaller communities. In additic:>n, the specific investments in
housing, a majc:>r program component, are tc:> be concentrated in 30 of
these. A great deal <:>f internati<:>nal agency support is going into the
Indonesian pr~gram: technical assistance at the nati<:>nal level, train-
ing <:>f planners and managers, and very substantial levels of l<:>an fund-
ing f0r certain target cities.
The Indonesian "targeting" decisions were reached in formulation of
the current five year plan (Repeli ta III) which went int0 effect in
1979. Yet one must question whether the program is still to<:> diffuse
f0r achievement 0f even the minimum service objectives dur ing the plan
per iod. It is a sign of the formidable 0bstacles faced, that in only
one 0f the "target" cities (Bandung) is the full array of investment and
assistance measures in place as of 1982. The 0ther.:ities are ~3cheduled
15
for one or more cf the program activitic!s, but rx:>t the fall and integ-
rated combination.
5. Kenya
Kenya is the least urbanized ;;''"~ poorest of the five coan-
tries. It has the smallest pri.•,ate center - Nairobi is still below
1,000,000 -- only two cities over 100,000, and only two other settle-
ments whose population exceeds 45,000. Kenya's second development plan
(1970-74) called for a hierarchy of seven growth centers outside Nai-
robi, but according to reviews commissioned for the World Bank, rela-
tively little implementation of decentraiized investment or.carred. Most
apgrading and development activity has been confined to Nairobi and ~om­
basa. The one set of projects for the third city Qf KisWllu has encoun-
teted serious implementation difficalties.
Carrently, however. Kenya has with the arging of three internation-
al agencies (USAID, the World Bank and ~ritain's ODA) embarked on a ma-
jor program of decentralized arban oevelQpment. Target commanities have
been selected for the estimated $4G-50 million Qf internatiQnal assis-
tance oo\1pled with domestic funds. Yet the targets are numerQUs. They
tQtal 36 cities, tQWns and secQndary service centers, more even than the
number targeted for shelter support in Indonesia, a country many ti~s
Kenya's size. llIIethods and timing fQr the Kenya prC:1(jram have not y@t
been finali7.Pd at the time Qf this writing oot issaes of implementation
will ::>e large, indeed, SQ long as what is effectively a "dispersed"
investment approach remains in effect.
B. Institational Adaptation at the National Level
Each"f the case aoantries has a hi<Jhly aeRtralized fGrm Qf
<JGvernment or, in the special case of Brazil, a decent&:alize'i adminis-
trative system heavily depeRdeRt on the federal government for develop-
ment investmeRts. AllQcatim systems, and the cQrresponding iRstita-
tions which adm:'nister them,. seem to sastain the dependency Qf indivi-
dual cities.
Despite the wide differen~e in actlial administratiw 0rganizatiM,
the allocation methods have been basically simil~~: sectoral agencies at
the natiamal level have determined, on the ba~is of their awn priori-
ties, which commlinities receive individlial sectoral investments. WheR
these investments have beeR liRked in ooncept (e.g. halising, indlistrial
develQpment and iRfrastracture, serir.>\As GQC.~lri:.ttiGA problems have been
eRCGlinteted in their a~plieati0R.
Effective decentralization Gf urban development requires, at the
very le~st, eoordinated programming of investments and t~chnical assis-
tance for given cities at the central level. 1"ssentially, this means
adaptation of institutions of central 90vernm~nt to achieve the neces-
sary linkages.
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Such adaptation has occurred or is occurril19 in each of the five
count:ries~ As a sign of cOl1Dl\itment it is no longer "business as usual"
among the ministries and sectoral agencies, although the extent of 3dap-
taticn and the degree of effectiveness varies.
In B4 azil a strong coordinating body, the Council on Urban Develop-
merit (CNDU), has been established w:lthin the Ministry of Interior. It
has its own technical staff to administer and monitor the program. On
this body are represented the top officials of the individual sectoral
agencies and institutions (BNH) who provide the central government's in-
vestment resources.
Korea's new five year plan calls for major reoLganization to imp-
lement the new secondary city program. Some key decisions remain to be
made. Alternatives under consideration range from creation of an omni-
bus Urban Development Corporation to conduct integrated projects in the
target cities, to a restructt-:ing of responsibilities of the two key
ministries, Construction and BanE:. Affairs, in provincial level construc-
tion bureaus. Until the matter is resolved, direct supervision of acti-
vities for the target cities will be exercised bf the National Planning
Board under a Deputy Pr ime Minister. Similar to Brazil, a special 00-
ordinating committee will be crei!ted, comprising representatives from
all of the implementing agencies along with senior technical ad~isers.
Tunisia, too, has moved towards consolidated responsibility, al-
trough not quite to tile degree of the t.wo more developed countries. A
"super regional" commission has been established to formulate physical
and economic development pro~_ams throughout the country. It is still
unclear whether that Commission will control central government invest-
ments or will play more of an advisory and coordinating role. A Central
Projects unit has been established within the powerful ministries of
Finance and Interior to provide municipal planning and management assis-
tance and to supervise a special municipal loan fund. The Ministry of
Equipment and several parastatal agencies which develop 'lotJsinCJ, indus-
try, and utilities, will continue to alloca":e their own resotJrces to
individual communities, within the guidelines of the new five year plan.
Indonesia has evolved an unusual mixture of formal and informal
institutional relationships to foster coordination of central government
investment in the tarCJet cities. As in Korea, two Ministries (Construc-
tion and Home Affairs) have principal responsibilities. The former imp-
lements the fall range of capital investments allocated to the target
cities and provides urban planning assistance to knit these projects
together at the local level. The Ministry (J>f Hml~ Affairs is respon-
sible for approvals of both plan and annual capital project bu~get. In
a series of marathon sessions at the end of each fiscal year, the two
agencies meet to determine the final project package for each city.
Given the scale and complexity of Indonesia, this process could become
extremely cumbersome, but a set of strong informal relationships has
been created between the two institutions which permits burealicratic
pr0tocol t.G be downplayed and a co0perative effort on resource alloca-
tion to succeed.
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In Kenya redistrit..1tion of authority and responsibility at the
national level is under way. Three agencies (Ministry of Urban Develop-
ment and Housing, Ministry of Local Government, and Camnissioner of
L3nds) have principal responsibilities for allocating and supervising
i~7estments. one initial step toward coordination has been transfer of
the Physical Planning Department fran MLG to the implementing MUI:S. The
mor~ important step, backed by the international agencies, is to create
a Project Planning Unit within MUDH to play a major role in forging in-
terministerial ties and coordinating the activities of national, provin-
cial, district and local authorities. The Project Planning Unit will
monitor the flow of funds and exercise over all control of the project
schedule. This P~DU is to receive technical assistance from the inter-
national donors.
In concept it is similar to the coordinating project units in Indo-
nesia, Tunisia, and Brazil, all fostered by international agencies in an
effort to obtain coordination at the national level. Only Korea has
moved in the direction of integrating their urbanization policy, of
which the secondary cities program is a component, into over all nation-
al planning.
C. Application of APproaches Tested in the Primates
Interest in secondary city development tends to emerge
after a country has tried to grapple with primate city or metropolitan
growth. Wider application of the approaches and tyPes of projects de-
vised for the metropolitan centers is usually the heart of the secondary
cities program. How to mount a program consisting of multiple, scaled-
down vetsiors of the solutions tried in the primate cities is the con-
cern of the oountries studied, except for Brazil. Adaptation for the
secondary city context appears to be treated mainly a matter of adjl1s-
ting institutional arrangements to the new demands of planning and imp-
lementing concl1rrent and widely dispersed projects. Quite understand-
ably, issues of administrative capacity and personnel training are coming
to the fore in connection with the secondary cities development prog-
rams~ similarly, questions of reconciling the need for central govern-
ment accol1ntability and control with also-recognized needs for local
participation. The nature and extent of the r.ole of local government 4n
these programs, and the appropriate channels and processes for local
participation are given varying deCJrees of attention, lar<;;ely fr0fn the
point of view, h0wever, 0£ inputs or responsibilities to a central <;;ov-
ernment undertaking.
Brazil ia the one country 0f the five which is not "imposinCJ" cent-
rally formulated s01utions and institl1ti0ns 0n its tarCJet ci ties, even
th0ugh nati0nal institutions such as the HOl1sing Ban.k, which be<;;an its
operati0ns in the principal cities, are am0ng the implementinCJ aCJencies
inVOlved. In Brazil, the projects proposed and funded have been lar<;;ely
generated by local g0vernments Wh0 have prepared integrated, "justifi-
able" programs f0r funding. That this has occurred, reflects Brazil's
relative level 0f development (the highest of the five countries), the
degree 0f auton0my of its state and local units 0f g0vernment, and its
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relative abundance of skilled technical and administrative personnel in
secondary cities. This latter is a situation toward which Brazil has
been working 2C years.
The other four countries aspire to being able to rely similarly on
the competence of local authorities for ~dentification and design of
flilndable projects. One lesson Clf the Brazi~.ian experience may be, how-
ever, that such local initiative can only occur after a long effort to
develop local technical capacity -- a mat:ter which the three least
developed countries are only now beginning to address. Another issue
related to development of local leadership is the matter of the stakes
that are involved, i.e. discretionary resources that are available at
that level.
In Korea, one of the main participating agencies is the National
Housing Corporation which began building housing estates in Seoul during
the 1960s and has gradually expanded its operations nationwide. Its
production level of ever 45,000 units annually is one of the largest in
the world. The high rise, high density projects designed for Seoul's
condi tiens of pressing need and the scarcity and costs of land there
have been modified for the intermediate size cities and towns elsewhere
in the country.
In Tunisia, the three main parastatal organizations which develop
housing, community services and industry along with the utilities dev~­
lopment oorpocations all began their operations in Tunis. Lessons
learned from these projects are now being applied in the secondary
cities. Urban upgrading has recently been attempted in Tunis for the
firCJt time. After much initial reluctance the government is now com-
mitted to upgrading as an approach for the the secondary centers, using
institutional arrangements and data qatherir-aq techniques developed in
TUllis.
Indonesia is applying the form of urban development activil! tested
in Jakarta. Lo!te in the 1960s the country elected to pursue urban up-
grading in Jakarta. Rather than tear out informal settlement areas
(kampungs), the government em~arked on a Ramptmg Improvement Program,
with World Bank assistance. Jakarta's KPIs are the model for urban
initiatives, widely studied for a.pplicability elsewhere in the wGrld.
They involve installation of minimally sufficient services, upgrading of
majGr water r sanitation, and SGlid waste systems and assistance tG fami-
lies with reconstruction Gr repair Gf their dwellings.
In Ren~'o!, it is the basic urban development solution, tried fiest
in NairGbi and Mombasa, which will becGme the principal vehicle fGr the
secondary city improvement prGgram. This invGlves sites and services
combined with ~asic infrastructure.
II. The Rit of TOGls; Content of the Secondary Cities Programs
Each of the countries studied is committed to invest in "packages"
of projects for its secondary or intermediate size cities. The project
combinations inc~ude capital inve~tments, 9Dmetimes additional
incentives for locating inQustrial or commercial facilities in the tar-
geted oommunitie$, technical assistance and training. Generally all
countries are sUfficiently sophisticated to recognize that a single cap-
ital project (e.g. a factory or a water system) is insufficient to stim-
ulate developmant. In this sense they are more sensitive to realities
of the development process tha':l oountries which tried to decentralize
growth a decade or more ago by scatter ing individual investments among
numerous oommunities.
Yet, the five countries differ oonsiderably in the array of tools
they apply. Brazil and lorea have the widest array, and the greatest
apparent flexibility. All can be modified to suit local conditions.
Those in the less developed nations (particularly lenya) are limited in
both number and flexibility. The variety of development tools and the
sensitivity with which they can be applied may well be a function of
past experience and relative amount of resources available.
A. Brazil
Brazil has used industrial location incentives and investr.ient
as direct techniques of urban decentralization for many years. The for-
mal secondary cities program encompasses a much wider range of measures
and includes assistance to develop the local economy, to expand infra-
structure and housing, and to improve municipal administration. The
program in one city, Natal, is indicative of the others. It comprises
thirteen undertakings distributed in three general categories.
1. Economic develOpment and job creation: provision of facil-
ities for public ma[kets~ financial, technical and facili-
ties assistance to fishermans cooperativesJ technical
assistance to conunercial and indlJstrial firms with fewer
than ten employees.
2. Infrastructure, oonununity facilities and services, and
housing: _ter, sewer, and storm drainage expansionJ im-
pr0vement of garbage collection and disposalJ transporta-
tion improvements including both road extensi0n and bus
service~ expanden of a sites and services pro!JramJ con-
struction of public health clinicsJ construction of a
police substation.
3. Munici~al jevernment imrrevements: provision of eleetronic
equipment for financial contr01 activitiesJ imprevements in
record-keeping and other aspects of cadastral surveys.
B. lorea
Rorea, perhaps the most centrally controlled of the five coun-
tries in the study, h~s been able to carry out a wide variety 0f invest-
ment projects in selected cities: industrial estates, major transporta-
tien facilities construction, electrification and c0mmunications
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installations, water and sewer systems, housing ~states, health and edu-
cation projects and the like. ~ombined with these have been credit pro-
grams, technical assistance and training for local administrative per-
sonnel.
Korea has also instituted substantial economic incentives and pen-
alties to direct new industrial investment to locations outside Seoul.
Other measures, including special Seoul resident taxes and limitation of
enrollment :'n the capital city's universities have been tried. Under
the new five-year development plan, all these measures and others will
be promoted.
A new emphasis on improving the living environment with C'.1ltural
and social facilities and services is under discassion in some official
circles, with the objective of bringing certain high-priority target
cities up to Seoul's standards. While recognizing that the target
cities should, in principal, offer attractions comparable to some de~ree
with Seoul's, the planners also blclude improved access to Seoul from
the target cities as a key element in their strategy to make these
cities attractive to potential investors and residents
c. Tunisia
Tunisia also offers tax and capital loan incentives to private
enterprise. Its main development tools are serviced industrial sites at
low cost, provision of a package of housing for a wide range of inC'"lme
levels combined with conunercial services and conununity facilities, and
shelter upgrading. These are slated for financing under the new five-
year plan, supplemented with external assistance. In addition the spe-
cial loan fund for municipalities is being expanded and considerable
technical assistance will be applied to identify feasible projects of
various kinds at the municipal levels.
D. Indonesia
At a GNP per capita less than one-half that of Tunisia, Indo-
nesia's primary concern is to provide minimally standard levels of ser-
vices in its secondary cities and smaller o::>mmunities. These minimal
services are seen as a necessary prelude to economic development and
comprise the basic program. They include the Rampung improvement up-
grading, water, sew~r, solid waste, drainage, and sites and services.
PERUMNAS' program of conventional rousing constr\lction is ooordi-
nated with these other improvements. Technical assistance is also being
applied in planning and project management, and t:le oo\lntry, with inter-
national support, is embarked on a major effort to provide technicians,
administrators and planners f0r the smaller cities.
E. Kenya
Kenya is the poorest and least urbanized of the five co\lntries,
and has the most limited number of components in its secondary city tool
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package. These are primarily sites and services and upgrading along
with associated utilities improvements. While Kenya. is committed to
training and technical assistance and income generation projects as part
of its program. these components have yet to be detailed.
V. The Issue of Decentralized ReSponsibility and Control
An effort to develop se~ndary cities affords a fandamental chal-
lenge to the basic structure of governance in developing countries.
over and above the basic requirements for public and private capital is
the need to devolve increasiI:!g responsibility on local authorities and
to obtain increasing participation fr~ local individuals and groups.
Capi tal in~stment may come fran the center, but project implemen-
tation cannot be administered entirely from the center. Rondinelli,
Rivkin and others have observed that successful cases of secondary city
development invariably involve management, participation and. ultimate-
ly, investment from the cities themselves.
Yet most developing countries are highly oentralized, and politi-
cal, as well as administrative and fiscal, controls are exercised by the
national government. The "dependency" tradition is a strong one~ and
any efforts to lessen economic dependency invariably involve the pros-
pect (perceived, in some cases, as a threat) of more independent politi-
cal decision-making at local levels as well. Each of the five countries
in this study has recognized the twin necessities of on-site coorcHna-
tion of investments and local involvement. None of the national govern-
ments is eager to relinquish control of its funds, however, anj each is
trying to rearrange its institutional structure with great care.
The most oonunon approach is establishment of re<)ional or local
offices of central government implementing bodies to supervise construc-
ti0n of projects approved, if not designed, in the capital. Yet each
country has also tried to induce S0me form of local participation in
pr0gram planning and project formulation. The results vary. Again. we
see a spectrum, with the greatest measure of local participati0n in the
mo~t developed oountry, i.e. Brazil, and the least in the poorest
nation, Kenya.
A. Brazil
Among the countries studied, Brazil's local authorities bear
the greatest resPGnsibilities for intermediate city development pro-
grams. Mayors and councils of the target cities are elected. They and
their staffs have generated the pr0ject ideas. A project management
unit has been established within each city administration to direct and
monitor the program, and p-ach city has the responsibility to make major
fiscal oontributions. At the same time a complex monitoring and appro-
val structure has been imposed with final deci.sions on I\'lO~t major in-
vestments co~ing from CNDU and the sectoral agencies involJed in imple-
mentation. At least in the case of Natal, where local political respon-
sibility and technical oompetence exist, the effort appears to be
wor king well.
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B. Korea
Korea is a highlj·-disciplined country under what is effectively
central military rule. Although the law provides for election of local
mayors and councils, such elections have not been held for mai'y years.
Local government administrators are members of a professional cadre of
civil servants responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs, or in the
case of the four largest urban areas, directly to the Deputy Prime Min-
ister who is also the chief executive officer of th~ National Planning
Board. Many Korean cities are developing rapidly. Numerous investments
are being placed by the national gover~.ment and generated by local pri-
vate business.. Korea's development programs have thllS far been managed
through decentralized units of nati\)nal government implementing agen-
cies. There is some invo) vement of local business and professional
leaders, mainly through committees advisory to the government.
Perhaps the key to Korea's effectiveness has been competent munici-
pal administration. Mayors can and do hire the professional and tech-
nical staffs to help manage the cities, and they have resources to ob-
tain such assistance as they need from outside consultants. Indeed,
KQrean cities are operated very much as cities in Europe or the Ulited
States, but for the absence Qf locally-elected officials. Even so, ma~y
KQrean Qbservers see the new targeting prGgram as demanding greater
public participation at the municipal level, if its Qbjective of creat-
ing significant economic growth in fourteen centers is tQ be achieved.
c. Tlinisia
Tunisia i~ just beginning to deal with the political and admin-
istrative issues PGsed by decentralized urbanizati~. Thus far the
majQr step has been creatiQn 0f regiooa1 Qffices f0r the principal
deve10pment agencies. Although provincial goyernors are appointed by
the Ministry of Interior, local mayors and counc{ 1s are elected. The
successful experience in secondary city development at Sousse and Sfax
has benefited frQm the considerable leadership of these elected looal
officials and from their ability to muster prQfessiQnal staff support.
Similar 100011 leadership and competence has rarely emerged else-
where. Tunisian central government Qfficials are quick to state that
unless this materializes, the decentralizatiQn effQrt will fail.
Several apprQaches are being cQnsidered to stimulate 9rea~er local
involvement and oompetence. All the parastatal agencies confer with
local Qfficials bef(ne finaliziACJ projec;:t sites and prC3ject plans, and
local apprQval is required. Camnuni ties are now required to prepare
five-year prQject investment plans, and they will receive technical
assistance in refining these plans.
Alth0ugh the training activities have oot been precisely defined,
b0th the central ~0vernment and the internati0nal aid a~encies are com-
mitted to impr0ving the caliber Qf local administratQrs. Residents 0f
the inf0rmal settlements to be upgraded will also be invQlved in project
fC3rmulatiQn and executi0n.
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D. Indonesia
In Indonesia, central government implementing agencies are
decentralized to the provincial and local levels. !'layors aM councils
meet with staff of these agencies to draft annual capital investment
plans. The Bandl1ng urban development program is the intended model for
all the comprehensive secondary city efforts. Its implementation is
being handled by a joint authority, representing both the central
government and the municipality, under direction of a single admin-
istrator.
Indonesia's most successful attempts at participation have been in
the Kampung improvement projects, largely because of the extensive pol-
i tical/administrative organization in Indonesian society wich estab-
lishes chains of command down to the nei4Jhb<'Jrhood and block level.
Using these chains of command, community organizers have obtained help?
e.g. labor, ideas and support from the Kampung residents. Results have
often been spectacular, as the residents proceed to improve their dwel-
lings and establish new enterprises once the infrastructure and commun-
ity facilities improvements are installed.
E. Kenya
One of the objectives of the national program is tQ increase
lQcal government decision-making and management capacity. Elected tQWn
ceuncils have responsibility fQr administration, oot derive most Qf
their resources from central al;1thor i ties anc'- have been 11ttle tested as
develQpment managers. In Kisumu and ~basa, local Reusing Development
Departments have been established tQ help plan and manage sites and ser-
vices projects. Apparently, however, these have taken considerable time
tQ staff and to gain acceptance with central government agencies. Al-
theugh the expanded prQ9ram calls fQr plrojects in 30 cities and tQwt1S
and the training of local officials and technicians, an applroach has not
yet been fQrmulated to meet the local participatiGn objecti~s.
VI. Local Fiscal ContributiQns and ResfGAsibilities
There is general reoognitiQn that looal gevernment must bear inc-
reasing respensibility fQr financial centributiGns to the develQPftlent
precess. All the oolintties Mlieve that central government's Clplital
investments, m matter how massive, can in the long rlin be eonsiclered
only "seed" meney. The municipaliti~~ need to finance increasing shares
of publie werks, I:'artly because ef a limit te central government and
fereign er international 2Igency capi.tal, and partly because ef the be-
lief that ence communities begin te risk their eWA funds, they will have
a greater oommitment tG effective program management.
There are several preblems with this view. The lecal cemllhlnities
have limited revenue-raising authGrity. Even JlI(;)[e im~rtant, many Gf
the ml:lnici};')alities, becalise ef endemi.c peverty, peer er non"'existent
recQrds, and limited will, eto not even oollect the revenues tG which
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they are entitled. one of the major achievem'!nts of AID's pilot urban
assistance program in Tamale, Ghana, was training of students hired --
and paid -- to colle~t taxes.
The issue of local fiscal responsibility was not directly addressed
in the field investigations, but it came up regularly in discussions
with officials in all of the countries. In Korea and Brazil, local
revenue resources are relatively significant. Natal, for example,
raises 60 per cent of its operating and capital budget through taxation
and other levies. In Korea, most intermediate cities manage to finance
about half their operating bucgets through property taxation and other
local sources of revenue. In these count~ies, however, the aspiration
levels are high as well. Development programs which call for increasing
levels of amenities, cultural facilities and social services in advance
of the contributions that new development will eventually make to t:le
local tax base present a particular problem. Thus the programs in both
countries call for improved record-keeping and wider local taxing auth-
ority or new mechanisms in the realm of public finance.
For Tunisia, Indonesia, and Kenya the prospects of many centers
becoming competitive with the primates are much farther in the future.
In all three countries the issue is provision of basic human services.
Local governments provide minimal portions of operating budgets and al-
most no capital investment. Without economic growth the chance of inc-
reased revenue raising is dim, and a vicious cycle ensues. For two of
the cases, Tunisia, and Indonesia, there is a commitment to increased
local funding. Both countries have instituted loans at 1ittle or no
interest with long amortization periods for projects such as water
supply and public markets. Both countries are also instituting techni-
cal assistance to improve cadastral records and tax collection proce-
dures. The minimal financial contributions by localities that are pos-
sible in each of these three countries, however, casts additional doubt
on the viability of a program with so many cities targeted for develop-
ment.
VII. International AssistaAce
International financial and technical assistance and training have
major rol'!s in the secondary cities programs of all the five countries
examined. In certain respects -- particularly in Brazil and Kenya --
the inter"/ention of international institlJtions has contr ibuted to the
basic policy formulation of the programs. The insti tlJtional reorgani-
zation under way at national and local levels in Brazil, Kenya, and TlJn-
isia has been spur r@ld -- and perhaps required -- by the international
lenders. These are delicate, and in some respects creative, roles.
Responsive host country governments make slJch roles possible. The pros-
pect of large capital loans to finance essential elements of the decent-
ralization programs is an important factor. All of the OOlJntr ies are
investing domestic capital in the developmeLt programs as well, blJt whe-
ther the scale of the programs welJld be so ambitious without the exter-
nal donor agencies' participation is an open qlJestion.
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The types of activity vary along with the institutions who are par-
ticipating, although the World Bank and USAID are the principal actors.
A. Brazil
In Brazil the World Bank is the major external donor agency
participant. The Bank.' c= intervention was significant in the formal
establishment of the secondary cities program and the restructuring of
capital allocations for the target cities at the national level. Pro-
ject management units were created in the target cities, and the
strategy-oriented approach to project selection acceptr.!d. With the
Bank's $80 million in seed loans, a total of $200 million has been
obtained for the program.
Although USAID is no longer active in Brazil, its support almost
two decades ago of the public administration institute (IBAM) helped
provide Brazil with the means of developing a force of ~killed adminis-
trators and technicians for the smaller cities. Without these personnel
Brazil's cities would oot have the capacity to carryon the project
planning and urban management essential to present secondary cities
program.
B. Korea
---
In~~~national institutions have played a somewhat less central
role in Korea. The policies, programs and administrative organization
have been created by the Koreans themselves. Both the World Bank anci
USAID have seeded some of the program activities: AID (which is no lon-
ger active) by housing loans tC" secondary cities during the 1970s and
the Bank, through its extensive pilot regional development projects in
Gwangju, its assistance in establishing the Korea Land Development Cor-
poration and training its personnel, and now with a major housing loan
of $ 90 million to the Korea National Housing Corporation anci the
National Land Development Corporation.
C. Tunisia
During the 1960s and 1970s World Bank investments, particularly
in tourism and transportation spurred the development of Sousse and Sfax
as major secondary centers. USAID began to program hc,using loans for
secondary cities several years a~. Now both the World Bank and AID
have joined forces to provide project loans for upgrading, management,
and technical assistance in several secondary centers and have influ-
enced central government reorganization by pressing for a Central pro-
jects unit to administer the program and to expand other loan opportu-
nities to the municipalities themselves. OVer and above these actIvi-
ties, Tunisian land use planning has been greatly influenced by a subs-
t ..,.,tial number of Pe,ice Corps Volunteers stationed in the secondary
cities a decade or more E.gO.
26
D. Indonesia
In Indonesia both the activities and the "umber of participants
are major. Several years ago the World Bank supported Kampung Improve-
ment in Jakarta and has continued to participate in succeeding genera-
tions of the program, now extended to secondary cities. The Asian Deve-
lopment Bank and USAID provided planning grants for infrastructure and
land use planning in two major cities (Bandung and Medan, respectively).
These projects are now being followed by internationally-supported imp-
lementation efforts. ADS's $14 million loan to Bandung, combined with
continuing technical assistance, su~rts that city'S comprehensive imp-
rovement program which is to be the model for other areas. UNICEF and
the Dutch Government have provided grants, loans, technical and training
support.
Now USAID itself has embarked on a significant program to provide
both funds and instructors for training in urban and regional planning.
The objective is to help increase local technical capacity in the target
cities.
E. Kenya
World Bank, AID, and aDA have had considerable influence in
helping the I{enyans formula~-= a policy for secondary urban develop-
ment. The three donors combined are providing $40-50 million in loans
to support sites and services and infrastructure projects. These
agencies, it may be expected, will prov'i.de technical and training
assistance as well.
Inte rnational agency support of secondary city development in the
five c~untries in this study, as in others, is significant as decentral-
izing urbanization emerges as a development priority. llklBt of donor
activities in this field are relatively recent am can not yet be
assessed for their effectiveness. Given the substantial oonunitments
being made, however, the informa~ion gleaned from the AID pilot projects
and the country case studies should be of interest.
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Chapter III. Urban Planning and Land Use Management
A principal purpose of this investigation was to examine the role
of land use planning in se~ondary city programs, and to assess the form
and oontent of current planning practice. A number of conclusions can
be drawn.
I. The Role of Planning
All of the oountries regard urban l;t1ysical planning as a useful
tool in management of secondary cities. Land use planning in one form
or another is being conducted in all five. The role of that planning,
however, in directing development within the cities themselves and in
influencing activities under the present decentralization programs is
generally quite modest.
In every case project development and implementation are emphasized
by both national governments and city administrations. The time frame
is short term, and long term land use objectives, with the notable ex-
ception of Rorea, are given little credence.
Thus, the concept of the urban master plan which prescribes ulti-
mate objectives for city growth and identifies uses, densities, and
enforcement procedures in considerable detail is, for all intents and
purposes, dead. This is true despite the existence of previously-
prepared master plans in all of the countries. Such master plans are
now generally ignored and are not being replicated. Rorea again is the
notable exception, resolving the "issue" by contin\ling to oommission
both long term master plans and short term staging and implementation
programs. Even in Rorea the annual plan (a sort of capital budget) and
the five-year development plan for a city is given greater weight than
the long-range plans when project commitments are in question. In other
words, the planning that is more closely linked with implementation pro-
gramming is the more effective in shaping a city's future.
Planning and its advocates have been forced to adapt to the new
circumstances of the short-term imperative. In the four most developed
countries adaptation has occurred and urban physical planning does have
bearing on major development decisions for the secondary cities. The
terms "some bearing" and "modest" are appropriate, since any controlling
force of urban plans now normally gives way to the perceived imperatives
of projects for which capital investment is available. These impera-
tives mayor may not be consonant with prescriptions of the formal long
range planning instruments. Where ~onflicts exist, they are invariably
resolved in favor of project requirements.
In Brazil, Korea, Tunisia, and Indonesia efforts are being made to
integrate land use planning with the more compelling project design and
implementation programs, as one of the processEs through which these
programs are assembled. Form and content of these efforts differ among
the countries as each ~eeks its own most relevant approach.
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A. In Bt aliI l~d use is ooe of the concerns addressed by the
municipal planning offices which are the key conceptual and
monitoring institutions within the ten cities of the program.
These offices, staffed with professionals conceive the initial
packagE> of projects to be funded under the program. They pre-
pare:
1. A detailed "profile" of the conununity. This is a col-
lection of connected data on all aspects of the city and a
review of problems or of major issues to be addressed by a
development program. The issues cut across sectors. Job
creation and assistance to the urban poor are as important,
if not more important than housing, land development, and
other physical matters.
2. A preliminary development strategy for the municipality.
This establishes targets for each of the problems and out-
lines row the municipality, with outl:ide financial and
technical assistance, will procede in each case.
3. Detailed specifications of the various projects to be
undertaken to meet the targets.
This form of planning is a far cry from the type of urban planning
practiced in Brazil during the 1960-70 period. A decade ago, under the
SERFHAU program, the Min~stry of Interior commissioned dozens of compre-
hensive city master plans, delineating long term development objec-
tives. Those were prepared largely by private consultants working out
of Rio or Sao Paolo.
At that time municipalities had to have such plans to qualify for
various government ~rants. But growing concern was expressed that those
plans often lacked a sense of reality, were necessarily static in char-
acter, and were fat with a maxim'.lm of data and detail. Even when small
teams of SERFHAU staff members wece, themselves, involvec in the prepar-
ation of the plans and in the effort to encourage adoption of more soph-
isticated local planning procedures, oommuni ties often failed to res-
pond.
Consequently, SERFHAU was dissolved in 1974 and the loan program
for local planning was taken over by Bre. By 1981, the local planning
assistance program had virtually ceased to exist and BNI! was doinq lit-
tle or nothing to promote it.
Natal, the city studied during the field investigation of this re-
port, was one of those for which a SERFHAU-sponsored plan had been pre-
pared. Apparently ~; s prescr iptions were ignored by the National Hou-
sing Bank and othe'. federal and state development agencies, with the
reslll t that new o.:!velopment sprawls extensively beyond the existinq
urban area and its utility systems. A new comprehensive plan has been
prepared by a local adviser, but it seems not to be a significant factor
in the project dec isions of the CNDU-financed program. CNOO will
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provide land use planning assistance if requested, but this has not been
a priority for Natal.
One -::an only assume that tile same };Ublic sector developers whose
investment went unguided by Natal's master plan were similarly oblivious
of other cities' plans, and that the disenchantment with conventional
master plamning reflected at Natal is quite widespread.
While land use is a factor, the new project-oriented approach to
planning, at least in the case of Natal, seeks to skirt issues attendant
to the management of land in order to concentrate on promoting locally-
managed action projects.
B. ROrea still places a high priority on planning for land use in
its secondary cities. One factor, which differentiates Korea
from Brazil and may explain the continuing concern is the abso-
lute scarcity of land in many of these centers. Agricultural
activity continues to be important. Rice and other crop culti-
vation, with high rural population densities, takes place right
to the boundaries of urbanized areas and, indeed, may be found
on vacant parcels within the cities themselves, in highway
rights-of-way and even up to the doorsteps of industrial
plants. Conversion of this land to urban use is effected only
after considerable municipal review.
In the past it has been relatively systematic, involving
the application of land re-adjustment measures whereby property
owners permit the municipality to plat "pools" of properties,
subtract land for utilities, assisted housing, and other public
purposes, and then return the resubdivided parcels to their
original owners for development according to a set of pre-
scribed uses.
Thus Korea has continued to commission highly detailed and
"comprehensive" end-state master plans covering a development
period of twenty years for its secondary cities. These plans
set forth general guidance concerning the physical character
and direction and set standards for future growth of the commu-
nity. They discuss land use patterns, zoning and greenbelts,
community facilities, etc. Their IIDst carefully elaborated
elements are those which concern the major works construction
programs of the Ministry of Construction.
Development of reside-ntial areas is treated in much more
general fashion, by delineation of zones and establishment of
standards to govern future grf)wth, e.g. density and community
facilities or services. In L~is respect they are quite similar
to the general plans of many communities in the united
States. Timing of implementation projects, budgeting and
assignment of executing responsibilities to particular agencies
tends not to be addressed in the plans.
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One reason for this form of master planning, not ~vailable
to lesser developed countries, has been the abundant supply of
trained professionals to conduct the work. In addition to over
50 Korean consulting firms which offer planning services, a
government-sponsored research organization, the Korean Research
Institute for Human Settlements, ?rovides planning advisory
services and master plans for cities. Both KRIHS and the con-
sultant contracting are under the direct responsibility of the
Ministry of Construction which builds most of the public
facilities in Korean cities. Thus the master plans have been,
in effect, the plans for the Ministry's work. Ev€n so, MOC and
other agencies such as the Korea National Housing Corporation
or Korea Land Development Corporation will depart from the mas-
ter plans when project considerations, such as land costs,
dictate.
These departures have served to highlight an increasing
discontent on the part of MOC, KRIBS, and municipal administra-
tions with the "end-state" product. One innovation of a few
years ago was the requirement that master plans be updated
e~ery five years, incorporating population data and projections
prepared by central government as well as new projeccs which
MOC and other ministries, e.g. health and education, have pro-
grammed during the interval since the previous plan.
This mandatory updating notwithstanding, the master plans
have offered insufficient guidance for the programming of capi-
tal investments under the new five-year national land develop-
ment plan. This plan targets 14 secondary cities for intensive
and comprehensive development. A new approach has been initia-
ted, which is consistent with the Korean's concern for detail,
relative abundance of professional manpower, and commitment to
implementatic:n. It makes the planning process more action-
oriented and specific.
Each of the 14 communities is required to update its mas-
ter plans for the 1981-2001 pericrl. There is an additional,
new requirement to prepare a 10 year action program incorpora-
ting capital budgeting and an annual implementatiCl"l plan as
well. The master plan will only be a backdrop for. the more
immediate project-oriented programs, and ample technical assis-
tance will be provided in elaborating these programs. Each of
the ten-year plans is required to cover several different sec-
toral categories: population, land use, transportation, public
facilities, economic base and employment, protection of the
natural environment, rousing needs and standards, parks and
recreation, public health and hygiene, social welfare, revenue
prospects, administration and project recommendations. All
project recommendations are to be framed in the context of a
staged implementation program and ju.stified according to six
criteria given by MOC for setting priorities.
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These priorities reflect both the level of development
that Korea has already attained and the national objectives to
make these 14 centers wcompetitive" with Seoul. They are:
1. Improvement of public facilities
2. ExPansion of employment opportunities or prevention of
emigration from the city
3. Mdit ional contributions that proposed project investment
can make to municipal revenue
4. Improvement in the living environment
5. Favorability of the calculated cost-benefit ratio
6. Extent of territory and number of people to be benefited
The new ten-year plans are to spell out in more detail than for-
merly, ~lans for specific residential, commercial, industrial districts
as well as areas slated for other uses. As these are to be the basis
for project programming, they are to be updated every five years. The
annual implementation plan is to be the capital budget for the ooming
year.
This new Korean approach comes the closest to the wland use pro-
gramming" concept elaborated in the earlier Rivkin secondary city analy-
sis and by USAID in its pilot technical assistance projects. It inc-
ludes a updatable guidance instrument for land development in the city
as a whole, a project orientation, and the application of land use anal-
ysis to the identification and siting of projects which would be impl~­
rnented in the near future. It also includes preparation of a detailed
master plan as the long-term guidance instrument, a task which, in
theory, can be accomplished for each of the 14 cities in view of Korea's
available professional manpower.
It is too soon to say, however, whether the new, shorter time-frame
and pragmatic approach will be accepted by the agencies which make the
devel<.'pment decisions and which today can either accept or depart from
provisions of the end-state plans.
c. In Tunisia there are land use plans for all of the major, and
many of the mi nor, c i ti es • Those be i ng prepared today have
only lO-year time- frames. They function as guidance documents
providing a general framework f0i: decisions on lam use and
infrastructure locati0n. They are not rigid, all-encompassing
master plans which define with precision the use and density of
all urban land OITer an indefinite future. Where these guide
plans exist, local municipal administrations are expected to
fill in the details of area and project development thr0ugh a
more-or-less continual planning pr0cess.
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These
Equipment,
comparable
Ministry.
plans are normally prepared by the national Ministry of
an agency with infrastructure development responsibilities
with Korea's M'JC, or by cx:>nsultants responsible to the
In the larger, lIOre rapidly growing secondary cities such as
Sousse, resident municipal planning staff have taken over fran the MOE
to carry forward detailed planning activity. The plans, and their
accompanying zoning instr~~ents, serve as the basis for subdivision and
building permit approvals.
One interesting aspect of Tunisia's land use planning approach is
inclusion of all unincorporated areas within five kilometers of munici-
pal boundaries. Generalized land use plans are prepared for this peri-
phery, at even lesser detail than those for the city itself, and the
mayor of the city has the right to approve, modify, or disapprove devel-
opment requests within this periphery. Theoretically, this mechanism
prevent~ sprawl development.
Unlike either Brazil or Korea, Tunisia's planning deals only with
physical characteristics and relationships. It includes little atten-
tion to social or economic matters, except as these directly affect the
quantity and location of land for urbanization or conservation. It does
not deal with costs or timing, and its prescr iptions of physical stan-
dards are somewhat mechanistic, stemming from the application of certain
norms to anticipated growth of population and employment. These limita-
tions notwithstanding, the typical development plan does appear to be a
reasonable g'.1ide to future decisions, at least in the sphere of land
use.
The plans themselves are remarkably slim documents. In addition to
basic data and projections, they provide generalized prescriptions for
the locations and densities of residential, commercial, and industrial
areas, along with the outline of major road and utility locations.
Directions of expansion are identified, along wi th land which is to be
conserved or held out of development durirl':J the planning per iad. Al-
though the plans discuss renewal of informal settlement areas, they nor-
mally do not deal in detail with reconstruction of existing uses. This
is left to any later project planning that may take place.
As an initial guide, the planning is apparently respected by the
parastatal agencies (e.g. housing and industry) and the utilities
corporations who are the principal "developers" iA the secondary
cities. Each reviews the plan with the municipality before it makes its
own determinations for site selection. It then conducts an independent
study, looking to maximize its own project criteria, and mayor may not
elect to follow the plan. If changes are made, the municipality must
concur and alter the plan accordingly.
Tunisia is, however, faced with some major challenges in adapting
this flexible form of land use planning to its new emphasis on project
development in secondary cities. The present system does not deal with
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economic or social development issues, nor does it consider implementa-
tion measures or timing. Yet the government is committed to requiring
investment plans from communities which will be assisted under the
decentralization program. How these investment programs will be pre-
pared and integrated with the land use planning now in effect has y~t to
be decided.
D. In Indonesia, as well as Tunisia, physical planning at the city
scale has been a valued activity. Indonesia began its indepen-
dence in the 1950s with the Dutch master planning tradition and
attemrted to apply the same detailed approaches. Many munici-
pal master plans were prepared, found unsuitable as guides to
development decisions, and left in place while new approaches
were being evolved. Indeed, the old Dutch master planning law
has not yet been replaced on the books.
In experimenting with alternatives, Indonesia has gone far
beyond Tunisia in tryi~g to fashion a planning methodology that
combines land use, economic and social concerns with ~?lemen­
tation.
The new approach, tested in Bandung, Ml~dan, and a number
of smaller centers is one of short-term, integrated, comprehen-
sive planning. The land use prescriptions are generalized.
Emphasis falls on identification and linkage of projects that
can realistically be accomplished during a five-year period.
The approach involves data gathering and analysis where pos-
sible, consideration of social and economic as well as physical
issues, focus on short-term problem solving: and designation of
implementable projects. The emphasis is on urban development,
and more directly on guiding the array of remedial actions
which represent the national investment tools available to Cip-
ta Karya and other agencies.
Within this generalized framework, the Indonesians now
prepare detailed land use and facilities plans only for those
areas, such as kampungs, where major improvements are to take
p1ece within a 5-10 year period.
Indonesia's long term objective is to increase local gov-
ernment's planning capability to the extent that the cities can
themselves prepare these oomprehensive, short-term plans. It
will take sane time before this objective can be accomp-
lished. At the moment, Cipta Karya performs most of the plan-
ning that is done.
In only one city, Bandung, is the model system actually
operating. There short-term comprehensive planning is actually
guiding the battery of capital investments being emplaced. In
many other cities, however, Cipta Karya is preparing the short-
term plans prepar atory to the inves tment ac tivi ty. fIIaj0r
training efforts are under way to train Indonesian profes-
sionals in this approach.
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E. Kenya still produces long-term city master plans along the
European model. The ability of these plans to serve as guides
for growth has been questioned, but as yet no new approaches
have evolved.
The land use plans which have been produced as part of
physical planning exercises at the provincial, district and
municipal level are rarely implementable. Plans for cities
such as Kisumu are not tied to sectoral planning and project
planning activities of the central ministries. Thus they are
frequently of little use when public sector investments and
projects are being planned or implemented. Either the private
sector is frequently ignorant that the plans exist and that
particular procedures are to be followed pried to the develop-
ment of land, or they choose to ignore the plans and procedures
that seem troublesome and inconvenient and have confidence they
can get by with it. In most cases the local authorities are
too understaffed and inSUfficiently financed to monitor land
development. The plans are simply becoming "advisory docu-
ments" prepared in the hoPe that private developers will con-
form.
The new internationally-assisted thrust to place projects
in over 30 secondary centers and towns will further challenge
the inadequacies of the present planning approach in Kenyan
cities. More realistic, short-term planning (involving parti-
cipation of local councils) is being considered as a means of
guiding decisio~s on project location and implementation. Thus
far, however, s~~cific changes have not been attempted. To do
so will require a new concept of planning, neither so ambitious
as the comprehensive physical plan nor so narrow as the project
plan.
The outlines of such a planning process can be seen in the
recent project documents being written in Kenya today, but it
is still very much in the drawing-b~rd stage.
II. The Utility of Planning
Although land use plans exist for many of the secondary centers,
decisions of the project development agencies will invariably override
their prescriptions in the case of conflict. These agencies' decisions
are actually the critical factors in shaping the patterns of development
in the secondary cities selected for investment under the various coun-
try programs.
What normally occurs is the following:
The project agency responsible for a particular development (e.g.
roads, industry, housing, etc.) will begin its work by reviewing any
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existing plan materials. These will be consideo:ed an initial guide to
si te and route location or de:·lsity. Agency technicians will meet with
local government officials and any responsible planners to explore the
rationale for particular provisions in the plan that affect the pro-
ject. At this point, the project staff will make their own site and
setting assessment, utilizing the physical, economic, and construction
criteria related to the project. If these assessments mesh with the
plan, development proceeds accordingly. If they do not, the plan is
either ignored or changed.
In some cases serious tnysical problems are revealed through de-
tailed feas~bility studies that could not be identified in the course of
normal general planning. For example, Tunisia's industrial development
agency had to shift the site for a proposed industrial park in Kairouan
because t~il tests showed the ground unsuitable.
The principal and recurring issue is land cost, another matter not
normally considered in plan preparation. Housing is one of the princi-
pal investments being made by all of the countries examined. Project
development agencies, particularly those dealing with housing and com-
munity development, are invariably seeking least cost sites ••• or those
which they can assemble readily that meet specified, IIDdest-cost cri-
teria. While other factors such as accessibility, location of existing
utility systems, etc. are also considered, the cost of land has the
greatest bearing on site selection decisions. The least-cost criterion
for si te selection often means location of shelter, both new housing
estates and sites and services, beyond existing developed areas where
extension of infrastructure systems bears a cost premium. This tends to
happen when, as is the case in many countries, the responsibilities for
siting and developing the housing and those for providing the infra-
structure fall to different agencies.
Generally, local officials do not protest when agencies override a
plan because the project is tangible and needed. In rare cases where
the local government has strong ideas it may make representation to
higher authorities to revise the project proposal. This happened in
Sousse, Tunisia, when vigorous r~presentation by the mayor succeeded in
shifting proposed railroad and port improvement locations into confor-
mance with the city's or iginal plan. In general, the chance of these
protests' succeeding is rare indeed.
Physical effects of these project-oriented decisions on the deve-
lopment patterns of the secondary cities are profo lind • In Brazil,
Tunisia, Indonesia and Korea, where secondary city expansion is occur-
ri.ng, these project development decisions have led urbanization into a
distinct sprawl pattern. Housing sites are often selected beyond the
limits of existing utility systems, in 10CCitions where access to com-
mercial facilities, community services and employment is very difficult
:or their residents. Inefficiencies and commutation difficulties simi-
lar to those of the metropolitan centers are already appannt as a dir-
ect result of government-sponsored construction.
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Implications for still further disjointed urban expansion would not
be so serious if land use planning were considered other than a wuseful
tool W , or if emphasis in its practice were on the process of rather than
its product. If planners' had an ongoing responsibility to participate
in land use decisions, they could make rapid assessments of the impacts
of site selections for various major site projects and other critical
decisions that bear on extensions of urbanized area. They could then
present local officials, as well as other parties involved, including
private sector investors, with reasoned analysis on the potential ef-
fects of the decisions. They could either help modify the location
choices or program compensating improvements (e.g. bus services, com-
mercial sites, community facilities) to mitigate inefficiencies or dis-
ruptions that might occur. If the project location choices were indeed
compelling, planners could devise means of directing further urban ex-
pansion in a manner to take maximum advantage of the immediate develo~
ments and their infrastructure.
None of the countries visited in the course of this study, save
Korea, has organized land use planning as a process, and even in Korea
the systematic and continuous updating and adjustment of planning ins-
truments is a relatively new practice. Although long term master plans
are being downplayed, the new emphasis on short-term instruments are
still focussed on the plan as product, not continuous professional
capacity for adaptation, intervention and change. Nowhere in the five
countries is analysis of the probable effects of project location deci-
sions and means of mitigating or enhancing consequences a regular ad-
junct of project pla~ning. Indonesia aspires to develop ~his continuing
planning capacity, but the staffing and training programs to produce
such capacity have only just begun.
Nor do the project develC'pment agencies Lemselves include land use
impacts as part of their facilities plan"ing. There is some effort in
Tunisia and Indonesia to blend conunercial and community services with
housing and industrial estates. In Tunisia there is also care taken to
wsizew project utilities so as to serve adjoining future developments.
The upgrading programs in these countries do include land use planning
for the neighborhoods to be rehabilitated. By and large, however, pro-
ject planning is focussed on itself, without serious consideration for
its side-effects.
Until or unless some priority is given to a more comprehensive
assessment of new pr.ojects -- by the agencies responsible for the pro-
ject planning, if not by local government -- the sprawl patterns which
are beginning to occur in targeted secondary centers will probably pro-
1 ifeute and present worse problems.
III. Land Use Issues and Approaches
Although land use impacts of project development decisions are
rarely considered, availability of land for those projects is a para-
mount issue. Site acquisition for roads and utilities is normally a
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straightforward process of negotiation or expropriation by the respon-
sible authorities. The variety of the projects to be sited and their
ancillary developments, especially in the somewhat higher-income ooun-
tries, have grown more complex and land-consuming.
Governments recognize the necessity of aggregating sui table si tes
for housing, industry, commercial services, and community facilities to
be available wen project construction is ready to proceed. Thus the
three countries with the longest direct experience in government-
sponsored development -- Brazil, Korea, and Tunisia -- have established
powerful agencies to assemble and prepare sites.
In ~me cases these agencies actually <b construction as well.
Each has operated initally in the major metropolitan centers, and has
now expanded its work through activity in the secondary cities.
The land assembly and development agencies of Korea and Tunisia
have an additional mission, i.e. suppressing land speculation. Exper-
ience has shown the rise ~;. values when major projects are installed,
and both Korea and Tunis';·.:1 have taken steps to moderate this trend by
pre-emption.
When a general site area is identified (in Korea, for housing and
allied community facilities and in Tunisia, for both housing and indus-
try) governmental authorities enact a pre-emption decree for lands often
extending considerably beyond the project site requirements. This
freezes land values at their existing levels and gives the executing
agency right of first refusal over any sales or alterations in the pro-
perties involved. The agencies then proceed to negotiate a price for a
specific site. Normally this would be at market value or, in the case
of the Tunisian industrial agency, AFI, wi thin a stipulated range for
permi tted purchase price. Expropriation is a last resort. Tunisia's
housing agency, AFH, has a "quick-take" provision which permits imme-
diate transfer of the land to the agency for project planning and with
negotiations to follow at a later date.
Cost factors are important in these acquisitions. Both the Korean
and Tunisian land development agencies are required to recover all costs
incurred in their developments. This constrains the extent to which
they can build for lower income ~roups Where land costs are high. Site
selection for projects to house low and moderate income households con-
sequently is directed to land which can be acquired at the lowest cost,
e.g. more remote areas.
To CDunter some of the negative consequenceR, the agencies in both
countries are broadening their project activity. A cross-subsidy a~
proach has been initiated in Korea, whereby in the more accessible deve-
lopments which are built on costly land, higher income shelter absorbs &
proportionately larger share of land and other costs. Dw!llings for
lower income families carry a smaller share of the project development
costs so they can be priced at levels more affordable by the intended
occupants.
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The Korean and Tunisian agencies, as well as Brazil's Housing Bank
are now attempting to build canplete communities, with ranges of
incomes, community facilities, and commercial and other revenue gene-
rating services which can both bear some of the cost of the projects and
provide more balanced settings for living and working. Still the many
cases of isolated project sites with few supporting services stand as
reminder of how difficult this goal is to achieve.
Indonesia faces a far more formidable site assembly problem than
th~ three more developed countries. Its cadastral records ir. the small-
er cities are poer. It is rarely possible to identify the ~ership(s)
of parcels definitively prior to site selection and acquisition. This
has been one factor pushing Indonesia toward emphasis on upgrading of
existing residential areas. Problems in clearing land titles have
slowed and complicated the site acquisition process for Indonesia's own
national oousing agency (PERUMNAS) whose activities are among the most
important in the secondary Cities program. PERUMNAS has had to operate
on government-owned sites or to use local land acquisition committees
who could ferret out the informal pattern of ownerships and negotiate
for sites. Improving the state of urban cadastral records wi 11 be one
of the World Bank-supported tasks under the secondary cities program.
In Kenya, lItlere the project development packages, are limited to
sites and services, development will apparently be scheduled for exist-
ing government-owned land under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Lands.
Chapter IV. Directions for International Assistance
International support for national pr09rams to strengthen the
hierarchy of cities and towns has greatly expanded over the past de-
cade. Such support will probably increase as the process of urbani-
zation in the developing world intensifies. The range of experience
thus far, as illustrated by the country studies and OSAID's pilot tech-
nical assistance projects, sugge3t sane areas for emphasis in future
efforts.
I. Policy Formulation
Ex~rience has shown that international institutions can influenc~
basic national polici toward decentralized urbanization, especially
when their representations are coupled with the prospects of financial
and technical assistance. In two aspects of policy such representation
appears critical.
A. Selectivity
International agencies should stress the need to identify spe-
cific communities for accelerated development assistance and to limit
the number of communi ties selected. There are just not sufficient re-
sources to be distributed, especially in countries with low levels of
income, to provide more than a few centers with adequate services, in-
vestment capital, trained administrators, etc. All of these are essen-
tial if economic development is an objective.
Political considerations will often mandate that policy makers com-
mit a wide spread of benefits and "projects" over a short period of
time, as is apparently occurring in Tunisia and Kenya. If these commit-
men~s are pursued, chances are that few, if any, communities will build
up a sufficiently critical mass of resources for conditions to im-
prove.
Yet, each country apparently needs to find its own road, often re-
enacting the history of others that have gone before. Brazil and lorea
have concluded, after long experience with more dispersed apFroaches,
that selectivity is essential.
International agencies are in a particularly good posi tior to ~e­
sent the lessons of other national experiences, especially those demon-
strating the failures of dispersed investment.
One way to encourage selectivity would be for international insti-
tutions to offer pr0ject support for a limited number of centers and
encourage national governments to allocate resources to the same cen-
ters. This could occur even though political exigencies demanded a pub-
lic policy which offers something for everyone.
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Apparently such a cooperative approach ':0 selectivity has been
adopted in both Brazil and Indonesia. In Brazil, the special Bank-
supported secondary cities program is applicable to many coIl'Dtlunities
comparable in size to the ten target cities chosen. For all intents and
purposes, however, it is only in those target cities that the govern-
ment, as well as the Bank, is ,:urrently placing major investments. In
Indonesia, a substantial number of communities are targeted for remedial
assistance under Repelita III, but the only cities where the full range
of tools ar~ now, or shortly will be, put in place are those where both
international and national cOIl'Dtlitments have been made.
B. Pro;ect Packages and Strategies
International agencies should stress the need to design pack-
ages of projects and programs for targeted communities. No single capi-
tal investment or application of technical assistance can address the
endemic probl~ms of economic lag, service inadequacy, administrative and
bUdgetary deficiencies which characterize the non-metropolitan communi-
ties, whatever their stage of development. Whether the communities are
rapidly growing and demonstrate some economic productivity (as in Korea)
or stagnating for lack of basic facilities and services (as in Tunisia)
they face multi-dimensional issues. To address one set of issues, with-
out commensurately addressing the others, may be counter-productive.
It should be possible to diagnose a community's problems, develop a
resolution strategy, and apply a battery of financial and technical
assistance tools in a simultaneous or sequential fashion. Major
achievements from Brazil's program have been formulation of multi-
dimensional community !':crategies and the application of aid in support
of these strategies. Of course, too few countries are as yet so well-
endowed with profes3ional talent as Brazil to expect formulation of
strategies at the local level. Still, this is an area where interna-
tional agencies can assist. They can, in advance of pro~ram design for
particu'ar communities, support dispatch of study teams to gather data,
evaluate local oonditions, meet with local authorities and test out
ideas with these authorities. The objectives would be to prepare stra-
tegies for each target community.
Unfortunately this advance strategy planning and program design
rarely occurs. The international donors are in a position to encourage
such planning, to lend their diagnostic resources to advaRce field mis-
sions and, by in doing, to train governmeRt officials and other host
country professionals in this sort of reconnaissance work. An outline
which such strategy/design missions can follow is appended to this
report.
II. Capital Assistance
International agencies should be prepared to offer financial SUI--
port in the form of loans and/or grants, for capital projects in cities
targeted for national action. Without the funding incentive governments
will rarely be disposed to consider representations on policy and
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program. Offers of technical/training assistance alone do not carry ~~e
"clout" of prospects for funding a water system, an industrial site
development or a housing estate.
The case studies provide ample evide~~ _ to underscore this recom-
mendation. In Brazil and Tunisia significa..t institutional adaptation
has occur red at the na tional leve 1 in conj unction wi th internat ional
capital assistance. In Indonesia international funding has expedited
design of project packages for Bandung and institution of a project
implementation/coordination mechanism for that city which pools central
and local government responsibilities. By way of contrast, one factor
impeding USAID's Chonburi, Thailand, land use programming project was
its limitation to technical assistance. Local officials, were respon-
sive to the technical team only so long as they expected the advisers to
be a direct link in securing for them capital funC's to build p.1blic
works projects. Once they realized the advisor1 te~m's mission was oon-
fined to technical assistance in planning -- and carried no promise of
implementation funding from either national government or external
donors -- the officials lost interest in the project.
III. Coordinated International Programmil.'3
As an increasing number of international agencies become involved
with decentralization proc;rams in individlial countries, the agencies
should coordinate their own assistance activities.
This stress on the necessity for capital investment, does not mean
that every agency need offer such assistance. But several potential do-
nors may be interested in a given country's urbanization programs.
Indonesia and Kenya are two cases in point. The donors can orchestrate
mutual interests and determine a balance of financial, technical, and
training support, (e.g. one or more agencies might be prepared for capi-
tal funding, another for technical assistance, a third to concentrate a
variety of measures in a single city).
Thus international assistance should, itself, be offered as a pack-
age. This would afford greater influence and leveraCJe 'l:.han prc:>grams
which individual agencies might c:>perate individually. Such c:>rchestra-
tion among donors is occurring in Indonesia and Kenya. In Thailand
USAID, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank aLe cc:>nferrinCJ
regularl7 to cc:>ordinate their support fc:>r secc:>ndary city initiatives.
IV. Capacity-building for Secc:>ndary Cities -- the Training Cc:>mponent
A primary rc:>le for international institutic:>ns should be the train-
ing of a cadre of professionals who will be able to manage and plan com-
munities at the local level. This training rc:>le is admirably s~ited to
the external donors.
Decentralized development can oot occur without skilled adminis-
trators, man'ilgers, and planners in the communities to be developed.
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Brazil and Korea have s~ch caeres. The others do not, and many nations
facing similar nece=si ties for decentralized development are fundamen-
tally hindered by the aLsence ,..,f trained manpower. Domestic universi-
ties and the more conventional methods of sending individuals abroad for
degrees are not in themselves sufficient for the capacity building role.
There are many models foT. what needs to be done: Brazil's IBM,
supported by USA1D years ago, is an excellent example of a national
training institute for mU:licipal administrators. This institution of-
fers many options, from long term education, to short courses, corres-
pondence courses, and roving seminars in locations throughout the coun-
try. The Netherlands Bouwcentrum has been organizing special programs
geared to secondary city planning and administration in Indonesia and
Thailand, and has continuing institutes in the Netherlands. USAID it-
self is now helping to finance and staff in Indonesia a set of regional
insti tutes to tr .~in planning staff for city and provincial government
throughout the country. There are other examples as well.
The models are ~~~~e, but generally no systematic framework exists
for assessing and addre::::=:~,g the municipal management and planning needs
of the countries. Inter~a~:onal agencies can assist in preparing these
needs assessments, and t~.·.'"·, can tailor their progr~ms to include a ma-
jor. net a modest, compcnent of training.
Next to capital assls~ance, capacity building is the most promising
avenue for international intervention. The impact of international
technical resources deployed to tr~ining can be far greater than any
combination of technical assistance directed toward specific projects or
conunun i ti es .
V. Management Assistance for Inoividual Cities
While a strong emphasis on trainIng is warranted, planning and man-
agement skills of foreign advisers will continue to be relevant to spe-
cific cities targeted for investment. perhaps the best example is that
of Band~ng where several advisets. both long- and short-term, are work-
ing wi th Ind0nesian counterpar ts to implement th~ planning and invest-
ment program. Representing a vi:lriety of technical specialties, their
objective is to leave trained Indonesian personnel in their places when
they 1epart. The number of advisers and their skills are specifically
rela,ted to the np,e.ds of the cities wh~r.e they are assigned. Matters of
t'1 is sort can be establ ished when progr am strateg les are prepared for
each target city.
The principle of offering such advisory assist.ance i.n combination
wi t.h project design and implementation is one that can be t irmly estab-
lished in advance.
VI. T.Jand Use and Impact Analysi~
There is a modest, but i.mportant fGle f(lr land use planning in in-
ternational assistance to ~@condary centers.
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A. Land Use Programming
The 1975 study for the Office of Ueban Development stated that
land use issues were becoming severe in rapidly growing secondary ci-
ties. Advance attention to these issues by skilled professionals would
help the smaller centers avert diseconomies and dislocations endemic to
expansion of major metropolitan areas. The study suggested that pro-
fessionals be made availahle who could contribute a "land use program-
ming" approach. The principal ch3racteristic~ of that approach were:
1. Goal setting for the urban community
2. Rapid gathering, assembly, analysis, and presentation of
available data on physical, economic, and social charac-
teristics
3. Formulation with the community of strategies to address
principal development and land use problems, and
4. Identification of projects directed toward the goals, in
keeping with the strategies, that could be accomplished in
the short run.
Lana Use Programming was presented as an alternative to conven-
tional master planning. It was intended to be flexible in content and
approach, adaptable to particular local circumstances. Indeed, the very
term land use "progra1'llJl\ing" was but a convenience to illustrate the
concept.
Th@ research (especially, Rondinelli's) and field investigations
dOl'le since th4! 1975 study report shed considerable light on the feasi-
bility and value of assistance in land use management. It a~pears that
many secondary cities are growing in population and economic development
more slowly than had earlier appeared to be the case. Their development
in many cases is impeded by lack of minimally adequate services and
faciE ties. These are required bef0re they can absorb substantiaHy
increased population and can support economic investments, indeed,
before they can bec0me attractive enough for those activities they mu~t
have t0 play a more significant role in nati0nal development.
Until growth is imminent for these communities land use issues may
be well down the list of prioriti.·s f0r them. M0re iml:'0rtant are their
needs for assistance (both financ. 11 and technical) in urban administra-
tion, public finance, and 0ther f elds related to the planning ai'ld imp-
lementation of prGjects that de::> I'ave high pri0rity. Land \:lse planning
1:>ecomes relevant when the state of development produces a variety of
construction projects, potential land use osnflicts among pr0jects,
special difficulties in securing site, and rapid spread Gf inf0rmal set-
tlement, Le. land IJse problems, start to emerge. Until that stage,
more sensitive pr0ject planning or wider scope for pr0ject planning C0m-
bined with improved urban management techniques is pr0bably ~ite
adequate.
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Where land use issues are addressed, countries are beginning to
employ concepts that reflect the programming approad1. Thus Korea and
Indonesia have both turned away from master planning (except, in the
case of Korea as a "background" guide). They have moved toward more
comprehensive, short-term exercises linking economic and social concerns
with physical. They are emphasizing project identification and capital
budgeting. Tunisia has not yet found a mechanism to integrate economic
growt.'1 with land use planning, but its land use planning is far more
pragmatic and focused on short-term objectives than the conventional
end-state ~pproach. In Tunisia, Brazil, Korea, and Indonesia the plan-
ning instruments are at least consulted by project development agencies
before major capital investments are detailed. To the degree that
international technical assistance can reinforce these trends, it should
continue as a component of available pLograms.
It is this commitment to major capital infusions, however, that
comes through most strongly in the country studies. Where secondary
city pro~rams are being pursued, the overwhelming emphasis is on capital
investments. The focus is on projects, and their implementation --
whether kampung improvements, new housing estates, sites and services,
water supply or industrial parks. In turn, these projects, once built,
have potential to lead growth in directions which nei ther the project
development organizations nor the city planners hav~ articipated. The
projects become the "leverage" for new rounds of dev~lcflIllent.
Once project development agencies have examined planning instru-
ments for preliminary guidance in site location and project character,
the question of land use impact is normally set aside. With land cost
as a critical factor in project design, the least land cost solution is
compelling, regardless of any long term growth conc:iderations. While
land use "progranuning" may be applied in over all c"'ban guidance sys-
terns, it appears to be among the last considerations of actual project
design and implementation.
Results of this "neglect" can be seen in countries as different as
Brazil, Korea, Indonesia, and Tunisia -- attenuation or leapfrogging of
existing developed areas, and proliferation of sprawl patterns that
produce inefficiencies and unnecessarily high cost in extension of util-
ities, long and arduous conunutation between housing sites and 'A'Ork or
urban services, and environmentally unsuitable living conditions.
Land use planning is generally oonsidered a "useful" tool, no more
and no less, and no claim should be made for wider, more general appli-
cation of the tool than it merits. Nevertheless, a wide gap in the pro-
ject preparation approach leave~ uncovered the impacts of project
development which may, themselves, pose serious issues for the oom-
munities.
B. External Assistance in Land Use Issues
This gap can be filled if the international assistance agencies
will use their own leverage to broaden the analytic base for planning of
projects which they SUppeft.
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1. By including land use implications arr",ng the specific
criteria which project planning technicians address in
their analyses. With a formal consideration of land use
implications, cost analyses could begin to consider WtotalW
costs, e.g. utilities extensions, commuting, services pro--
vision in addition to the raw costs of land and site deve-
lopment. Once Wtotal Wcosts are considered, final location
choices may be improved.
2. By requiring preparation of land use impact assessments
as part of the documentation for international funding of
specific project proposals. If these assessments indicate
negative consequences, proposals for mitigating the conse-
quences should accompany the project plans. If a mitiga-
tion approach is adopted, some negative consequences of
project development could be aver tee.
3. By offering project development agencies professional plan-
ning advisers to participate in the process of site loca-
tion and design.
There is nothing dramatic about these proposals. They represent
merely a calibration of the capital support activities now u.nder way.
They can lead to better, JK)re sensi tive and efficient patterns of urban
development than otherwise would be the case, i.e. if the present narrow
focus on individu.al projects continued.
VII. Supporting Local Leadership
Over and above financial and technical assistance, one of the most
important roles f0r international institutions may be in icientifying
ways to support local leadership -- both political and entrepreneu.rial
- in target cities. Both the earlier land use programming study and
the five more recent oountry cases underscore the necessity for local
responsibility. It is difficult, if not impossible, to force secondary
city development from above. While all the case countries consider
involvement and commitment of local leaders critical to successfu.l pro-
grams, actual participation has been spotty. The notable successes,
however, have involved presence of local leadership.
Natal is cons idered the most effective of Brazil's secondary city
targets because the electei: mayor has adopted the program as a wcrl1sade"
and heavily supports the professional staff. A principal factor in Ban-
dung's success with comprehensive I1rban improvements has been the wil-
lingness of the mayor to pl:>Ol municipal staff and resol1rces with the
implementing agencies of central g0vernment into a single pr0ject man-
agement agency. In both S0usse and Sfax, Tunisia has had the benefit of
maY0rs and c0uncils c0mmitted to development and to I1tilizing municipal
funds for professional staff. They are effective l0bbyists in t.he capi-
tal. Moreover, each of the towns has had private families of means who
have invested funds in oonunercial pr0jects. The lack of commensl1rate
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leadership and investment capability in other secondary centers frankly
troubles central government officials who are trying to plan a decent-
ralization program in the new five Year plan. Even Korea, lbich has
tight cen~ral control over local development, is concerned about meeting
urban growth targets without greater local participation in planning and
investment.
International institutions must proceed with sensitivity in articu-
lating a role, but some directions can be pursued.
Training is one. Indonesia's AID-assisted regional planning insti-
tutes will establish special ;;'clninars for local mayors and councils in
the same cities for which they will be training professional planning
staff.
Travel is ar.other. Study tours of cities in other countries, both
developing and developed, can be arranged for local elected officials
and bJsinessmen.
Most basically, however, international institutions can suggest
that the presence of active, interested local leadership be a criterion
for target city selection.
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I. Context of the Medium-Sized Cities Program in Brazil
Brazil is an enormous oountry with virtually half the land and
half the population of South America. Its cities are correspondingly
large and numerous. Rio de Janeiro has over 8,000,000 inhabitants. Sao
Paulo, the major industrial center of the country, has over 10,000,000.
There are something upwards of seventy cities, including the new capital
city of Brasilia, with over 100,000 inhabitants.
The per capita Gross National Product of the nation in 1980 was
close to u.S. $1,500 which placed it among the most economically privi-
leged of those defined by the United Nations as developing countries.
Until 1973 and the international energy crisis it appeared that Brazil,
having embarked on an ambitious program of industrialization, was about
to experience a milagre economico that in the not so distant future
would see it overcome its principal development difficulties. However,
the miracle has yet to occur and Brazil remains a country of widespread
poverty with a marked discrepancy between the well-being of the lower
and upper income groups. In 1980 the bottom 60 per cent of the popula-
tion earned only 18.4 per cent of the national income, While the top one
per cent of the nation's population received 16.4 per cent. Although
the greatest disequilibrium in income shares continues to be in rural
areas, the World Bank calculates that in such major urban centers as
Recife (estimated population: 1,300,000) and Natal (estimated
population: 530,000) 77 per cent and 70 per cent of their respective
inhabitants live in poverty.l
In the main, the nation's s:>ils are poor, a condition that ad-
versely affects the urban as well as the rural areas of the country.
Average rainfall often counts for little, for in many areas the rains
occur in deluges that surpass the absorbent qualities of the soi1s~ and
in 1981 the great Northeast Region of Brazil was experiencing its worst
drought in over 100 years.
Added to the oountry's CDntinuing difficulties of development are
systems of agriculture that emphasize the large plantation and extensive
cattle ranch. today, both systems are prone to heavy population losses
to ur ban places.
In Brazil the drift of people to cities from the countryside is one
of the most pronounced in the world. The 1970 census, which registered
52 million urban inhabitants and 41 million rural ones, was the first
survey to demonstrate that Brazil had become a predominantly urban coun-
try. The tendency accelerated during the 1970s. The 1980 census showed
80.4 million urban inhabitants and only 38.6 rural ones, fewer rural
inhabitants in absolute terms that in 1970.
1. World Bank Appraisal Report for the Brazil Medium-Sized Cities
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For many years the migration of the people from rural to urban
places was most dramatically evidenced in the major cities of the coun-
try, particularly in the South and Southeast. A number of these cities
grew to gargantuan size in the space of a single generation. Conse-
quently, during most of the 1960s and 1970s major development attention
in Brazil centered on the industrialization, housing, and infrastructure
problems associated with massive metropolitan growth. However, during
the last half of the latter decade official interest began to be taken
in the development needs and economic potential of urban centers of more
modest scale, those which lie roughly within the 100,000 to 500,000
population range. A number of factors ~~nverged to create this concern.
It became increasingly clear that the urbanizing problems of major
metropolitan centers are virtually intractable, that amelioration of
their basic difficulties is an effort of decades, and that meanwhile
other sections of the country and its urban economy require attention.
Further, during the 1970s a large number of Brazilian cities of inter-
mediate size ~gan to increase at rates considerably greater than those
which attended the development of the country as a whole and of its
principal urban places.
For example, during the decade Rio de Janeiro grew at an annual
rate of 1.8 per cent while the overall annual growth rate of the popula-
tion in Brazil was 2.4 per cent. Highest growth rates were observed in
cities with populations between 100,000 and 200,000 - almost 10 per
cent per year dur ing the decade. Development experts began to see that
Brazil's rural population was increasingly moving to the smaller cities
closer to home rather than, as had been the case in the past, toward the
dominant cities of the South.
The phenomenon offered both an opportunity to accelerate develop-
ment of hitherto lagging regions as well as the prospect of directing
such growth in a manner that would avoid the graver problems being
generated in the principal cities of the country. In addition, research
into the urban fabric of Brazil and other developing countries was
making it increasingly clear that human settlements grow and decline in
relationship to one another. They are linked through a series of econo-
mic, social, and political relationships to form systems whose develop-
ment difficulties require that each settlement be viewed and addressed
in the context of these relationships. While aiding one city it is both
possible and desirable to aid a series of others as well as to advance
the well-being of their rural inhabitants. Thus, it is possible to plan
development of medium-size cities in a broader and more effective manner
than thought possible earlier.
Finally, in the context of Brazil, the mystique of conquering the
interior of the country and thus realizing the enormous economic poten-
tial of the nation has been a persistent national vision. Construction
Project, p.l.
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of the new capital city of Brasilia in the arid sertao of the interior
is the most dramatic expression of this dream. Offering special
development assistance to non-metropolitan centers throughout the
country is a similar, if to date a more modest, expression.
A. The Governing of Brazil
The Constitution and form of government of Brazil closely
resembles those of the United States of America. The country is a fed-
eration of states in which legislative power is exercised by a Chamber
of Deputies and a Federal Senate. The President and Vice President are
elected for a single term of six years by an electoral college rather
than by popular vote.
Each Federal State has a Governor who exercises executive power and
a Legislative Assembly which legislat~s on all matters affecting provin-
cial administration. The states in turn are divided into municipalities
(municipios) each of which covers an extensive area that encompasses
both urban and rural places. This system of organizing local government
is common throughoot Latin America. Another name for the same type of
local government unit is distrito, ttle term employed in Venezuela and
several other countries. County governments are the closest equivalent
unit in the United States.
In Brazil the popularly elected mayors are called prefeitos and the
local governments themselves prefeituras. A small coun~il, also popu-
larly elected, serves as the local legislative body. The mayor presides
over a series of departments that usually include administration, plan-
ning, finance, pUblic works, and education.
Despite the outward appearance of popular rule, since 1964, when
the military leaders overthrew the government of President Joao Goulart,
the army has controlled the country and its political machinery. Since
1967, by revisions to the Constitution, the President has been granted
residual control over all aspects of the Federal Government, author i ty
to intervene in the affairs of any of the 21 states without consulting
Congress, and the power to declare a state of seige and rule by dec-
ree. The essential nature of the Government is, and historically always
has been, highly centrist. States are correspondingly weakf local gov-
ernments, even more so.
A fundamental aspect of the governing process over the last several
decades has been to encourage local a~mlnistrations to increase their
contr ibutions to national and regional development without at the same
time relinquishing the National Government's authority over public deci-
sions nor its financial power to implement these decisions. One result
of these contradictory policies is that official rhetoric does not nec-
essarily reflect political reality, ror does administrative reorgan-
ization necessarily denote liberalization.
Local governments have extremely limited means to affect their own
development, and almost all public capital expenditures, even those of a
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quite minor nature, are made by agencies of the National Government.
Nevertheless, many important political leaders are committ~d to broaden-
ing public participation in t.."le governing process and to strengthening
the role of local governments. It is within this context of strong cen-
tral authority on the one hand and a gathering interest in local parti-
cipation on the other, that the evolving role of middle-sized cities
must be viewed.
B. Field Investigation
In September 1981 a SPeCial two week visit was made to Brazil
to study the operations of the Federal aid program for medium-sized
cities. Interviews were held in Brasilia, the nation's capital, with
representatives of the Ministry of Interior, which is directly respon-
sible for the administration of the program, with members of the Minis-
try of Planning, whose research helps to support the effort, and with
the Ministry of Tr~~sport, which provides a major portion of the direct
assistance. In Rio de Janeiro conversations were held with members of
the financially powerful National Housing Bank of Brazil (BNa), and the
prestigious Brazilian Institute for Municipal Administration (IBAM).
One of the communities involved since the outset in the Medium-
sized Cities Program, the Northeast coastal city of Natal, was also
visited. There an array of local public officials were interviewed in-
cluding the prefeito, the directors of the municipal offices of budget-
ing and accounting and planning, as well as the local coordinator and
staff members responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the spe-
cial assistance program.
C. The Evolving Commitment to the Accelerated Development of
Medium-Sized Cities
Since the early 1960s one of the most publicized agencies in
Latin America concerned with the improvement of local government has
been the Brazilian Institute for Municipal Administration (IBAM). It
has served as a prototype for establishment of comparable agencies in a
host of countries.
IBAM is a private. ronprofit training and research organization
which is supported by government contracts and voluntary membership SUQ-
scriptions of participating municipalities. Its primary objective is to
increase the technical capability of municipal governments in order that
they CZ:l playa more effective role in the development of the nation.
Over the years it has grown to be a large and respected organiza-
tion that offers practical training programs of all kinds. For many
years it was assisted by USAID. Now its own cadre of trail"lees,
quartered in Rio de Janeiro, are employed in programs of technical
assistance through~Jt Latin America and, increasingly, in the other
developing regions of the world. It has published numerous studies that
affect the operations of local government and which deal with such basic
administrative ooncerns as accounting procedures, public works
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administration, project preparation and the like. Its efforts strongly
complement an extensive urliversity system, of both a pUblic and private
nature, that graduates young people in a variety of subjects necessary
to the functioning of government.
Important as is the need to impart practical operating skills to
those responsible for the administration of local government, it is
probable that in Brazil neither the lack of £ormal education nor of the
technical skills necessary for day-to-day operations is a significant
deterrent to competent and imaginative urban administration -- at least
in so far as cities the size of 100,000 or more persor'S is concerned.
Lack of experience in office, caused by historically·.M ~<ilary scales
that attract principally the young and untried and "-'f the inevitable
turnover in technical personnel when the prefeitos leave office after
each four year stint, is probably a more limiting factor.
Nevertheless, establishment of an agency such as lBAM and the
introduction of training actl\ities into all aspect~ of municipal admin-
istration reflects public support for the illrorovement of urban
government.
Another Brazilian agency involved with urban development whose
impact has been enormous and which has received a great deal of national
and international attention is the National Housing Bank (BNH). It was
established in the early 1960s to finance the construction of public, or
worker, housing for low- income groups. Its unprecedented influence on
urban development in Brazil derives from its enormous financial
resources.
The Bank is the repository of, and uses as the basis of its loan
activities, the national pension fund of Brazilian workers. Over the
years, therefore, BNH has been in a position to promote the construction
of housing estates in a large number of cities throughout the country.
The majority of its financial resources have been channeled into the
classical, fully equipped, apartment unit constructed in clusters within
a series of superblock compounds. However, in the mid-l~70s, after a
number of years of experience, BNH began to expand its local investment
activities to include the financing of allied types of urban infrastruc-
ture: water, sewers, roads, schools, and the like.
On the one hand such an expansion War7 logical as it supported the
housing censtruction activities of the Bank and ,'" :'!red a single source
of financing for cities' capital needs. On the oth~r hand, it assisted
BNH to find investment outlets fer its financial re~ources while giving
it an even more influential voice in promoting local P'lysical develop-
ment and planning.
More recently Bm has beg:1n to experiment with the financing of
sites-and-services housing programs and with the provision of integrated
packages of aids to rural settlements. The former program is designed
to provide vacant, but fully serviced, lots to low-income families who
then proceed to construct their own housinC). The idea is to allow
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greater flexibility in the construction process and to permit the par-
ticipating families to proceed in a manner familiar to them. Because of
the appreciably less cx>st1y nature of the undertaking, many more low-
income families can be accommodated in sites-and-services programs than
in conventional public housing.
One of the principal results of the operations of BNH is the enor.-
~ous impact it has had on the physical growth and configuration of Bra-
zilian cities. A second result has been to demonstrate the power of the
Federal gcvernment to affect local development and the inability of
urban governments to negotiate wi th, and exert influence upon, agencies
of higher authority. Confronting unprecedented rates of growth with
limited resources of their own, municipalities have had to scramble for
whatever aid has been made available. A principal source of this Feder-
al largesse has been BNH.
The nature of the };ilysical ilnpact of BNH's operations is appar-
ent. In order not to have its resources dissipated through excessive
cost of land, BNH has insisted that its financially supported housing
projects be located on inexpensive tracts. In many, if not most instan-
ces, this has meant sites considerably distant from the urban center.
As a consequence, the large housing estates of BND have acted as power-
ful suburbanizing forces propelling development out into the country-
side, surrounding cities.
Another ilnportant organization established in the mid-1960s that
related to urban deve10pme.lt was the Federal Service for Urban Planning
and Housing (SERFHAU). It was created as a relatively small, highly
professional pUblic agency attached to the Ministry of Interior, and it
received support early on from USAID. SERFHAU's principal mission was
to " ••• develop local capability for land control and, as a corollary,
see to it that public investment, especially from the Federal Govern-
ment, was placed within some form of rational framework at the municipal
level.,,2
This reflected the recognition that without special assistance,
~unicipal building and planning departments were increasingly unable to
:ationalize local development. The aid program initiated by SERFHAU was
similar to ~he local planning 4ssistance procedure then in vogue in the
united States -- the so called "701" Program.
The scheme was one under which the Federal Government financially
assists a local community to prepare a master development plan following
certain prescribed guidelines f0r issues to be addressed and land con-
tr0ls to be estublished. Because most municipalities lacked profession-
al personnel experienced in the preparation of comprehensive devel0pment
2. Rivkin, Malcolm D., Land Use and the Intermediate-Size City in
Deve10ping C0untries, Praeger, N.Y., 1976, p. 79.
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plans, typically a firm of consultants was retained to perform the
work.
There was, however, a significant difference between the "701" com-
prehensive planning assistance program in the O.S.A. and the local plan-
ning aid program of SERFHAO in Brazil. The former was a grant program:
the latter was based on a loan. Cormnunities had to repay the money ad-
vanced them for the retaining planning services. Loans were amply
available, but they were to be repaid over a number of years at 8 per
cent interest plus an index factc~ to compensate for inflation.
Although the requirement necessarily screened out an appreciable
number of poter.tial candidates, it probably did not discourage many
medium-sized cities. As various types of Federal aid programs, such as
the provision of public housing by BNH, were conditioned on a municipal-
ity's having a master plan, cities were encouraged to participate in the
SERFHAo supported planning program.
A weakness of the SERFHAO approach (as it proved to be wi lh the
"701" Program in the United States) was that the consultant firms who
undertook the planning studies were most often "outsiders", physically
located (in the case of Brazil) in either Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paolo.
The planners associated with these firms were divorced from the actual
process of local development decision-making. The result was that the
plans they prepared often lacked a sense of reality, were necessarily
static in character, and were prone to setting forth a maximum of de-
tail. Even when small teams of SERFHAO staff members were themselves
involved in the preparation of plans and in the effort to encourage
adoption of more sophisticated local planning procedures, oom"!Iunities
often failed to respond.
Consequently, in 1974 SERFHAU was dissolved and the loan program
for local p1annin~ was taken over by Bm. By 1981 the program had
virtually ceased to exist, and BNR was doing little or nothing to
promote it.
A1 though the results of the planning effort expended by SERFHAU
were considerably less than hoped for in terms of their practical appli-
cation at the local level, studies undertaken in conjunction with the
program assisted in the clarification of the complex nature of the prob-
lems of olrbanization and, more specifically, in the need to target aid
to cities in a systematic manner. Brazil has over 4,000 municipalities
and considerably more urban places. The same kind and scale of assis-
tance can not be extended to all of them.
The Second National Development Plan for Brazil, which encompassed
the five year period, 1975-79, was the first explicitly to incorporate a
national urban development strategy. This was composed of two prinr !pa1
elements. One was the recognition of a ser ies of major ci tie.. that
were, in fact, economically and socially metropolitan regions. Beyond
formal recogni tien for these urban regions, the strategy called for
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strengthening their internal interrelations and for special aid programs
constructed tc meet their particular requirements.
A second element of the urban strategy recognized the existence of
a second tier of cities considerably more numerous and widespread than
the metropolitan regions. Their growth rates were beginning to outstrip
those of the larger conurbations. The controlled development of these
secondary, or medium-sized cities represented a possible lever in dir-
ecting development to important selected regions of the interior of the
country at the same time as it held the promise of slowing down the rate
of population growth of the existing metropolitan regions.
With the elaboration of the National Development Strategy there was
established a National Commission on Metropolitan Regions and Urban Pol-
icy (CNPU). It was an interminister ia1 body whose pr imary functions
were to coordinate Federal aid efforts to cities and to prescribe new
ways of making sue-lot aid nore effective. Administrative responsibility
for the functioning of the ~ommission lay with the Ministry of Planning;
a,ld the research branch of that Ministry, t.~e Institute for Economic and
Social Planning (IPEA), acted as staff for the Commission.
Simultaneously, a number of special funds were designed to channel
special financial support to selected cities. Fran the standpoint of
the prospect of directing an integrated package of aid to urban areas,
the most important of these funds was the National Fund for Urban Devel-
opment (FNDU).
The CNPU set about analyzing its area of responsibility and shaping
policies to gllide Federal support to cities. However, in 1979, with the
change in the Presidency and thus the Government, the Conunission was
abolished and a new agency, the National Council on Urban Development
(CNDU) was created in its stead. (The accompanying chart shows the
structure of the Council.)
This new entity was placed within the Ministry of the Interior and
a Subsecretariat of Urban Developmen~ (SOU) was created to provide spe-
cial staff support. Canparable to the former Conunission, CNDU is an
interagency body on which high level officials of major ministries and
funds are represented whose operations significantly influence urban
development. The most important of the programs currently administered
through this structure, both in terms of financing and staff assistance
provided, is the one for financing i"tegrated packages of aid to medium-
sized cities. In 1979 this program became the recipient of special
assistance from the World Bank.
Still unclear in 1981 was whether transfer of the responsibility
for coordinating Federal aid to municipalities fran the Ministry of
Planning to the Ministry of Interior and ttle replacement of the staff of
IPEA with a new crop of technicians, reflected an increase or lessening
of political interest in the subject on the part of the National admin-
istratioo. The answer is probab:'.y equivocal. Much will depend on the
success of the CNDUls World Bank-supported program during the next
several years.
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It should be noted, however, that neither CNDU nor CNPU ~s created
by the national legislature. Hence, both have lacked authority to staff
operations with career personnel. As a result, professionals associated
with SOU are temporary h ires paid for by participating agencies. As
long as this situation continu~s the Program retains the character of an
experiment and can be restructured -- or eliminated -- with compara~ive
ease.
II. Nature of Special Aid Program to Medium-Sized Cities
The general goals of the Medium-Sized Cities Program (MSC), as set
forth in the enabling legislation and confirmed through personal inter-
views, are to:
provide for a mare balanced distribution of the population
throughout the national territory,
reduce the economic and social costs of rapid, uncontrolled urban
growth,
direct an increased share of the national wealth to cities within
the interior of the country enhance the well-being of the urban
poor within these cities, and
establish effective institutions for planning and implementing
projects required to achieve the other goals.
The goals of the Program are general in nature and their actual
intelpretation is best made through analysis of the manner in which the
Program is implemented. Yet the over all aim is clear. It is to en-
courage development in the poorer, less advanced regions of the country
through the channeling of resources to the large number of medium-sized
cities scattered throughout the country. The aid to these cities is to
be directed at the stimulation of income and employment and the provi-
sion of physical and social infrastructure.
There is no official definition of what constitutes a medium-sized
city and thus no definitive determination as to which cities are actual-
ly included in the Program. The World Bank in the ~ppraisal Report on
its aid to the Program stated that the approximately 200 cities betweeA
50, 000 and 500, 000 inhabitants are involved. However, in interview:!:
conducted for this report a variety of figures were employed by govern-
ment officials centering generally within the range of 130 to 150
cities. The reason for the discrepancy is the difference between the
roles of the technician/researcher and the politician/administrater.
While the former wishes to clar ify class ifications in order to be able
to make objective statements, the latter often finds it necessary to be
fuzzy about distinctions. Such is the case in Brazil where people with
operating responsibility for the MSC Program \IlOuld prefer not to state
conclusively which cities are included in the Program, nor -- more
importantly -- cities which are not included.
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At the end of 1981, for the overwhelming proportion of cities of
moderate size, the matter of eligibility was academic. The World Bank
had agreed in 1979 to make financing available for aid to a limited
group of eight cities. This aid is complemented by special national and
local contributions.
For all intents and purposes the project thus funded constitutes
the Medium-Sized Cities Program of the Brazilian government. Neither
the funding nor the operating personnel are made available in sufficient
quantity for systematically assisting other medium-sized cities.
At least two very good arguments can be made for limiting the MSC
Program to the size of the World Bank-supported project. First, it can
be argued that, under any circumstances, the matter of channeling sub-
stantial aid to cities is difficult. The task is especially complex and
the chances for failure particularly high in a developing country. In
order to piece together a workable program and to put the institutional
mechanisms in proper place, it is advisable, the argument states, to
initiate activities at a scale that is unquestionably manageable. While
the first steps are designed to achieve substantive results, the initial
effort is actually viewed in the nature of a pilot program.
This institution-building aspect of the MSC project is stressed by
the World Bank, who expect that the resulting policies, institutional
arrangements, procedural mechanisms, and trained personnel will form the
basis for an expanded effort in the future.
A second argument for Jrastically limiting the number of cities in
a program of concentrated Q~d is theoretical. Only a certain few, stra-
tegically located cities actually perform, or have the prospect for per-
forming, a strong supporting role in a region of substantial size and
prospective importance. Thus, assuming a situation of scarce human and
financial resources, it is necessary to center attention on those few
cities that possess this potential. At present, no agency is making
this argument in respect to the MSC Program in Brazil.
A. Basic Components of the Medium-Sized Cities Program
The World Bank is lending on favorable terms to the Federal
government of Brazil, U.S. $70 million in support of the MSC Program.
This amount of money is being matched by the Federal government and an
additional U.S. $60 million is being contributed by the local govern-
ments involved in the Program. The resulting pool of U.S. $200 million
was initially designed to aid eight cities in a concentrated manner over
a period of three years. However, early, rigorous attention to costing
the various components of the aid package to several of the ini Hal
cities permitted the Prog~am to be expanded to include ten cities.
The combined contribution of the Federal government and the World
Bank is channeled through a National Fund for Urban Development (FNDU)
in the form of grants to the favored municipalities.
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Because of the special or ientation of the World Bank, the MSC
Program has more sharply defined its targets. The Program is to be di-
rected at assisting the well being of the urban poor within the munici-
palities to be served. The instruments to be employed are:
stimulation of income and employment within the low-income groups
provision of physical infrastructure and social services for the
benef it of the same groups, and
improvement of public administrative p[~cesses that support local
deve1opmen t •
The last of these support mechanisms reflects the strong commitment
of the World Bank to strengthening the institutional basis of the na-
tional agencies with which it becomes associated through its loan activ-
ities.
B. Criteria for Selecting Recipients of Special Aid
Rather than to try to determine which cities would be assisted
by the Bank-supported program on theoretical groundS, the Federal gov-
ernment asked each state to submit a short list of candidates meeting
the following criteria.
1. capacity for growth (presumably as evidenced by a combina-
tion of current population growth rates plus physical
capacity to accommodate expansion)
2. relationships with an extensive hinterland
3. ~idence of a history of coping with problems attendant to
rapid growth
4. evidence, also, of the organizational capability of pre
paring and executing projects of significant scale, and
5. expression of a willingness to participate in and to
follow through with the special aid Program.
The selection of the initial group of eight ci~ies was based, to a
large extent, bn the level of development of local puclic administration
combined and strong political rommitment, on some specific political
pressures and on the desire to be representative throlJC3h iACllJsioo of
cities of \rarying character in different parts of the country.
Salient features of the cities inclu' I in the Program are presen-
ted in the fo~lowing table and are located geographically on the accom-
panying map.
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Characteristics of Cities Incorporated in the
Medium-Sized Cities Program***
Characteristics o~ Cities
l. Florianopolis
2. Juiz de Fora
3. Natal 344,000 ( •76) 6.0
4. Call1pina Grande 205,000 ( '77) ?
5. Vitorla
6. Pelotas
7. Moutes Clares
~"
-+.. B. Petrolina/Juaxeiro
9. -- *
10. -- *
Cities Included
in Program
Size of
Population***
Rate of
Growth of
Population
Level of Employment Under- Capital
Poverty Tertiary Employment of
% ** Sector (%)
-ill State
38.0 Yes
70.0 78.0 ? Yes
? 7B.0 55.0 ?
*
**
***
Incorporated soon after initiation of Program.
According to criteria developed by the World Bank: for a mJ.ddle-income country such as Brazil,
the Bank uses the concept of "relative poverty" to establish poverty income level, calculated
as one-third of national per capita income (adjusted for urban-rural price differences).
Figures refer to the major urban centers within their respective municipios.
Although it can be seen that the cities vary considerably in res-
pect to their rates of population growth and other characteristics, in
general, they have between 200,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, their under-
employment rates are high as are their levels of poverty and employment
in the tertiary or service sector.
C. Profile of the City of Natal
As explained earlier, the basic local unit of government in
Brazil is the municipio, or municipality. Typically, it is extensive,
encompassing both urbanized and rural territory. Thus, while the major
urban center of the municipality of Natal is a recognizable "city" of
approximately a half million people, the governing jurisdiction, the
prefeitura, encompasses this center plus a large rural hinterland and
several much smaller urban places. For ease of expression the word
"city" is employed in this report to denote the principal urban center
of Natal as well as of other important municipalities.
Natal is one of the major cities of the depressed Northeast Region
of Brazil and is a prime target for families migrating from the rural
countryside. It is on the coast where it enjoys both rainfall and a
general climate more abundant and agreeable than does the interior of
the region.
Natal's poverty is spectacular (70 per cent) as is its level of
activity in the tertiary or service sector (78 per cent). The parti-
cular significance of these figures is that the city's many newcomers
are unable to find remunerative employment, and relatively little of the
employment involves the industrial processing of the basic produce gen-
erated within the region.
The city functions pr imar ily as a poli t ;cal and administrative
center. It is the seat of state government, a center of commerce and
service -- including social services, medicine, et al -- and is a center
of transportation and communications.
Two attributes of the city's appearance are particularly stri-
king. The first is its exceptionally clean and orderly quality. The
second is the very low density and, thus, extraordinary physical spread
of the city. In the face of widespread poverty, the level of cleanli-
ness is unexpected. It is probably a result of a combination of fac-
tors. There is an apparent sense of personal pride and feelinC) of com-
munity that pervades the area. This is viewed most dramatically in the
poorest sections of the city, the favelas or shanty towns, where flower-
ing plants often adorn the sides of houses and the grounds of the small
plots. The city has the good fortune to be sited on sandy soil rather
than the Ubiquitous red clay of the interior of the region, and it has a
history of alert, concerned local government. As the city is also host
to the state government, (xmcern for appearances is unquestionably
greater in Natal than in the other urban centers within the area.
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According to local officials, the horizontal spread of the city is
due in large measure to the activities of ~ie National Housing Bank of
Brazil (BNH), Which over the last decade or so has been responsible for
building a number of large public housing projects on the periphery of
the urbanized area. The immediate effect of these developments has been
an explosive expansion of construction activity at the urban fringes,
along a series of long, sparsely developed corridors.
The city's inability to negotiate better terms for the development
that does occur wi thin its borders is manifest in the activities of
BNH. Although the municipality has the legal responsibility, as well as
the legal power, to guide its physical growth, its bargaining position
vis a vis developers is weak. Federal and state agencies as well as
those Who build with the promise of creating jobs do as they please.
In order to qualify for Federally-financed capital projects, the
municipality in the mid-1970s oontracted through SERFHAU for the pre-
paration of a land use plan. This was undertaken by an outside consult-
ing firm. Although the presence of a P'lysical plan satisfied a legal
requirement, it was never employed by the municipality in its own devel-
opment planning, and the plan is totally neglected.
Another plan recently prepared b.r a special adviser to the
prefeito, probably represents community wishes more accurately and, just
as probably, is no more useful than the consultant's scheme.
During the special visit to Natal in 1981 a very large-scale tour-
ist development, several kilometers in extent, was under construction by
the State government along a major portion of the city'S beachfront. It
should have an enormous effect on the growth of Natal, yet none of the
city's planning or building departments was formally consulted about the
development. State officials simply proceeded to do what they wished
without local consultation or approval.
The local government of Natal - and by implication, any other
municipality of moderate size in Brazil -- is tmable to examine land
development needs and serve them through rigorously enforced ordinances
for several reasons. Prominent among these is a history of domineering
leadership that tends to produce automatic acquiescence to those in pos-
itions of greater power or influence. Equally important has been a cor-
responding history of weak community organization, including local gov-
ernance, for articulating and upholding common concerns.
Lack of ability to contribute financially to capital improvement
programs is also usually cited as a pr imary factor in weakening the
ability of Brazilian municipalities to assume greater responsibility for
their development and to negotiate effectively with others who wish to
undertake construction activities within their boundaries.
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The municipality of Natal prepared a 1982 budget of approximately
u.s. $43 million. Seventeen per cent of this amount was for administra-
tion of the primary school system. (In Brazil municipalities are res-
ponsible for providing and administering primary schools: states, for
secondary schools and the national government, for higher education -
universities and training centers.) The remaining 83 per cent, about
U.S. $35 million, was expected to be available for the normal operations
of city government including both administrative and capital expendi-
tures. This amounted to approximately u.S. $70 per capita, quite small
for a rapidly growing city of a half million people. Given a national
economy wi th an annual inflation rate of close to 100 per cent, the re-
maining budget seems too low to allow contemplation of extensive capital
improvements. Nevertheless $13.5 million, or roughly, 30 per cent of
the budget is destined for capital works. This is a substantial pro-
por tion, and wi th increased revenues one would hope that the capital
commitment can grow as well.
Analysis of the projected income of the municipality for 1982 is
also instructive. Roughly 18 per cent was expected to derive from sub-
ventions provided by the Federal government, 24 per cent from the State
government, 49 per cent fran local taxes and 9 per cent frem various
contractual sources. Canbined, the Federal and State governments pro-
vide over 40 per cent of the municipality's revenueS. Unfortunately,
the aid is increasing at a pace substantially slower than the rate of
inflation, and the municipality is unable to devote a progressively lar-
ger share of its income to capital improvements. Although it is expec-
ted that municipal revenues will increase by approximately 20 per cent
in 1983, the rate of inflation is nearly certain to outstrip that figure
by far.
With all the attendant difficulties, in 1981 the municipal govern-
ment of Natal presented a picture of professional competence. It was
directed by an energetic, articulate mayor who enthusiastically suppor-
ted the local MSC Program. All the departmental directors (secretarios)
were highly educated. Several had received degrees or special training
abroad. Their relative youth and general lack of specific experience in
their respective jobs are a result of the inevitable turnover of super-
visory personnel when the office of the prefei to changes hands every
four years.
Government officials in Brasili~ interviewed in connection with the
MSC Program agreed that strong local leadership in the form of an inter-
ested, decisive p!:efeito is crucial to the success of the Program and
that this type of leadership was present in Natal. However, apart from
the personal qualities of the mayor, it is probable that, just as state
capitals are favored in other ways, the level of municipal government is
also incrdinantly high in such jurisdictions.
Thus, Natal genera.lly is in a favorable position to respond posi-
tively to opport~nities presented by state and national governments.
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D. Organization of the Medium-Sized Cities Program
At the Federal level the MSC Program is the responsibility of
the National Council or. Urban Development (CNDU), an interagency body
chaired by the Ministry of Interior. The operational arm of CNDU is the
Subsecretariat of Urban Development (SOU), of the Ministry of Interior.
The MSC Program is one of SOU's principal units. (These relationships
are shown on the organizational chart of the Ministry of Interior.)
CNDU's role with respect to the MSC Program is primarily that of
promotion, coordination and supervisicn. As of September 1981, th~
entire professional st:aff of the MSC ~,i t consisted of only eighteen
persons. They work wibl the participating local governments in develop--
ing each municipality's program, in setting up the monitoring and eval-
uation procedures, and in financial arrangements for disbursing funds.
A par ticular ly advantageous feature of CNDU is that, dur ing the
process of its formation, it developed contractual arrangements with
p.very agency of government expected to participate in the MSC Program.
Every agency knew in advance what it would be called upon to do in sup--
port. In general, the arrangement was that their services would be con-
tracted for by the participating municipalities. Where payment for
these services was necessary, it would pass from the National Fund for
Urban Development (FNDU) administered by CNDU to the contracting muni-
cipality. The municipality in turn would have responsibility for pay-
ment: of contractors' charges. These would be overseen and audited by
the MSC unit.
Another special, and quite possibly unique, feature of the Program
is organizational arrangements at the municipal level, constructed to
parallel those at the national level. Although these arrangements vary
somewhat frCJft municipality to municipality to reflect local forces and
predilections, the case of Natal is typical.
This municipality has a Coordinating Commission composed of the
area representatives of the public agencies involved with the local MSC
Program. Directors of these ~ame agencies comprise the National Commis-
sion for Urban Development (CNDU). The loc.:~al Commission meets quarter1.y
to review progress of the local Program and to assist with establishment
of over all policy. Significantly, in the light of Natal's role as a
state capital, the Director of the State Office of Planning chairs the
meetings of the Coordinating Commission.
Under the Commission is a second advisory and coordinating body,
termed the Operating Commission, composed of the directors of operations
of each of the agencies represented on the Coordinating Commission,
1. e., the persons directly in charge of their agencies' projects which
together comprise the local MSC Program. This board, which meets almost
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weekly, is chaired L. +~~ Director of the Municipal Planning Office. At
its meetings control points on the monitoring and evaluation systems are
checked, and any slippages in performance are noted and remedial actions
recommended.
Under the Municipal Planning Director is the key Project Management
Unit, the group responsible for the day-to-day operations of the local
MSC Program. It is also responsible for managing another of the Pro-
gram s special features, the Municipal Fund far Urban Development
(FM>U). This is a special development account through which grant
monies fran the National Fund for Urban Development (FNDU), plus local
counterpart funds, are channeled. The FM>U is one of the principal
building blocks in the long-term effort to make key medium-sized cities
greater contributors to their own development.
Monies recovered from development projects that comprise the local
MSC Programs and which produce re~enue (for example, from land sales in
sites-and-services housing projects) will flow into the fund as will
supplemental national and local contributions. The concept is to create
local investment funds to be planned and managed by the most competent
group each municipality can muster.
At the time of the field tr ip to Natal, approximately a year and a
half after initiation of the local MSC Program, the Project Management
Unit was composed of eleven professional people - economists, engi-
neers, sociologists, etc. Although all were formally appointed by the
mayor of the municipality, their candidacy had to be approved by the
national MSC office. This agency has retained responsibility for re-
viewi ng the credenti a1s of profess iona1 per sonnel connected wi th the
Program.
The salar] of the Director of the Project Management Unit is ac-
tually paid by the national office while the State and munici~l ~overn­
ments have each assumed the salaries of five members of the Unit. In the
future it is expected that the municipalities, perhaps in <~onjunction
with their respective State 90vernments, will assume full responsibility
for paying the salaries and related personnel costs of the local MSC
Program.
The Project Management Unit in Natal has three small subcHvi-
siorE. Two of these are responsible for monitor ing and evaluating
progress of the projects related, respectively, to increasing income and
employment, and to provision of physical and social infrastructure. The
third subunit handles the accounting and financial management of FM>U,
the local development fund.
All the professional personnel of the Project Management unit have
received special training fran the Institute of Budgeting and Pro9ram-
ming, one of the agencies participating in the Program. The training is
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related to a key element of the MSC Program, i.e. the proj~ct-by-project
monitoring of physical progress and financial expendit~r~s on a regular
basis and the concurrent evaluation of project achievements in terms of
outputs and other sPeCific targets.
The management processes employed are based on a logical framework
systeJII maintained by INCR. They involve regular reporting on two as-
pects of project activities: ~e efficiency with which projects are
being executed, and the effectiveness of the projects in meeting their
reSPeCtive goals.
The processes for monitoring, co~trolling, and evaluating projects
appear to function well, and rapid progress seems to be made on the full
array of projects. The only anxiet.y expressed by those close to the
Program was that, with the inevitable change in the prefeitura scheduled
to take place in 1982, many personnel changes would b~ made and the
operations, severely disrupted. Nevertheless, local leaders were begin-
ning to think and to plan for a second round of projects based on new
grants and loans, and the recuperation of funds invested in the initial
Program.
III. Loca: Development Planning Process PrCftloted by the Program
During the start-up period of the MSC Program each participating
municipality has the responsibility for preparing three, brief, inter-
related documents. The work is normally undertaken by the local plan-
ning offices in conjunction with the newly established Project !lIanage-
ment Units and with the special technical assistanc~ of the national MSC
office.
The first of these documents is a profile, actually a brief sketch,
of the economic, social and spatial s !.t'..1a\..ion of the pcincipal urban
center, the "city", with a se t cf stat"!ml~nts respecting thE major diffi-
culties that affect the city's over all well-being. The document is de-
signed to set forth the nature -3Jld. in the eyes of local authorities,
the relative severity or importance cf these problems. These include
such oonsiderations as service deficits, land development, employment
needs and the like.
The second document sets forth the preliminary development strategy
of the municipality for confronting these difficulties and establishes
target figures for the solution of specific problems.
The third document describes each project proposed as part of the
over all development strategy for the city, explaining how slJch an un-
dertaking will contribute to the solution of the locality's problems.
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In the words of the cooperating personnel of the World Bank:
Any component may be proposed that falls within the Program's bro
adly-defined categories of urban infrastructure and services,
employment and income creation, and administrative and financial
improvements. The system allows cities to propose solutions to
specific local problems in the light of local priorities, while at
the same time providing a framework of jOnsistent information
within which the proposals can be reviewed.
Project profiles are prepared according to guidelines developed by
the World Bank for appraising projects and establishing their eligibili-
ty for inclusion in a comprehensive urban development program. As
emphasized previously, a basic criterion for appraising a project pro-
posed for support by the Bank is its relationship to improving the well-
being of the urban poor.
The full local documentat ion, including the particulars of each
project, is reviewed by the sectoral agencies that comprise the various
coordinating commissions. Project recommendations are also reviewed as
an integrated development package by the several full ~~mmissions.
A. ~prehensive Planning in the MSC Program
Although principal emphasis of the planning process is on pre-
paration and execution of integrated packages, where necessary, the pro-
cess can include direct assistance to participating municipalities by
the na~ional MSC Program office in such additional tasks as r'':'eparing
city-wide land use plans.
This is not the usual procedure, however, and where it is under-
taken the contrnlling concept is not to be more specific than absolutely
necessary. The exercise is to be done in connection with, and as neces-
sary basis for, specific Jevelopment projects that are anticipated. A
frequent example of such a project is urban transportation, which
requires that major undertakings be based on a generalized physical plan
for the ur ban ar ea to be se rved.
To the degree possible the planning process seeks to skirt issues
attendant to the general management of land development in order to
concentrate on promoting locally-mana-ged action projects. Obviously,
howe'J'er, if the two strands of plaMing consideration are not brought
into balance, the projects that are undertaken will exacerbate land
development problems.
3. World Bank, Op Cit., p. 8.
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B. The Development Program of Natal
The projects that comprise the initial development: program of
Natal are representative of the integrated packages of activities under-
taken by a number of the participating municipalities. In the field of
income and job creation the projects are:
1. Assistance to the operation of public markets
The project involves a variety of activities related to
provision of warehouse facil~ties: construction and rental
of movable stalls, etc.
2. Assistance to incipient fishermen's cooperatives
Again, a number of activities a~e involved including es-
tablishment of an umbrella cooperative with sane 3,500
participants and the provision of facilities for collect-
ing, sorting, cleaning, packaging, and distributing the
produce.
3. Assistance in the establishment of a local office of tech-
nical assistance to small (under ten employees) commercial
and industrial firms
Under this project the office personnel to be retained
will be special~_y trained by a national agency connected
with the MSC Pr ~ram.
Projects related to the provision of physical and social infrastructure
for the city include:
1. Expansion of the municipal water system to accommodate all
major portions of the urbanized area.
2. Extension of the sewage system to previously unserved,
low-income sections of the city.
3. Provision of major storm drainage facilities for seftral
of the poorer residential sections of the city.
4. Improvement of the garbage and rubbish collection and
disposal system of the city, acquisition of additional
equipment and provision of sanitary landfills are some of
the components of this project.
5. Improvement of the urban tre.,lsportatiol'l system, principal-
ly road improvements and extension of bus service into an~
through law-income areas of the city.
6. Expansion of the existing sites and services housing
program.
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7. Constrl~ction of a series of ~blic health clinics in the
unserved low-income sections of the city.
Construction of
residential area
police protection.
8. a police sub-station in a
whose residents requested
low-income
additional
Projects related to improvement of municipal government involve:
1. Provision of improved electronic equipment for financial
control activities of the municipality:
2. Improvements of various kinds to the cadastral system of
the municipality.
Some of the Program's projects in Natal, as elsewhere, are tmder-
taken directly by the municipality with its own personnel. Some, usual-
ly when construction is involved, are contracted for by the municipali-
ty. Others are undertaken by State or Federal agencies tmder special
agreements with the local government: and some represent a combination
of efforts by several agencies.
The local Project Management Unit in Natal has the same basic res-
ponsibilities as the other cooperating units. It is responsible for
project execution and operation, including design, contracting, con-
struction, supervision of works, cost recovery and the like. A critical
path statement is prepared for every project nonitored. Quarterly re-
ports are prepared and reviewed with the coordinating commission to
identify and correct problems.
The MSC Program in Natal was functioning ~ite well at the time of
the field visit in 1981. All the projects included in the Program met
important needs of the city. A noticeable feature of the Prog~am in
Natal, however, was the absence of projects related to the particular
reqional context of the city and its specific economic activities, with
distinction between those projects located in Natal and those in other
urban places in the region.
There was, moreover, considerable similarity between the Program in
Natal and the Programs in the other particip~ting cities. It was evi-
dent that, efforts by the national office of the Program (SOU) to encou-
rage differentiation of local programs especially suited to the respec-
tive economies of the individual cities notwithstanding, in fact, a more
or less standard package of core projects was being adapted by partici-
pant cities. Directors of the SOU expressed some anxiety over this sit-
uatiat. It li:l!y be that considerable uniformity is necessary -- and
inevitable in the initial elaboration of this type of multi-sectoral
Program.
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For this reason continuity of the Program is of great importance,
for only over time is it possible to achieve the diversity which is
desired and still manage the over all Program in an efficient manner.
IV. Conceptual and Procedural Issues in the Middle-Sized Cities Program
As the first round of assistance to a select few municipalities
draws to a close and discussion begins regarding the nature and extent
of a second round of specialized aid, a series of critical issues are
confronted.
One of these relates to the coverage of the Program. Will the MSC
Program expand to include all secondary cities of the country or only a
few? Under either alternative, what are the criteria that will be emp-
loyed to determine eligibility?
These questions have a growing urgency. In a specialized aid pro-
gram it is often possible to initiate action on a limited basis without
a strong conceptual base or broad political support. Common sense com-
bined with limited resources steer initial actions along a few, fairly
obvious paths that create little controversy. Unless, however, an aid
program has a powerful rationale that can be popularly understood and
appreciated, it will soon run into crippling difficulties. Then it
risks becoming d iff\1se and ineffective. This process is particularly
marked in countries where it is customary to discard or !adically change
policies and programs whenever the leadership of important ministries
changes.
If the J.IIISC Program is to be extended in more or less its current
form to include 150 to 200 cities then the national commitment will have
to be of a very high order, for the financial resoll1rces involved would
escalate enormously. Assuming that, in order to provide a relatively
secure institutional base, the Program that currently includes ten
cities at an over all cost of U.S. $200 million were to be extended for
a second, three-year cycle. The level of effort would amount to U.S.
$400 million. If a second group of ten cities were to be added at the
end of the first three-year cycle, anoi so on until 200 cities were in-
corporated into the Program, the fin~Jlcial cost wol1ld jump to U.S. $4
billion. Given the hard pressed-financial situation of Brazil, it is
difficult to imagine the national government sustaining such a level of
effort without a very strong motivation.
On the other hand, drastically limiting the Program to a relatively
few cities that perform specific, intermediate roles in the advancement
of key regions would also require a strong national commitment in order
to justify continued, high-level support to the favored few.
Whatever the decision, therefore, if the Program is to be carried
to the point of achieving significant results, it will require a strong,
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easily articulated and understood oonceptual framework. SUch a scaf-
folding did not yet exist in 1981.
The rtSC Program can probably oo:'ltinue to grow and.~rosper if com-
pelling reasons are established for limiting the target group but still
allow for a certain leeway to accommodate peripheral cases that come
with strong political support. Such a deliberate narrowing of the field
would require:
1. that the cities incorporated in the Program played definable,
perhaps complementary, roles in their respective regions,
and
2. that the package of aid extended to them strongly related to
sUpPOrting these roles.
In order to fulfill these requirements, it 1IlIOuld be necessary for
the pragmatic, action-oriented character of the Program to respond to
the broader orientation of the Ministry of Planning, the agency of gov-
ernment responsible for relating major public undertakings to an over
all economic development strategy for the nation as well as to strateg-
ies for its separate, major regions.
Specifically, this would mean that special emphasis 1IlIOuld be placed
on promoting economic activities that not only improve the well-being of
the urban poor but promote the economic integration of the region within
which the respective, recipient cities are located.
Such considerations, of course, complicate the task. On the one
hand, there is the need to provide the theoretical basis for limiting
the scope of the Program to include significantly fewer cities than
initially publicized. On the other hand, there is the need to make the
aid packages correspond to the special economic and social requirements
of each city and its regional hinterland.
With sufficient political wi 11, Brazil can unquestionably marshal
the technical resources to make s~ch definitions and determinations, and
it can oonitor, eval~ate and adjust major elements of the Program
accordingly. The very high level nature of the undertaking suggests,
however, that probably mly co~ntries with a fairly advanced ~rban
structure and a strong technical capacity can expect to emulate the MSC
Program as executed in Brazil.
If the Program is to have a positive infl~ence on key secondary
cities it will be necessary that the package of capital improvement
projects selected for the successive rounds of investment as well as the
physical location of these projects be planned to achieve efficient spa-
tial arrangements. In this respect a tentative, though promising,
beginning has been made by the national office of the MSC Program, i.e.
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through te~hnical assistance to municipalities in the preparation of
sketch physical plans and subsequent aid in the actual preparation of
the development project packages.
AI though it is tmrealistic to expect that the Program can counter-
balance forces tending toward fragmented and inefficient development,
over time care in the siting of major public investments can act as a
constraining force on irrational development of land.
The overriding issue confronting the MSC Program relates, of
course, to the matter of being willing and able to ,;ustain the MSC Pro-
gram over an appreciable period of time. If at the end of the first
thr~e-year cycle special aid to the initial ten cities were to be ab-
ruptly ended in order to assist a second group of ten cities, the sit-
uation of the first group could be drastically worsened. Expectations
would be dashed, institutions in an incipient stage of development would
be severely, perhaps fatally, wounded and many programs would be
stalled. There is implied, therefore, that along with the need to
supply an MSC Program with a strong conceptual base there is need for
special attention to the long-term institutional requirements of the
Program, most particularly at the local level.
This the Brazilian Progr~m sets out to accomplish, particularly
through the innovative devices of special revolving development funds at
the municipal level and small, professionally staffed local project
management units capable of initiating and executing an array of impor-
tant projects.
Currently, however, both the national organization responsible for
the Program and the Program's local management units are structured on
an ad hoc basis that can be easily dismantled. The arrangement promotes
fairly ra~id turnover of the professional staff. It is possible, there-
fore, that the exceedingly promising beginning of the MSC Program in
Brazil, which contains numerous elements for emulation by other COUR-
tries, will not develop into an organization of great national util-
ity. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that the Program will retain its
dynamism long enough to achieve si9nifi"~aRt resl1lts in Brazil and to
provide additional lessons for other countries in similar stages Qf
development.
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I. Context of Korea's Intermediate Cities Program
"'In late summer 1981 the Government of Korea announced a program to
stimulate the development of 14 cities, with the objective of relieving
the pressure of population growth on Seoul and Busan, the country's two
largest cities.
Centerpiece of the Second lO-Year National Land Development Plan,
the population dispersion strategy seeks to make "growth poles" of the
14 cities, creating in each strong attractions for future residents.
Three of these places -- currently Korea's third, fifth and sixth
largest cities -- are designated for particular priority under the
program. The idea is to bring them up to a level on a par with the
country's leading urban centers.
Major government investments in infrastructure, for example,
hydropower, water supply, and transportation facilities, are envisioned
as the chief means of achieving the desired magnetism in the secondary
cities. Housing, industrial and cultural projects would be tied in as
well, increasing the cities' capacity to absorb substantial new growth.
Some background to Korea's situation aids understanding of the
rationale for this secondary cities program, its precedents, prospects
and the institutional machinery for putting it into effect.
General Background
In scarcely more than three decades' history as a modern nation the
Republic of Korea has undergone the devastation of war, geographical
division and one of the I1IOst strikingly successful efforts to achieve
rapid economic development observed anywhere. Created in 1948 under
united Nations auspices after almost a half-century of Japanese colonial
rule, Korea was very shortly embroiled in military conflict. South
Korea emerged in 1953, a very small country with many refugees and
dis~laced persons. Most of the country's mineral wealth and industrial
base lay to the north of the demilitarized zone. Of the 38,175 square
miles in the south, three-quarters is rugged, mountainous and widely
denuded of forest cover. The remaining arable area is divided into
intensively CUltivated small holdings for the most part, following post-
war land reforms. South Korea is among the most densely p'pulated.
countries of the world. In~eed Korea's people are its prime resource.
They are an enerlJetie, hard-workinq people, members of a single ethnic
group who speak a common language. Literacy is high, the rate having
exceeded 90 per cent for some years now. Government has been highly
centralized and under strong presidential control. A large standing
army remains as a reminder of ever-present defense concerns.
lorea's economic boCJl\ has been achieved through concerted
government-led efforts emphasizing industrial production for export
markets. The country was able to attain economic growth rates on the
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order of 10 per cent per year through the 1960s and early 1970s.
Although growth has slowed in more reoent years, it is still sustained
at a healthy pace exceeding the rate of population increase.
The World Bank classifies Korea as a middle-income country, with a
per capita gross national product (in 1978) of $ 1,160 per year.
Over the past 30 years Korea has become urbanized at a pace vir-
tually unparalleled, even in the rapidly urbanizing developing world.
Between 1970 and 1981 urban population grew 93 per cent. l By 1975 half
the population was urban. With two-thirds of her population living in
cities today, Korea has attained a degree of urbanization approaching
that of some of the world's most industrialized nations.
In 1970 there were 32 cities of 50,000 population or over. Today
there are SO, 35 of which had more than 100,000 residents in 1980.
There are also 25 towns of over 50,000, 14 of them larger than
100,000. Eight cities are in the 200,000-500,000 size class~ two, in
the 500,000-1,000,000 class. Four have more t:lan a million inhab-
itants.
Even with. a range of urban living opportunities available through
this whole hierarcby of city sizes, growth of Korea's largest urban
concentrations has c~ntinued on an enormous scale.
One-third of Kor<~a's 37.5 million population live in her t'WO lar-
gest cities. Seoul alone has a 1981 popUlation of 8.5 million. Busan,
at 3.5 million, is the size of Seoul in 1965. Both cities have grown by
almost two and one-half times since that year.
"Very rapid economic growth has made almost every problem
associated with urbanization less serious. In many developing
countries rapid urbanization has been accompanied by high unemploy-
ment rates among migrants and by long periods of transition into
organiZed employment sectors in cities. lorea's rapid economic
growth has enabled cities to absorb migrants into the urban labor
force rapidly. Korea has thus been spared much of the urban discon-
tent, discouragement and violence that has plagued some developing
countries. Al thouCJh urban housing remains inadequate for many
Koreans, !'Dme1essness and extremely inadequate !'Dusing have been
reduced to a small scale by the mid-1970s. Finally, transportation
investments have kept pace with Korean urbaniz!tion. Otherwise,
chaos would have resulted in the largest cities."
Thus it is not the present intractability of primate city problems
that motivates Korea's concern for building up secondary cities, but
1. Total population increase, 1970-81, was 20 per cent.
2. Mills, Edwin 5., Princeton University and Byung Nak Song, lorea
Development Institute, Korea's Urbanization and Urban Problems,
19~5-1975.
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rather three ql;.ite specific objectives. One is the lesser social cost
of coping with urban expansion at a scale smaller than continued growth
of the largest cities would demand. second is the desire for a more
balanced pattern of growth throughout the country -- utilizing resources
so far undeveloped and interrupting the self-propelling trend of region-
al disparity. The breadth of the gap between opportunity in the more
favored parts of the country and other areas has, itself, been recog-
nized as one of the most significant contributing factors to the growth
of seoul and Busan. Third is ':.he matter of national security. SO much
of the nation's population and economic activity concentrated in Seoul
is vulnerable beca:"se of its nearness to the border with North Korea.
Concern for dispersion is a real issue, one which has even inspired
proposals for relocating the capital.
Nor is the concern with the spatial distribution of development
sanething new in Korea. Decentralization policy and "growth poles: or
"regional cities" have been talked about since the mid-1960s at least.
Indeed, government has tried a wide-ranging variety of approaches to
stemming the flow of migrants to the big cities. Among these have been
national land utilization planning, institution of a rural community
development program, imposition of residence tax in the big cities,
limiting admissions of students in the big city educational institu-
tions, an integrated regional development program, "deconcentration" of
industrial development to satellite cities outside Seoul and Busan, and
national housing and land development programs to ease the difficulties
of municipal expansion.
The effects have begun to show in the past few years. Although
Seoul has not stopped growing, much less diminished in size or degree of
dominance, its growth has IlDderated from the rate of more than 7 per
cent in the 1965-75 years to half that between J.97s and 1981. Busan' s
annual growth ra te has stayed in the 5-6 per cent range, increasing
slightly toward the end of the period. Several other oities have out-
paced these two, however. Notably, these are cities in the region sur-
rounding Seoul and in the southeastern coastal area along rout~s radiat-
ing outward from Busan. These developments are certainly testimony to
the industrial deconcentration· program if not to the combination of
other approaches.
Looking to the future, however, the new Five-Year Economic and
Social Development Plan for 1982-36 asserts that much greater emphasis
needs to be placed now on balancing regional development. Sustained
economic growth depends on it. Moreover, Seoul's growth must be even
more tightly reined. The Economic PlanninC) Board's projectiol'ls show
that Seoul's population would reach 10.3 million by 1986 if permitted to
continue growing at its present rate. The plan's target for Seoul is a
maximum 9.2 million in 19861 for Busan, an increa~e of no more than a
half million between now and then.
This Fifth Five-Year Plan reaffirms a cr itical role for "growth
~")les" in its current spatial policy. The Economic Planning Board is
calling for a "major shift in government strategy", however. They want
to move away frClft the 1970s' emphasis CI'l a single leading sector
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(through creation of new industrial estate$) to more broadly-based
efforts at boosting growth of individual cities. The individual city
strategies, in turn, are to be cast in context of regional development
programs.
As migut be expected for a country of limited land resources that
has been deeply involved in reconstructing war-damaged cities, extensive
building of infrastructure, and substantial government investing to
create a new national economic base, physical planning has long been
part of the scene. Plans have been prepared at every scale, from the
national level on down through regional, special development areas,
existing cities and new towns to large development projects. Although
the real driving force for development investments has come fran eco-
nanic, or sectoral, planning rather than the recommendations of these
physical plans, they contir-ue to be prepared, adopted and updated with
increasingly sophisticated techniques. They do serve as 3 geographical
framework for land allocation decisions.
Local planning has been long range and general in nature, the sort
that presents a picture of how things might be in a given city at some
future time, 10 or 20 years hence. Now, however, as the Planning
Board's strategy calls for economic development programming and local
planning to converge, planning practice is newly burdened with the need
for bolder approaches and much greater attention to the specifics of
implementation. Corollary challenges lie in applying an effective
"system of incentives" for investment in targeted locations (as spot-
lighted in the current Five-Year plan) and in strengthening the ability
of municipalities to manage and finance the requisite physical
development.
The Geographical Pattern of DevelOpment
Historically, Korea's mountainous terrain was a crucial determinant
of the country's settlement pattern. Whatever fairly level land people
could find was occupied and cultivated, with densities becoming greatest
in the plains and lowland areas. The resulting eoncentration of popu-
lation and activity in the coastal plains and the greater ease of water
transport combined to emphasize coastal movement. Of the 32 cities in
Korea in 1970, 14 were ports and six others were close to the coast. 3
Loeation of the mountain ~asses shaped the main overland transport
routes.
Junctures of the principal routes were where the largest eities
developed. Seoul and Incheon in the west and Busan in the southeast
gained their early commercial importance as ports. Other major citie~,
- Daegu, Gwangju and Daejon, for example, -- grew up as crossro:;;(,s
collection points for mineral and agriCUltural products.
3. Vreeland, Nena et aI, Area Handbook for South Korea, Foreign Area
Studies (FAS) of the American University, washington, D.C., Second
Edition, 1975, p. 42.
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Dominance of Seoul increased over time, as more and more of the
country's manufacturing activity, business and leading educational and
cultural institutions came to be located there. Since the 1950s,
particularly, the expansion of government itself contributed to the
capi tal city's sustained pace of growth. The power of Seoul as
political center increased with government involvement in an ever-
widening nnge of development activities, enterprises and controls.
Even growth elsewhere in the country, enhanced Seoul's position inasmuch
as central government exercises power over all lesser administrative
units as well.
Thus Seoul has continued to attract "the ambitious and talented
through the potent and still-accurate trad~tional belief that proximitI
to powerful figures is a requirement for personal advancement."
Approvals necessary to the conduct of every day business similarly
~equire access to the authorities who grant them -- in Seoul.
Outside the capital the emergent settlement pattern has been very
much shapec by Korea's industr ialization polic ies. The substantial
amount of new industry c:'~ated and its geographical distribution have
resulted in major population shifts, both rapid and widespread. The
areas favored by governmental investment in infrastructure in support of
industry and then by the location of manufacturing plants have shown the
most dramatic growth. These include the larger cities in general, the
southeastern coastal region as a whole and the area within a radius of
40 km or so around Seoul.
So great has been the attraction of jobs in manufacturing and
services that the population in cities of 100,000 or more grew by four
to five times between 1949 and 1975. Small cities (of lmder 20,000
popUlation) lost ground during this period of rapid urbanization by not
growing at all. Rural popUlation declined absolutely.
In general most of the larger and intermediate size cities have
maintained their positions of relative importance. The exceptions --
all of them below the six largest cities in rank order of size -- have
been ootably in the Seoul Region or in the dramatically d'langing
southeastern coastal area.
Seongram, for example, was net classified as a city until 1972.
With 27 2,000 population in 1979 and 345,000 in 1980, it is now the ninth
larges'" city in Korea. Anyang, also near Seoul, was the 39th city in
rank o~der of size in 1960. By 1980 it was 14th, with a population of
216; ~OO.
Ulsan grew more than tenfold between 1960 when it was the 40th city
with a popu11tion of 30,000, and 1980 when it was in 8th place with
393 ,000. Pohang rose from 24th to 15th as it tr ipled in size over the
same 20 years. Masan moved up from 8th to 7th place, by doubling in
size between 1970 and d80. These three cities and othersS in the
4. Ibid., p. 3.
85
The Seoul Region
I~ (,_~ (.f''''
,.}t'",... y~J
.. ""'~"/ .
• -"\U'
~ ' ...:~ .- . ,C:~}" .~\ /'~ ...
....-.~~
f - .. , ...
r.. ~
-...,.
~.'t' ....).~.,
"-~'\':.-"_.'\'),- :"\ .,,-...,~ ".0... .;'
•
-_._-
.,.~"'--";L-_~---_
1tI-.. -
- ~ --. ..:.:;.:::: "'"iNC~EQN
---- ------~.... ~~::---,;: ',-;. ~~.J
#' • &_..-...A ........ ,
al~G~NOn ~~
- t.pilESS ..·..... • ...
- .............,.
-=- iliA'" 14IG"WAfS
_.ILACt.O ,,_.___• ......-...-.-..
PAOVllI:t""" Boo_'sOfJtl~
Cl PAOVI~:I.c~C.PITAL
C CITY
.i) ,"O'lT
~- - ------.
_...
-
GRAPHIC SCALE
'C~ '0 .70. !~._ 4~1".'
1,000,000
Source: Ministry of Transportati0n, K~rea Port - Phase Two Development
Development Study, Seoul, 1956.
The South€asterr. C0astal Region
- - - --- --.,.----:-:--"f
.".- - --
~:JEJUVI SEOGWIPO
GRAPHIC SCALE
o
SOUT"H SEA
«LEGEND II
- 11lJt"~!"""
lIAIl H'.HltA,.,
"AIL..OAD
~.I3VI"CIAL. 1O\JIlIle...,
~ ~"O'lII"CUlI. ~ITAL.
C Cln
8> P'O'tT
+ AI~PO"T
•
Source: Ministry of Transportation/Korea Port - Phase Two Development
Study Group, Korea Port - Phase Two Development Study, Final
Report, Vol. I, Introduction and Summary, 1976, p. 56 .
. "
Rank
1960 1966
Urbdn Populations and Ranks, 1960-1980
(pOpulation in thousands)
1970 1975 1980
Rank
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
II
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
City
Seoul
BUSdn
Daequ
Incheon
GwangJu
Daejeon
Jeonju
Masan
Mokpo
CheongJu
Suwon
Gunsan
yeusu
Jillju
Chuncheun
WonJu
GyeongJu
Suncheun
ChungJu
JeJu
Jinha.,
Jangsel,ng
Iri
Pohang
Gangneung
Andong
Euijeungbu
Gimcheon
Samcheunpo
50sa
Chungmu
Sangju
Sokcho
Cheonan
Mukho
Jechon
Son9tan
Yeungju
Anyang
Ulsan
Populat~on
2,445
1,163
67&
402
315
229
189
158
130
92
91
90
87
87
83
77
76
69
69
68
67
67
66
60
59
53
51
51
50
48
48
47
46
44
41
39
35
32
31
30
Clty
!ieoul
Busan
Daequ
Incheon
GwangJu
Daejeon
Jeonju
Mokpo
Hasan
Suwon
Cheongju
Ulsan
Jinju
Wonju
Gunsan
Yeusu
Chuncheon
Jeju
Jangseong
Gyeongju
Jinhae
Chungju
Suncheun
Iri
Euijeungbu
Cheonan
Pohang
Gangneung
Andong
Sokcho
Dongducheon
Gimcheon
Anyang
Samcheonpo
Chungmu
Mukho
Jechon
Sangju
Yeungju
Song tan
Population
3,805
1,430
847
529
404
316
221
162
155
128
124
113
107
104
103
102
100
88
87
86
81
80
79
79
75
71
66
65
64
63
59
56
54
53
51
50
50
48
46
44
City
Seoul
Busan
Daegu
Incheor,
Gwangju
DaeJeon
Jeonju
H'. .ian
Hokpo
Suwon
Ulsan
Cheongju
Chuncheon
Jinju
Yeusu
Gunsan
Wonju
Jeju
Jangseong
Euijeongbu
Gyeongju
Jinhae
Anyang
Suncheon
Chungju
Iri
Pohang
Cheonan
Andong
Gangneung
Sokcho
Jech, n
Gil'1cheon
Dongducheon
¥eongju
Sosa
Hukho
Chungmu
Sarncheonro
San'lju
Population
5,5]6
1,881
1,083
646
503
415
263
191
178
171
159
144
123
122
114
112
112
106
103
95
92
92
92
91
88
87
79
78
76
74
73
62
62
60
59
57
56
55
55
53
Ci ty
Seoul
Busan
Daegu
Incheon
Gwangju
Daejeon
Masan
Jeonju
Seongnam
Ulsan
Suwon
Mokpo
Cheongju
Gunsan
Chuncheon
Jeju
Anyang
Pohang
Yeusu
Wonju
lei
Bucheon
Suncheon
Gyeonqju
Euijeongbu
Chungju
Jinhae
Cheonan
Andong
Gangneung
Jechon
Sokcho
YeongJu
Gimcheon
Chunqrnu
Hwangju
Dongducheon
Samcheonpo
Shindo
Song tan
Janqseung
pnpulation
6,889
2,454
1,311
800
607
507
372
311
272
253
224
193
193
154
141
135
135
134
131
120
117
109
108
108
108
105
104
97
95
85
74
72
71
67
67
61
60
60
59
57
56
City
Seoul
Busan
Daegu
Incheon
Gwanqju
Daejon
Masan
Ulsan
Jeonju
Seongnam
Suweon
Cheongju
Mokpo
Anyang
Bucheon
Pohang
Jinju
Gunsan
Yeosu
Jeju
Chuncheon
lei
Weonjo
Euijeongbu
Chungweon
Buncheon
Gyeongju
Cheonan
Jinhae
Chungju
Gangneung
Gwangmeong
Gumi
Donghaeung
Andong
Jecheon
Yeono)ju
Chunqmu
Sogcho
Gimcheon
Population
8,114
J,O]S
1,513
1,044
733
61J
398
J9J
361
345
290
237
217
216
196
195
186
169
162
161
156
141
136
125
125
119
117
116
112
112
III
105
10J
102
101
BJ
78
76
72
71
1
2
J
..
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
2]
24
25
26
27
28
29
JO
J1
J2
JJ
34
H
36
37
J8
39
40
C'." ."",.. ,",e .c ..."." I~" 'I'lome Affairs, Municioal Yearboo~ of Korea, 1974 and Municioal Yearbook of Korea, 19801
southeastern coastal region have shared in the boom that made this area
the majoL focus of growth during the last decade.
Korea's emphasis on development of heavy industry or iented toward
imports of raw materials ard experts of finished goods has been the
major factor in the phenomenal development of the southeast. The area
has good natural harbors and mild climate: and it is closer than any
other to primary sources of raw materials as well as the Japanese
market. Undeveloped lard along the coast offered large site::; suitable
for the refineries, petrochemical and other chemical plants, and for the
steel and shipbuilding complexes that were built. Moreover, this is the
part of the country farthest from North Korea. Government has augmented
the natural advantages of the region by major ir_vestments in ports ca.,,:d
other infrastructure and through financial measures encouraging private
decisions to invest in the Southeast.
Although construction of industrial estates has facilitated a wider
dispersion of manufacturing activity in general, highly focussed
policies in the manufacturing and transport sectors have contributed to
a more selective and less broadly balanced pattern of development.
Within the last planning period, particularly, the flow of credit for
business d"'velopment was controlled so as to emphasize heavy industry.
That had a great impact on fueling growth in the Southeast relative to
other parts of the country. With respect to investments in upgrading
transportation facilities, the dominant themes have reflected the
industrial development thrust of government, i.e. ports oriented toward
the outside world, highway access between the larger cities and Seoul
and Busan, and a system of mass transportation to serve the "deconcen-
tration" objectives in the region surrounding Seoul.
Other governmental action, e.g. in housing, land use regulation,
community development, social infrastructure and administrative training
has had more important effects on the quality and management of Korea's
urbanization than on its spatial distribution.
Urban Development and Management in the Governmental Structure
...;outh Korea is divided into thirteen administrative subdivisions,
all of whic'h are, in effect, implementing arms of the central govern-
ment. These include nine provinces headed by governors and four "spe-
cial cities" whose status is parallel in some ways to that of the pro-
vinces.
Provincial boundaries generally circumscribe units that were estab-
lished five centuries ago and are associated with river basins. The
provinces are further subdivided into units of "general" city with
populations of 50,000 or more and counties. Counties are further sub-
divided into towns with popUlations of at least 20,000, townships and
villages.
5. E.g. Busan, Yeosu, Jinhae.
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The governance of local units is a direct and cloSE:ly lIDnitored
channel for policies of the state.
Heads of all the provincial and local government units are career
administrators who accede to office through presidential appointment.
Recommendations for provincial governors are made by the Minister of
Home Affairs from the prominent members of the civil service. Mayors of
the 46 ordinary cities and county chiefs are nominated by their respec-
tive provincial governors. The special cities (Seoul, Inchecn, Busan
and Daegu) are under the direct control and supervision of the Pr ime
Minister's office, rather than the Ministry of Home Affairs (MORA). It
is the Pr ime Ministl:= who place the names of their mayors before the
President for formal appointment.
Local government officials are rotated among various positions in
different parts of the country after serving tours of, perhaps three to
four years in one place. It is not unusual for an individual in the
course of his career to have experience in many different levels of the
administrative hierarchy, with the exception of central government. Per-
sonnel units for local and central government authorities are separate,
the latter having somewhat higher social prestige. In the local govern-
ment service a succf'"ssful promotional route would most likely be from
units of smaller size to larger ones, with status escalating according-
ly, up to the pinnacle which is the position of Minister of Home
Affairs. Seoul's mayors tend to be selected from among those who have
attracted attention as mayors of other large cities. The mayorship of
Seoul, in turn, seems to be regarded as stepping stone to the position
of Minister of Home Affairs. .
None of the administrative subdivisions has had an elected
decision-making body for the past twenty years even though local auto-
nomy legislation remains on the books.
The authority of local governmental entities to levy taxes and to
borrow funds is tightly oonstl.icted. Because locally-generated revenues
are unable to cover more than SO to 60 per cent of local governments'
expenditures, these units are financially dependent on the central gov-
ernment. Assistance is provided through subsidies for special projects
or programs central government wishes to implement, through the provin-
cial offices of the ministries, and directly, through a shared tax. 6
6. The shared tax allocations are based on the computed difference
between the local entity's projected "nep.ds" and its ability to
finance such expenditures through local revenue sources. As the sum
of local governments' "gaps" exceeds the money available for
distribution, the Ministry of Bome Affairs determines unit costs for
the various services. Estimated "needs" are consequently the
computed costs of meeting a schedule of 'Jniform standards of service
compiled by the central government (expressed in won per thousand
popUlation or won per square feet as in the ease of expenditures for
property maintenance). "Ability" is measured as 80 per cent of the
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The system is such that the ~ntire budgetary structure of local govern-
ment is subject to close supervision and coordination by central
government. In the course of its monitoring activities, central govern-
ment generates an elaborate data base on the individual communities and
establishes for each leo;;-el (or broad size category) a uniform standard
of comm~.ity services.
At the level of central government, responsibilities for the inter-
mediate size cities divide principally along the lines of urban adminis-
tration, which is the bailiwick of the Ministcy of Home Affairs (MORA),
and development, which is the concern of the Ministry of Construction
(MOC) •
Long range planning for the cities is a function which involves
both ministries, but in somewhat different ways. All the cities have
plans which are mandated by law. The framework within which these plans
are prepared and their final approval must come fran the MOC. This
Ministry is the parent agency of the Korea Research Institute for Human
Settlements (KRIBS) which, among its various research duties, sets out
the policy and statistical parameters, e.g. populatic.'l targets, as the
terms of reference for preparation of individual local plans.
Arranging and paying for the preparation of the local plans as well
as overseeing their implementation falls to local government. Thus
screening and acceptance of the plans by MOBA is also required. In
actual practice the municipalities usually contract with professional
consultants -- and sometimes with KRI~~S itself -- to prepare the plan
documents. The plans are screened by advisory committees within the
municipalities and then by MORA before being sent on to MOC for formal
acceptance.
Once adopted, the local plans are officially the plans of
government. They are the basis for stringent land use regulations and
greenbelts, special zones and tuilding permits through which local
government controls the location of private sector development. In lar-
ger privately developed housing estates, the Ministry of Construction
also requires installation of schools, recreation facilities and other
community services by the developers in accordance with the standards
set forth in the plans.
The relationship of public sector development to the plans is
complicated by the fact that several different arms of central govern-
ment and local government itself carryon development activities.
regular local tax levy. Separate ftunit expense ft scales are created
for the special cities, provinces, nonmetropolitan cities and the
counties. The Ministry of Bome Atfairs has some flexibility for
adjusting to changing conditions and responding to emergencies.
(Pages 128 and 129 show how needs or cost standards for nonmetropolitan
cities are specified.)
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The Ministry of Construction, through its eight regional offices,
desi~ns and builds most pUblic works, e.g. roads, schools, water supply,
etc. MOe's national Physical Planning Bureau achieves over all coor-
dination through review of designs and final inspection of completed
construction. K>C's projects are, by and large, as called for in the
local plans wi th respect to location and scale. Such is not always the
case, oowever , wi th proj ec ts of the Korea National Hous ing Corpora tion
(KNeC) and the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC), agencies which
have more clout than the plans and more than local administrators.
The Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) is a government
corporatioo set up nineteen years ago as the principal implementing
agency for public housing programs and other measures to relieve Korea's
housing shorta~e. Its mission includes the supply, finance, and upgrad-
ing of shelter as well as the management of housing estates. KNHC is
attached to the Ministry of Construction, which directs its housing
operations in consultation with the Ministry of Finance.
KNHC's building program is very large by any criterion -- 45,000
units in 1981. 9 The work is widespread throughout the country, but
under high~y centralized control. Seven branch offices have responsibi-
lity for construction management, yet all basic project planning in done
in Seoul.
Beginning in 1976, KNHC reoriented its production from emphasis on
Seoul and Busan (where over two-thirds of its uni ts had been built in
the previous 14 years) to other cities. By 1979 almost three-quarters
of their new units were being built in 38 cities other than Seoul and
Busan. Thirty of these are cities in the small or medium size class.
New projects were begun in five more cities within the last two years.
Under a 19 77 Ministry policy that governs DlHC operations,
priorities for housing construction focus on five regional growth poles
(Daegu, Daejon, Chongju, Gwangju and Masan) and seven other industrial
cities. KNHC is charged with providing housing for industrial workers
in these targeted locations. The objective is to have the housing ready
when it is needed. Timing of the industrial development and other new
activities is not always well synchronized wi th the housing construc-
tion, however. Delays in the creation of new jobs has left KNHC with
several hundred vacant units in various locations. This problem is
characteristic of the smaller cities where KNHC is enjoined to build,
virtually nonexistent in the largest cities with the greatest backlog of
demand.
7. Exceptions are power and telephone lines which are built ~ the
Korea Electric Corporation and the Ministry of Communications'
Bureau of Telephones, respectively.
8. Sites and services projects are covered by the term, shelter, in
addition to conventional housing projects.
9. This l~vel of activity surpassed even that of the Japanese Housing
Corporation for the current year (35,000), though not the JHC's all-
time annual record.
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In the past KNEC housing was about evenly divided between units for
rent and for sale. Now, however, all new housing is built for sale.
Consequently market acceptance is an important factor in the agency's
planning. Although resistance to the five-story walkup flat (99 per
cent of current production) has been overcome ir. time, consumer concerns
impose other constraints on the projects. One of these is cost, as KNHC
is obliged to build for low and moderate income families. Another is
location, specifically, access to urban services and employment. KNHC
has had a major problem reconciling these needs in the selection of
housing project sites.
The Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC) is another government
corporation, created in 1979 to play a major role in shaping as well as
implementing urban land de~lopment and reclamation policies. Its
mission is to acquire land for residential and industrial use and to
sell the land either for private development or to develop ~he land
itself prior to sale. Developments up to the size of a whole new town
are within the plrview of KLDC and its current priorities center on
residential land development for low income groups.
KLDC has been vested with the assets of a predecessor agency, the
Korea Land Bank, that had been formed in 1975 to acquire excess property
from businesses. That earlier body had had too limited a scope of oper-
ations to make much impact, and it was unsuccessful in meshing its land
supply with the demands for urban expansion and development. KLDC, with
its broader mandate and international agency assistance has grown
rapidly in size and project experience.
In addition to Seoul headquart.ers there are currently five KLDC
branch offices located in: Busan, Daegu, Gwangju, Daejon and Chonju.
Finance for KLDC activities has come mair:1y through government
capital and sales of bonds backed by its land assets. All its costs for
land acquisition and development (including overhead and interest) are
to be recovered through its land sales. The cost-sales price equation
virtually forces KLDC to seek out the cheapest possible land.
The municipalities are a third group empowered to develop land for
housing and allied purposes. They do subdivide land and install utili-
ties and roads, and they are required to provide off-site infrastructure
for the housing projects of the KNHC and KLDC. Their methods and
approach to development are different from those of the central govern-
ment project development agencies. Both their degree of initiative in
the development of raw land and their volume of activity are also more
limited. This is so partly because of their rectricted financial re-
s::>urces and partly because central government has not cast them in a
leadership role with respect to urbanization.
A high level MOHA official expressed the attitude of central
government that the key to developing the intermediate size cities is in
creating the industries and jobs to attract population and the essential
infrastructure for supporting them. This is the primary interest of
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government. It is the job of city administration to fill in later with
the services. But this is a subsidiary objective in his view, and one
which has rightfully received short shrift.
Implementing agencies such as KNBC or KLDC generally do try to
follow the land use guidelines set forth in the master plans when they
select project sites. When for reasons of cost, immediate availability,
accessibili ty or another, the choice of land OJnflicts with a city's
master plan, the project planning considerations generally prevail, and
there ::;; a fairly straightforward process for amending or revising the
plans. This is consistent with the sort of long range (20 year) compre-
hensive and general guidance type of local planning that has been
done. In the case of such a conflict the project implementing agency,
once its detailed plans are prepared, reviewed by the municipality and
approved by the Ministry of Construction, is required to propose revi-
sions in the land use maps of the communities involved and process the
revised versions up through K)C channels for approval. There is a Na-
tional Urban Deliberations Committee OJmposed of E"x-officio ministry
officials and professionals or univers':ty professors who review these
proposals and make the formal decisions on revising or amending the
adopted master plans.
This process of amending and updating the long range, -end-state-
type of city plan does not, however, directly address some other prac-
tical, more immediate and possibly more serious development problems
that arise. These have to do wit.l timing anC! sequence, with coordina-
tion of budgeting for project oomponents and connections to the larger
community, with the relationship of different agencies whose efforts
need to mesh I:llt are oontI;)lled by inheren'tly CX)nflicting policies.
Housing standing unoccupied because the potential buyers and the econ-
omic activity to support them have not yet arrived reflects this sort of
problem. Other illustrations are purchases of residential sites by KLDC
under the dictates of its least-cost selection criteria which are so
distant from existing development they fail to meet KNHC's criteria and
prove excessively costly when it comes to the municipalities' extending
infrastructure, or si~ply the massive housing estate that does get built
and tenanted but lacks the schools or health clinics, the shopping
facilities, recreation or other services that go to make up an urban
Commurl::'ty.
Increasing pressure on the part of citizens for improved services
is an emergent feature of the development environment in which the urban
development and management agencies are working. In the p.1sh for
economic growth attention to urban services has b~en downplayed.
Similarly, concerns about pollution. New, however, these matters are in
some quarters beginning to be seen as elements in a strategy to attract
popUlation and economic activity to communities outside Seoul and Busan.
Two additional, and very important, factors affecting K~rea's urban
devalopment in the coming years should be recognized here as well. One
is the enormous national housing pro-}ram which calls for almost 3.5
million new units to be built over the next decade. This will Iftean
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sealing up arumal public sector productiOft to levels of 130,000 -
140,000 dwelling anits, i.e. a tripling of the present rate: and a
private sector output aver~ing onr 200,000 units per year - a mighty
challenge to the development institutions identified above.
Their efforts face further challenge in the second factor, the
scarcity and high price of urban land. Between 1965 and 1977 the price
of urban residential land rose tri 3,472 per cent (ClOmpared with an
increase of 436 per cent in the consWIler price index). Land as a
ecaponent of the ClOst of an apartment rose frail 9 per cent to 39 per
cent dur ing those same years.
Urgency of the need for lousing and the severity of the land
s\1PPly/cost situation haft led government to devise a series of special
measures for CDping. These are descr iOed in the following section on
procedures fGr the development Gf urban land.
II. The Orban Land DeV'elopment Process
Two approaches tG the develGpment Gf urban land are wi<lely used in
Korea today. Land readjustment is the te-<:hnique employed by ml':ilicipali-
ties tG subdivide ac)rieultural land intG building sites and tQ pravi<Je
thQse sites with urban services. Sometimes this is done in collabora-
tiGm with the nooc: and .. in a few cases, the DaC. It has been a popJ-
lal:, and ur:til recently the principal, development prooesa because it
enables the local gevernmental autharity tG accomplish installatian af
utilities, rGads, school sites.. etc. withaut a net outlay Qf capital.
Reservatian and exprQpriatian Gf land fQr housing projects is the secand
and newer SeMIIle, increasiACJly faVGred by the central ~vernment deve-
lOPllent ac)encies, the ltNlIC and lUoDC. This mechanism has featl1res ~ared
tGWard balding down the price Gf resieSenth! land fGr lGWer incCllllM! fami-
li.s and improving the efficiency of large-scale develapment projects.
Althol1C)h the mGre recently instituted apprGach avoieSs SGRe of the
probl_~ Qf land readjl18tment.. it has 80111e of its cwn and it ca,n entail
substantial capital expenditure at the outset Gf a ~r:Gject.
Peatl1res of the two approaches are suftlllar!z@CI _law.
Land lteadjl1stnlent.
'fttia ayste.... introdl!c@eS in lorea by Japan dl1rinlJ the years of
0CCl1paUGft., and I1pdat@Cl by Korea'. Land lteadj-I1Stnleftt Law Gf 1966. Land
r.adj1lat1Mmt haa _en .-ploywd primarily in residential area c1evel<;Jp-
••fIlt, lwt there ha.,. 1Men SC!lIII@ ~~ercial aM indl1strial applicati(!)ns
also.
'!'h@ pr0CeeSl1re is f(!)r the IIlllftl~ipallty tG c1eelare an area (!)f the
city which ia ri,. f(!)r eteveleplHnt _ a Land It.adjl1stnlent PrCJject
(LItP) • '!'heft the eity aur..ya the p!:CJperty and prepares a a1 te plan
ahCNiftlJ the atreets, plCJt lines.. aflld SitH for COIIIIIl1l\ity facilities Sl1ch
aa aehools, perka md CJther land use.. COIIts Gf site preparati(!)n and
bstalling the ess4!ntial iJ\fr...st~ucturelQ are estimated. and the
e~nt1l&l market value of the serviced lots is projectc. Based on these
fiCJUres. a calculation is made of the proportion of lots or ~_and area
that lIJIOW.d ba~ a va~ue. when sold. equivalent to the investment in
infrastructure. In these matters of site plan and appraisal. the muni-
cipality cr lead developnent agency of central qovernment may hear opin-
ions of landowners and professional experts whom it appoints to a land
readjustment advisory committee.
Wbera the project _i te develOJilllent has been completed. the municipal
allthority withholds the land designated for streets and cQl\lllUnity faci-
li :.es sites plus the n\11t\ber of finisb..d lots .mose sale at auction will
enable the city to recoup its develoV;lent costs. This withheld portion
is called the wKea redllCtionw or Wcost reduction-. The remaining
finished lots are returned to the original owner or owners of the
property in p»Ioportion to the vallie of their respective original inter-
ests. In some cases. the city has sold the pUblic facility sites to the
governmental .;encies responsible for developing them. e.g. the Ministry
of EducatiQn.
This method of .coomplishinq urban expansion is advantageous in
that it permi ts installation (j)f basic: services without net cash Qlltlay
by looal government. the mst beiRCJ tapped frQll\ the increased value
accruing tD the la. as result of its being farnished with infra-
s tructlll'e.
Analysts William Doebele and Myong Chan Hwangll point GUt certain
technical problems in accal'ataly fore<l:astiACJ infrastra<l:tlll'e costs and
.ales prloe CK IUcket vallie (j)f the finished lots. They also Qbserve
that the ..aMer Qf applyin9 land readjlist1lent ..ay aC<l:elerate lard pri<l:e
increases rather th~" helping to hGld the. in Cllhe<l:k and CllGfttributes
relatively little to e~aAding the slipply of holisiACJ f(J)l le:- incc.e
fa.Uies.
In CDncept u¢h land readjastftlent p»Ioje¢t .1'1ollld be self-financiACJ
and not recruire inpllt frSt the general fllnds of the c:ity or town. This
P\lt. pal'tiClllllar pressllce ClIft the ~ity W ~vise a slIG:Cllessflll _rketi~
stratev fGr dispod tiQR cpf 1 ta w<!:Ost recl\l<l:tion" la»ts - and sCMlletilles
tea Mnipylate the IU-rket - .0 that th~ land allctia»na ~, incleed. real-
i •• the lM<l:e.sary yields withlft a rea150MBle ti_. This generally h.aa
10. Work tlPi~allF 1ncllld•• ,ra4il'CJ? stree~ layGY~, pla-tti-A9, p..i""
of acterial toacl8. lA.tallaUan Gf ..wer trllftk lines (!!lilt A0t w.ter
allpp11) and .,_t1.s ¢lI-rItS mcl street li9htin9. Sinc::e IIser
~h..[geS al'e reU,e4 C!m to <!Over the ~apital a,net o~ratin9 <!:O!ts of
the water Alenei.s. the tenclen<l:Y is tG wait until enoll9h lots are
ecald and IInder <!:OftStrlletion to a••lire there will ~ sllffi~ient
c1uand.
11. EJGe_le" Willi_ A. IIld lIIYon9 Chan HWMll', -Land PetHeiea in the
Re~Glie etf IGrea with Special ~efereftG:e tG Deeentraliled
...l<JPllleftt", WGrld Ba-ftk. JUly ln8.
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meant keeping the supply of available lots 901IIewb.at behind demand.
Indeed, it has even gone to the extent of the municipality's offering
preferential tax exemptions to improve the oompetitiV"'! position of its
own lots in the mu ket.
The system emes not take into account the ne1!d for some working
capi tal bebre@n the time a project is begun and when cash is generated
by sale of the finished lots. lllhat actually hat:P!ns is that the city
"lends" the frQDt-.nd money to the project. But the formula for repay-
1IIeDt through the proceeds of lots sales makes no pr: :>Vision for interest
at the "borrOW@d" money. A city with se"ral ongoiTl9 LRPs may get
arOUftd the cash flow diffi0111ty by using "surplI1S" income frOil a project
in the marketineJ stage for starting a new project or f"r I1pcJrading an
older developntent. '!'his practice may be questionable. Such surplases.
generated the ::~9h a combination of conservative ini tial m~rket esti-
mates, strong demand and the effects of inflation on sales prices,
sftol11d, in principle, be retarned to the original land owners.
-'s for the Griginal land amers, Doebele and Hwang find evidence
that many of the .all far1Mrs who are displaced frOll an LRP area cannot
afford to acquire farmland elsewhere ad cannot afford to hold on to
tlMir interests in the rAP I1ntil it is completed. Because th·!y tend te
sellout Mrly, it is speculative subsequent owners who realize the
handsome capital gains frail the converted land when the city 111timately
releases it.
Land readjl1stment practices ~ the cities may be more indicative of
effort to "work the syst.." as fl111y as possible rather than to
itapl..nt utional tGasift9 and land dl!ftlopaent policies. '!'he resalts,
at any rate, do not se.. to reflect high priorities Qft increasing the
sl1pply Qf land for hot1sing low inCOlMt hGusehGl<ls, sl_ineJ the rise of
land prices or coor<linating the provision of hot1sinc) with other decent-
ralization incentiftS offered t~ industry and labor.
These shGrteGMings in the land readjl1stMnt systell appear to be
a_"9 the factGrs that 1."spired the spec!ial new ptG<::ed\lres <NtH·ned 1ft
the ROt1si·nC) Site Developne"t to.-. This legislati01\1' 1,n effect sift¢e
Jaftt1ary 1981, prGvides fGr a _re direct apprGa¢h (lG land pianni""
aequisitiC!Jft1' developllent am disPGsitiQft, This apprGach is linke<l lIGIe
clc.-.ly tD iapl_ntation Gf cantral fOYermleftt prGgralls and it incetr-
petratea featwres inteftded t~ assl1~e a swpply Gf land far lGW and moder-
ate ineo.. hBwliftg.
!be ~w.i",Site Bevelsp!!nt Gistriet
Un<ler al1thGrity of the new law, the R~nister Gf CQnstructiQn12 may
ae.iC)ftat~ as spee!al <liltricts areas required fGr lar,e-seale iftteCJrated
12. The Rinlster etf CGnstructiGft may deleC).te SGlfte 0f hil authGrity
Wilder this law t~ tl~ mayetrs etf Se0\l1 etr Iti.an Special Cities, bet
ptGvlAeial 4J<"1ernors Gr tG clirectors etf lGleal land mafta,e_nt
Gffices wnder the ROC.
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(i.e. bDusin<) and allied services) development projects in accordance
with t~ national housing prOCJ~am. !'!lis is to be done in consllltati<i)n
with other ministe~s whose areas of responsibility ~uld be involved in
the e'ftfttual development and with beads of the respecti'Oe local jllris-
dictiClnS to be affected. It would also follow review by the 1!ollsir.J9
Policy ~liberatiCl\ Committee. l3 The proposed designation must be
supported by survey of the land involved and a program describing how it
~d be developed. byors of Seoul and SUsan Special Cities. county
beads. governcrs ex l1ci>using project development aqencies may be exdered
by the lIIiftister of Construction to participate in prepari~ tbis dOC\i-
1IIentatiGJn.
0ftce a housil'C) projec::t district has been designated and ptlc1icly
annowteed, the .-.1_ of the immediate site and per ipheral prQpertifls is
frozen at a standard 1~e1. The st.mdard is indexed. however r to the
rate of ehan1)e in wholesale COiidiiGdity pr:ice~r and if the land is net
expre;,priated withift five years of its designatiQn as a hol1sinC) project
district r t.be land reverts tQ its original statas. Meanwt.i1e the owner
is obliged ~o obtain a lNrlIit frOll local 9QVernment for any Iitysical
c:hange be wiabes tGl make ift the prGlperty.
'!'be lIIinister of CGlInstructiGJn names as exe¢utor r or lead cieveloper
of the distri¢t r a state 01: local gci)ftrnJllefttal bodyr t.ne KNRC or: the
Kt.DC. '!'he designated eXe¢l1ting agency is cmar~ wi th preparing a-
tailed site deftlopqnt aAd ilIplementatiQlll plans fGr review aRel approval
by the lIIinister of C<iJftstrllCtiGln. 'l'his is a OR@-StGlp apprGIVal process,
i·ncGrpcKaUng sG:reening far all leCJally requirecl permits ana G:learaACeS
appli¢a~le 'bel sll¢h a project. 14
Saving receiftCi thft lII1Ristec' s apprcwal, the plafts ace fOl'warded to
the ,cesidiRCJ lIayor or ool1nty head where the project distriet is looated
fGr re1Mse to the PibIi¢.
The u-eG:1itiftCJ ..~ negetiate. Piccmas. of the land or expra-
ptiat•• it as it is "Mciel fGr chvel~nt, Site aG:Cf\lisitiGJR G:M 1M
Ihl",ated ~ the lead ..,.n¢y (if a .ntral ~erMlent entity) toO the
fOftCftGr r lIayM (!)r GKJl1ftty helld where the land is IGlG:ated aloneJ wi th a
fee ~1Iftti"CJ tG 3 m-r .I\t (!)f the plIcchase priG:e <K standacd fixed
.....ft••tiGft.
13. A 2O-......r ~i. tt•• G'haired .., the Depllty 'r iJM ll!:i.nister who is
al.. IU.."i.t« C)f the BGKJn_e 'laMiftt act.rd. The liU.Rister (If
CGRat:rwctiGft is Via. ChairftlaR.
14. PM tucample r wcl:tan i,,,frast.~dG:t ..re, land readj ..stment r h<ilusint
eGftst:rwetiGft y water 8UPP~1, pwblie seweraC)e. reelam.ti~,
rh'erwerks. [Nblie r(!)8~&? aCJrie..ltllral land eenservati<Mt, 113iMMr
hUftst r ,rassland lift r erGsicm CJlHltl'Gl, industr ial cl&Yel(!)flllll'l4!t r
8111:"11ftt. lIi·...ral ri!hts, enYir0nJ11@fttal im~et a.ses81llE'"t anel
.peeial r.t1l1atiGfts pertaiRint bG speeifie ..efteies sueh as the
KLDC.
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In-site infrastructure is installed by the p£oj~c~ ex~aClng
~cy. Local 9O~rnment is r@qllired to provide all off-site roads.
water wpply and sewecac)e facilities. Electricity and gas (on-site and
off-site oonnecti~) are to be prcviaed by the respective sappliers for
the area irm:lllftd. CclnJmJnicatiQl\ and postal facilities are the respon-
Gbility of the lorea Electrical COIIlIl\anication Cocporation. ~ll these
litilities ar.d facilities are tQ be fllrnisbed in acC(j)rd~nce .. i~.h stan-
dards and s.c:bedales Ht by the llIinistry Qf Constrl1ctioft.
Costs of the off-site infrastrllCtare are to be borne by the bodies
charqed with oonstructiOR y but local qover'l'llllent may be sl1bsiaized by the
State for IlP tQ balf the necessary expenditllce. If l<xal gcnrernment
<:annQt: meet even half the cost Glf its QbligatiQfts (which is not IlRCGliiUiiOn
for .aller cities) the lead implementiRC) agency for the pr-oject ~es
ahead and builds the off-site infrastr~tllre. The mllnicipality then has
three years in which to repay the fl.lftds that are thliS "advanced".
El:ecllting or implementin<J ~ies !Ny sell Gff l~ i!lCOllle hcusiR9
sites in their prGject districts fGr c1RvelGplftent in accordance with
their bollsing c1evelop"Mu,t plafts. at prices bel~ the cost of site
prepacatiGm. They may also repu:chase at the ocigiMl gelling price
pll1s accrlled interest.. land which has !lot been so developed within three
years Gf its sale. Land in the h0l1sing devel~nt districts slated for
lIiddle Gr IIPP'K ineon. hCNSin<J and ~rcial IIses is Pllt liP for campe-
tithe pab1ic laiadiAg. Profits realbed ~ the project implentel\tin.g
a9ency frOlll sale of these parcels can be IISed toO slIbsidize the aevelop-
IIent (li)sts of land fCH: l<l1W tACCi>lle h0lisiRC) in tne project. 'l'his crCDSS-
subsidization techitierue was iRStitlited jllst tl\is yen LA CGnnectiGft with
a WGr14 Ba~k-a4sisted project. BKperience is still toG new t~ evalllate.
Ilftpll!1ftefttiRC) &!enci.. can raise WGrkiR9 eapi tal at the outset of a
pCGject in Qfte <tf the.. ways: Ill' advance sal.. of lNildiA.C) sites (fGr
_iGb put'chasers pay all IX part in cash) ~ IDy isslliRC) "land aftlOctiza-
tion" ~ds laa¢k-ed ~ RlCtrt,agea GIft the tollsiRC) which will 1I1timately be
llNilt and tlGlel; CDr thl'outh State slilDsidy.
When ILDC INrchaaes land far a MIiSiRg thvelCDplftent district it may
iNl' lIP t1G ame-half the ne,<ttiated plIl:'l::ha. pI: ie. (IX stanetard sompensa-
tiCMl "en it is a ase CDf eapl:0priatiCMl) 1A land aMGrtizatCDn IJ0nds and
the rest ift e"h. Gther: execllti-R, ..eReies are reqlliredl t1G pay the fllll
~i.it1am .st in cash.
'l'hil new _ftlcl'Plllet ~<tl, fGr,ed in the BOWlin, Site Bevel(!){MIent
PI'-.t10ft t.-T ,.i... ,oftrlUllent the optiCMl caf initiating larCJe-seale
4e••1CDJ;IIIIeRt aftd Cltntrcl1.lint its Ullin,. In adIditi0ft to land readjllst-
_nt, whiGh aan Itill ~ applied where appropriate1 ther~ are now means
for: _e'.Jcin, eatusive litel for 1_ i-ftceme Mlising relatively ineJtpen-
st..ly. The eentral gCJverJ!lllleM and its administrathe slIbclhisi(f)ft are,
at tIM Mille tiM, flll:ldshed a t0Gl wi. th .iGh they ean inflll@ne@ the
s14pp11 of land CM\ the ftlartet, and 1:11\1s, the ftI0veftlent of land ~iees in
III:Mftiii'" MUS.
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'l'!M following diagram15 shows ~ distinction between outright land
acquisition far devel~pme,nt wi~'t subsequent disposL-i.on b private sec-
tor bii.lders 01: ho1ll(l!Qwners. md land readjl1stment. It is qt1ite clear
how lLlic:b more scope 9QV'erTDneftt has linder the acquisition/disposition
approach for shaping the w;e of land to its development priorities.
sewnty per cent of the land to be developed ander the national
housing constrlJction progra11l for the 198Gs is scheduled for the acqui-
sition/dispositl.OIt approad'l. Luger low-price sites will be sol1CJht for
this pc:;>rtiQft Qf t.be PrQCJramr possibly ~ some in areas now designated
by lUster: plans as ~reen space. In these districts 30 per cent of the
total l_d area to be <inelQPed is expected to be devoted to pl:ibl ic
infrastrlJCture uses (e.~. roads, community facilities etc.) Half the
remainder is to be for single family mid- tQ hi~er-eost housincJ. When
sold. these lots will be ~rioed so they can crQSs-sllGsidize the low
income Piblic sect<K housing (j)ft the last 35 per cent of the development
site.
La-nd re.tdjllstment will be llSed fQr 30 per cent G>f the residential
land tG> be c1eveloped md@r the housing prQ9ra. This approach will ~
IISed mainly fCK si tea adjacent to existing residential areas where land
prices a.rg high. In the LRPs, 4S per cent of the land will be retllcned
to the ori~iMl earMrs, 3;Q p"c O!!nt of the [Jarcels will be an "area
reduction" fGJr infrastrlletllA Ilnd an additiamal "ac.. rec:lueti(j)ft"
aJlQllntincJ to 2S per cent Qf the J!)rCJject area will be retained h'f the
CJQvernme-lttal implementi,ng authot:ity. 0f this adcHtional "redl1cti-Gft" 49
pet: cent (Le. lQ per cent G1: the total LRP) wUl be sold G>ff as l<l>ts
for more CGlstly si'AiJle fa"'ily ~si'A9. I:' will '- priced at levels
sllffi¢i@ftt be erCDBs-soosidize the G>thel:' 60 pel:' <Jef.lt (15 per Gent Gf the
G~er all LJllD) where PicHe holld-At will be CGftstrlJCted.
Al thGlIJC)h the CJceater CJ")!Ntr<Jl GIVeI:' the chftlCDlWfteRt pt:CK:eSS is gai_d
at the expense Gf ~ceater initial eapital i~ftsbmeftt ~. CJOVecnment, the
law ~GVi~8 a ftIe¢hanidftl for _eyc i"9 SGlIM Gf t:ll\at "fr<Mlt-end" zap1-
t,al. ftlece i-s at l.est:. 8<JIIIe hai.s few eqle¢ti,At that, .. ttw "8 Bystell
works 00 SllPPre8~ .:ipeeulati<Ml 1ft land at the lIfeaft peripbery, the _w
laftCi UDrtizat:;'OR OOncla "UI 1M "eft H a1:trKtift iRves1m!ent Gppctl'tllftt-
ties h'f printe net_ 8Rd i,n8ti tlitilWla1 iftvestCKs.
Aa f. ,Mltle. likel, t!G aci_ wibh the 1t8 IMa:hMt_, CJ."ernMftt
eaft 8,.l:e17 .tieiJl8te S0nte AststAftCe bG tAe ewprCDpt:iati<lRl .aSllf:es.
811tYGftd this., 1:t will ta-k. tt_ laefeKe 1 t is petssiltle bet see hCIW the pt:<J-
e.tllr•• WM-k elliot 1ft act_l pracrttee.
'1'heee is _ns·i~Hl. wi~ee e-f the systematic manner in wld,Gh
fOveCnJlM!ftt 1s tol'''' a"..t e<JftMa:tt", its ",atiMlal hCDYS!'"! ant land
te••1<JIIIIHRt pt'<J9t:a1H wi th tttese ~vel(J"""t wels and the ilft,l8ftl@"ti-",
ateneii.etI «hKIf. with .,l,i-", tlMlt. By 198a ItLOC hacl already s,tlrveyecl
15. Fr_ the KtDtZl .....thcKtGlGW fCK Relii.afttial Sibe aeftl<JPIMAt:
MphHia (Jft IillPl"-fttati<JR PGUey 0ver '!'heMy", p. 16.
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oW cities and tow.ns to determine the amount and si tuation of land poten-
tially available fIX resiantial development. They have also been mcni-
toring the monthly nevements in. land prices. '!he following figures l6
indicate t1.. prepa:atory WQrk tbat bas ~ne into the national hollSin9
prQgram.. revealL-,g concern wi tb implementation from the very be9in-
ning.
Relationships between implementation activities and land develop-
ment policy or "spatial" policy and., more specifically, policies fQr in-
termediate size cities and towns are discussed at greater length in tM
pages that fQllow.
Hi. SGlit:'Ges: Jeen9-1kJ Kill, Senio>r Iteeeareh Fe Haw, DlHS, "HO>IlS inC)
BevelO>l,IIIIfteftt Plaftnin9 1", IeGcea", 1981, and leana'e "llIaster Plan fen
PliGlit! IkDlitllng CoostrlJetiGfl eel Mati~nal tJf'~aft Land aeve10>p1fteftt",
1ttl, p. 17. (-A\;IthersM.-p l:Iftattrihlitleci, aS8limeci t:l~ be the MiA4 st.ry
<tf Ccmstrlteti-an.).
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III. Evolation of National Involvement in Urban Development Poliey
It is in the context of national.. land, or spatial, development
pGlicy that Korea's most recently articulated poliC'1.es for development
of secondary or intermediate size cities have been laid. The current
approach is the l09ical outgrowth of a series of programs and measares
directed toward redistributing population and ecc.~omic activity within
the CQ\1ntry. Specifically, the central objective is to reduce the size
and development problems of seoul. The rationale fQr bliilding up secon-
da[y or intermediate size cities as Wgrowth poles w is that they became
magnets fQC rural-urban migratiQn which Qtherwise would be attracted tQ
the capital.
Mana<jement Gf land development was legitimized as a proper object
Qf gQvernmental action fram the beg inning of Korea's existence as a
modern rePiolic. In the interest Qf both pt"otectiGn and efficient use
of the co\lntry· s scarce land res,Qurce, the draftsmen of Korea's CQnsti-
tatioo establis~~d in Articles 117 and 119 a brQad scope fQt' State
interventian. GQvernment's apprQach tQ this mandate has eVQlved since
theft., r.eflecting at each stage the OQuntry's cnief avelQpment
priGrities.
Land policy concerns of the early ~ars focl1ssed on refQtm Gf the
fam tenure system and redistri~uti(;)ft Qf formerly Japanese-held estates
among small farmers. With respect to \it'ban development, ooncerns cen-
tered on post-war reCGnstrl4ction Gf the cities and the acgency of accQ1ft-
modating masses of refugees frQ1ft North Korea and Qther displaced people
who needed tG be resettled.
Burinq the 196Gs ft\QCh Gf the legislation that had important impli-
~atiQns fGr land develGIJIfte'Rt, and the ptlysial planning a<:taally \1nder-
tat-en by government, were oriented hG)wacd secta>cal devtt.l<:lpment P!'a>-
~r.me. GGver~Rt was eGncerned with eGnstractiQft Gf larg.-4cale puGlia
i·nfnstr\1ctlJce crucial tG the ~rowth Gf manl1faetlici~ indlistry -- the
t.,ads and railra>ads, the pa>rt expaflsiGft., clams and PGwer plants and the
acquid UGft and servicing Gf st tes fa>r the new factGries themselves.
AlthGliqh dispersiGn a>f devel~pMeRt reSGarces thrGughGl1t the cOl1fttry was
an aft-repeated ga>al, it was nat a si~ftificaflt ,aliey factGr in 1008-
t.i~l dMidGrw. As indastrializati<Jl!l prGCJ~essed tltca>'ltth succesd".
"'••es Gf emphasis an li<Jht ftlanl1faetaring and impm:t SI:lGsti tl1tiG>n" tmen
heavy ind\lstry GrteRt" tGWacd elCPGrt mackets, the majG>r sectCKal
In''st1ments <JlDfttinl:led tG faVGr: the largest dUes. CGAsideratiGRs Gf
eOOft0lftie retarn (!II!l c1evel<!lPl"ftt investment dietated these la>catians where
label:, 8eG>nMlies af seale, i'ftter industry lift~acJee Md g(!Ime Ni st tng
if\frastrlietlice were already in plaee.
0ffieial interest in \1r:~an de"elGpnteAt ancl the shelter sectcu as
ele..... .:.s <Df nati0nal c1evelGl.'ftM!nt pa>liey Gri<Jinated <Ini~ th is per iM as
well. Blit here, as was tme <!ase with investments in ather seetals,
aeca::ahs4atin9 af industrial expansian and oopin<J with its assa>ciated
i:~ts (!Ifl peprllatieft ,r~th <JeftllhR~ed bhe first attentiGA.
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'Until 1962:.:ban developnent irJ Korea was governed by thirty-year-
old colonial c~.i.nances whieb sJ;'e~i,fied sao things '\s street layouts.
The City Plannir~S' Act of that :''''"'': c::barged il'lmicij; 4 goverronents wi th
responsibility for preparinq .... _ .. :'l master ::lans. A new Btlilding Act
dating from about the same time and an lJPdated land readjastment mecha-
nism gave the municipalities tools for controlling land ase and the
bargeoning CX)nstrllCtion activity both in the citil!"S and on the peri-
lKban fringes. Seoal's 1963 master plan W3S tbe first prepared ander
the new legislation. Others follOlfed fairly quickly.
'Urban poli~ on ~ national scale was inaagurated in 19~3 also. with
enactment of the COIIIprehensift Rational Land Development Act. '!'bis le-
gislatio,"l called for a national land survey and long-range, comprehen-
sive land use planning by central goverrutlent. National urban develQp-
ment policy weald thus be set forth in c::ontext of over all national land
development policy. The Act envisioned a hierarchy of coordinated plans
ran~ing in scale from national through provincial, coanty and specially-
~signated areas. These master plans would be coordinated witb national
sectoral planning also, whieb bad only shortly befQre entered intQ tbe
first fift-year (19'2-66) economic plarming period. It took some time,
however, befQre the plaMing work got under way, and it was with the
special areas that gGlvernment started, rather than with the larger scale
planning effQrts. Interesti,n~ly, the first special area desiCJftateci was
the MtiQftal GBpital (seO\ll-Incheon) region, in 19~5. Ulsan was the
second, with primary focas on c1eveloplMnt of the new heavy industrial
complex there. Others similarly QRntered on majG>J: develQpllent prG-
jeets: tourism and industry in Jeja, mi.neral and energy resoarees in
the northeast Taeback area, and land reclamation-water resoarce cBevelQp-
ment and fisheries promotiGln projects In Yeongsan mel Asan-Seosan, two
weste~n aGastal aceas.
'!'be special d1nelopllH!ftt area plane varied in areal aGverage frOlll
1, GOG to 9, SGO square kUOIleters. Most projected an implementation
periGd of 3G ~a-r.. tJlsan was the exception. SlIlallest in area, its
implementatian was to tMt CQIIIpleted within seven years of the official
eI.si9ftation.
KGrea'. first CMIprehenshe MaHonal aeve10)!1111ett Plan was pred\lced
tty the lIIi-nistey of CGftstrootion in 1971. reJllowiJ!lC) on .veral years'
e·ffeJrt in natiGnal lanrl \1_ and re'lional plannift9 anrl a 1967 national
plan f(l)c ClOnltr\lC!tion (l)f IUjGr iftfraltr~etlire (expressways, parts and
lIIo8t of these sp@cial c1tftloPlllent area plans have hael rather
liJlttM illplUlentation tB elate. The elisapp0intift9 experience has been
attcibuteel to l~k of pro~ralll ~OGuntability, ins~ffieient support from
9Gftlnlllental a9eneies who_ participation in preJjeet eI.veloPlllent and
finaftce was required, mel SClnIIe I:Iftsound investlllent eteeisions. 18
18. soe Y01lftlJ pa,rk, PhO. "Uran Growth and MaU<!)nal Poliey in Korea",
KGcea ••seareh Institute fBC RUlIAn Settlellents, Seoul. September
1ge1.
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water resotUC!es oevelopment) , this new plan set forth general
development guidelines fot the country as a whole over the next ten
years.
Its theme, ·balmced distric...~:....!'! of population and economic
activities wit.~in the country·, addressed Government's c;rowing concern
over the effects of the major population shifts that had become so
drmatically apparent. Balance seemed to be an an~r to problems of
coping with growth in the booming urban areas - the con<jestion, the
housing short~9es and the high costs of expanding services - an<! to
relief of distressed ocnditions in the hinterland which had not been so
econa.ically favored.
!'emulated along lines of thinking developed in the COllrse of a
United Nations-assisted regional plan1'\ing project, the 1971 Canprl!-
hensift National Developnent Plan projt:::":ted the pictllre of a flltllre
Itorea caIlprised of eilJht largely hOll10geneo",~. self-sustaining regional
economies. Leading cities of eech region would be functionally linked
with _aller caNlunities and their peripheral Iural are.. Well-
developed links between the major cities would, in turn, be the basis of
a network integrating the national econOJllic system as a ~Ihole. First
step toward achieving this scheme was dividing the collntry into planning
relJioni. These were based on physical featllres, resources, assessments
of deftlopnent potential, existing incillstry and relationships between
the large cities and the territories surrounding them. Development
lJuidelines wen presented for each region and priority projects f"r
each, identified. Beyond conceptualizing the role of -regional- cities
vis a vis their rural hinterlands and weighing these relationship. in
the delineation of plar~inlJ regions, the Plan did not proceed very far
in elaborating policy or stratelJies for llrbanization in general.
'RoM of the principal llrban development recOlllllendations seemed to
flow frOll the plan's regional ctevelopaent scenario in the sense of pre-
.cribing where and how tG promote llrban development. Nor did they speak
to inter••t in solving probl... of the aaller and IIediWft size cities
per... ~ather, it was bilJ-eity llrban development -- especially Seoul's
-- that callle into focus with the gre.test clarity, and this, in the
.en.e of 'l1ppres.ing or redirecting the I1rban growth. The specific
llrban policy ....llr•• pr••ented in the 1971 plan inaluded restrictions
against additional d.velo~ent in Seo111, desi~n.tion of lJreenbelts
atollftd the capital ..d other _jot IKban .re.s to prevent further
4.ftlo~ent Oft their fring4!s, progr... for locating new luge-sa.le
in411.trial (X).ple••s ••y fr(l)lft Seoul alonlJ with the infrastructllre and
ea-linity facilities to slipport the"" ani propo.als for building ne.
t_ns in the .st rapidly IJIbanizi!'lCJ reCJion~ to absorb activities and
popUlation relocated out of the densely deft loped centers.
In tho= intervening ~ar" Goverftlllent' s impleftlentation efforts h.ft
follC!llWed silllil.r lin., of emphasis. tfWllerous SftIall town and vill.ge
develo~ent project' have been undertaken under a nationwide program to
IJPlJrade rlJral living conditiMls, and there have been llrban projeats as
part of • _jor re,iaIRal dlftlo~ent program in the one of the
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ec:or-amically stac;nant parts of the country. Yet the measu~es ...mich have
had the greatest i.m~ at shaping settlement patterns have been those
directly related to industrial location programs for relief of over-
concentration in the biggest cities.
The ea.unity Development Proaram or -New Vill!S! 1IlIovement-
(Sa@ll\aul Ondons
PhenCllftenal success of !orea' s economic planning efforts notwith-
standing, it was clear ~z the end of the second five-year plan that the
ru:al areas had not been ahar inq in the 00untry's advaracing prosper-
ity. Incane differentials between urban and rural households (SO per
cent higher in the urban areas), low rural productivity and high sea-
sonal unemployment combined wit.,h heightened economic aspirations and
superb new transpo~tation facilities providing access to the big cities,
to keep the flow of rural migrants steady and strong.
~e sa..aul ondong has been an effort, D4!gun in 197:A.. to help re-
dress the rural-urban -gap·. There !'las been an ideological thrust to
the prQC)ram O\'er and above the assistance it offers toward improving
living conditions and incc.e-earning opportunities in r\1.ral communi-
ties. It has been prOlllOted as a social Eftlllent of sorts, .-eking to
instill a spirit of cOftll\W\ity collaboration a·nd self-help in local
betterment projects.
Initially the program offered .ndividual farmers' hooseholds the
materials for upgrading their kitchens, toilets and roofs (which were to
be chan9ed from thatch to tile). Gc::wernment also provided materials
su~h a,.;; cement and steel rods tGl cOIIIIIuni ties .. a whGIle, encouraging
them w select, organiae anel inlpl..nt projects accorelinCJ to their own
priorities. These miCJht be conatr\lctiQft of _all brielCJes giving access
to a village, iJlprovil'lCJ far.-to-llu ket roads tG a stat\ls capable of
handling vehicular traffic, ..all-scale irrigaticm works, streambed
stabilization, lanelscapiftCJ, ~nstruction of ~1IUIlW\it.y baths~ laundries
or meeting places nr setting up a cOlllllunity credit wlion. Once villages
showed they ~\lld exec\lte projects of this sort, next-stage projects
were to focus em incCllte-generating opport\lnitiH. The \lltillate objec-
ti..s wre, of oo\lrs., 1D increase procl\1ctivity in the c:.'!S1IlftI\lnities'
prillary economic p\lISuits (usually agricultucal) and t!o provide sup-
pl_ntary off-Hason .ployment. balftples of these latter projects
haw IMIn r\lral electr ificat1C!1ft~ c~\1nal vegetable gardens, pig-
farlling, reforestation and land reclallati~n werk, .erkshops or faetolies
and cooperative pro«!\1etion a. well .. marketing facilities.
At the village or .all town level, the SaEllftalll Undong program
ooaponents are planned and organized by a developtlent C01IIIIittee. COIII-
lI\1ftity residents ale respansittl. for iIIplementation. Government pro-
vid•• , in addition to materials, technical and adllinistrative assistance
and s\lpple_ntary finaneial slipport in the form of subsielies and loans.
At the. natiGftal leftl the pregram is under a national eOllneil
ehaire4 by the Minister of R~e Affairs and eamprised of Viee Ministers
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from lK)St. of the minist.ries, e.g. EconClllic Planning Board, Finance,
Defense, Educat.ion, Agricult.ural and Fishedes, etc. A working level
group of Directors General of the min5st.ries involved meets mont.hly to
follow the progress of the program and resolve suc1'l issues as arise. 19
Most \lPgrading project.s of environmental nature come under the purview
of the Rinistry of Hame Affairs. Officials of its administ.rative subdi-
visions, i.e. proviDeial, city and county, town. and township, are likely
to be brought into t.he process as well.
There is no quest.ion that. the progru has raised aspirations in
lorea's smallest. CORIIIl\1ftities. It is very difficult to say whether it
haa c:reated incentive enough to hold people lIIho otberwise would have
migrated to the cities. If indeed, villagers were encouraged to remain
in their rural PIllsuits, it would be difficult to separate the role of
this progr_ frc:. the higher prices ~:or agdcultaral products that
became effective about the same time. Nonetheless, Saemaal tJndong is
generally regarded as quite successfal. sa. observers believe, hov-
e"r, that real gains in rural prodactivity will require larger scale
efforts and involve more coordination beyond the individaal cQmmunities
the1l8elves, i.e. eft inter-village and intraregional levels. This 23s
likely to be the direction taken in sabsequent stages of the program.
The Gwangja Regional Project.
While }ll()BA pursl1ed the goal of "balance" with small-project stra-
tegies for villages and small towns, llIOC's approach addressed the issae
of income disparity on a broade~ regional scale.
With financial assistance fr<:lll tlNDP, !IIlC began a new rOl1m of
regional planning studies in 1974. Their initial work pr~ram included
plans f0r the Seoul-IncheCl\ , Busan and Gwangj a ltegi0ns. Bvefttaally
this was redaced to p~eparift9 a plan for Gwangja alone. The 0bjectives
of the plan were to identify means of reducing out-migrati0n, to narrow
the gap betwen incomes in Gwangja and 0ther regi0fts, to upgrade urban
infrastructure and services to nationally-set standards and to provide
experience with new approaches to regi~tal planning.
A year later, the W0rld Bank .alle a "Sec0ndary Cities Itegional
Project Loan." At that pl:)int, flI)C created a Gwangjll Regional Deve10p-
1I.nt unit in GW&n9ja City 80 that there O0uld be lICre local involvell@nt
in th. planning pr0Ce8s. When the Ministry opened several decentralized
C0n.trllcti0ft Offiees aroand the country, this special regional deve10p-
..nt unit was absorbed int0 the provineial re,ional branch office of the
IU.nistry.
1'. Profes80r Chaon Hee H0, Depart.ent of Pllblic Administrati0n, The
City University of Seoul, lIOnograph on "New Commllnity Planning" for
UMCRS/ISCAP Expert Gr0up Meetin9 on Inte9ration 0f Physical
'lannin, with EC0nOlllc and Social Plannin9 in Asia and the
Pacific. Bangkok, NOvember 1980.
20. Profes80r Chaon Hee Ho, gp. Cit., p. 23.
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Some industrial estate developnents in the Gwangju Region had pre-
dated the intll!9rated reqional planning project. They include:! a 4,400
hectare petrochemical estate where 12 factories were either in operation
or u.~er construction l:ly 1979, and SIIIall local industrial estates in
Gwangjl1 and !lIog'pc:) Cities. Pr("ljec::ts under th~ late 1970s integrated
regional proqram21 included: imi:o'roved road links between the region's
main cities and high grade highways ocnnec::tinq Gwangju City with Seoul
and BQsan. Irrigation weeks, about 5,QGQ serviced residential plots in
three cities, a municipal market and fishery harbor-market-eold storage
facilities were also b11Ht. 22 Feasibility stadies on additional pro-
jects by Korean staff and World Bank consultants yielded lICre project
rec:ommendatiol'l& fcc a second rOl1m of fanding: i~dustrial estates,
water supply systems for one city and an island, an urban road, Jtl)re
ser.viced residential plots with expandable core hol1ses for low incane
families, bridges and another fishery-slll?port facility. Other ~mpo­
nents of tbe second-phase project were credit prO<Jrams for fishermen and
small industrial enterprises, technical assistance in the operation and
maintenanee of the new facilities, training and assistance in the plan-
ning of work for sllbseqoent staC)es of ilIplementation.
Over all responsibility for the Gwangj 11 Regional Project was
assig!"@d to MOe's National Physical Planninq Bureau, ~ional Planning
Dividon.. They prepare plans in consultation with provincial and local
aut~)rities and other central government agencies Whose specialties are
involved. The Regional Constrl1ction Off ice of MOC, subject to final
approval by the National Bureau, sl1pervises consl11tants in the prepa-
ration of detailed designs and constrl1ction contractors who do the
actual building. Once facilities are built they are tl1rned <'Wer to
varieus responsible agenci.. fer eperation and maintenance, e.CJ. ml1ni-
cipalities in the case ef industrial .,d hc1>usinq estates, I1rblan reads
and water sl1pply systems or fisheriea cooperatives in the case ef the
market and stera,_ facilities.
Enool1ra,ed by results of the oontinuing GwanCJju effGrt and prespec-
tift additienal World Bmlt financinCJ, IlIlC selected the Jeonja RegiGft fGr
a second inteCJrated reCJiGftal dtvelGpment prGCJram alonCJ similar lines.
An important impact ef the.. reC)ional planning ~rGjects ha. beer.
their i,nfllJenc~ on the natiGnal ~veler-ent plannirilCJ pl:ooess. Altheu,h
the CCllIIIprehensive Land DevelOpMent Plan has been considered .. a sec-
toral plan within natiGRal plannin, framewark, Iftd incerporated therein
aecordinCJly, t~ Kerea PlanninCJ Board did not recoC)ftize reCJienal scale
clevelGr-ent planninCJ. They have mt c1eftlGped Gr and maint.ained region-
al aecol1nts statistics. New, however, a representative ef the Bareau Gf
Statistics will be a part Gf the CJQverninCJ 00"",1 ttee that reviews prag-
re•• en the WatiGnal Land Oenlor-ent Plan and regional develGpment will
be an effieial Gemponent af national planninCJ.
21. Some faftding fer the.e ptGject. callie frQftl the Asian Devel(!)plftent
8an. a. well a. fr_ the warld Bank.
22. The W~ld Bank, Urban Prajeets Department, KGtea Staff AI!!aisal
Repott, Seeer~ Gw.n,j~ Regianal 'rGject, July 1'79.
lU
Anti-eoncentration Measures
While the rural ex>mmtmity and regional upgrading programs worked
toward providing incentives for potential migrants to stay where they
were, Goverftlllent took a variety of additional steps with the intention.
of reducing the concentration in seoul and preventing similar ·over-
devel~t· elsewhere.
Special wresident citizen· tas -.s levied in sewl to discourage
lIigran/.;:s frc. staying there. SUbstandard housing was banned. Regional
quotas and eeiliftC)s wre iJlpoaed on adaisiiion.s to education.al institu-
tions in the capital and a speeial preJllia was added to Seoul school
fees in order to li1llit ~owth of the city's student population.
Physical expansion of the ~l 1IIetrGpOlitan area (and other large
cities as W~l) _s constrained by asignated green.l:i>elts around their
peripheries. 2 Within. these zenes development -- and even. alteration of
eaisting structures -- wa. firmly restricted.
Industrial estates were established in. liMY parts of the eountr~
Differential property rate. iapoaed penalties on Seoul industry. 4
Ift&'1tries that located in specified estates elsewhere were offered tax
relief. Other incentives to establis:.ment ift the decentralized indus-
trial estates iftCluded the opportunity to purchase land (which would
appreciate stJbstantially in vallie) at 1"" prices, services and infra-
structure, and ease ift acquiring building permits in contrast with
severe ob.tacles to getting such perllits for other sites.
By the late 1970s there were still other ..asures in ef~ect. onder
the Distri~ution of Industrie. Act, ~rlUMtl\t oould designate • indus-
trial relooatiGlft ar•••• 1ft seoul where indu.trial expansion and IMW
devel~ent wre strictly curbed and enterprises oould ..en be OG1Ilpelled
to le.w. New satellite indostrial tGNft. -- hnweol and Seol\9n_
out.i~ of SeOlll bu~ within ~..uting distance, ..re built in GOnteat of
new capital reCJion and ..tropolitan ar.. plana.
A speeial Ministry withGut Portfolio wa. ereated and charged by the
~eaident with deftlopiftCJ re~ndationa for redistr ibutiftC) population
Gut of the capital reCJi~. Their 1977 "lie Plan propoaed that all ..a-
lute. then in effect fer redi.tri~uting populatiGft and econc.ic activity
be CDntinued. In alditiGft they ..lll¢t.d five eiUe. (1)a.,u, D..jGft,
ChQftCJju, GwanCJju and lIla.an) aa gr<Nth pol.. where C:OvernIMftt ~hould
acthely .tNr MW c1eftloPlRent. The.e plac•• wre ch••n IMca";je they
alreactr effere! considerable infrastructure aftll serviee8, e.g.
23. The CJr.e"Delta were instituted wnder the revi.ed City Planning
~t of 1972. 9eGUl .a. the first applieatisn. Twelve others
folla.ed ~ere de..l~ftt preaaure. appea~ed to be heavy.
24. Property ta. in 9_ul ••• ttlr.. tiMS the norllal rate and
acquiaitiOft tax ~, ReW industty va. five times the usual l~vy for
the firat lift yeara.
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SGuree: Korea Researeh Institute f~r RUman Settlements, NattoAa~ Lalld
Development Planning in KGrea, Seoul. July 1980. p. 35.
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W\iftrsities, general Iospitals, water treatment and s\:pply systems,
sewerage, high quality roads and capacity to acconuilooate populations of
half a .1ilian or ~re. All .-ere at least lQO kilometers from seoul and
jlldC)ed to be suitable locations for industry. These cities were to bave
priority for naRC housil'lCJ projects and, presumably, other investlllents as
wil.
At this stage no one call say whether this growth pole stratecn has
sueee~sflllly oontr ibuted to redistr ibution of Korea's populatiCWl. Cer-
tainly the tUfty efforts of Govern1llel\t that preceded it bave not reduced
the s be of Sacul.
It is quite ....lear, however, t:l'!at L'1 some respects Seoul's cbminance
bas been reduceS. Between lM8 and 1978 S4eo\1l' s sbare of the nation's
ftOMIaI'lufllCtlKing employment dropped from OV'er one-third to around one-
foorth. Its share of new indllstrial constr\lction dropped frQlll 35 per
cent in 1966 to abQut 2 per cent in 1978. The rate of populatiGn gravth
slClWtld as _11.
The ..in beneficiar iea of sucb W~entralizatiOl\- as did occur
sM1llt!d, boweyer, tc be counties and cQllllJlt11nities in the capital r'll!9;.Oft,
within OG1NftutineJ distance Gf seoul, rather than the designated growth
poles.
Outlnigratlon frc. the poorer areas (J)ntinued liftabated. "Regional
shares of every province eKcept Jryunqgi and Jej\i declin@d consistently
between lMO and 1980, and between 1975 and 1980, the atls )l\ite mamlMrs
of people livinq in GaRCJfton" ChunqcheGngt!>\lk and Ch\lllanam -- all agri-
c\ilt\lrally based provinces -- actllAlly declined. w25
Qbservers analyzing the illpacts of national land develoPlllent plan-
niftC) have co-.ented that GogerftMnt Mver quite foll<JWed tluoagh with
decentralization pt:>liqr that -had teeth in 1t-. Invest1llents 1n b\illdiR4J
lIP t!M gf'Gwth PGles wre teo Haited tG Mk.. these cit1es coapetitive
with the capital. Facilities for: industry were p,rGvided, to be suee,
tNt aG.-unity facilitie., CNltllcal activities, a wide variety Gf ser-
vices at high standarels, and other \ir~M amenities S\i<m as parks and
r~reatiGft facilities ..re not fllrnished as part ~f a loeatiGnal incen-
tift packaCJlt. MGt were puftitiw MaS\ireS appliecl 1ft S"ul strGnc) eno\igh
tG CNtwei9h the pe,reeiftd _d real "vantage. Gf "i"'l there. SCMIe say
thlt types ~f ind\istry eapha.h_ in the natiGnal eeGnC!mlie develGpnnt
prC!"Jru et....d.d ~:i.q-city Gr _tropcJlitan reqiC!Jft loeatiGns. Qther prG~
le. en.- are, ~fl1ct1RlJ ~~jeet1ves a1lOftCJ ~Gverftlllent agencies, eGn-
fl1etiftCJ or ••,etiI\CJ ~eentralilatiGn .trate~ie.. tns\iffieient author-
ity ~r leaclershi, t!G eoorelinate lRlple1llentaticm Gf the ,t\ysic;:al ,lans
with Gther _ctGral lnvestMfttl. and absenee of loeal partieipatiGn i-n
the plaftftlnt praeesl.
25.. Par: It SGl! YGUlng, PhD., 92. Cit. p. n.
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Gover1'Dllen.t pl~o!rs bad these factors in mind when they unoertook
the next round of national land development progrGlllJlling. The new
national pbysical plans are still strongly foc~ssed on decentralization
objectives but this time there is a heightened emphasis on implemen-
tation.
The National Development Plan for the 1980s
T.be ~nistry of Construction asked the Korea Research Institute for
lIwIan settlements to prepare the new ten-year physical plan for the
nation as an Waction study for the 80s-. '!'his is a step beyond the 21)-
year indicative or wend-state- plalUling that has usually been done in
Korea.
IIIlC has a 1981-2000 National Development Plan which sets forth
general policies as a context feK IIICre detailed physical development
program1lling. In effect, the long-term plan is the guide for N)C's
construction progr_. Its majeK sections deal with over all population
distribution tarC)ets, the basic directions of urban developllent and
policies GIft urban 9rQWth, standards feK IIcban cOlllllunities, land lise
classification and CDntrols, \Kban developl'llent financil'lC) and special
SUbjects such as new cities and disaster relief planning.
KRIKS respc:Jnded wi til a document - now adopted by !lIOC and released
to the public -- that outlines an implementation strate9Y. It features
fourteen -regional cities- 0: -9rowth balance centers·, that are an ~
dated versi(j)ft of the -growth pGles· c:>f earlier plans. Other related de-
veloplllent isslles ace c::onsicSered .. _11, such as specific;: pGlicies for
the large metr~politan regions, standards for the secondary and interme-
diate size dties, physic;:al lIevelopillent iJIlplications of growth at the
scale envisioned, nece.sary chaftges In the system for administerin9 and
coordinating the investment prGMJraftl outlined and procedures for acOO1llp-
li.hift<J IIcban expansion and control of land lise.
In order t!,.t Government 1nvest1llent priorities be fooussed, the
nlecttt4 ciUes are dividwcl lnm tw ,rc:>ups. A first-cla.s or prime
priority ,rOllp ClGfts1sts Gf three: D-9u in the East, Gwa",ju iA the
SCNttl....t anel Baejon bl the central part of the eountry. The ottler
eleven dUe., aaoorded "eGReI-level priGrity, ace: Wonjll" Itang"ung,
Ch0n9j II" Cl'lonan., Chonju, MalWGl\'1 lIbkpe, SlIftcheOft, AndCllI\CJ, Ch inj II and
Jeja.
The•• cities etf lnter_diate sile 1ft the IH:l:tan bieruc;:tly have Men
analyZed iftdi"i"l4ua11y b3 cleterlline what physical, eCGRolli.c and soolal
de••l(!)~t lnv••tJlents .,alel IJe leCl\lirecl to bGost thelr ,r(!)Wtb to the
1...ls tartet". Pretjeets were identified frC!ll ttleir lIaster plans
aC!CGl'cUftlJ bet the fGll~ift9 investRtent priorities:
2. eatsAt tG .-tlieh • ptGpeaed pCGjeet .ellld expand elftpl<:JYIHRt
ctppGrtllftiti.s or pr••ent eMi,rati(!)ft fr~ the city
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3. degree to which the proposed project investment WC'.11d add
to m\Jnicipal revenue
4. c:cntribution of the project to i.1ftproved living envir~nment
5. favorability of the calculated cost-benefit ratio
6. how many people and how wide a territory would be benefited
Cost estillates were made in each case and the city's revenue-
generating capacity, examined, to determine what suppl~ntary funding
would be required.
Until now BOst ilIplementation under the national development plans
has be., the resllJOnsibility of local government. Central government's
role bas been that of financing and directing special large infra-
structure or sectoral projects (e.g. water, sewer, transportation,
housing) • InvestlMnt of the scale envisioned in this new ten-year
actial plan. is clearly beyond the capability of the municipalities to
finance with the level of remurces OIrrently available to the1l. The
substantial nl11llbers of projects, mUltiplicity of diverse locations and
n..d fCH ooordinating tho in the field O'nstitute a task that is beyond
the present resources of central government to &Iminister. Resolving
this (iallir of issues is probably the biggest challenge the action plan
poses to gci)vermnnt just nClllW.
Administration of the Intermediate Size Cities Development Program
The new ten-year national plan examines alternative apprGaches to
the administration and financing of its impletlentatic:Jl\ without cCllftl1Ilit-
tint itself clefinitiftly to c:JI\e Gr another. One apprGach would central-
ize aU IIrban cleftlG,..·nt fUft¢tiGM IInd_ a single national ministry
(i.e. the Rinistry of CGftstructiGft inas1IIIch as it has IUnaged .st
plaMing anet constructiOft to date). '!'hey ClOuld Gperate through their
clecentraliaed regiGftal offie-s Gr throll9h an Urban Development Corpora-
ti<:8. 1'his "01114 be a joint stock corPGrat1on in which GGvermnnt would
be the _jCJr ity shareholcler. Like the IMIIC and ItLDC, it wolild mt be
swbj.ct to governMent control over its buclget, but its manager -olild be
anewcable 1D the Rinister caf CGftstrllCtiGft for pr()CJram developllent .ul
e..euti~. It. respeftsibUitiel _1I1d inC!:lycla planning (It:llng-teI1l and
aicldle-range ,*ysical pl.1 • wll a. financial ~d iilIIplnteAtatiGn
prog~...i",), c.~ryift9 out Yrban 4...1o,..nt investMent pr~9rams, super-
y181_ r/f aBnstrllC!:tion wrk, purchase and insp4tC!:tion of lIaterials and
pr-oyisian ~ teetmiC!:.l guiclanC!!@ ta consliltanu and contractorl.
The altern.tift _1I1cl • CDnsetHd.tion of the present cI\1al struC!:-
twre (i ••• MOe f~ planning anet constryC!:tian and NORA for administration
and ..nage.nt of faellities) ~cler a provinC!:ial level CDnstrlletion
btlreau. Ifhi. blleeau _\114 be aeooyntable throllgh the governor tCJ the
MORA for ~ftlopMent 1ft ar.as lying between munieipal boundaries and fGr
matters inwlv1ng relationships aftlC!)J\l) eities, while leeal develo1"'lent
<tffi.. ef the lII'JC _1I1d • r••pansible f~r pl!blie -orks wi thin the
11t
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individual cities. Short of the structural ehaztges such an arranqement
implies, the Plan indicates that some rationalization of the flmctions
aDd operations under existing governmental struct\lre is also possible.
Under any circumstance the Plan report recognizes that a certain amount
of overlap between the MORA and MOe responsibilities is inevitable.
Under either of these arrangements the idea WIOuld be to haft a
single agency or organization accountable for properly CX)Ordinated
sehedaling as well as location of all nev facilities to be installed in
a given proj«t arM. '!'his would _oid the situation, encountered in a
nllJllber of instances so far, of large scale bousing estates built but
llftSatisfactory for occupancy because they lacked the schools or health
centers or shopping facilities that had been planned bllt were not yet
blJilt. Whic::hever ministry is assigned the role of chief facility-
installer, MCIIA or MOe, there ~ains the problem of acceptance by other
lIinistries , e.g. health or eclllcation, of the trans~er of their local
eonstraction btldgets for execation OIItside their direct control.
The solution to this probl..:'tl will be coordination of the inter-
lMdiate size cities development program by the ~orea Planning Board.
Because the Deputy Premier is lIlinister of the IPS, this agency has sig-
nificant authority to orchestrate investment activities and to order the
priorities of variOlis other ministries. A special coQriinating com-
lIittee, still to be set tIP, will report to the -Second Division for
Investment- in the ~PB. Its members will include representatives of the
IP13, the II.OC, the Ministry of Construction, the National Statistical
Office, the Ministry o~ Bome Affairs' Director of Orban Planning, Chief
of KRIBS and Chief of the lCorea Development Institllte as well as some
university prGfessors with expertise in regional economics and regional
planning. ICPB wants to decentralize its administrative ftmct':'.,., to
looal areas but they have I'Qt decided on how they ace going to dG it.
0,. scheme under consleteration is creating decentralizt!d (local)
branches offices of each lIinistry in the tar~t cities.
Pinance
ICPB etc.s not ret have a full roster of the projects for ea¢h city
and their estillated costs. Developing these proposals in detail will be
the citi•• ' n••t task. "sed an project ietea. and general cost .sti-
lutes 1ft the .ational Ten-Year Plan, hGWever, .x: pats the aggregated
coats of the fourteen-city prograll Oft the order of 597 bil~kon won fen
the first rift years and 1,638 fCK the whole 1981-91 per iod.
ARIong the pr1fte1pal l'eCllOMendatlons of the new ten-year plan is
creation of a new financlng lIechani.. at the national level. This would
be an Orban oeveloplu!nt Flind, functioning as a soul:ce Gf l-Gafts fot' the
.lII'licipalities whose revenue base is too lIlall to permit these lIajor
capital iJlprovelHnt lftves t:JIents. llbneys frOll the fund coule! be IIsed for
iftfr.structure (l.e. r(!)ads, water, sewer, ftM!dical and ecl1Jcational
2'. About $.00 .illlon and $2.2 ~illion, respectively.
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facilities) or for industrial development. The level of capitalization
required for the urban development furA would depend at how much the
cities need to accomplish their respective investment programs <Ner and
above the resources they can secure throu¢ normal municipal revenues or
special benefit assessments. Financing for the fund would CX)lfte from
governmental appropriations, banking institution loans, private sources
andler fore ign borrowing.
Whether the ftmd would be controlled by the Ministry of Home
Affairs (in its capacity of overseer of municipal finance) or the
Illinistry of COnstrlJCtioft (in its eaPltCity of national general contrac-
tor) is ~till under discussion at the time of this writing. In the
course C"f field interviews there wre several indications that until
these Wlresolved issues are settled. the Wactian plan. for the 80s Wwill
be regarded as the Illinistry of Construction's plan. without controlling
au~rity over ether agencies. MalA or the noOC. for example.
Local Plans
Reamrhile local planning is undergoing a major change. Hereto~ore
the cities haw prepared classic 2G-yeac end-stab: master planll. These
plans set forth general 9'lidanee CDftcerning the physical character and
directian a,nc! standards for future grClJWth of the cClll1llunity. The!! dis-
C\lSS land use patterns, zoning and CJreerabelts, CDftI1tlunity facilities,
etc. Their IIIOst carefully elaborated elements are those which concern
the _jor ~rks CDnstr\lctiGn prGgr..s of the llIX. Development of resi-
dential areas is treated in lIuch IIIOre CJeneral fashion, by delineation of
ZQAes and establishment of standards to govern f\lt\lre growth, e.g. den-
sity an! C01lllllUftity facilities or servicell. In this respect they are
quite sillilar to the general plans of many CD1IIII\iftities in the united
States. Tilling of implHlentation projects. b\ldqeting and assignment of
e&eG:utinCJ responsibilities to particular agencies tends not to be
addressed in the plan••
ladl municipality is required to update its CD1ftprehensive lonCJ-
ranlJll plan each fift yea,rs, incorporating population elata and prGjec-
tiona prepared by C'entral ~.rmllent and new p»rG>jects whicl1 flI)C and
val:1008 other ministries. ..CJ. health and education, haw progranllleel
du~ing the interval since the previsus plan.
lIow there are n_ reCllJire.ents that.. all fQurteen tarCJeted inter-
."iate a!L.e eiti.. IIftdertake to IJPdate their CQlIlprehenaift plans to
OGVK the 1981-20Gl period. In additian th@y lII\1st prepare bG>th ten-
yur .tailed ctlcm prQC)r... incorporating capital badCJetiftCJ, .,4
anng.l ililple..ntatiOft plans.
Iaeh e:tf the ten-y.al: plan. is required tG> Cl!()ftr Rveral different
a.ete:tral cateCJe:triH: pGpulaticm, land gee, transpnrtati<!lfl, pl:lblie
faeiliti•• , eee:tftGllie ".e mel .ple:ty1Mnt, natural eftVirG>Ment prG>tee-
tiG>ft~ hG>uaing n.eell and standard., parks and recreatiG>ft, pl1bl1e health
and hyCJiene, lDeial Wllfal:e, revenge ptG>8peetl, administration and pre:t-
jeet r.e~nclat1e:tn. in eG>nt••t all a ItaCJed impleftlentatiCM'l prQCJrall
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according to the six criteria for priorities indicated above. Thes..!
ten-year plans are to spell out in more detail, plans for specific resi-
dential, COJIItIlercial, ir-dustrial districts as well as areas slated for
other uses. As these are to be the basis for project programming, they
are required to be updated every five years. The annual implementation
plan is to be the capital budget for the comincj year.
A brief review of Daejon's newly updated comprehensive plan illus-
trates what will be in~lved..
'lhis city is ate of the 1977 ·growth poles· and one of the three
first-priority intermediate size cities IInder the new ten-year urban
developnent progra.'l.. Located in the west-central part of the country,
it is a little over 160 k1I frolll Seoul (to the northwest), 260 kill from
Mogpo (the nearest port, to the southwest) and abollt 280 km from Busan
(to the southeast). DHjon is also the E.L.clCt! which has been discussed
for possible relocation of the capital. Planning for a new internation-
al airport has focussed en a site olltside the immediate periphery of
D_jon to the northwest -- in the direction of S·!oul: and two of the
lIlajor transportatiQR projects in the new ten-year national land develop-
ment plan are a high-speed rail system linking Daejon with seoul and up-
grading and dualizing the national highway connecting Daejon with Busan.
Daejon (inclllding central city and the two principal satellite
settlements at the periphery of the planning area) had a population of
660,000 in 1976, .t\en the last plan was prepared. At that time, the
plan provided for a projected population of 860,000-920,000 in 1386 and
1.1-1.3 million in 1996. The new OO1IIprehensive plan shows acttMl 1981
po~ '.c:ation to be about 850,000, and anticipates that 1.1 million will be
reached by 1991 and 1.3 million by 1996. TIlis is wi thout any 1IIeAtion of
impacts of a PGssible capital move.
The new plan, .... ich with 193 page. is twice as long as its
forerllnner, is flill Gf data and illllstrations. lIIuch of th is mater!al
appears quite sophisticated and the land lise maps reflect careflll att~n­
tien to land liSt! data collectiQft and monitor inc). There is a qeneral
introductory sectiQft which 4iscllsses the seope Gf the plan and the bAsie
policies it embollies. It al_ describes the city's physieal setting,
l\istorieal clnelGpllent, p:>pulation and 4ICGl'lOIIlic base. Alternative
sehemH fl)l' the physical fom and directiQft of future grGwth are shown
and the preferred arraoAqellent# identified. The el\a,ter concludes by
laying 0Ut SGMe parameters whieh set the scale of future develOPMent tG
be &eao.-odated .by the plan in its all~ation Gf land fGr different llses
anet its preseriptio"a f0r new infrastruetllca.
A _eGnd HetlGn aont&ins IGng-ra"ge pla"s fGr 4ifferent sectors.
seven el\apter headings aover: infrastrlil'l:tllre, environmental proteetian,
intlgstrial c1aftlGplltent, mcial ~velGPllH!nt, finance, Ilrban administra-
tiOft ancl lmple_ntaUC!Ift. '!'here is eGnsiderable detail em land \lse --
~ to eatt••tea 0f land reqllirements Dr maj0r eate~Gries Gf land \lse,
all"OaUGft 0f antieipatecl peplilatiGA alllOng delineated zones and eGlftpu-
tatiGft Gf the r-esul tent. density in ea-eh. '1'ransportati0n lIUestians are
122
also addressed in :;ubstantia~ detail. Projected volumes of travel
demand for key transportation corridors include estimates of pedestrian
movements as well as future nwmbers of vehicles expected to be in use in
the city. Drawings are presented which show in general scheme, the
street network, parking area developnent, bIls terminal, railroad and the
t~affic circle at the central raU statim. They plan dO@s not, how-
e~r, _ntion impacts of an international airport or a direct, high-
speed electric rail link with Seoul. Nor are operation and maintenance
of the public transportation system discussed.
A downtown. development plan which includes discussion of the rela-
tionships between central city and outlyil'l9 commercial centers, and a
section on telephone, t<i!legraJ;it am electrification networks to serve
the areas of future development complete the infrastructure portion. of
the plan.
Protection of the natural environmer.t so far as this 20-year plan
is concerned is a subject which en.compasses residential constr\lction
(scale, standa-eds and general location of fut\lre projects) and its sup-
port services (water sapply and distribution, sewerage, solid waste, and
parks and recreation area development). Anti-poll\ltion and fuel conser-
vation measures are also treated in this context.
Under the heading of industrial development are sections on commer-
cial and industrial area development, plans for export promotion, tour-
ism development and ac)ric::ultural development. In respect to the latter
it should be remembered that the delineated "city" plaMing area encom-
passes rural land lying outside the currently urbanized area bit in the
path of future urban growth. Rice fields occupy unimproved land, liter-
ally, right up to the doorsteps of the outlying factories around Daejon
and there is extensive cultivation of vegetables under plastic-cGvered,
barrel-shaped hothouses.
The social development plan deals with facilities for public health
and hygiene, social welfar.e services, education and cultural activities
and disaster relief. r.oeatjons of programmed projects are mapped.
Subjects covered very broadly unoer the heading, "urban adminis-
tration u-provement plan" have to db with reorganization and improvement
of Ilunicipal adllinistration, uplJracling of CJoverMent personnel skills,
expanding the arban area by the addition of new development zones (land
readjllstllent project areas) and regional coordination or SC!lIM form of
are..i~ adllinistration exten4inq beyond the jurisdiction of the indivi-
dual Illlnicipal1ty. Specific proPGsals are n<!Jt. elal;)orate<l. The final
chapter pr~ject. f~t~ce reven~es of Baejon, indicating poten~lal !JGurces
~f financing for project 4evel~plllent and potential levels of reSOlirces
t~ be av.ilable fr<:JIR each (Wer the 20-y.ar planninCJ period. Projects
identified in tlw plan are then laid out by sector and phase and their
COlts, tlBtalled. (Ilk;)re than half the financing needed for Daejon' s
deftloPIHnt progrM will have t~ c~ frc. outside the city'S CGnven-
ti~al re..nll. reSOlirces.
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Korea's largest cities have city planning oo1lllllissions who viII be
expected to perform silllilar updating and expansion of their comprehen-
sive plans. and prepare the nl!V middle-range development programs and
anftWil implementati~ progras. Th@y vill have to follow 9l1idelines
prepared and distribUted by the Ministry of Construction. submit the
work to the governors of their respectift provinces and. after approval
at the prOVincial level. forward the plans to the Ministry of Construc-
tion. oms will perfortll technical review of these draft plans am then
pass them on with their oo_nts to the Central City Planning Canmission
for final approval and adoption.
Ministry officials expect that the cities viII be able to complete
their new 20-year and ten-year: plans within a year. In most cases, this
will be mainly an updating exercise involving ex>nslll tat ion with eadt
ministry about its five-year construction plans so that actually-
sehedllled projects can be indicatt!d as StIch in the municipal plans. The
annual ~plementation plans, howe~er, are expected to be more complica-
ted. The Ministry of ConstractiQn anticipates the process of preparing
these to req11ire several stages since these plans will be the determi-
nants of hc;)w limited ftmds for the 16 target cities will be allocated,
and the precise level of fllnding to be available is net yet known.
1IlIanparer is another cr i tieal problem facing implementation of the
over all planning sche.. Thf!io new reeJlllations recommend that each local
90ver~nt establish a planning grollp composed of professionals such as
economists, landscape architects, planners, engineers, etc. to ,,~vise
the mayor on plan preparation and implementation.
Few of the cities have professional and technical planning staff to
do the ac:tllal lIOrk of draftincJ their plans. IkWever, lIlIinistry of Cons-
trllctiQR officials consider it unlikely that matty such persGnnel wollld
be hired as staff by lGCal ~erMent, mainly _cause of the high cost
of their salaries. JII)C anticipates that the buJk of the planniACJ work
will CGntinue to be CGntracteel aut to lJftiversity professors (who, in
vi" of the eircllillstances, haw been granted allthor ization to enC)aCJl! in
part-time oontraet planni"9 jGbs) (lJI: specialists vi th CGnsul HnC) firms
in the U_lds Gf en9ineering. archi tectllre GI: planning. There are SO
such firlls in lor.a today, twG-tM.rcls of them looated in SeGlil and the
Gthers distributecl arsund the e~untry. The nullbers of qualified lorean
pl..ners ha.. increa.ed within the past five years, since ereatiGm of a
city planning facUlty at S.aul .atiGnal University anel esta~lishllent of
\lnelergraeluate tralni1\9 prC!lCJralls at five Gther wniftraities plus two
gracl\late eI..,r_ progra.. '!'here are, in adelitian, fGrei~ speelalists
r.siet.nt ift .Grea WhGse ..rviees are available b0 losal CJ(3)Yernment.
The Rinistry also expects to eGneluet special training ~eminars for
local officials (3)1\ hG" to ".eute the WG·rk ealled fsr in the new plan-
ning guidelines.
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IV. Prosp!cts and Issues
Itorea's OJrrent urban policy seeks to establish a system ,.mich
jointly serves the objectives of stimulating the development and mana-
ging the growth of intermediate size cities. some of the mechanisms are
already present. Others haft yet to be put into place.
Prc.peets for the 14-eity program will be very much influenced by
the resol\lticz of certain qt1estions and iss\les that became apparent in
the course of field ~rk for this report.
A. COIIIIIitllent of the Government is one of these. Skepticism about
the will that lies behind the 14-eity developllent program is expressed
by those who observed that the last rO\lnd of -growth pole" policy was
not p.trsued in earnest. Reducing the size of Seoul seems not to haft
been a goal realistic enough to take serio\lsly.
': hll Government ~ittlent seemed laeHng even to the lesser 0b-
jective of limiting further growth of the capital by distrib\lting new
investJlents atIOftC) the growth poles. '!'his would have enhanced the inter-
lIIecliate cities' positions relative to Seo\ll and Busan. Oft the one hand
eno\lgh priority _s rot Eourded the growth policy to outweigh other
fac~ors in loeational decisions for new developlllent. Oft the other hand
there _re insafficient incentives and sanctions to make the growt.h
poles tr\lly attractive, ~titive sites for new investment •••es~ial­
ly in view of conc\lrrent efforts by governJleftt to channel new growth to
places within conm\lting distance of Seo\ll and Basan.
Solie agencies _ose participation is critical to the new inter-
lIecIiate cities prOCJrn are looking for a sign that the prograJll has f\lll
backing of governJMftt at. the highe.t level. - and convincing evideftce
of intentiOft to i.pl...nt tlw prOCJra this ti_ aro\lncl -- before they
will respect it a. governing their own &acisions.
It oo\llcl aake .~ clifference if GovernJMnt were to articulate the
PMiticm that c1eftl~nt of the iftter_cliat. si•• citi.s is a ..ert.hy
C)oal 1ft i t.s OWl r1C)ht. - r at.her than OM clef ined 1ft lIIainly ne<jative
tera., i.e. cli1IIinishing or lillliting growth of the big cities, Seoul ancl
BIIslft. At.~ poiftt cle.,.10pi"" ~.t.ic .arket.s wUl beCOllle an inc-
rea.iftCJly itIportant el.-ftt 1n the anr all strat.eC)y for tIConOlllie
growth, and t.M existence of a network of wll-cle.,.loP8cl \lrban concen-
tratiOfts <D\llcl '- reoognized as a dlIfinite lonC) ranCJe a.set. 1~ that
conte.t..
I. l.olutitm of the ot\lcial outstanclins CI\J••tiens of financinl
for the l!!9r.. Iftd ad.ifti~trati.. arranl.Ment. wo\llcl Qe1tainly be .-onCJ
tile first inclieaters of Gover_ent'. intent to put its weight _hind t.he
1ftterllediate citi•• prOl9ram. Dltter.tlliatien ef the level '3f fil'lAncing to
be .a~ a.ailable will be sitftificaftt becau.e it will c~ntrol t~ .cope
ef the ft09ru _eI p)ssibly ..en the preciae IN.ber or ielentity of the
cities to be IMlllded. CIMttrel ever the fiftancbl lIIeehani. to be
.,teated will be mether iapeEtant. aspect. iftas.\lch a. there lIIay be SOllIe
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rivalry among ministries for the power that goes along with control of
the program ftmding. This issue io;, of course, linked with that of the
administrative arrangements yet to ~ settled definitively.
Until the';e matters are resolved the planning that is done may have
little _anl~ beyond the symbols drawn on maps.
C. 'I·he merginq of econ01llic development and physical planning is
one of the .cst interesting and challenging facets of the Korean ~se.
Up to now physical planning has been relegated a role of supporting
or accoilnodating growth. It has been regarded as a means of preparing
the way for industrial development (i.e. bf provision of industrial es-
tates •.nd _jor il'lfrastrlJCture) or coping with the impacts of develop-
ment (i.e. ~ providing housing and residential support infrastructure.)
New t.llelles are being struck now. A dramatically different ale is
that develcPlMnt of the intermediate city in the full ran~ of its
civic, cultural .nd physical furactions is itself a siqnificant factor in
attracting new investment there. '!'he housing and community f.cili ties
and services, heretofore regarded as nice luxuries which could follow
i~dustrialization and econc.ic qrowth when c~unities were able to af-
ford theil, He now seen by at least SOIfte theorists and poHCY-IIakers as
preconditions or incentives for achieving the grO\~ in tne first place.
'1'0 ba sure, cOno1llic planners speak of emplayi."lC) tax incentives and
credit controls as lIeang of directing the geographic ~~stribution of new
industrial invest1llent. This CJeOCJraphical ele_nt will be something new
for the eeon01llic planners whose principal feclls has been on sectoral
development. Mar they will be challenged to think not only of which
industri..es to empha.ize and how to bllild lIP thOle respective sectors,
bllt also of how to fit these invest1llents into strategies for building liP
:lnd:lvid\lal local (ard regional) eoon01ll1.. Th@y will be working at a
~1fferent scale and facing entirely new isslles.
A.t the SUIe ti_ the current five-year develoPlllent plan points to
••e slcwinq in the a.er all rate e;,f CJr(!)Wth in the national @con01llY, Inc!
the need for oonsiderable chanCJe in the governJllent' s general strategy
fe;,r .ti~Jlating fllrther hiCJh rates of devele;,,.ent. In th~ ooming phas~s
of eCGn~lc prQ9ra..ing, the plan calls f~ mll~ more devele;,piIlent e;,f ~he
em~ic inter.ti.s bet.eft the ..jot ..etors that haft been expanded
to date. Thi. will Man lIuch ireater c1epenclenee on expansion in the
private ..ctor and lIiaed enterpri.e and MUch wider latitade for
dec1aioft-ukinCJ by tM marketplace. '!'he ,·ery tiCJht controls Gver credit
durinCJ the palt, fGr ••allPle, are seen as having been e.cessive to the
~int of causi~i ••rious inefficiencies.
In Ofte sense a new ~phasi. on ~Q9raphical dispersion e;,f eeonamic
activitr is qIlite oonsistent with a 1'1_ e.phasis on diversification of
enterpris. and diffllsie;,n e;,f c1eeilion-lIaki~. In another, there is a
real ~.stion of whether GOYernment's powerful intervention in so many
a.peets of enterprise developlMnt •• not a key te;, the success of such
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deconeentration efforts as we have witnessed in the last ten years: and
the corollary question of the extent to which Government will truly be
able to steer new investment atce it bas relinquished some authority
over decisions in favor of the marketplace. The situation in prospect
suggests that the program for intermediate cities will have to rely much
more on strategies that make them appealing industdal and COIInercial
locations in market terms and less a'l Governmental leverage through
credit controls and other incentives and sanctions. This will require
moee than simply ~ocedural training for planners and administrators of
the local development programs. They will need to be imbued with large
dose of entrepreneurial spirit and they will need to be permitted scope
• for imagination and innovation.
~
If economic developnlent strategies are no longer to be so closely
focussed and centrally controlled as they have been in the past, if new
investl'llents are to be spread among geographically diverse lo::ations, and
if growth, in general, will be occurring at a somewhat slower pace, the
new intertlediate city prClCJram should probably lI)t be expected to show
dramatic, visible results within a very short ti_. The abiiity of
local officials and business people to reCOCJnize, and respond energe-
tically to, opportunities .. they arise may very well make the critical
difference in how well the intermediate cities program succeeds.
D. There is irony in the decentralization scheftle that adds to
centralized pOWer. A1~gh the l4-eity program does place the massive
burden of pl.nning .t the local level, it also expands by geometric F~o­
PGrtions oentral ~rnment's 'Crk of revb. and clear.nce of all the
new docwnnts a,nr) projects and budgets. As government has sO\ight to
devise ever-!IOre effective tools for shaping urban aveloplllent, it has
.lso increased control over that developillent .t the national level.
The decisions which GovernM@nt must eventually .ake en the form and
proc@clures for decentralized adllinis",ration of the interaecliate city
proglaJI will be wry iIlportant c1atermil'l.nts of the prograll's success.
If all decisions contin.. to be .ade in Seoul, the expanding fllftctions
in the rest of the country vill only incr.... the neecl for lIOre repre-
••ntation, i.e. more agents to ~nduc~ the business Gf processing deci-
11.cn., in Seoul. The citie. ~uld fincl th....l". in the situati<:m of
.any a decentraliz" business ent.rpri•• , i.e. havin, to maintain an
office in the eapital in orller to keep trac!:k Gf nece.sary transactiGn.
with a,.ncie. of central 'Gv.r~nt. If lGeal branches of centr.l
to"r.-ental ."encie. are •• tabli.hed tut Seoul retaina the bulk of
clecilion-.ak1n, authGtity, channels Gf cc:.lunicat1onll ~uld beeOlle s~
clOlCJ" a. to illpede the ~OlJra.'I executiGn. It vill be ilitpottant not
to .tifl. the local lniHathe th.t ls neeeled to mat. the decentrali-
.ation ~OlJr.. ~rk truly .uccessfglly.
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Table 14. ~Ie~sure!:"len~ U:i.i~ and Cos~ pe:- Uni~ for Calcu-
lating MXe~~sM of ~cn-Metrcpolit~nCities for
Shared Tax Pu!'?oses
Type of Expense Unit o~ Counting
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
I.
t.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
IS.
COlmci 1 Expens es
Election Expenses
Ad-:uinistrative
Exper.ses
- Salary
- Office
Exper.se for Roads
• 'avin:
- Gravel
Expense for Brid~e
E~~ense for River
CO:1trol
Expense for City
'lannina
Expense for
Sewerage
Other Civil Enain-
..rinl Expense
'arming
Farmland Land Im-
provement
Pnmot ion Gf ram-
lftl Technitlue
'en'estry
StG~kbreedina
Ccammer¢.. In.
4\istry
Nuneer of COUo"lcilors
Number of Election
Districts
Number of Voting
Districts
Number of EI:lployees
Number of Employees
L:..lgth 0 f Road
Lenith of Road
Length. of Bridge
Local Length of Larie-
Seale River
Local Lenit~ of Small-
Seale River
PopulatiGn
Area of Cultivated Land
Area of Cultivated Land
~Ul'!'.b1!r of rarrninl
KousehGl d.s
.
Area of re;,rest ry
:fumer of Oxen.
}(e;,rses, Pias
~umber of Tra~ers,
Indus trialists
32,959 won per co~~cilor
40,928 won per district
14,230 won per dist~ict
Grade 1-1-4 per e~plo:ee
84,051 ~on per e~plcy~~
308 won per ~eter
27 WGn per Qeter
1650 ~on per rr.e~er
40 WGn per ~eter
25 WGn per meter
137 WGn per person
40 ~Gn per persGn
38 won per persGn
24l WGn per jGniae;, (2.4 acr~
110 ,,·on per jGnibe
209 won per hGusen01d
141 won per j Gniaa
J& ,,·Gn per heacl
lSI WQn per persQn
Type of Expense Unit of Counting Cost per Unit·
16.
11.
11.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.,
Marine Industry
P..blic: Health
Soci~l Service
Tax Colleeticn
Property
-Reinforced iron
concrete
-Tile reef. stone
stractun
-WQOQ.en structure
Traininl
Pu31ic: Information
Anti-Co:'l"amunist
Education
Enliehterment
Statistics
"ftSiGl:l
Nur:U,'H:r of Persons En-
la~ed in Fishini
Pcpul~tion
Popul~tion
!~sic Financi~l Revenue
lui1diui Space
luildinc Space
Number of Employees
Population
Pop,dation
Population
PGpulati~n
Salary le~uirement febr
Employees
69 won per person
6S won p~r person
66 won. per person
i won per person
278 won per square meter
300 won per square ~eter
152 won per square meter
3.384 won per e~loyee
20 wen per person
a wGln per person
a won per person
6 WGn per person
23 WGl1\ per 1000 won
21. A4I1linistrath", !x-
plas IS fQr JU. and
Dolle
.Salary
-Gffia,
21. Ta-uris:!! l),velGpmen-;
21. Cl,a.nln,
SO. In¢wraatftle:tt 'If
SavinI!
Kamber of Ri and Dcnl
Chl,fs &ad Clerks
Number of Ii L~d Del'll
O\i,fs attd. Cltrks
l'opulatioa
'lJ,ulatia!l
'Gp'&latiBJl
Crade i-A-I per employee
14.Q51 won per perS3ft
S WGft per person
17 WOft per person
3 WH per person
• 'th,•• \mit Ctlsts, wh.i¢l\ are hased OR 1~&7 prit\:es, sre adjasted far
pr1cI Ch~ftl.s in the annual &~dietaty pr3¢ess.
&."tee: :Unistry.f tt(!lTllt Affair!, '!"he tB¢al rinan(!! .!.di\jst~ent $~#sttm
.f Ketea, ~gl71 (SeeJl:Il, ~lG::~. 1\.<&.) •. PI'. il-'.i.
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I. A General Framework for the Discussion of Tunisia's APproach
~ lmderstand how Tunisia approaches planning and development for
secondary cities, it is usefal to begin. with some salient facts about
the country and its govern.ance. Tunisia is relatiftly small in popu-
laticn (6,000,000) compared with Sc::IM urbanizing nations such as
Thailand, Iorea, and Brazil with as many people in their ~imate cities
as in all of Tunisia. Ethnically and linCJUistically it is relatively
homogeneous (Arabie-speaking Muslims of preaominantly Berber stock).
Frc. an internal political standpoint one major party (Destour ) has
dominated since independence in 1956. one major political fi9Ure, Habib
BotIrCJUiba~ has led the natiat and imbued its evollltion with his
personality and ideas.
TUnisia is an internally coherent and~ despite some opposition on
ec:onotllic: matters, unified nation. It is also relatively prosperous.
The WOrld Bank classifies '!'tinisia as a -middle iftCOllle- country, with a
Gross Mational Product in 197. of $950 per capita.
Tunisia is also a rapidly lEbanizing country, with a ~illlate
center. In 1980, 52 per cent of Tlmisia's population was in urban
areas~ oompH&<! with 3~ per cent in 1960. Tlmis in 1980 had a popula-
tion of over 1,000,000, about 17 per cent of the collntry's total and 31
per cent of the ~ban figllre.
Despi te the dGminanee of 'l'\ln18, the OGIlmtry has an elfterging network
of secondary citie., several of which ha.. viable eeon~ie. and are sig-
nificant contriblitCKs to Tunisia's conoaic trC!JWth. 1ft 1978, Tunisia
had a total of 20 citi_ with l'OPIllat10na o.,.r 20,000. Of the.e~
SQllsse-Monastir, Bizerte, Sfu, 11\4 GaMS, all alGm~ the ooast, md
lairollaA 1ft the interior are the .,.t illpertant anet the lar~est. All
are onr 50,000 in p'pulatiCllft. OnellplCJY!"nt and \iftderoplGyllent are
,robl.s 1ft the ei ties, ••,.cially the many .aller eertters vhi~ are
,r~ift9 in pGPIllation 411. to .i,ration frS1l their rllral hinterlan4s.
WhUe 'l'\lnisia h. a lIiMel .CGnM\Y, eltfttral ~"rnJNnt play. a
.i",ificant r~le tn the ~aftC!)lIie syatell Iftd ~..iRates the tnternal
attaini.trati.. strllCt\lr.. M ~M ~entary puts i tr
'!'h.r. is no «l0nC:Jlll1e .etar ~ere th. st.at. dB.. Nj)t ttltter..ne
either directly Gr incUreetly. on. of the goals Gf the 'GVerAment
is t~ reduce inca.. disparities and lIa_. a more equitable division
af the ecanollle pie. It thus aets .. a laWMaker, planner, invest-
ar # lUft&ger, mel C!lWfter. Aa the SGuree af re,ulatory It!lJislatian
anet a. the author of ~OIIIpreh.nsi.. plannin, fGr devel0Plftent, the
atat. i ••\lpr.... ttl rGle .. investar, llaftager, 8ftd ~#fter varies
wielely ~et"M industrie., ran~il'lCJ frc:!lll s~le GWl'ter tlo a partner-
ship arr.n....nt with private f0tei9ft <Ilr cbmHtie _ners. POl'
eft~etpris •• that are wholly ~lvate and ~ee1led tB ee illportant to
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the development of the economy, the state Offirs direct investment
services through public lending institutions.
Although central government control and execution of major
development responsibilities is a basic feature of Tunisia, the
state is embarked on a two-pronged decentralization effort. One
thrust is incre~sing regionalization of parastatal agencies who
create the tilysical facilities to support human settlement and
economic growth. The second is an increasing reliance on elected
municipal administrations to participate in the planning and
financing of urban infrastructure and services. Both attempts to
bring governmental decision-making closer to the people are taking
plaOll! gradually, almost as if ~uthorities are trying to find the
appropriate formula to estal)lish -just enough- localism ,.nile a
pre-eminence of strong centralism is maintained.
The state is performing a balancing act. On the one hand, it
recognizes that national Objectives to reduce urban and regional
disparities can be achieved only with greater local involvement
and more expeditious on-site coordination of decision-making. On
the other, it has no intention of relinquishing centralized plan-
ning, budgeting, and control This process is in its very early
stages, and its e9olutic-,n should be of considerable interest to
other developing countries with a similar ~~itment to decentral-
ization and similar objectives of !ROre equitable distribution of
economic growth.
Two other matters merit oomment in setting the stalJe for a
discussion of Tunisia's appr<J>ach to secondary cities: technical
competence and international aqency interest.
A. Technical Campetence
Public .,eftCy officials _d technical staff by and large
ct.mGnstrate a high level of skill in their various fields. The staff of
central government ministries and parastatal organizations tend to be
well train_ ancl are quite able to perfon. lIIany in leadership posi-
tiOfts dIIaling with urban development have stront, wll-considered
ide.. This extends to the embryonic reClioRal offices of parastatal
ateftcies anel to the munieipal staffs of the larter eities. Serious
proble_ exist, hswever, aid are recoCJftizl!CI retardiftlJ the laek of
trained personnel in the SIIIaller IKban <:.'enters which the gQvernment is
tartetiRCJ for attention in the forthcaming sixth five year plan.
The issue, .. articulated by the Ministry of Interior is that
"nmicipal staffs lack ability to coneehe, plaR., and eX-4!ClJte fea·sible
Pl'oj.~ts. Muni~ipal MedII are too Gften presented .s -wish lists" Clf
llIu.alistie requirements. '1'00 lIany of these p.rojeets ean Reither be
funded nor effectively eKeeuted.
1. Me18C!ln# Harold D., Bel., Tuftisia, A CO~try Study, American Univer-
sity, Washin9ton, D. C., 1979., p. 122.
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'rhus the need for trainin9 and for technical assistance in the
smaller municipalities have been noted, and considerable "!fforts will be
made by bo~ the central government and international agencies to fill
the gap during the 1982-87 plan period.
B. International AgencY Interest
For S01Ile time Tunisia has enjoyed a favored position in the
activities of the Wocld Bank, l1SAID, and some of the bilateral European
assistance programs. Projects dealing with ;tlysical planning, ~usin9,
and other aspects of urban development ha~ been undertaken for many
years. Durinq the 1960s and 1970s, for example, ~merous Peace Corps
volunteers worked in Tunisia and contributed to planning for Tunis,
Kairouan md other cities. The World Bank' s techn~eal support and
investments have helped to make touri_ the country's principal source
of foreigft exchange and have supported the growth of Sousse-Monastir as
a major secondary center. Both the Bank and OSAID have Ilndertaken major
programs in bousing, first in TIlnis and now broadened to both Tun.is and
secondary citi.. Ttl. '1'unis primate center has been a testineJ ground
for international agency activity in the shelter field -- as well as for
the central government's own efforts. NOW, as concern for reducing
emnomic and social disparities deepens, both oentral govern.ment and
international agencies are attempting to adapt and apply SOllIe of the
lessons learned to communities elsewhere.
Tunisia has a clear and longstanding poligY COMmitment to physical
planning -- and implementation of the plans -- for its eities. '1'0 some
<legr.. that eOJllftitment ste_ froll P·resident Boul:quiba's own personal
decUeation to shelter for his people, Wiich has b@en reflected in his
nation's devel~.nt prioriti... As one cabinet minister put it
reeently,
If TIlnisia today affords the speetaele Gf a vast eonstruetiGn
yard, with urban faciliti •• and eitie. beinq built everywhere, it
ia beeaus. lQurguiba has gnderstoad from the very beginning that a
lIIan badly ho\lsed i. incapable of produeiACJ seriGus WGrk. lie has
••t, frGJIII the dawn Gf inchpeAdeMe, _bitiGUS Gbjeetives fGr
~ftrnlHnt in this ".ai... Efforts tG rroduoe deeent sh.l ter
haft be~ a majGr Tunisian preoeeupatiGn.
In IIIMy cleftleJpin, eountri.. with stron, l.adership, that leader-
ship'. own ,.raoftal aGneerns are traft.lateeS intG PlGfraM priGrities. In
tl\e HftM, Tllftisia's "prwoocupaei(Jft" with tll. phy.1~.1 a.peets of l\Wllan
s.ttl~t _ts it apart frGII 8Gme other ~untries whGse principal
f1,uc.. l\...had eJther erJIIlpelUng interests. InterestinlJ1y enGuCjh,
lIour:,uiba haa frequently eitecl Ataturk's Turkish re'mlliUGn Gf 50 years
~G a. an •••lIIp1e fGr Twftis!a tG eMulate -- a nati0nal revival whieh wa.
~. MBh~ Saya, Minister Gf Bqui,..nt and RO\l8ing, in "PanoraMa
I.-bUier", Septe1lber-oet0ber, 198B, p. s.
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the first in the 20th century to utilize city-building and decentralized
urban development as major tools of economic and social policy. 3
All of these factors of context - from the centr:..~ized structure,
to its relatively prosperous economy, to the personal interest of its
leader - CCIIle together to explain Tunisia's approach to planning and
develoJ;'8ent of secondary ~ities. That approach may be briefly charac-
terized as follows:
c. Issues of Ort:-anization (including those of secondary city
develC?P!!le~tl.
These have for some time been recognized as an appropriate
focus for public policy.
D. Planning and Development Institutions
'rI1nisia has created ~ planninq/development structure of
powerfal central government agencies coupled with limited municipal
respoftsibili ties designed to organize and regulate development at the
municipal lenl. Objectives are to e~nd these municipal capabilities
in planniftCJ, project execution, and finance. Technical assistance and
training -- by both national government and international agencies -- to
permit municipal government to function Dl)re effectively are priority
matters.
E. Physical Planning as a Precursor to Development
In the secondary cities ~ planning instrwments themselves
deal primarily with land use, utilities siting, and zoning. They do not
include attention to such related s'Ibjects as ecolWftlic potential, pro-
jeet eosUACJ and capital budgeting, Plblic finance, uPCJradil1CJ and its
aooioecon01lic reCl\1ireftlents, stac)il1CJ, etc. These are the province of
others, and the 4.gree to which the elaboratien and coor4inatiGn of pro-
ject ct.velopaent fits with ptlysieal plans varies frOlft C'OIftnI\lftity to 0011\-
munity. But the planning instru..nts th.mselves are sufficiently
flexillle tD provUe i\1i4anee for pr:oject developn.nt, and they are
adaptable to changing circum.tane.a.
P. Land lss~es Ad~eBse~ S,uarelx
In the Tuni.iaR system land i. ~nsidered a critical link
Det...e planning and implelllentati<:m, ancl inatrwwntalities haw been
established to ensure that availability Gf urban land - its <:."Oat,
aequiaitiGft, as..wlttly and deftl-0paen.t -- presents 1'10 bottleneck to lirban
•.,a"aiGft.
'l'Un:1sia hae .. ri011s issues of retional and Ilrban imbalance. The
seale of deftloplent to meet aoeial neecls partielilarly j01:!la and
J. see lUnin, M. a. Ate. Revelpent fGr MaUGnal Gr0wth, the
,»,k1,b Precedent, Pr-.gel, N.t., 1,.5.
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shelter for the urban poor - has fulen short of the needs. In this
sense Tunisia continues to be a developing country. Coordinatia\ of
urban development presents serious issl1es the further way from Tunis
and the dec:ision-makinq center that it must occur.
Despite these problems the observer can col'!clude that, in Tunisia,
a framework for £fforts to improve secondary cities is L"'l place. The
vory basic isstJes of secondary city growth, still to be addressed in
many countries, have 1::Ieen joined in Tunisia. During the forthCOllliJt9
sixth five-year plan period, the system will be called upon to perform
at a greater seale and a higher level of efficiency.
A major objective of that plan will be to reduce markedly existing
regional economic disparities. Whether it can do so withift the fiscal
and human resources avail~ble will be a principal questioft •
II. Some Physical-E~nomic Description
TlInisia's CJtOCJraPJbic regions are shown on the accompanying map.
The following excerpts frc. various COllntry studies are a capsUle
description of its physical, social, and economic circumstances.
Tllftisia has an area of approximately 164,000 square kilOllleters
and a ooastlifte of about 1,600 kilometers indented by the gulfs of
Tunis, Al HaJllllamat, and Gabes. It has six major and nearly a
dozen minor seaports ••• The Atlas MOuntain system, which begins in
southwestern Morocco, terminates in northeastern Tunisia. Most of
Northern Tunisia is MOuntainous, but elevations average less than
300 meters and rarely exceed 1,000 meters ••• Tunisia c:an be divided
into three IMjor 9l!ographic regions, determined in part by topo-
graphy and quality of the soils and in particular ~ th@ incidenc2
of rainfall, which decreases progressively from north to south •••
The ethnic:ally hOftlOCJeneous population is a1Jllost exclusively of
Acab-Berber stock, Ara~ic in speech, ~d SIJMi Muslim in
reliCJion. llIost _lIbers of the for_r Preneb cOllftunity weparted,
'IOllintarily or otherwise, after Tunisia gained independence in
lts., althollCJh French is still aft important second lanCJuage and
slMll French, Italian, and Maltese minorities remain.
In agric:ultlJre, wheat, olive 011, wine, esparto grass, and frllits
are the Min pr(!)Cfucts. There is 80M mining of phosphates, iron
ore, l ••d, and line, while petrellleWl w.s discc:>vered in 1964.
Iftdustry, t:hcucJh lhlitecl, is exp.nclinq. TlInlsia boasts the first
steel mlll in nc:>rthwest Africa, and chemical and paper industries
ace beiftCJ developed. Tourism, an important and growing industry,
1s the country's IIIOSt important source of foreign exehaAqe earn-
Iftgs ••• On.mployment remains hiCJh ••• Rec:ent Tunisian development
4. Mel_ft, OP Cit, 1'. 62.
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efforts have lost their radical soc:irist tene, and the country is
actively seeking foreign investment.
MOSt industrial and tollrism growth has been along the coast. can-
bined with productive olive and fruit-producing agricultural land in the
littoral, this results in a relatively prosperous CDastal region and a
ralatively poor interiex. Despite dOlllinance of Tunis, this relative
prosperity is not confined to the Northeast of the CDast, but extends
along the primary road and rail trans~~rtation well down the length of
the Mediterr~~ean shoreline, inclllding several secondary cities. Major
developllent efforts C!uring the 1960s and 1970s fOCllsed on building IIp
the infrastructure to support economic growth and urban settlement in
tiais region which has the country's major exploitable resources.
'!'be following paragraphs from OSAID' s 1979 She1te r Sector ~eport on
'!'unisia along with the aCCOlllpanying table and map describe the present
pattern of IlIban settlement.
'l'oday's settlement patterns in 'I'"lInisia feature a heavy CDncentra
tion of large IlIban clllstecs along the coast. The Tunisian
economy's JW:)st significant industries are to be foond in the
cities, as is the case in '!'Unis, Bizerte, Sfax, Gabes and
SOusse. '1'0 a large extent, inland aceas derive their income
primarily fre. farlling. With the exception of a few large indus-
trial operations allell .. the lasserine paper lIill, the '!'hala
ce.ent plant and the Gaf.. lIines, the majority of the population
is dependent en ~ricultural activities. It is precisely this
r~ion that supplied lIigratory flows to the cities which, in a
lIatter of a f.. !Wars, .,Clr.vated the population concentration
proble,. on the ooast and exacerbated further the econollic
imbalance between the various regions of TUnisi••••••
(the foregoing table liltl) the 20 major: population centers (as
lleterllined by the 1975 census), follcw.cI by a 1986 popul.tion
pl~jection ~~".lopecl by the National Statistics Institute. In
.ddition to city ~ptllatiOft figures, statistics are supplied for
gouvernorats, and percentages of gou..rnorat population classified
as uban are reported••• the locations and relative siles 0i the
principal c~unities (.re shown in the aCCOMpanying figure).
one particul.r infr••tructure effort ...rits mention ~c.llse of its
direct effect Oft growth of ••cond.ry citi.s and the spread of econOMic
activity ••y frOll '1'IInis. 'ftl.t is the aDftStrl1ctlon of intern.tional
airports at Monastir and on the Island of Jerba. '!'he airports, combined
with the _rltetiftCJ activities of Tunisia'. tourist industry, have
perMitted direct flights between lurope and Tunisia without going
through 1'111\18. TArie N1l1ber. of hotels and recreaUGnal at tractions
5. Country Stl1lly, author IIftknGWn, p. 453.
t. OSAID y '!'unisia Shelter aeetar Asses_ent, 19", p. 8.
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have been constructed in the Sousse-Monastir area and on Jerba, and both
prosper frClll paekage tours on an almost year-round basis because of
favorab~e eluate. 'l!1eir growth as the third and fourth major urban
areas was directly expedited by the physical investments which are now
available to support other diverse economic activities as well.
'!'be lUrli.stry of Planning has classified areas of the country
according to five l~ls of relative prosperity. Generally the grada-
tion .~ves frc:. the coast (with the highest leftl) to the western and
southern borders (as the lowest). Urban areas, regardless of location,
are more prosperouzi than rural. '!'he principal coastal cities of SOusse-
Ma:astir and Sfu are ~signated in the same prosperity category as
Tunis -- providing some indication of the extent to which eccnOlllic
development has already been diffused beyond the primate center.
The degree of urban dec:oneentration now oc:curring may be noted in
fiq1Ues from the World Bank's 1980 World Development Report. These
indicate that Tunis' share of national urban population fell fr_ ..1 40 per
cent in 1960 to 31 per cent in 1980. 'l!l@ primate center OJntinues to
grow, but sane ot.her e.nters are expanding in economic activity and
population as ..11.
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III. The StrllCture of Governance
Tunisia is a unitary state: all authority flows from the central
(national) goverrmtent~ and lower governmental units haft no inher-
ent or residual authocity of their own. Constitutional provisions
covering subnational goftrnment are limited to the statement that
-1WIlicipal and rl!9ional Councils conduct the local affairs, under
tbe cond i tiona foreseen by law. - Subsequent leg islaticn bas
establisbed a well-organized system of regional and local adminis-
tration that stresses the interdependence of qoftrnment and
party. 7
A. Central Government
Within this centralized system, the national 1Iti.nistry of
Interior bas sole responsibility for local governance and finanee.
Other national ministries and related parastatal cor~~ations~ direct
the planning and recj11lation of urban growth alone) with the design and
execution of primary urban infrastructure, i.e. roads, ..ter swpply and
systems. sewage distribution and treatment, and electric power. By and
large these agencies also maintain the systems.
In addition, thr_ parastatal a9encies assemble and develop urban
land for bouSin9, allied C01IIIIIercial .md community _n'ices~ and for
industries. Each of these is embarked on a process of regional decent-
raliBation. '!'he three (Agence Fonciere d'Sabitation, ACJeftce Poneiere
d·Indultrie~ and Societe Nationale d-Innobiliere de Tunisie) are dis-
cussed at length below beeause of their critical roles in secondary city
develoJillllent.
Tunisia is divi~d into 18 geuvernorats Gr provinces supervised by
the Ministry of Interior. whoa chief executive Gffieer (90verRor) is
appointed by the President. ~ernors are also regiCilftal directcns Gf
the party anll a _RIbera Gf the party's national central cOIIIlittee,
sywd!lGlizing the linkage _tween pGlitical and administrative affairs.
a.JcI.,etl of the gouverRoratl are f\lftcl_ and approvM by the Ministry C)f
InteriC)r (NOt). ~rnC)rs exerei.e primary supervision over municipal
affairl ift their respecti.- provincel.
In tar.s of 11I:blild deve10p111ent, the princil'al national institlltions
arel
1. PhYsical Plannins
The aure..u Gf Planning (MenaClement du TerritGire) Gf the
IUnhtry of Bl'IUiPMnt 11 responsible fGr all urban lanet uee planninlJ.
In addition the Ministry supervi... land uee regulaticm (zoning) and
7. ..180ft., OR Cit, p. 181.
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building permit issuance, provides research in urban matters, and
constructs government buildinqs and roads throughout the country.
2. water SUpplY and Distribution
SONEDE (Societe Nationale de Exploitatioo et de Distri-
bution des Eaux) is a parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture. It
OOftstructs, operates, and maintains all water systems in Tunisia.
3. sewm
OMAS (Office National d' Assainissemement) is responsible
for design, construction. operation, and maintenance of all sewa91! and
drainage networks in. municipalities. It reports to the Ministry of
Eqtiipment (JC)!).
4. Electric Power
STEG (Societe Tunisienne d'Electricite et ae Gaz) is under
the Ministry of Industry and is the national electric power aqency.
5. Hol1sincJ, Services, and Urban Land
TWo institgtiQfts, new associated with the new Ministry of
ilGusimJ, have special f\lnctiQns in this field. SNIT is the principal
~ilder Glf publicly assisted she1 ter. In 1980 SNIT was directly respon-
sible fQr buildineJ 22, GGO lIni ts, or abQgt half the national hQusiA9
prGldllction. The Aqence Ponc;:iere d'SabitatiGln (An) has a brGlader
shelter and land development rGlle, ~]ttenclift<J tB t!!le middle- and lIpper-
iftCG)ftle qrQuPB. APR wo.rks with SNI'1', but unlike SNIT, its respcl)nsi-
bilities are tc;) asseRlble and devel-op sites Qftly - leaving .ctllal CQn-
strllctiQft tQ be lHldertaken by private or puBlic purchasers Qf the
finishM sites.
6. Indllstrx
The Atence PGnc iere <I' Ind\lstr ie (UI) is the pr iACipal
aa.mblK and developer of industrial lam. It is responsible tQ the
the M1.nist ry of National Bcen<lJllly.
7. Other; PlIblic hrvifts
SGlici .ste oollection and disposal _ wll a. looal
(1ftunieipal) public finanoe and technical assistance in adm:i..nistrative
fields ace S\lli'ervised and hnded by the Ministry Gf Interior. Its
Direetion <les Collectivites Publiques Locales (DePL) will expand
activities as the government emphasizes looal municipal atiministrative
and fiseal responsiBility.
While ~her Mil'listries and ageneies als@ play roles in urban
<level-oPMeAt (e.9. the t~uri8ftl land a~el'ley, AFT) the fore~@ln~ represent
t~ primary ·~vers· 1n urban affairs.
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All capital expenditures of these aqencies are coordinated wi thin
the framework of successive five y~ar plans by the Ministry of Planning.
A r@cent appraisal report by the World Bank characterized this
system as follows:
'!'he division of responsi~ilities••• has often led to some con-
fasiat in the design and implementation of urban development
schemes. '!'he Government has very cautiously embarked on a process
of decentralization to delegate more initiative to local authori-
ties. I1IIportant steps in this direction have been taken or are
IlMer consideration••• first, the creation in 1972 of the Ttmis
District, and second, the creation in 1976 of five 'economic
regions', each comprising three to four governorates grouPed
according to their socioeconomic characteristics. Also the (DCPL)
is in the process of designing special training programs for local
and municipal staff to improve the planning and execution capaci-
ties of governorates and cammunes, respectively. The delegation
of responsibilities and allocation of resources to the above
'regions' is still very limited but is expected to grow •••• 8
B. The Role of Municipal Government
1ft 'r'unhia, central gcwernment performs many functions that
would be coftsidered municipal or private in other countries (e.g.
provlslon of utilities, assembly and develG>pment of land). But it can
ROt do everything, and the greater the number of secondary centers with
develG>pment prG>grams, the greater the need for on-site municipal perfor-
manee, else the central government capabilities will be stretched tQO
thin.
Despi te .JGncentraticm of power and ftmds in central government
agencies and governors, elected municipal (commune) councils have impor-
tant responsibilities for land deve10pment anel for the financing and
constrllction of certain pucbHc f-;.cili ties.
TUnisia has 158 comm~es or municipalities, each
••• administereel by the c~unal cOIiAcil ••• whicn is elected by the
100al pc!)plllation. The council's powers are narrowly defined, and
its actions are subject tc the supervisic,n of the governor and,
ultimately, the MiRister of the Interior. The co\incil selects a
prestcleRt fr(;Jlft amonCJ its members. An excepti0n is the C01llllune 0f
T\inia, ~ere the [K"esielent of the repUblic ch«:)Oses the oouncil
prestdt?Rt fral amoftCJ its elected members. The G0uncil presideAt
represents both the loeality and the central gGYernment. 9
8. W~ld Bank, AR2raisal ~eRGrt f0r the Se~nd Tunisia Urban
Pr~ject, 1'79, p. 2.
,. Nelson, Cp. Cit., p. 181-2.
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Within this limited framework the municipality has the right to own
and develop land and levy property and certain other taxes to supplem~nt
revenues from the state. Revenue sharing dispensed by the central
government comprises a large proportion of municipal funds.
Under a 1976 law communities with development plans have authority
to issue subdivisim and building permits (see IV below) both inside
municipal boundaries and within a 5 km per~ter outside.
By far the most significant municpal responsibility is the planning
and oonstruction of certain pablic facilities. The municipalities can
ask parastatal and other central agencies to construct and maintain some
facilities and economic investments (e.g. oousin9, sewage treatment,
primary roads, and industries. But for others, especially ones which
affect the qIlality of C01IIJ'ft\ifti ty life, such as markets, local streets,
street lightin.g, parks, most sports and recreation facilities, local
sewage lines, day care centers, etc. initiation and financing are up to
the communities themselves.
Nor~r, with the wide variety of agencies involved in one form of
pbysical development or another. any coordination of investments, if
there is any, mast be led by the municipality, for this is the atly
institution in a position to keep track of what is taking place
directly.
In ex>mmunities that are not gr:owift9, faillues by municipal
autht'rities to exercise these responsibilities do not ripple through the
strllcture of CJcvernment to calise undue disturbance. But with a PGlicy
mandate which calls for muniQipal improvements to reduce disperities in
the quality of life and whiCh demands economic de~elopment in secondary
centers, failure of municipal government to perform has serious
impl icat ions.
G<!>vernment is disturbed abGut this matter of capac! ty to plan.,
finance, and coordinate. Interviews with heavily worked centr~l a<Jency
officials sU'JCJest ~at the central institlltions want laeal authorities
tB play these rGles, but find them la¢king. some-e;~Qndary cities such
as S0usse and Sfu haft capable administrations, ftdrly effective tax
colleetions and have suffieient funds to hire professional planning and
lIlanaClement staffs. filial t othees ~ !'Qt. This diff i~lJl t s1 tllatiQn is
illllstrated bf the fact that the national government had to fGrCJive all
outstanding IIlURieipal ind~Dtedness in 1975.
A report issued by the Ministry Gf InteriQr in 1979 stated that
eities had t(!)O li ttle techni~al skill tQ desiCln fundaale projeets, and
were hot even makil'lCJ use of finanebl reSQ\uees that were availaale to
them. One Interior Qffieial repo£ted that the ~lleetion rate for l~al
taxes is less than SO per eeftt Gf the amount levied. He contrasted this
«Jeneral situatiGn with Tunis Clere taxes are paid "willingly" beeause
the municipality prQvides sendees~ "In the smaller cQmml1nities, how-
e..r, this is a vieiGU8 eirele. The services are lft@sger, prQperty
(!)Wners <Il!ln't eCMlle thr(!)uCJh with t~xes Meause af this, and the eity can't
imprave services beeause it he-ks the funds."
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For Tunisia's sixth five-y!!ar plan to succeed, there must be an
upgrading of skills and financial capacity in local government. Central
officials realize this and have begun to take steps to solve the fl1nda-
mental problems with respect to skills am planning.
The Central Projects Unit of the Direction des Collectivites Pu!>-
liques Locales in the Ministries of Interior and Finance will take on a
greater direct management and technical assistance role in respect to
municipal affairs.
Through CPU the municipalities have been asked to prepare five-year
plans. These are not land I1se plans, but rather lists of needed pUblic
works similar in form to a five-year capital budget. Where physical
development plans exist the projects will, presumably, be derived from
them. The cities are to set priorities, provide project specifications
and estimates of fanding requirements.
"The work has to start with the cities themselves," says a CPO
official, "becal18e the national government can not know as well as they
what are their needs."
Once a preliminary plan has been prepared, CPO staff will review
the materials and then provide technical assistance to formulate feas-
ible programs. Principal technical assistance will come from staff of
the relevant sectoral agencies, e.g. OMAS, SNIT, STEG, etc. Other
sl1pport may be forthcoming thcouqh World Bank and USAID technical aid to
CPU. Advisers will help define reasonable projects and translate the
priorities of the sixth national development plan in terms 0f £llrojects
to fGster decentralized lirban growth. With CPU's approval, the plans
with then become the final deve10pment prl)CJrams f0r the respective
mllAicipali ties.
SimUltaneously, CPU will try b3 improve munici£llal management
through training activities, incllJdirtCJ special seminars, sending some
staff QVerseas for educatiGn, and stracturinq university and vocational
sch~l programs to turn 011t better administrators. Th@y wtll also make
efforts to uP9rade communities' efficiency in collecti0n of local taxes.
There is alm a c0ft111i tment to increase allocations of central
g<!)vernment resources for mwti<::ipal capital projects. The Caisse de
Prets (CPSCL),l0 an \irban IGaft fund allied with the OCPL, has existed
for several y@ars, but MS had qIlite limited resources. Its fl1ndinCJ
ca,acity will bw expanded thrGugh a special 10&.n fu·nd ereated in 1979.
Subsicliz@d l(1)8I'\S to municipalities will be allooated on the basis
Gf need and pr<!lject planning, rather than thr0tiCJA the reventle shar inCJ
fGrmula. Two specific loan I:'r(i)iJrams have row bee" established. 0ne,
fGr critical infrastructlire (e.g. water, sewer, parks, et al) carries
terms <!If t-NG per cent interest. The second pr0gram charlJes f0ur per
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cent and can be used for "economic"llly productive" projects such as
markets and commercial centers. Even these nominal and subsidized rates
of interest may be difficult for some communities to accept, CPU
officials point out, because of the Muslim stricture against usury
but they must be considered part of the inevitable learning process if
modernization of these communities is to occur.
'l'hus r central government is fully aware that only a nulti-
dimensional effort will succeed in removing the obstacles to more
eqQitable economic and social development inherent in the present nature
of municipal government. That effort will involve intervention to
improve project preparation and ltIiInagement, substantial technical
assistance and training, and expansion of financial resources available
for mmmunity development.
IV. Planning at the City Scale
The NJE's Bureau of Planning is ultimate authority for all urban
plans in Tunisia, and the Ministry is also ultimately responsible for
approval of zoning and building permits. In a co\B'ltry with 158 communes
such a high degree of centralization can easily lead to a cl0CJ9ing at
tbe top as well as a lack of sensitivity to local conditions in elabor-
ation of urban plans. While some such problems exist r the Ministry bas
manaCJ4!d to work out ·partnership" arranCJements with municipalities,
backed by presieiential decrees, that permit a much more flexible situa-
tion in practice r fairly wll tuned to local circumstances and respon-
sive to requirements of specific development projects.
Development plans currently exist for all of the major, lind many of
the smaller, cities. They are prepared directly by the technical staff
of the Ministry or by private mns\1ltants under contract. These plans
fanction as "g\1ielance"documents, provicling a general framework for
etecisions on land tise anel infrastrlJcture location. They are not rigid r
all-enOO1llpassing master plans whi~ define with p>recision the IJses and
development densities of all IJrban land ~er an indefinite fature. Many
plans have short-term (i.e. lO-year) perspectives. They can be revised
d\1rine) their lifetimes and sC!:hed\1led for re-examination at the end Gf
the planning period.
Where these guide plans exist, local municipal administrations are
expected to fill in the details of area and project development thr~agh
a ~re-or-less CBntin\1al plannil\CJ process. When ma.j~r parastata1 aC)en-
ci_ sach as AFR and AFI are scheduled to prepare and implement a pro-
j@et in a gi-ven city they Iltilize the adopted development plan as a
CJuide to ini tial si te investiCJat1on, but are empowered t~ work wi th the
lIIufticipa.li ty, the Gaver nor , and the Ministry if partiC!:alar locations
pr~ve infeasible and plan provisions m\1st be shifted. DisC!:ussi~ns with
parastatal agency ~ffic::ials and the planniReJ staff in Sousse, a majGr
secondary city with an ~ver III development plan indicate that this
generalized system of land lise guidance WClrks.
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Development plans act as the basis for permissions to subdivide
land and install new uses. They govern densities and, ultimately the
issuance of building permits.
A decade ago concentration of this power in the bands of a central
ministry was bound to produce roadblocks as urban development quick-
ened. Under a 1976 law, however, the municipalities themselves were
delegated the permit iSSlling power, provided they had over all develop-
Ment plans. Decisions can be appealed tc the }Il[)E. ThlilS, some of the
growing municipalities have resident techr.ical staffs to perform con-
tinuing planning and review and issue permits, relieving the central
ministry of these functions.
The same 1976 law provided mayors with permit review power outside
mW'licipal boundaries. The mayors can approve, deny, or modify develop-
ment reqwests within a radills of five kilaneters Olltside the town
boundaries. This power,in practice .. does help to deter Ilrban sprawl.
It also obviates the sitaation faced by USAID's pilot technical assis-
tance project in Chonb\;:ri, Thailand, where principal growth was OCCllr-
ril'tC) outside mW'licipal balndaries and local officials were tmable to
exerc ise control. BeY"nd the five km r adi llS, the area •s governor has
permit-isslling authority.
In situations where a development plan is being prepared Qr does
not yet. exist the Ministry maintains permit authority. It does so,
however, with advisory services frQIII a regional commission comprising
representatives of the m1.l1nicipality as well as central agencies (ONAS,
STBG, etc.) who review and comment on each request.
A. Character Qf the Planning Instr1.l1ment
The developllent plan itself is an instrWllent strictly con-
cerned with physical characteristics and relationships. It inclades
little attention to social or economic matters, except as these directly
affect the quantity and 10catiQn of land for urbanization or conserva-
tion. It does not deal with GUsts Gr timi'1CJ, and its prescr iptions of
physical standards are sOIIlewhat mechanistic, stemming as they do from
the application of certain "norms" to anticipated growth of population
and emplQyment. These limitations notwithstanding, the typical develop-
ment plan does appear to be a reasonable guide to future decisiQns, at
least in the sphere Qf land use.
The plans for Sousse and for Jendouba wre examined in the OOl1ue
Gf ttli.. preHftt stlidy, .. fairly typieal e,x-HIple of those fer a major
seeondary eity -.d a Slftaller one. Boosse has been described above.
Jendoaba is a city Qf 20, gOO, the center Qf a relatively poor province
1n the northwest of Tunisia.
B. The Jendouba Plan
Jendc:>uba's plan was prepared and ~opted in 1976. At that
tillle it was expected to hold for 10 yean. I t is remar kable in its
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brevity -- fewer than 40 paqes of text with accompanying drawings and
photographs. Detailed %oning regulations which accompany the plan cover
no DIOre than another thirty pages. This is in contrast with many plan-
ning documents in other developing countries, hopelessly thick tomes of
data and commentary which are likely to go unread despite such value as
they may possess.
The document for Jendouba is well written, clear, and devoid of
extraneous diseussiQ'1. Whatever it lacks in ·comprehensiveness·, it
makes up in strong, definitive statement of land use objectives.
1. Background
The plan begins with a general discussion of past popu-
lation growth - which has been quite rapid over the decade - and the
continuing problem of underemployment. It then describes the urban and
natural environment, the archaelogical sites (Bulla Regia), the history
of damaging floods, distribution of popUlation, and it projects popu-
latim growth (a doubling) by 1985. Fran the population estimates, the
plan moves to calculate the need for jobs tI'lder conditi .,ns of full
employment, and for housing. The housing requirements are then trans-
lated into terms of need for land, based on certain density assumptions,
for both shelter and urban services, i.e. schools, roads, commercial
areas, etc.)
2. Options and Policies
The next sections review basic options for location of new
growth. Choices are made, and the document proceeds to identify th~
policy goals for the munici['ality toward which the plan framework is
oriented. These are:
a. To establish the key areas for new growth.
b. To establish a land r::eserve not to be touched during
the plan period.
c. To identify locations for secndary centers.
d. To dRlineate a hierarchy of roads.
e. To concentrate industrial growth in established areas,
without allocating new land until these are developed.
f. To differentiate industrial sites from those allocated
to warehousing and storage.
g. To create qreater densities in the central developed
areas, concentrating residential growth where it can
most easily be serviced.
h. To identify informal 8ettlement areas where redevelop-
ment would take place.
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Given these basic policies, th@ plan proceeds to a.pply them to land
in and around the commune i tse1£.
3. The Plan for the petit ~ry (SCale 1:20,000)
As indicated above, the national assembly passed a law in
1976 providing municipal authorities with the right to approve or deny
development requests within a. five-kilometer-wide zone outside municipal
boundaries. '!'he Jendouba plan provides guidelines for exercise of these
powers. It delineates two basic zones within this cordon:
a. land *ich can be developed for various uses durinq
the 10-year plan per ied, and
b. Land in the following categories which should be held
out of development
(1) Reserves to be maintained dur ing the 10-year plan
period but possibly developed later.
(2) Land undevelopable because of );hysical
constraints (e.g. flood plain, steep slopes)
(3) A4ricultural Eeas
agricultural use
.aintained in
(4) COftservation areas with special .,vironmental or:
historical features, e.g. the archaelogieal/-
t\}U[istie site at Bulla Regia.
4. '!'he Pl.n for the City (Scale 1:5,000)
In CDnsicierably CJl:eater _tail, 1Mcause it lIeals with the
central lIunieipality i t..elf, t.M plan proceed. to e.tablish CJllid.lines
for ....lopaent ctIriftCJ the 10-year plan period. •• _phasize the
ClOftC..t of -CJllideUn••- here becall. t~ plan st.ops short of street-by-
street, block-by-block prescrlptiOftI. These are to be artielilateci by
the .Wlieipal1ty later (within the fralNVGrk of tha plan) .. speeifie
cI..elC!JPlleftt or llMiileliftCJ projects 00_ Oft lifte. "aift the pi_liftes are
established within two .ajor lone.:
a. keal *ieh _ulel ",t .. cle..lopeel dllriftCJ the p1..,
per loci.
b. kea••ere ...lopa.nt of ... kinel will ClCellJ: clur lftCJ
the per iocl.
The ...lopMent lone i. flltther lubdivicleel into three .eetions:
(1) Ar.. for MIlSlng and related .ervie.. Su~-
eategorie. within thl1 are lc1.ntif1~ by over all
deft.ity. OM C)f th... 11 tlw e.ilt:iftCJ ar.a of
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i.nformal _tUement 1l1bieh is to be left alone
p~nding specific renewal plans.
(2) IIlajor ClO1IlIIIercial and Plblic facilities. Here the
COII'Dercial, administrative, education and other
-public· areas are delineated, along with major
parks to be developed and open space to be pro-
tected.
(3) Major activity areas, e.g. for industry, wre-
housing, transportation, and the military.
At this poi~:' :.:.>e plan becomes the Jll)st detailed in its preseri~
tiona. It identi;i~ land standards to be applied in calculating public
f.cilitie. ne~., i... 8Chools, !'I)spitals, lIDSqueS, etc. and proceeds
lone-by-zone to calculate SI1c:h parameters as deftlopable land, minimum
per.issibl. den.itips and land requirements for roads, parking, and
pgblic faciliti~s.
s. !'Plations AeCO!!P&l'!ying the Plan
Th. MCGftd _jor _ction of the Jendo\1l)a report aDnaists
of an actual zoning in.truaent to be .nacted in &Coorctanee vi th the plan
and to 9O"rn fGr the l(J-year period. This in.trWllent may best be
eaaparecl with the "ee.preh.nshw rezoninCJ." or "s.ctional tftap Ulend-
-.nts· which frecrJently _cxapany urban ar.a ~neral plans in the United
Stat... The.. ar. regulatory device. which give the plan pr.scriptions
the force of 1_. In Ttlfti.ia they are est.blished by deer...en a
local plan is fom.lly adD~ted by tbe centr.l 9OverNient.
Th. ~er.. for J.ndcuba include. both the city it.elf and the
periph.ry ••telding fiw ItU-.t.r. beyold thP eity'. bound.ri... In
•••••• ing the rigidity ~ fl.xibility of this in.trUReftt it i. ~rtant
to cit. its preaable .-ieb Itate., "Tbe validity Gf the pl.n 1••et for
10 years fl'. the elat. C)f the clacr... JUl'lor "aptations CAn be .ade by
t~ Qogernor of Jen~ with the fa~rabl. con.ent of the ~unicipality
and the Office of Pl~l'li1'l9 of the Nini.try of Iqui..-nt."
"- r..,ul.tiC3ft ••tablish•• fK ••eIl toN and IIUb-ZOM icl.ntif ....ct
1ft till. ple, l_ct use _eI cIIft.ity 1W••criptlon. Met dlIvelOlWl.nt per-
fc»raanCle .tanelacds. Th.. pr••cr iptloM co.er the fo1leNing=
lection 1. wat..r. of lect ....
kticl. 1. pee.a. tt" u•••
Articl. 2, p~.cribecl u•••
sectlon 2. COftcliUene for deftlo,..nt
kticla 1, _ce•• _eI roact ..r'llee
Attiel... eee... to and type of utilities
ArtlC!la It .t.~ Met aha.. of pare-lt
A~Ucl. ., aU,,-ftt w1 til roaell and oth.r public .er..ie••
15.
Article 7:
Article 8:
Article 9:
Article 10:
Article 11:
Article 12:
Article 13:
Article 14:
alignment with parcel boundaries
alignment of multiple structures en the same
parcel
land eoverage
maxi!ll1.:l1l height
exterior design (where relevant)
parking requirements
open space and planting
coefficient of land occupancy (similar to
the floor area latio employed in the u.s. rtd
depicting the total amount of building space
permitted in relation to the parcel area.
The zoning regulation stops short of definitive prescriptions for
existing areas of informal settlement. It establishes a long range
objective of redeveloping these areas in conformance with more regular-
ized standards, but reC09ftizes the improbability of implementation in
the short run. It essentially pilrtIlits these areas to continue IIntil an
upgrading program is established. In the short rWl, however. the docu-
!lent urges that right-of-way be designed to .3CcollllllOdate roads and
utility systems when upgrading does occur, and t.hat early efforts be
lIade to improve the poor quality of water supply md sewage disposal.
c. 'laMing in SeNsse
Soullse has a plan similar in oontent to that of Jendouba.
SOusse is ~unisia's third city, with a population of about 120,000. It
is on the Mecli terranean about 120 kll SGuth of ~unis onr an exellent
highway. Souss. is .ctually the center of a lIueh l.rger urban region,
ineludiftlJ the industri.l/agricultur.l center of H__ SOI1.se to the
north and the eonferenQe center/tGUristic city of Nsn.stir to the east,
Pres1dent Bol1rf\1ib.'s ace.tr.l ho1Ie. 'ftle thr.e OO1I1IIunitie. haft •
c:c:.binecl popul.tiG'Jl'l .pproaehiftCJ 200,000 and the center of SOu... is
within an ...y 20 lILnute dr!.. of beth the other citie••
TOuri_ is the principal econOllic activity ift Sou.... AlcmJ the
o.stUn. .tween II.JftU So\l... 11\4 Mon••tir are ..r twenty resort
ho~.ls with .ev.r.l thou••nd roo... ~ba Non•• tir Int.rnational Airport
.er... the region, ~o.e • ....on· laats for nine ROnth. of the yeat.
Wh 11. touril1l is pr iJIt, Sou... h.. capi tal i .eel Oft its .dvanta,.. of
oce.n. .ir, Inc! r.il oonneations 1lB MCOIIe In iJlport.nt industrial
eet.. ~Iw pert aM drydook .r. fl-GQ~i-ah!nlJ. There 18 • .ajor
r .. iC!lftal pew.r plant, mel _ny i-nclu.trie. ar. in C!I~r.tiCl»ft or uncht
eonstr..ctiGm in indu.trial pack. at the periphery of the city. Sou•••
1\.. a l.t.. _dina and Gth.r historic .it•• that are Mint pr••erved.
!be city al80 owns two of the re.ort hetels, frOll which it derifts
r ...ft_s.
&Gu••e bas ••tr0ft9 elected CJOftrnJllent and • clyftoic JUyer. It: has
GM Gf tM f_ lGCally"'iftdlJewc! IIplJraclint .nd SClXl:i.l eteftl(!Jllnt prCl»9ru.
ift the CD\lfttry ...- for • infMlIlal _ttl_nt ar •• known •• ·Chicago"
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because of its high cr iDle rate. The program was sparked by the mayor
am deputy maycx. Its planning had invclved a great deal of partici-
pation by the area's residents. In the opinion of the fOrlller deputy
mayor (at the til'lle of this study the deputy mayor had recently been
appointed to a high position in the Ministry of Interior to help organ-
ize its new municipal financing pr:ogram) enlisting this resident sup-
port ~s the only _y the city ClOuld deal wi th the area's increasingly
intractable problems.
Sousse' mayor believes in planning, and he allocated funds from his
budqet for a sizable planning a~ research staff (eight to ten pcofes-
sionals). Tbe plarning director is a French-trained urbanist and
engineer who is, himself, excited about the challenge of his position in
a growing community.
The director and his staff like the plan prepared some years before
by the !Ill!: as a guide and they use it in that way in processing the high
stack of building permit requests that are presented for their review.
Their municipal planning office is responsible not only for enforcing
the plan'S basic provisions but also for working out detailed plans for
individual smaller are... These detailed area plana fit within the over
all development framework e.tablished by the Ministry.
The staff is alllO aware of Sousse's setting in an urbanizinC)
region. They described the JUror's power to rule on development pro-
posals at the city's periphery with the objective of controlling spill-
over grGNth. In this partieular region, however, there are periodic
lIl@etinCjs of local offic:ials frc. the province and all the local juris-
fHetions to revi_ jointly 'Ih.t ueb ~1IIIIunity is doing so that SOlIe
coordinated planning can occur.
Certainly ~obl... with the MOB plan exist, but the director points
<Nt that, in the ea.e of port facilities and raUroa! expansion, the
city had formulated wll-reaSGftM pr1)sitions to ehal\iJe locations. The
Mayor ~arried these requests for changes to the Ministry, and they were
lUlde.
The planni", offiee ai.e furnish•• re.eareh and analytic capability
for the eity. '!'hey ha.. prepared a ••ri.. of _all area delllOCjraphie and
.ocial Hlldi•• of oleler _d squatter areas, tbne to help the city set
prioriti. for its IIpgradiftlJ pt~r_. If fancl. lMeOM available frOll
the oafttral ~rnment, ~e of the project. developed in these studies
will be in.itiated. The city cleM. not ha.,. sufficient te.ollte•• to CJo
&bead directly with the gpqradiftCJ pr09r...
loll... plal'miftlJ .taff report CJQOlI _rkinCJ relati0ftship. with
natiOftal et.ftl0PRent .,.ncie., S\I~h as Aftl and SNIT, .-ho eo.e to Sou••e
with land acqlliliUOft authority ancl resourcel to unelertak-e eI••eloPllent •
••pre..ntati... of the•• paraltatal AleftCie. r.spect the local personnel
am Hek th.ir aet.iee C!lI'l all site locations. U1 timately they must
r ...... t .unie!pal apprCW'al f(Jt final s1 t.... selections for their ~rojects.
lS8
Sousse' chief need for helpr in the view of that city's planninq
director r is not in connection with developiD; a plan framework r or
improving intergovernmental relations r or even technical assistance in
project doesign and execution -- but is mainly in the area of financing
the infrastructure projects for which the municipality is responsible.
"The city has a good technical staff that can handle most everything
associated with a project •.• and if we can't we can always 90 to one of
the parastatals for specialized assistance. What we lack are the funds
to build the parks r scbools r and ct~r facilities that are either wholly
the city's responsibility, or projects for which we have to share the
cost with a national agency. Give lIS the funds r and we can do the job r "
he says.
Sousse may be unusual in the extent and caliber of its professional
staff. In the matter of access to finance it shares with most other
municipalities the single most important p~oblem facing secondary cities
as the sixth five-year national development planning period be9ins.
v. '!'be ~ftlopnent of Urban Land
!lIore than IIOst developing countries r TIlnisia has perceived that
availability of urban land in appropriate locations and at reasonable
cost is a critieal element in urban development and a legitimate subject
for na~ional policy. Tunisia has established a basie appriaeh to ensure
land availabiity and dampen speculation. An array of paraastatal organ-
izations charged with preparing land for eoonomic activitYr housingr and
community facilities tmplement the approach r and have been operating for
about a decade. The &gencies differ SOIIIewhat in their missions and
methods of finance, but the three principal organizations (An, A!'R r and
S~IT) share the following basic characteristics.
Entrance into a aGJIIIlunity at the aGJI\IIIW\ity's req\Jest and/or in
response to national development objectives endorsed by the
community prior to entranc••
site selection in accordance with the CDlllJlunity's dtveloplllent
~lan, but MOdification of that plan if detailed feasibility
analysis proves first c::hoiee sites iJlpractieab1e
I.and acquisition throu9f\ direct purcha., preemption, or
expropriation.
site planning, alte aasembly, Inc! development on their
account and ~ coordination with other central agencies
.uni~lpa1 awthorlti •••
cwn
anet
Disposition of finisheet sit•• on a mst recovery basis at prices
which .et the pattern for ar.. land .a1.. and are intended to
bloek s~eulation.
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In a!dition each agency bas tested its methods on projects in the
greater Tunis reqicn cut has increasin91y moved into the secondary
cities and s~aller communities. Each is now being regionalized in some
fashion, with field offices in various parts of ~be country. Each will
be relied on heavily to meet objectives of decentralized development
during the sixth five-year plan period.
Before reviewing the missions and operations of these ag&ncies it
is important to underscore their role as the creators of ..!!!!- development
areas. They operate on undeveloped land in and outside existing urban-
ized areas, and with the single exception of AFI's present upgrading of
an ~xistincJ industrial park in Tunis, are not being deployed to redev-
elop existing arban areas at all.
A. Alienee Fonciere Industr ielle, Th-e Industr ial Lands Agency
AP'I was created in 1973, (as were the Ani and A!'I') with tne
express mission of assembling and developing land for illld\istrial parks
throughout the country. Since then AFI has completed \lIIIOrk on approxi-
mately 1,000 hectares of land, partly in Tunis and partly in the secon-
dary cities. As the accomPanying m~ of AFI sites in Sfaa illustrates,
the sites are strategically located to take advantage of existing trans-
portation systems and proximity to ooRllllerc:ia1 areas and concentrations
of population.
AFI began with 2,000,000 c!inan of capital from tne state (about
$3.4 million) but receives all other financinq through borrowinq. Most
recently they negotiati" a .eftn-year, $20 million loan C't commercial
rat.s, i. e. 20 per cent interest. Although AFI is a ftonpro~it instit1i-
tion it is charged with obtaining complete cost·recovery fro,.. its invest-
Mnts. As a parastatal agency it can pay its employees ,,"gea aboft the
ncrmal ~vernment seale and has thus assembled a skilled managerial and
technical staff.
1. Enterini the C~unity
MorJIally a Rllfticipality "asks" "1 tD initiate a
pr"jeet. lIIany of theM requests c~ via the activities of the Inclus-
trial 'r.cti()ft Agency (API) af the IUftistry of In~stry which ha. the
twofGlcl taak of pr~ti~ indultrial inveltment domestically and over-
•••• , Ind of ooncluctiftCJ Ilifftya in m-.uniti.s to i~ntify their lnd\is-
u1al pote.ftU.l. API ..eta wi-ttl ,over_~••nd 1I11fticipal QGliIftcil• ., who
1n turn request iftterftntlon of Ut.
2. selectiM the lite
UX I».,ina the .ite ..leetiGfl process by revi_inc) the
.rea's deft1.."t p11ft pre,.·r" ." the flI)B. Land desi,n.teet f"r
lftcl...tr7 (either withift tt~e llUftieipal ~ndaries or in the peripheral
ar.. C!mNred by the pllft) ia tou,.ted fM initi.l iftftlti,.tim and
dl.eY••lcn with lIIOI and loea1 authGriti... Prior to et.finiti..
UG
selection, however, AFI deploys its engineering staff or consultants to
do detailed feasibility analyses of candidate sites. In most cases
suitable land in the amount desired is identified from the plan.
Sometimes, hawever, the plan must be changed. In one instance, for
example, the Kairouan plan had designated certain land for industry and
a brick factory was already under constructia'l. Detailed analysis
showed the area to have poor soils and flooding problems. Despite
initial objections by the governor, AFI selected an alternative site and
worked with municipal authorities and the JlI)E to amend the plan.
3. Acquiring the Site
AFI and the other parastatals ha~ land acquisition
powers. While they can negotiate directly with landowners r they nor-
mally invoke a right of preemption for the desired site and a surround-
ing area. This decision is approved initially by the municipality and
then lIP tbrouqh central government channels to the Ministry of Justice
and the !ll)E. Once API receives the right of preemption, it can effect-
ively freeze land prices by exercising first refusal on any offer of
sale.
At this point AFI begins negGtiation with land owners. It can pay
up to 700 millimes (about $1) per square meter, the maximum price for
land anywhere in the oountry. Apparently most owners come to terms
during this negotiation period, since most sites are in agricuLtural use
and the only buyer for higher value is AFI. The negotiation process may
take several months, however, because AFI and the other parastatals are
reluctant to exercise expropriation. Although expropriation proceaures
can be pursued throl1qh the eGurts, API has done only twice.
4. Site Develgp!!ftt
API b~ins detailed site planning once the land is
identified. The process inell1d.. COGrcUnation with other parastatals
(e.t. water, power, etc.) and the MOE, Who will provide trunk utilities
and access if required. AFI itself handles pareelization, builds inter-
nal roads and sidewalks, .,d installs elec::tric::ity, street lighting and
PGuble .ater aCCl:Grding to set standard8 • Telephone and telex are
in.talled .. well.
Of partie\llar inter@8t i. AFI' s tr0win" OMlIIIi tltent to install
c::ommunity facilities a,net services a. rsrt of it. larter projects. A so-
c::alled -town center- apprc3ch has been tried in Tunis and is now pert of
every pr0jeet larter than thirty hec::tare.. It includ.s eonstr\lction of
certain <!Ore faeUities that are 801d to industrial r.-lAsers as pmrt of
the purcha8t pri~ of the fini.h~ aite, cafeteria, dispensary, c::~nven­
i.nce shop., .etiftCJ rOOlllI, pol1c::e stati~n, gas statl~n, and a ¢entral
.aifttenanCl:e facility.
A. f~r Gthet wu:lMr-ariented aet'lJ'lee. 8lAch as day care centers and
••que., AFt offiedala' basie apprCMch is to try to 100&te sites near
Hil
existing concentrations of workers' hoosin9. Alternatively, they coor-
dinate their own site development with projects of SNIT and AFH so that
residential units for the potential labor force are easily accessible to
the industrial areas, and they prefer that services such as day care be
located in these residential settings.
The effects of this policy can be observed in southern Tunis, where
new industrial development (apparently not very much constrained by en-
vironmental considerations or rigid ideas about separation of land uses)
is within easy walking distance of new residential areas accommodating a
wide range of income levels. Indeed, Tunisia has been more dedicated to
this coordination of industrial and residenti31 siting than most devel-
oping countries, and is probably en a par with Singapore in respect to
importance of this policy principle.
AFI officials are, however, ready to admit that the policy does not
alwa~'s have the expected results, citing some cases in Tunis where near-
by reslients commute elsewhere and job-holders in the plants come pr i-
marily from other sections of the city. AFI and its sister agencies do,
at the very least, try to link work place with community.
S. Site DiSposition
AFI normally builds for specific industrial clients or
proceeds on the basis of a market assessment that identifies a reason-
able demand for finished land within the near future. ll Because of its
cost-recovery charter and its limited capitalization the agency does not
feel able tG operate a land bank.
Deals are neqotiated with specific cust01fters in accordance with a
basic formllla. Total costs inclllding land aequisiton and site develop-
ment are roughly the SUle throughollt the country (abollt $10 per square
_t.r) • Finished pric•• are s.t, however, at three levels dependinc) on
location. For the mst preferred ar.as (e.l). '1'IJn1s, Sfax, Sousse) the
price ia set abeut '40 ,.r square _ter. For the l.ast well-off (•• g •
.. ja, J.ndOllba) the price 18 set below cost, at roughly $7 per square
_tar. Por cent.ra 1n between, with s~ viable .conOlllic activity, the
pr ice 11 put about the $10 per square _t.r.
Thus, there 1s a crost-subaiay for the l.ast ~...loped cent.rs by
prGjeetl in the !mst c1yna.ic tKban ••as - a practice compl.tely in
It..pine) with national policy tlo clileeura,. contin\lett concentration of
induatry in the ..jar eiti•• and clistribute it el.ewher••
Because the Municipalities have responsibility for buildi~ permit
approvala, API toll.s thtouqh with a cli.nt tG the final permit
sta~. It CCllOrclb,.te. with oth.r p.rastatals and ministerial aCJencies
to eftS\lre that all _r-.iees are 1ft plae. and work. wi th municipal auth-
oriti.s to obt.in the ft.c••••ry perMits.
11. ArI rately build. fintabeel atruetur•• 1n its eli.position packaCJe,
Itut w11l cII!I so - it I\a. ex-pletecl 77 builclil'll). to elat. - if
nwewa.ary, ~ at~r.ct f~t.llft 1ftve.~ent.
Once the plants are oompleted and ownership transferred, the
finished properties go on the tax roles of the affected communities.
The revenues become a major resource to the financially strapped towns.
AFI officials say there is no reluctance a1 the part of owners to pay
these taxes because ·once the services and facilities are installed,
people realize the need for taxes to maintain them.·
By setting the selling price for finished lots, AFI has a
• secondary· objective of controlling speculation in industrial land.
When the agency began in 1973, raw land sold by the private sector for
industry in Tunis and Sfax cost about 12 dinars per square meter (about
$5) and was so high as to deter development. AFI then assembled and
finished certain government-owned sites at a total cost of 2.5 dinars
per square meter. The agency then marketed these at 6.5 dinars per
square meter, slightly above half the price of unfinished private
lots. New plants moved onto the government sites, and private owners
dropped their prices. Now there is a rough equilibrium. Private
finished industrial lots are running about 31.4 dinars per square meter
vs. the 28.5 of AFt in Tunis. All intervention has clearly worked.
While speculation has been dampened, the three major cities con-
tinue to attract the bulk of industrial growth. Even the considerable
differential between site prices in the ne;ltt tier and the major cities
(a factor of four) is not sufficient to move a significant portion of
new industr ial growth to the less developed areas. This is an issue
which AFI will be confronting under the next fh'e year plan.
6. Regionalization and Decentralized DevelOpment
Major AFI decisions on land sales and site planning
continue to be made in Tunis, but the agency has begun to decentralize
its operations in to five regional offices (Sfax, Sousse, Gabes, Beja,
and Gafsa), each conducting liaison with three to four gouvernorats.
The objective is to decant growth out of Tunis and to provide the
closest possible on-site coordination of projects outside of the
capital.
Decentralized industrial growth is to be a major objective of the
next five-year plan, and API is approaching it with SOllfte new tools, but
a considerable aMOunt of trepidation.
~ new tools are contained in a June 1'81 industrial incentive law
C)eared to the mst illportant objective of the new plan~ creation of
ind~.trial jobs. There are two incentives. One will be applied to all
Un,s, reC)ardle.s of location, ..tIo create new jobs. This is a tax
reduction based on the number of new employe@8 hired.
The second has reC)ional implications. It is the application of
direct capital C)rants to firms based on the number of jobs created and
location of their ..l.eted site.. NO ~rants at all will be forthcomin~
in the .,.t well-off ar... At the slidinej scale established, the
direct capital ••si.tance available for the lowest income areas would
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represent a significant subsidy incentive to decentralized industrial-
ization.
This is an objective which An approaches with some concern. Under
the forthcoming plan, a target has been set fer 22,000 new industrial
jobs per year. In land development terms, this works out to a require-
ment of 220 hectares of finished sites annually, almost double the level
of past production. At least a major proportion of these sites would be
targeted for the less-favored cities where MI has hitherto had quite
difficult experience. Marketability is a key factor because of AFI's
cost-recovery mandate. The agency does not believe it can hold finished
sites for an extended period and marketability in the outlying, smaller
centers is a serious problem. AFI officials cited the example of Beja
where the municipality requested industrial development. AFI's assess-
ment proved negative, and the agency replied that it would not act even
to acquire the land until the city could provide a list of specific com-
pany prospects.
In view of AFI's exPerience with successful projects, they believe
that even when there is compelling resource advantage to outlying loca-
tions, there is need for a full array of ·urban" services to attract top
management and professional staff. Beyond good quality housing and
schools, recreational facilities, places for entertainment. shopping,
airports, and instant telephone and telex connections are all regarded
as crucial. utilities and services to support plants are on one level
of need -- ,Dd under AFI's control -- but that in an increasingly com-
petitive wor1d of business AFI fears that the amenities of urban life --
which are not under their control -- now make an important difference in
indwstrial location. This is the challenge AFI faces in performing its
role within the sixth five-year plan period.
As of this past summer, the Tunisian government announced creation
of a ·super" regional planning and coordinati"9 body to guide decentra-
lized investment dur ing the plan period. Callposi tion of this body and
its leadership has not yet been announced, but the AFI officials stress
that Skilled apolitical profe.sional direction is called for along with
the power to force coordination. if the plan objectives are to be
achieved.
B. Aience Fonciere delabitation, Rousin, Lands Agency
API is also a land ..sembly ~d develOPMent agency, created in
lt73 at the .... time as ArI, with a similar initial capitalization of 2
milllon dinars. tts role is to produce sites for housing at all income
levels that can afford to repay the cost of land and services, and t~us
foeu..s Oft middle- and ~per-income production -- although &0 per cent
of its output is to be for -social housift9·. roughly synonymous with the
publie housing activiti•• of SNIT.
SNIT ia a Rajcr custOMer. althouqh it does handle most of its own
land assembly aftC! development. AI'lI differs from SNIT it that it does
ftot builet shelter. MGr ttoe. it continue to IMintain projects after
1&4
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deftlopme."'1t. It prepares tl'!~ land and supervises its servicing for
transfer to private and pub~ic home builders.
Like AFI, AFB is a parastatal with skilled technical staff that it
can pay at higher wages than normal government scale. Unlike AFI, how-
ever, it is not empowered to borrow for development financing and must
therefore finance its development activities through advance sales and
cash payments of its programmed output.
One of An's greatest strengths is its commitment to design and
deftlop wcommunities·. Each project contains provisions for a range of
incane levels and housing types fran apartment blocks, to private
builder subdivisions, to individual lots upon which owners build their
own units. Each also -- depending on the project scale and proximity to
existing residential areas - has space for commercial services and a
complement of community facilities fran dispensaries to schools and
mosques, along with land for parks and recreation space.
AFB is a powerful organization with a broad mandate. Thus far it
has exercised that mandate primarily in and around metropolitan Tunis,
although it has begun to expand in secondary cities and to decentra-
lize.
Under the forthcoming five-year plan APB will be expected to
operate more extensively outside of TUnis and shift its emphasis towards
greater accommodation of lower income households.
1. Entering the Community.
Nomally, the provineial governor or the municipality
initiates .request for AN. In practice, lIIOst of the agency's activity
has been wi thin the Tunis district sinee there is the greatest unfilled
demand for lIiddle- and upper-inCCllle housing. During the years 1977 and
1978, for example, AnI developed sites for 33,519 housing units, of
which 22,245 (72 per cent) ..re in the Tunis area. Of the 9,274 units
produced elsewhere, 2,7S4 or 30 per cent _re in SoulI.e and Sfu. The
relati~ distribution remainee! about the .ame for the 1979 program year,
although Sousse and Sfax rec:..ived about 40 per cent of production
outside of Tunis.
2. Seleetinq th__ Site
APR alao works within the city'. CJeneral l!eveloplllent pl&n
and fto~ally ••leets 1 location within the prQ9r..-ed residential zone.
3. Acquirinq the 9i te
APR acquires land by a .t.hod slightly different from
All'., yet with 1111111r: re.lllts. Deciliona are mad. in consultation
with prOVincial CJDvernors and local Myors, and sufficient lane! is
iclentified to ..et an ••tillated two-year: production schedule. Once the
.ite is chos.", AI'II asks for a pree.ption deeree covering both the
in
desired land and a significant surrounding perimeter (one means of
blocking speculation). A special commission cllen establishes a price
reflective of market conditions. The amount is put in escrow pending
negotiations with the ~1ers.
If the owners challenge the asking price, they have redress to the
commission on the amount of compensation, but not on the transfer of
ownership. AFB has what is termed in the United States a "quick-take"
~~r which provides immediate expropriation and permits the project to
;,coc::eed Meanwhile, three independent appraisers assess the land for
court proceedings which will award a final sum. The "quick-take" power
reflects the urgency of AFH's mission, and the agency tries to proceed
with development within the two-year period.
In the case of smaller, less favored communities the "build-out"
time tends to be longer and Am, whether by design or accident of
market, must move into the position of land banker. AlB may hold a
fairly large parcel, but develop in the short run only those sections
for which it has definite buyers.
4. Site DevelOpment
Once land is identified, AFB staff prepare detailed site
plans for both the residential units and associated services. Coordi-
nation must be maintained with the infrastructure agencies because these
actually handle construction of both off-site and on-site facilities.
The latter are responsible also for maintenance of the utilities they
have built and for levying user charges once the projects are completed.
The scale of the projects and their strategic locations on
undeveloped land imply a capacity to attract additional urban growth on
private land nearby. The General Director indicated this does occur,
and that sometimes the infrastructure agencies size their trunk systems
to acCOllllftOdate future developllent outside the Ani projects. In this
event, landowners bordering the trunk lines are charged a proportionate
ahare of the ClOst, reflected in increased property tax. This permits
recapture by the municipality of some benefits from the original public
capital investment.
5. Site Disposition
APR has a particularly inter.ating approach to land
sal.. Iven before developllent the Agency establishes prices for the
var1,.)\1a site., frOil 1al:'" seale subdivisons and apartJMnt land to indiv-
idual hCReowner plots. The land is then pre-sold with all the rrivate
b~r" payincJ the full stipulated price in advance. (SNIT is empowered
to .ake instalment payments.) This permits AFR to utilize the fu~ds for
actual project ~vwlo~.nt, especially important because it lacks access
to loan••
lleu.ift«) ~lIland has been 80 high, that prospective developers are
,,1111119 to .ake SlJdl prepaYlMnta. This syst. is, of course, self-
liJItti", for, in effttet 1 it narrowl!l the range of available myers to
those wo have sufficient capital resources. The payments are provi-
sional and, if developllent costs prove higher than the original esti-
mates, additional charges are levied on the buyers before they ean gain
access to the land they have purchased.
If demand for subdivisions or apartment sites is sufficiently
intense that there is JIlOre than one prospective buyer, AFH draws lots to
select the successful bidder rather than permit the land to be bid up
beyond the established selling priO!. When demand exceeds supply for
individual }x)use lots, AFH asks the municipality to choose the pur-
chasers. Such choice is based on chronological order of siqning up.
All the finished housing sites (including those earmarked for SNIT) are
priced at cost plus 10 per cent which covers AFB's operations.
On commercial sites the agency can make a profit. These are sold
at auction above a minimum price. Sites for public facilities such as
hospitals and schools are transferred to the responsible ministries at
cost. Meanwhile the municipality receives at no cost, ~uks, parking
areas, and finished streets. As with An, all privately owned land then
goes on the municipal tax rolls.
Countering speculation is one of APH's 1IOst important tasks, since
inflation in residential land wall one of the factors which brought it
about. Bere it claims conlliderable lIuccess and contends that its
pricil'tCJ progr_ haa caused private landowners to cut back on their
expectations -- or risk beil'tCJ left with unmarketable lIitell.
Despite professed efforts to complete projects in two ~ars, AFH
has been SUbject to delays which have distressed buyers who put up the
entire purchase price in advance. NOW the agency is trying to hold
project development to eighteen months and is encouraging builders to
use that period to prepare con.struction drawings for implementation
immediat~ly after transfer of fini~hed plots.
~
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&. Unfinished Busine.s
Low-Income Groups'
Regionalization and Sheltar for
Aft'. aona iderable .ucce.s has been in the lllajor' c1tie.,
principally Tuni.. '1'he agency now ha. t., reclional offices (in Sous.e
and Jf..) which can lW90tiate hnd 81es, but have lillited deve10pllent
authority. Further decentralization is expectllCl. '!'he agency has been
criticiled for concentrating on ..rv1"9 higher-inco.e groups, to a great
a.,r.. a r ..ult of its 1illited capitali.ation. It oonten~. that it will
be ..ekiftlJ way. of aceo'M,odating lower-inc01lle groups Me! has begun to
explore ideall of cro.s-subsidies fraM higher incOMe purchasers.
Aft 11 expected to play art illportant role in the dltcentraliaee!
deft10ptlent progr., but like API, it i. Itruggling to figure out how
this can be accoapliahed in vi_ of the re.trietion. in its charter,
lack of significant experience in the outlying center., and the constant
problem of finding ~ pay1ng .arket for itl output in ..al1er citi•••
111
,-,
.~'.-
c. Societe l~ationale IJIIlIObiliere de Tunisie, HOUsing
DeftlOJi!lent AgencY
Of all the parastatal agencies a:mcerned with ur.>&n
deftlopment, SNIT has the IIIOst extemrive missiat. It is a housing
agency, but one which builds and manages shelter as well as assembles
sit.. SNIT is responsible for providing housinq to a vida range of
i~ qroupa, but pl'iaarily those ~o can not afford oonvantional
shelter in the private .arket. While the bulk of its production is
urbul, it also provides b)usinq for rural residents outside the urban
pert..ters. SNIT is the largest single home builder in Tunisia and has
an out.put which is u'Jly ~odigious.
t)urinq the past f_ ~ars it has been oompleting 18,000 to 20,000
units annually, clo.. to 50 per cent of the country's total housing
prodQCtion. Althouqh the luqest single proportion of its rotput has
been in the Tunis are., SNIT has extensiw experience in the secondary
citi.. and is perhaps the m.t decentralized -- in. terms of G1ec1sion-
..king and operation•. - of all the land agencie••
DIIr1nq the period 1972-79 SlfIT built 90,000 units, of which about
27,000 Of 30 per cent "ere 1n 'funi•• Sfu received 10.2 per cent (9,327
units) of the production and Sousse, , per cent (5,410). Given the po~
ulation of the. tlC ceraten relati" to 'rUnis, SNI'!' would sen to be
playinq a ..jor role in their urbanization. SNI'!' ,,111 be a principal
instr~nt of the country's effort to build wp .econdary centers in the
next five ,.ar plan.
1. Saae '.ckgroQftd •
..,inni", in lit', the agency was the fir.t of the ..jOt
land ••••bly operation., .nd w.s charged fraa the first wiU\ the full
task of site ~vel~erat, f1raanc1"" Iftd aonstruc~ioft of .helter. After
tw ,..,.. when output was Gftly 3,000 to .,000 tmit., the gMermnnt
er.ated other ira.titutiOft. (with 1IIlicl'l SM'!' continues to work closely)
to handle IMlter finaftc. aftd the AI'1I to be the pr inci,.l ift.trWftent of
l.nd ....ly. While SIltT cClfttlnu.s tIo be • ~i_ IUrcha.er of Aft
.it... its ~ ch.rge f~ ~etate- to low-lnea-e housift9 h.s ao expand-
ed that it nov buy. Iftd deftl~ the lind for ••t of ita own Pl"ojeets.
IltT'. ~rs of acqui.ition, .....bly .nd development of land are
.tallu te ~. Gf tJM ot!let para.t.tals. tt (JOftsult. eloa.ly with
both 9Oftrnor. and .uraiei,.l official. on building t.rtets, and JIlust
coordinate it. field ecti.itle••ith the .ater, ....r and electric power
...nci.. and t~ Mlrai.try of lqui,..rat "ho provide utilitie••
_r, b. .lreaely becx.e the .at regionalhed of the _jor par.-
.t.tala. tt h•• fi.. regioraal offices, e.ch with profes.io".l .t.ff.
Wbl1e ~r .11 bud~t IIld PDliey i. set 1ra !Unis, the re~iOft.l directors
~'ft fl.e.ibUity to ••1ec:t projects .nd sit... Ttle.. offic.. handle
.it. ,llftftift9 and project "119ft .. well IIld, withira the oonstrairats of
1"
standard housing types ana limited budgets, are charged to adapt the
character of units and neighborhoods to particular local climatic ana
social conditions.
SNIT'S planning emphasizes a mixture of dwelling types and income
levels in most of its projects. The resultant mix of :n~~ levels is
particularly broad when SNIT purchases sit~!lt from AFH, Wt.&.,;;;t1 is develo~
inc; middle- and higher-ir.oome housing nearby. SNIT itself concentrates
on lower-income groups an.., built only 100 middle-income housing units
during the past year.
with its ex.lstruction activity, SNIT is also a major source or:
jobs. Officials estimate that new jobs created by its projects h.:.ve
been running about 5,000 to 6,000 annually. SNIT's own job-generation
ability will be important in the smaller citie~.
:Becallse of the scale of its mission and its significance in
creating shelter for the lower income groups, SNIT has been the ;?!"in-
cipal implemente: of OSAID assistance in the shelter field (although the
housing bank, CHEL, has been the actual recipient of loans).
2. Problems
Despite clear success in housing production, SNIT faces
certain qualitative problems as it expands its activities in secondary
centers. While these do not effect the basic shelter mission, they do
impact seriouely on the adequacy of living conditions for those who
occupy SNIT d~llinqs.
a. Site Costs and Locations
Altho\Jgh it operates wi thin local lItveloPlllent
pla.. and atte1llpts to locate projects near industry
and other "Ork places, SKIT functions tmder a funda-
mental cost constraint. It ha. to select and bllild on
relatiftly inexptnsive land. It has to pick lp.nd
who.e purcha.. and development coats can ultimately be
repaid by project beneficiaries, even thollgh some mea-
lure of CJoftr~nt sllbsicly lIlay be involved in rental
or purchase of units. The .arch for cheap land,
especially in the .aller l1r:ban areas, has sClMti.a
led to sites that are 8O.e diltance frcm _ployllent
and services, CJivi1'lC) the deve10Plftent the isolated
character that occurs so often in the developinc)
world.
b. Coordination
De.pite efforts at reCJiona1ization, the fl1tther a
SKIT project is fro. Tllni., the more likely that coor-
dination difficulties will arise with other perastatal
or CJOverftMent bodi.s re.penaible for key project
ln
elements. Of particular concern are the C!Ommunity
facilities essential to livability. SNIT builds the
units and C!Onvenienee shops to serve its develo~
mente It only reserns the sites (as does MB) for
schools, playgrounds, dispensar ies, poliee stations,
etc. Other aqem:ies have to obtain the budget and
Ilanpower to build them. SNIT can not force their
construetion to 1Ilesh with opening of the project nor
ean it bandle the building and operations itself. ~e
proper mesh does not always occur and project resi-
dents ean be left without tmportant facilities for ex-
tended periods.
-This situation was highlighted in a recent consultant
report on AID-assisted SNIT projects in Sfax and Mah-
dia .tlieb have been coIlPl1.)ed and occupied, but still
lack even primary schools.
In fairness to SMT, its unage.nt reClOC)1'lizes the probler.. one
over which it has li1lited control. This eoortUnation issue is Ofte
Tunisia must resolve as it attempts to apply housing production tech-
niques that orovec! successful in thriving eeonOllic centers in places
where oonditions are l ..s favorable.
VI. International Assistance and Orban DeveloR!!l!nt
For alllost two decade. '!'Unisia' s m-.itJllent to urban devel(;)pllent
has attracted international assistance agencies. Support, particularly
froll the World aank _d Am, C!Ontinues to be extensive. The rtature of
that support haa broadened, along with the country's OWl effor ts to
expand benefit. of urbanisation frc. '!\Inis to the secondary eitie••
'resent activiti.. coneentraUi priaarily on sbelter for the urban poor.
but include technical assistane. and institution·building to ,.rlllit both
aunieipaliti.. ard c.ntral ~".rftlleftt to iapl~nt innstllents IIOre
.ffectively outside Tuni••
A. o. S. P.ace Cor,s
sa. of the early ••1stanee, ttlril1lJ the It'Os _d 1170., caMe
fra. the P.aee Cor,. which ~pl~yed nwaer0Us profeasional architect. and
planners In Tuftisia. lIIIfty wr. lacated 1ft '1'IJftis, butl other. wer. in
secondary eiU.. such _ lairou.. .11e it i. difficl1lt to trace eau••
and effect, one .1_t suraise that ... of the lanet 11.. or ientatlon. the
fl••ibUity, al'd the -tuida:tee- eharactler of Tunisia's municipal plans
can .. traced to tile infillenee of thes. tJftiteet State.·trainell wlun-
tura. In the. featl1re. 'funista'. plaMiftCJ instru.ents cUffer eonsi-
eterably fr. KMr ....lop1111 ClOuntd.s f where mr. detailed and rigid
l11tOpeaft planninq approache. ha~ been IItili.ed.
12. Jllreau d'itude. A.I.U.D., -Ni••ionl Vi.ite .t In.pection des
Chantier.-, 3anvler ltlO.
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Today the earlier bilateral program of resident volunteer assis-
ta.nc:e no longer exists, and Tunisia feels itself entirely capable of
undertaking planning with its own government staff and consultants.
B. OSAIO'S Office of Housing
OSAID, through its Housing Guaranty program, became involved
in 1966 and has subsequently disbursed. almost $35 million in shelter
loans along with some technical assistance. AID's activities have
reflected the chang ing focus of the Agency and have helped to accelerate
changing priorities of the GOT itself. The first projec~ was a middle
income housing develoPlllent in Tlmis. The second was also in Tunis but
supported a new residential area with a mix of middlt!- and low-income
families. During the 1970s Tunisia continued to emphasize relatively
hiqh cost new housing, along with heavy subsidies to the range of lower
incane bouseholds who could obtain occupancy.
Meanwhile, Congress redefined Am's mission, charging the Ac)ency to
concentrate on afforclable solutions for the urban poor. This inclllded
upgrading existing settlements, expandable core housing, and s1 tes and
services projects. Althou9h i~itially Tunisia waa reluctant to try this
approach, th. hard economics of its limited resources bee.. evident.
AID·s next loan gu.aranty (003, for $20 million) was an incentive to move
in new directions, not only in '!'unis but elsewhere in the country. Part
of the funds went for additiOlllal units in the '!'unis new town of Ibn
tthaldoun. Another portion helped lau.nch a major l.ipgradinq project, in
the Mellassine neighborhood of Tl1nia. These projects are partially
canpleted. lIIuch of the assistance, however, wnt to initiate a program
of core housing (1,40() llftits) in both Tunis and secondary citie~.
SOullse, Sfu, md Mc:lJnastir wre aIIOng those to receive 100-200 c.re
units each, in developments sited and eonstr\lcted by SHIT.
Wlten the 003 loan .s in1Hated. Tunisia was I't0t yet prepared to
accept the "minimal" she1ter approach of si tes and services. It is
williftCJ to <IG so now, !'owever. The next BG loan will be dewted to
sites and serviees, core hQl1sing, uPJrading, and cQIIM'Inity facilities.
This proposed lCMn will 1M far a taul of $$0 million. All the fW\da
will be us" f~r projects in secondary CiUN. The largest and Mst
pra.perOl1s C'Z: these, S~us.e and Sfu, ....11 as Tuftis are nat ta be
reciplent. under the proposed n_ lo~. 'l'tMre are seven target cities
ranting froa 2,000 to 45,000 in PBpulation. None of these has had
l1P9radil'\9 projeeta previously. '!'hus, AID will now be supportiI\CJ u·rban
projeets that _et the new national plan abjecti".. of wider seeondary
~nter <tevelcl"Hnt.
An iJIlplelllentation IICJrHlIle1i t f~r the MW laa-n has net Y'lt been
si.,necl by the GO't, elue to itl reluctance to C<!lIIIIIit to current high
iftter••t rat... Slit the prQ9rUl it••lf is fairly _11 establisheel
within SRIT and other a,encie. who will be responlible. S~ teehnical
a.sistaftce f\Jfteleel thro\J9h tiMID'. UPUP prOCJru has already begun, and
the 90VerMlellt 18 \lsin, its CiNI'l staff on pre-project planning 1n the
e~tatiOft that the protra. will praeeed.
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It is in technical assistance that the new activit¥ may hrtve some
of its greatest benefits. As we have noted earlier, central government
is concerned that the smaller municipalities lack the information and
the staff to carry their own weight in project development. The tech-
nical assistance from central government and OSAII", both, will be
directed toward filling that gap. Already the lIPUP-funded program has
led to field investigations by Tunisian consultants to obtain basic data
in several of the candidate cities. Existing statistics have been veri-
fied. Extensive questionnaire surveys of resident economic, social and
shelter c:haract.eristics have been undertaken. Detailed physical and
de1llOCJraphic portraits of neighborhoods have been drawn for the first
time, and priorities for specific improvement projects have been estab-
lished.
Once the loan program starts, technical assistance funded through
IIPOP and other sources will fr.>eUS a'1 training and advising municipal
staff on ..tters relating to public works, i.e. planning, ooordination,
execution, and to improvinq social service and education in upgrading
areaa. The fllll range of activities anticipated is summarized on the
aCCClIIlpUlyinq matrix fran the project paper for the new loan.
Another important feat\lre is AID'S support, jointly with the World
Bank, of a central government agency with explicit responsibilities for
financing municipal projects and \lPgrading municipal administration in
cities outside T1.mis. This instit\ltion-building will be critical if
Ttinisia is to haft any hope of achieving its decentralized development
objectiv.. During the 1980a, both USAID and the Bank will channel
their efforts through the Central Project Onit of the Ministry of
Interior's Direction des Collectivites Publiques Locales (DCPL)
The DCPL has taken on a new look in recent years. Currently the
MOl is considerinq a reform of the organizational str\lcture of the
DCPL, specifically to assure a more effieient approach to muniei-
pal improveHnt:8. '!'he IBRD project, now under way, offers the
first lMjor opportlmity to develop the staff and organization
which is n~ce8sary for channelling iAternational assistanoe funds
to 1IUfticipal projectl in addition to ilftproviftlJ DCPt.'s ability to
de"l with the subj.et lIatter. '!'he DC'L'. Caisse de Prets et de
SOutieft ~. Colleetivi tes Locals (CPSCt.) has al.o be.n revitalized
ao tha~ the ao! will have a better financial cond~it through which
to aslilt the urban develo,.ent proe••••
The C'SCL 1. Yncl.r the .upervi.ion of the the Ministri.. of
....'\t.d-o[ Mel Financ.. The CPSCL'...in plE'poae il to lend to
public entiti.s such as lI~nicipa1itie. and gouvernorate. for
financllllJ Plbllc facilities, infrastructure works IIld municipal
hGu.ifteJ e.te..loPllent.
Initial f.-iliatity with the I.ID project operation will .tren9-
theft the DCPL/CallM .taff which lhoulct be ready to e.~nd its
f_lI. 1lO the interior of the C!OlH\tl'Y by the tille the HG project
betina iJlpl_ntaUOft. The resultl af this 'break-in' period
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should••• lead to a major new GOT effort to cope with the problems
of municipal government as i.t confronts urban development during
the Sixth Plan period. w13
C. '!'he World Bank
The Bank has also played a role in urban institution-building
for '!'\misia. Its first urban project in 1973 helped establish the
regional governaental and planning agency of the District of Tunis and
modernized the capital's transportation system:
In the first years of its existence the TUnis District was able to
CCIIlplete its original work progr. established in consultation
with the Bank••• to (i) carry out _ctoral analyses resultin9 in
the identification of deficiencies anll leading to the design of
priority action programs, (ii) develop a strategic regional
development plan, (iii) establish IIIOre realistic and operational
programming and budgetinc} mechani_s, and (iv) initiate a nwllber
of important changes in investment programsl~
The Bank's .cond project is fOT: shelter and services primarily
for the urban poor and is to be concentrated in Tunis and Sfax. Total
project ~st is estimated at ~~S million, of Which the Bank loan is $19
million. In Tunis the e-Cus is is on UPlJradine) of low iracoae areas,
one of which adjoins the USAID-assisted upgrading project, and on solid
waste collection am dispo.al. '!'he progr. in Sfax is Jlllltidimension-
ale It inclllde. 1,900 sites and services plots with allied workshops
and ea.llnity facilities, constrllction of schools, loans and extension
services to improve small business, and iJlprovetllerats in traffic flow and
manage_rat.
~r and above the.e, the Bank will provide consultant and advisory
services to both Sfu (_ a ca. with replicable consequences) and to
the Central Project Unit. '!'he obj.eti.,. is to iJlprove over all lMn.age-
tIlent and proqra_ing of projects both at the central 81lpport leftl and
within the municipalities.
'ftlus, the thrllst of both the World lank and OSAID prOClr.. in
'l'lIfti.ia during t!lle 19tO. will be towarel support I)f secondary city
d...l~ent throulJh project loans, .sviaory .rviee., .,d e;,n-the-scene
.afta~ftt traifting.
13. USAID 004 Proj-et Paper, 1~'9, p 42-43.
14. seecftcl Orban Project !p,raisal __port, p. I. '!'his direct in.ter-
..fttiOft 1s 1ft addition to the indirect g~banilation effects of the
laftK'S tourism project cited .arlier.
15. !M DytC!lh 90ftrftMnt will alao lGM ftlftch for thlt IlPlracling.
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VII. Structural Adjustments under the Sixth Five-Year Plan
Tunisia's sixth five-year plan is still under preparation, so many
specific features will not be known for some time. At this writing,
however, it is clear that the plan will involve some fundamental policy
and structural changes besides those discussed in earlier sections of
this report.
A. Regional Rural;orban Focus
The effort to reduce economic and social disparities will be
regional in character and will involve concerted attempts to develop
rural as well as urban areas outside the most favored coastal region.
Thus, while mumicipalities in general will be singled out for support,
specific secondary centers will not be designated for special treatment,
at least at the policy level. In this respect Tunisia's program dif-
fers, for example, from the Wgrowth polew approach being pursued by
Korea in its new five-year plan. There fO\1rteen centers are designated
for special attention. In Tunisia, all cities in the less-favored
regions will be considered poles of development for their respective
hinterlands. The objective is to formulate regional strategies which
will foster this evolution.
The ·regionsw will consist of contiguous gouvernorats with similar
development characteristics. Strategies will be evolved at the regional
level, and wichin each gouvernorat. Special programs will be set for
rural areas within the governorats as well as for the cities. Governors
will have special loan funds for rural area development, along with the
urban assistance of the Caisse de Prets.
Preswmably this entire aspect of the plan will be coordinated by
the new ·superw regional oemmission. involving the staffs of various
ministries and a pr~fessional, rather than a political, director. The
precise powers of this commission are not yet known, i.e. whether it
will have decision-making authority or Whether it will be strictly a
coordinating body with only advisory powers, whether it will deal with
land planning issues or will be limitecl to ecoftOJllic and social planning.
I. Carrot and Stick
The government cl.arly intends to offer a battery of fiscal
incentives to both urban and rural areas in support of the decentral-
i.ation policy. SaMe of these, e.~. the industrial incentive 1.. and
the lIulnicipal loan funds, haft been cited already. tn addition, plan-
ning ministry officials indicated that ~nial of location permits will
De e••reis.d if needed be block additional ooneentration of major indus-
try in TUnis. CoMMensurate with these strictures, the plan will direct
industrial 4evelopMent activiti.s of Art away frsa Tunis entirely, and
intG other re~lafts. St.ilar locational pressures lalthouqh not perhap~
as extreme) will be put on API, SNIT, and the other major parastatals.
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C. An Analytic CC!!lf!C)nent
Analysis, at a continuing basis and at a highly professional
level, will guide formulation of investments under the plan. The policy
is bo launch earefully ~ught-out programs at every level to minimize
the risk of failure. Thus, every gouvernorat has, or is to have, a
-cellule· of researebers and planners to guide project formulation and
funding at rural and urban levels. The ·super commission-, regardless
of its ultilllate decision-making power, will be staffed with trained
professionals in a number of fields who will prepare over all regional
devel~ent plans and link these with the national plan itself.
D. Concludin9 Note
'l'hus, in theory at least, Tunisia is about to embark on a
well-considered national effort to reduce the dallinance of Tunis and the
coastal region and to build up economic growth in less-favored urban and
rural areal. Physical planning and the rapid mobilization of urban land
vill be important components of this effort. Tunisia has already
aehievwd notable success in translating both national and urban plans
into action. Certainly the relevant range of issues has now been reex>g-
nia~ and the structure for this n@w level of comprehensive action is
now in place. Politically, the strategy is probably most appropriate
for this stage of Tuni.ia's history.
While the objective. and approaches are clear, an observer is still
unable to asses. the extent to Which central government expects ~uccess
during the ~riod oo..red by the sixth plan. onanswered questions
remain: How many of the outlying centers can attract viable economic
actiYity? Is a ClOUfttry-vide area developlllent strategy IIOre productive
than one which liMita targets to the most promising secondary cities and
rural regions? Cift in..stlMnt _tually occur at the scale intendeel, Inel
be coordinated? Are there enouC)h ~ple and funds to do the job?
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IV. The Case of Indonesia
I. Introduction
Indonesia has embarked on a national effort to improve living con-
ditions in places that are already urbanized. Explicit focus on upgrad-
ing and corrective action for existing cities distinguishes this program
fra. those of other coQfttries where the central coneerns have to do more
with accommodating future deftlopaent in newlYr ex not-yet urbaniZing
areas.
Indonesia's ~ogrUl is extensive and ambitious. It includes the
primate city of .:rakarta r nine other centers with populations over
lOOrOOOr 40 cities SOrOOO - lOOrOOO i .. size and lSO smaller towns.
secondary cities r in the sense that Jlany ."lIIIaller than Jakarta are in-
cluded r play a prOllliraent role in the progrL'. and the special problems
of these smaller centers are the object of considerable attention. It
would be inappropriate to term the Indonesian effort other than a broad-
scale wurban ilIproftJllentW cUlpaign ira which both SIIIaller and larger ur-
ban areas have been selected to share priority for assistance.
The tem ·priority· lIust be stat.t ira relative ter.. Although the
targets of assistarace are numerous r they are far fewer than the CDUft-
try's estillated 3,000 - .rOOO wurban· cCllllunitiesr and they haw been
expressly ~signated for treat:1llent wi thin the country's present (1979-
14) tift year plan (ltepelita III). Indonesia has chosen to be explicit
about its urban a.velo~nt priorities, although it is unlikely that the
progr.. can be fUlly iaple..nted at the pr••crib~ scale during the plan
period.
Indone.ia face. fOrMidable obstacle. in establishing basic .ini.al
standards of public health and shelter in ita cities. Orban eoonOlllic
developlllent obj ectift. for _eondary centers, Mel to so_ .xtent even
f~ the chief cities, are 80 10ft9 rante that -- while still expresseel in
planniftC) c1Geu.ents - they rank in prior i ty belCIW that of prolJress in
.eetiftIJ ba.ic hut..n ,...dI. Indonesian authorities are frank to a_it
that a leap of faith i. required to Mticipate w:ban eeonCllic deftlo~
..nt .. a eon••qu.nee of the in...~nt. currently prolJr...ed. 'erhaps
it will occur ln 80_ place.. !bey hope eo. but haft no forecast a. to
h_r or wh.ther, it will actually be achi..... '!'he authoriti•• believe
that urban eeGnoaic 9rowth will be netli,ible without priGr ..elioration
of the 41atr•••iACJ ",y.1ea1 aftC! eelal eoftdit1OftS thatchaz:acterh. 10
lIlany eiU•• _eI towns. Indonesia'. -.ban prOCJIUl is remedial above all.
Several a.pect. of the Iftdon••ian pr09raa ...rit COMMent, becau•• of
their wi~r relwanee to the la.ues of .eeonelary city expansion in the
developi", world.
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Source; u.S. Department of State Background Notes, "Indonesia", 1980.
A. Institutional Framework
Indonesia has established an institutional framework for
planning and implementing urban development outside of Jakarta
which se£1lls to overcome many of the organizational obstacles
faced by other countries. The institutional setting has its
own problems, largely of capacity, but in principle it affords
a good model for structuring national/local relationships to
meet targets of decentralized development.
B. Planning
Physical planning, at all seales, is well regarded in
Indonesia. National planning serves as the basis foc the
investment program. Regional planning and city planning have
been practiced in one form or another for over twenty years.
Indeed, Indonesia has experienced or tried just about every
type of planning including land use planning at the secondary
city scale. The results have been disappointing, to a great
degree because past physical planning approaches proved far
too detailed and too difficult to implement under Indonesian
conditions. Neverthelesss, the Indonesians continue to res-
pect the practice of city planning, even as they evo~ve a more
pragmatic and limited role for it.
'!'he actual significance of that role _y well be less
than is depicted in formal position papers by government auth-
orities. As one foreign observer put it: planning for the
Indonesians can act .. a ·black box· promising orderly ration-
al solutions, but Msking what are essentially political, ad
hoc decisions in investment allocation at every level. Whe-
ther Indonesia's (I)_it:ment to planning is JW:)re or less whole-
hearted, the fact r... ins that goverftlMnt at all le~el. re-
quires planning be done.
Over time the principles ot planning at the secondary
city scale ha~ beee-e e.treMely ee-prehensivw and plans have
beCOMe much more ~neralhed. llIIphasis is no longer on long
range, idealiZed patterns of urban IJrovth. 'flO the contra~y,
ti.. ywar invesbllent plans and annual programs are demanded.
Although not yet there, plana for secondary cities in Indone-
sia &l:e definitely Macled in the direction of becOllling five-
year capital budgets, if and when increased levels of capital
investJllent actually beco.. available.
c. nainin,
Training tor the ~rfor.ance of planning enjoys a higher
priority in Indonesia than in MOst developing countrie.. IX-
tending back to 1959, lIIhen the planning program at Bandung
'1'echnical Institute vas established, formal university-level
1.0
i:
D.
training in planning has been offered in Indonesia. In addi-
tion, an extensive variety of short courses and on-the-job
training situations exist under spon~~rship of severa1 insti-
tutions. OSAID, furthermore, in association with a special
continuing prosram of the Ministry of Halle Affairs, has re-
cently made a $ 9.5 million COftI1Ilitment for technical assis-
;;ance surport to eight regional training centers. These will
haw short courses ani! extensiat progras. The -comprehen-
sive- approach of the training acti~ity reflects current pol-
icy of the Indonesian government. 'ne aspect of the training
effort is to expose mayors, gov~_ -.ors, and other decision-
making officials to the principles and techniques of planning
in the eXPectation that understanding will lead to applica-
tions.
Orban Land
The use and availability of urban land represe~ts an im-
portant focus of planning· activity at the city scale. The
problem is, ho-.ver, that basic cadastral reoords and accurate
maps are minimal. Ascertaining ownership of sites is a more
serious obstacle to project development than land acquisition
procedur.. Tho_ procedures are reasonable, and funds are
generally wailable for hi'1h priority projects. The system
works with difficulty, however, because information required
as basis for negotiation or expropriation is just not there.
The conditions pertinent to assembly of urb., land point up
the obstacles facing IndonesIa and the long and uncertain road
ahead, despite a reasonable approach to planning and implemen-
tation of urban developaent.
II. Basic Background
....
\
Indonesia is ene of the lIDst populous countries in the world,
(over US million in 19'0) vi th a low per capita annual GNP of about
$ tlS. Su.ccess in exploration and exploitation of oil notwithstanding
- the country is one of the biggest petroleUJll producers outside the
Per.ian Gulf -- Indonesia wst deal with endellic problells of ru.ral and
urban poverty and, in the cas. of Java, SOlIe of the highest rural "en-
s!Ue. in the wrld. The archipelagic character of Indonesia (over
13,000 islandl) and the Multitude of .thnic groups contribute to the
country'. difficulty in e.tabliahing both political Wlity and econOlllic
cJe.,.los-ent.
Urban population is about 31 Million, repre.enting close to 22 per
cent of the total and increasing at the rate of 1.2 Million annually.
Apart from tne , lIillion people living in primate Jakarta there is actu-
ally. fairly ~ood di.tribution of urban population alllOftg many large and
s..ll ciUes. !his aay be function of the lIlultitude of populated is-
lands requiri", their OWl -regional- distribution and admini.trative
centers. '!'he ten largest citi"e• .cC'Ol1nt for about SS per cent of the
I1rban population.
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While any ocuntries have emphasized rural developllent strateqies
to keep population en the land, the extraordinary der~sity and rapid
popllJ.ation growth of Java have led both the national government and
international assistance agencies (not normally supportive of urban de-
"'l~ent) to ocnsider increased population growth and economic devel-
o~nt in cities .. a desirable objective.
Orban areas suffer frc. high unemployment and serious deficiencies
iI! basic infrastructure to acco" ,sate even their present .eveIs of
devel~ent. !be WOrld Bank's analysis leading to its Third orban Pro-
ject I'lOtlld the following conditions:
1. Lns than ale-third of the population has access to reli
able. safe water supply.
2. OI'l1y ..:our cities ha~ even rudimentary sewerage systells for
portions o! their population.
3. One-fourth of the urban population has no .ans of sanitary
hwlan waste dispoaal other than duIlping into watereotlrses, and
~nly 1.7 per Clent have sanitary latr ines.
• AlJIost 60 per cent of tlrban c!wlling units are in iJIlperma
nent .trQctQr~s.
5. Infant mort.lity is at a hiJh 126 per 1,000.
Many of the basic life support issues COMe together in the physical
aettlnl) of the Qrban k.apm,s "'ere mat of the c:ity population live,
whether In Jatarta ex Denpa... The kUlpuftlJs are ~ssentially rural
hoosinl) transplanted to an Qtba~ set.ting, f.-ily-built at extraordinar-
. ily high densiti... !ypic.117 using ~boo-.at walls and red tile roof.
l.iel Oft bmIb~ fra.ing, the ..llings en .q\Jatt.r l.nd are indi.tin-
91lisbable frc:. tho.e CI'l plots which the occupants own. Th. kUpuftC)s
.1I~.ad dir.ctly to the ed,e. of road. and footpath. and even into water-
eour.... W!\el'\ fiMnci.l coneSi tiona cIo laproft fOE the occupant. the
ballboo wall. l)ive .ay to bdc::k, _d ·,.~.anent· .trQctQr•• are erected
in tIM ._ tiny, crCNlled .pac•••
Indone.ia has chc..ft to li.. with the Qrban ka-pun,. because to do
o~.~wi. woll14 be .he.r folly. 'fh~ .re .cc.pt"'d a. the b••i. for
IIrbM .ttl_nt ed their *-inance ••• mde of Hving hal directly
.1\..... the ·r....i.l· M _Hor.tift ehatccter of Indon••ia'. urban
deYelapllrlt p-,=Q'Jra. - ••pee1.111 that 1ft the aeeor\c!aty eiUeli and
_ll.r tOWM.
ttt. "- tft~tltutlOft.l rr...-ork
tlrbM "ftlapMftt eel _fta,e.nt ift Iftdonelia .re pri.arily the
r••PDft.i~11it1 of two aifti.trl•• -- the Mifti.try of Ra.. Affair. an4 the
1t1J,btry of Ptlblic .rkl. V.rlooa ..eftct.. wi thin the.. .1niltrie•
• lo~ with ~111ed ..~••tatal or,~i••tioftl .nd the ptowinei.l and loeal
1.2
levels of government (whose heads are appointed by MBA) perform phases
of the work. Investments are made by other ministries (e.g. Health and
Education) but the two ministries cited are the major forces in urban
development. They have established coo~ination mechanisms which in
both rrinciple and practice pe~it easy communication and effective con-
trol.
In wmgnition of the system's relative effectiveness, several
international institutions - the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, the Netherlands Government, OHICEF, OSAID - are funneling sub-
stantial support for urban development through one or the other of the
t1lllO Jlinistr ies.
Indonesia's urban developllent program channels central government
investments into specific localized projects, supported in some cases by
additional funds and technical assistance from internaticwtal ~encies.
Local funds play a relatively ..all role in the project finance, mainly
because JW:)st local jurisdictions do not have such reSO\1rces. Altho\19h
central governaent is the source of ~st capital investment funding
inelw!ed in local budgets, those co_unities which do have SOllie revenue
capabilities are encour~ed to undertake certain investments with loans
froa central ~ernment.
Altho\1gh the funding is 1I&1nly central, there is local participa-
tion in several aspects: project identification, seeping and planning,
site selection and acquisition, all where there is sollie measure of cap-
abili~y in local government. This varies considerably across the
nation. Local participation and, ultimately, local responsibility for
impleaentation within the framework of continued central control are
etearly the objectives of the two -planning- ministries. Indonesia in-
tends to .aintain the priaacy of central government, but to devolve as
uny planning and iapl_nting reaponaibilities as po.sible to local
levels of adaini.tration a. their capabilities improve and are tested.
One e.ample, striking inde. .-eng centralized developing coun-
trie., ia the method of appointing the chief e.ecuti.,. offieer of
cities, i.e. the ..yor. PrO"Jincial governors are direct appointe•• of
tbe JIIinistry of Kc:.. Affairl, larlfely frClll a prof.ssional adllinistra-
1. The lituation in Jakarta, ~ere a atrong metropolitan agency oper-
at. along with local lJoverMent and central .inistrie., 1s sOlftewhat
different frc. the rest of the ooQl'ltry. leeause Jakarta's circua-
Itance. are uniqu., they are not cliscu.sed here. The present CQM-
.."tary a.als with the sYlte. applicable to the oth.r eiti•• and
tOWM.
2. ..y of tb.ae loan. are for _ter aupply "'ere local _t.r a\1th
orttle. eharljll eOft8WMrl. '!'hey ar. -.ubaidisectw in the sen•• that
tile _".y CAn be repaiel, free of interest, ewer a 20-y.ar period.
... loa.. bear: tw to fO\lt per eent interelt, and loan. for
rwertue·,efteratiftIJ f_11iH.s such .. IMrketl, ClAn CJO as high a••
per eeftt. '1'he latter haft been relatively few, however.
113
~.
the/political cadre as in many other ooUh~_'ies. Mayors are also
appointed, but with a particular sensitivity to local circ:umsta..,ces.
Municipal (kota) councils are elected by popular vote. Onee elect-
ed, the councils make three nominations for mayor to the MBA. The can-
didates can come fran the council itself or frOlll outside, e. 9. local
businesSJllen, doctors, etc. MBA makes its appointment fran among the
three nominees or, if none is acceptable, requests the council to offer
additional names. 'rhus, the chief executive, while responsible to MBA,
is a local figure with strong ties to the col'llJllunity and its institu-
tions.
A principal means of maintaining these cPntral/local links lies in
the chain of planning and iJIlpletlenting ageneies with counterparts at
each relwant level. Por example, BAPPENAS is the national planning
agency under the Ministry of Balle Affairs. It is the key instrU1llen~: in
satting priorities for national, provincial and local inftstllents. Its
counterparts are BAPPEOAS at the provincial, BAPPDlKAS at the county,
and BAPPDlKOS at the lIUnicipal, levels. These planning agencies theor-
etically provide both long and short tem planning advice for their
respective juri~dictions.3
Similarly, other central government departments in most ministries
and ageneies have parallel (and reporting) divisions at provincial, city
and CGUnty levels.
Indonesian administration is so tightly organized that even within
a city there are l.vels and sl1b-levels of institl1tions, down to the
neiqhborhood and block. This proviclles both ClO1'IIIIunication and control
(since party ...bership is a factor in the organization) and has proven
particularly effective in obtaininq neighborhood resident participation
and support for: the kUlPUftCJ iJlprove_nt progra_. Indeed, it is ol1r
opinion that without this highly ~centralized ad.inistrative/participa-
tory apparatul the very substantial successes of the lIP' s could not
have been achieved.
!h. ·system· is t ••ted once .ach ywar when the annual city capital
lnvel~nt progra. is d.t.rmined. A city begins by fo~ulatiftCJ its cap-
ital .xpenditure proqram and el...nt. of its operating budget. In prac-
tic. the Ministry of Public Works' plaMing division helps the local
council and ..yor fo~ulate the capital .Jrll. r.quest withia the frUle-
work af a five-y.ar 4.vel~PMent plan, wh.~e one exi.t.. Thi. con801ida-
ted capital budget request (tenled tl:e :;'lP) is then ratified by the
J. 'ftle kebupat.n, ex (l)unty, 18 M i.Ilportant lev.l of ~overMlent in
Indon••ia bet_. the provine. and the city or t01llft. While the
plaftftiftg agencies are part of ev.ry lev.l of .ubnational 9QYerftMent,
they haft Bot actually been establ1ahed throughout the country.
lIIany •• neither staffed nDr aperatiftCJ .ffectivel..·• It is an
ult~ate national goal, however, to ha~ the. ope~ating nationwide.
lit
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local council and forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Similar
b'~get preparation is conducted at the county and provincial levels.
In OCtober or November each year lUPPENAS ecnducts a 11Illrathon
series of meetings in Jakarta with provincial governors, public ~lts,
and other agencies as required. They review all pro~incial and local
project requests. During the review all the local DIPs are matched
against BAPP!:NAS' understanding of national priorities and resources
available for the coming year. OUt of these meetings, BAPPENAS then
approves a batch of DIPs, e.g. capital project allocations, for all exe-
cuting jurisdictions. These becOllle the actual project budgets for the
subsequent year. '!'be intensive and compressed nature of these annual
reviews suggests that political and other non-technical considerations
may figure in final decision-making. Indonesian officials contend that
the system works.
That it l«)rks as well as it does is to a great degree a function of
the consolidation of urban development responsibilities in tl«) bodies
responsible to the Minister of Public WOrks (Cipta Karya and Perumnas)
and to the - infortlal- close cooperation that has been established bet-
ween Public Works and the MBA. In our opinion, t1'te results l«)uld be
less prClllising in situations where such consolidated responsibilities
did not exist and where the lIOre usual competition and tension between
operating agencies and an interior ministry prevail.
A. Public Works ReSponsibility: Cieta Karya
The consolidated urban development responsibility is demonstrated
by Cipta Karya's n.. in English, -Directorate General of 80usin9,
Building, Planning and Urban Oevelos-ent-. It performs in all these
caPaCities and IIOre, under a strong general director who is hilllself res-
ponsible to a strong .inister .oJedieateet to the urban dlevelo~ent con-
cePt. Cipta Karya has been operatinq for: over a doaen years, and its
perfor.ance ~als (for work in 10 major citie., to smaller cities and
150 towns) haft been spelled out with eerresponding budg~+: allocations
ift the five-year .epelita III of 1979-lt. These goals inc lucie the fol-
lowing construction responsibilities. executed by divisions of the agen-
CYI
1. K_pun, iaprove..ftts, the ~CJraetiftCJ and reoonstrllction of
150,000 Uftits
2. Urban water: supply
3. Bade ••waCJe etiaposal and treatJII.ftt
t. Draba,e u.prcwe..nts
5. SOlid waste r..val and disposal.
All of the.e are to be ••.euted at 1Iiftilll\lll Itandar<!s to focus on
Meeting basie hUIlAft fte.dB. Por .....1., the target for the water supply
pr:otr.. 11 to provide ••fe dr 1ftUNJ water for 10 per cent of any given
clty·, populatiC!llft at a fltwf le...l of 10 Uters per peUQI'l per day. The
operatlOftal <!lIbj«:tift of the water slIpply pr<!MJ·ra., .8 with ead! of the
other: ~Mftts, is toe llftk its perfomaftGe wlth those of the other
.l...ftts tft the Clpta Karya ,.ek~. withift a ,1veft city. That is to say
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improved water supply 1IJCuld occur simultaneously with improvements in
sanitation ana solid waste disposal as rehabilitation in the selected
neighborhoods proceeded. Cipta larya has other operational responsi-
bilities as well, e.g. in rural housing and building materials research
and deJllOftstration, bit the urban developnent activities cited above re-
present its major consolidated urban programs.
A strong planning framework for selection of target cities and
iden.tification of the project 1IIi.x in each city is established by Cipta
Karya's Planning Division. '!'his division also provides technical sup-
port to provincial am local planning agencies throughout the country.
It is this division which also wrks laterally er..,d informally vi th the
various agencies of the Ministry of Heme Affairs vho have responsibility
for planning and deftlopllent progratll approvals. llBA' s own Planni!\CJ Di,-
ision will also be responsible for preparing S(Be fortll of national and
r~iOftal Plysical deftlopllent plans into which all local planning and
develoPBent programs are intended to fit. Cipta Karya maintains parti-
cularly close relations with that division.
CK official:1 tem the tasks of their o~ planning division those of
a ·planninq kitchen·. The term ·planninq kitchen· essentially means a
license to illprovise, to establisb sane forti of longer term rationale
and conceptual ooordination for a series of project actions which need
to be related to one another in space and over tille •
••• ~ task for (the division) itself in this planninq field will
rellain s\lpport and guidance. It will develop r L ..ndards, norms and
systells for town and area planninq to be laid down in lIOdels and
lIu\I.ls.
DTKD being the planning kitchen IIUSt leave the planning-prQ9ramming-
b\ldgetiftlJ fex the ilIIpl..entation itself to the central and local
agencies within and outside Cipta Karya, 1Il0 haft \lltillate respon-
sibility for the spendirtC) of the budgets. Orban ilIIplementation pro-
gra.. , feasibility st\ldi.. of regional projects and the like haft to
be conducted by theM. Rowever, sine. appropriate planning eonsists
of • cyclical proe." f feedb.ek is needecl frOlll the apl_ntef.
toward. the planners.
VariC!R1s suppor:t1ng actiYiti•• will be ooftducted in ••pelita III to
apro... tlW planninCJ outpat: .nd it. instrWftentation. Data eollee-
tion and processing as wll •• upping will be iIIproved. Planner.
of the cent.ral and local fOverMleftt will be train... Local eonsul-
taftt. w1l1 ..t e.tr. .\lpport. teeJal ACJUlation will be \lpdat.d.
'roeed\lre. w11l be sillplifietl. Coordination JlechanislM will be
.treng~el\ed.4
f. ·fte Direct.ocate General <J)f llou.iftCJ, PulltUft9, PlanninCJ and Urban
hftl-olWleftt 'totr•••• • .e,.lita III, oetober 1919, pp. 12-13.
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B. Bousing: Peruanas
PerlDlftas is the national l'Dusing corporation. It is a para-
statal organizatic::n established to build conv@ntional housing for low
and BOderate income families throughout Indonesia, and to execute sites
and services projects in association with Cipta Karya's urban upgrading
activities. It has a construction target of 150,000 units during Repel-
ita III, and is currently producing at: a level of 20,000 units per
year. Peruanas projects are new mder way in approximately 30 cities.
Bach developaent is planned for a minimum of 200 units to achieve econo-
aies of scale, and the -:;ency is gradually moving toward development of
such larger housing estates and -new towns·, with allied commercial and
industrial enterprises. A quasi-independent corporation, Perumnas ~rks
extremely closely with Cipta Karya, especially its planning division.
Altboggh other ministries have construction responsibilities in the
cities of Indonesia, between Cipta Karya and Perumnas -- both reporting
to the .... .i~ist.r -- the government has been able to consolidate res-
ponsibility for the principal tools of its urban develoPillent program.
C. International Aieney Interest
Urban c!eveloPllent -.=tivity in Indonesia has become a particu-
larly attractive focus for international agencies. They are drawn both
by the magnitude of the task and bf the integrated approach practiced bf
th.t gonrftlllent. '!'he concept of packages of projects guided by some form
of over all planning strategy at both the national and city levels bears
prc.ise of success. Thus, financing and technical assistance are being
provicled in a number of cOllmnmities by the World Bank, the Asian Devel-
opa.,t Bank, OtfICJ:I', and the Govern1llent of the Netherl~nds. '!'he Dutch
are, meeover, providing ewer all t.chnial support to improve the man-
a~nt of Cipta Karya itself.
D. The Bandun, llIodel
Aft urban clevelopaent syste. for: tnclo·ne.ia' s cities is 1n place
and ftUllerOUI indiviclual projects are in progress. It is a I1gn, how-
ewr 9 of the formidable relource obItacl.. , that Wlile there are Mny
pla"s, water project., kUlPIlft9 iaprOftMntl, etc. throughout the coun-
try, Clftly i" landun, 11 there a fully operational program with all the
el...ntl in place. A second i. clo.. to being established in Medan.
!tle re.lIlts Md organilation of the Bandun, project are truly
r••rtable. ..ncluft9 1s Indonesia'. third laI,eat. city, with about
1,300,000 people 1n 1910. It has .riolls probl.s of public health anet
ace••• to lery1eel.
tft -'ep1", with Cipta larra'l Philosophy toward planning guidance,
M Qftr all urbM cleftlo..."t plan fot ••nduftCJ "a. COIIlpleted in 1977.
It hid a 2O-y.ar tl.e fr_, yet lpelle4 oot short-terll projects for
u"r"1... "e1t"borhooll fac:il1U.. aftd ••rvie... Thlt plan \faa pre~ared
by out.iela ClJnsll1taftt. IIftcl.,r AaiaJ'l Devel~ent Bank funcl1ng. Solid
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SQurce: Band\inCJ Urban DevelC'lpment PrQject
support was obtained from the municipality. Within relatively short
order a $32.5 .illian loan C01IIIIIitment was obtained frail the ADS along
with Indonesian funding to initiate the pilot developnent program. It
is multi-dimensional in character and has the following basic features:
-~
1. Organization
'!'be main urban improvement program for Bandung (Dewi
Sartika) is totally managed by a single agency which is a
merger of Cipta Xarya and the MUnicipality. (see
chart. ) '1'h is permi ts a streamlined implementation ap-
proach, and is another example of how cooperative linkages
between governmental '!ntities can be achieved under the
Indonesian system.. The Bandung organization is held up as
a model, because it is Cipta Xarya's long-term objective
to foster coordinated implementation at the local l~el --
recognizing that central operations are just not possible
i,n a country so vast as Indonesi;... In (bing so, CI is
prepared to consolidate its local oper ationa with muni-
cipal lICJencies.
Under Indonesia's basically interlocking form of gov-
ernment, such mugers becaae possible. A single program
director is, in the case of Bandung, responsible both to
the mayor and 0. ae is supported by a COIIIpiement of for-
eign advisers who serve as counterparts to him and to In-
donesian planners and engineers with individual task res-
ponsibili ties.
Along with a _rger of personnel, the program has
produced a pooling of funds from national, provincial and
local goverMlent as wll a. the ADB loan. (See chart.)
2. Project Activity
'!'he aandung effort applies t..1ote fllll variety of progru8
which ex has available.
a. lanlpunq Improve.!r:.!!2l
Centerpi.ce of the effort is Jr..pun~ imprc;>vement in
thr.. cities with a population tc;>talling 100,000.
Alreac!y wll under way, the lIP hall installed drain-
age, .ide.alk and roa~ay iaprovement.~ bridge.~ foot-
path., health, education antS social service. centers
and .anitary core unita .erving groups of houses
thrCNCJhout the ~.iCJnatecl di.tricU. An ClIb.erver is
.truck by the appareftt direct effects of thes. illlp-
rcwe..nt. Oft upgrading of individual dwelling units.
Throufhout the atea, reddents haft begun to transforlll
baaboo hut. into ~r.aneftt brick and tile-roofed
.tructur.. A. pertla"ent .ettl.-nt, cOlftplet.e with
tiny ,arden., 1. beiftCJ cLe.ted out of forlller slu"'.'
11'
Budget for the Bandung Orban Development Project
ta ~llioD rupiah.
,-> )
'"J.ce to~al GOt 'IQVINCI IO'fAMAnU Ani.
III 2.%' 0.10
- -
1.22
....~.•. I.'~ 2.20 0.43 - 6.00
loll. v.c. 4.70 •
-
1.11 3.09
I~al.... 1.57
-
1.07
-
0.50
ISCI 1.25 4.7S
- -
3.30
tOtAL 25.17 1.IS 1.50 1.'1 14.11
b. Drainage
In ~c1er to improve storm drainage in the kampungs
the..el~es, the progr.m has to install channelization over
a 1IUCh wider L.ea. 'rhese projects are affectinq a total
population of 200,000.
c. Severaqe
!he same broader: treatment requirements apply to
sewage dispollu. Project construction is affectinq areas
where 400,000 people are living.
d. SOlid Waste
There is wry little 80lid _ste collection and
dispoul in Indonesian citi.. Bandung's pilot efforts
call for a oollection system and landfilling that will
ultiaately service 900,000 people, i.e. 1lIOst of the
city. The project has begun by dist.ribut.inc) unit.ary
containers in the kupungs already improved and setting a
regw.ar oollec:tion schedule. Sp!!c:ific:ations haft been
designed f~ new collection vehicles and a location for a
sanit.ary landfill has been identified.
e. S1tM and Services
'l'o ~loc:ate feilies displ.-:ed by the KIP anll other
illprove....nt.., the progr. has ident.ifielJ a lOS-hectare
site at the edge of the city. AltQCJ.t.her 80ftle 7,100
hous.holds will be relocated or s.tt.led on the land.
f. Conftnt.ional Rousing
Al thotlgh not. a foraal part of the 1)fti Sart.ilta pro-
gr., 'er\lllft.. housing is being built. in .anduftIJ a.
well. Ie.,.ral mftdred unit.s are ClOIIpleted or und.r oon-
st.rtlctiClft. Operationa are being coordinated clo.ely wit.h
the prograM -.nag.r.
'l'alten totet.h.r, the ftriCMl. ~ojects ~JIOn.trate a _jor
ftational ~itJI.ftt to the uPlracliNJ of .and1lftlJ. 'l'tlat it i. Itill
t.he only cit.y in .iell the full array of urban lIIprovetMnt projects
at. beinq applied, within t.he fr...~1t of a plan, indicat.e. how far
tftdDMlia MUlt ,.t 90 to r.ach it.1 MUonal urban deftloe-ent
targeta.
•• !1M 11r_" LlftcI Qu!st.1Oft
Urban land acquilit.ion ~ft4itiOfts ift .andung are gellerally re-
,re.etatift of thOM throu~hout the country.
ln
Ongoing work in Bandung is but the first P1ase of a long-term
developaent effort tc be conducted under the guidelines of the
general plan. With tlle ezeeption of Perumnas housing and sites and
services, most of the current work is, like the Cipta Xarya activi-
ties in otber cities, essentially remedial. It involves negligible
land acquisition requirements.
'!'he proble is twofold and prevalent throughout Indonesia.
1. Owner.hie Pattern
As ~t, bowever, the l06-hectare sites and services component
has not been iJlplemented. '1'0 a great degree this is due to diffi-
cultie. in acquiriDg the project site. SUbsequent Piases of the
progr_ which il'~lft aeql1iring rights-of-way for roads and a site
for a sewage t.reablent plant, are also in danger of delays for the
s.. fundamental rea.on.
Basie ltecord•
Land holdings in and around Bandung and other Indonesian
cities are extr...ly ..all, i.e. two to three hectare. on the
average. 'l'hu., the area seltlCted for lite. and .ervices ..y
have a. many a. 30 different owners. Although the government
has the power to expropriate land, it i. reluctant to use
tt. N4t(Jotiation is the preferred technique of acquisition,
but a tiM aon••ing one. 'ftle project has a land negotiation
.taff of local people who haft apparently established good
r.pport with area re.idents. The .ite il still far from being
wholly a....bled, however, and project officials are extremely
coneerned .bout the pro.pects for next-pha.e activities whose
l.nd •••.mbly requir..ent••re con.iderably greater.
...
~.
The cada.tral 8ituaUon i. quite poor throl1,;hout Indo-
ne.ia. P., accurate land ownership .aPl and other reoord.
e.i.t. Ilftn if expropriation wre favored, Wld"r PE'esent
cirCUIIltanc.. in 'anduftlJ and el••here it could not work
effectively. 'art of the acqui.ition proce•• , and one of it.
tiJIe-oonau.iftlJ faetor., is the Med to ferret out throl1gf!1
infor.al oontact. who ~e. awn Which property. !hen 00.. the
pureha.. netotiationa. tnternational a••i.tanee i. atteMpting
to "dre•• thi...rieu. tap.U_nt to trotte... '.rt of the
Warlet ,.It'. pre.ent loan aetiviti.. are focu.ed on iJlproving
the cada.tral !Ii tuation and IKban .ppiftfJ 1ft <)eftetal.
IIOnetllele.. any JIIajor resolution will be a very 10'" tiM in
COM!ft9.
_Qtionally "rwana. hal the .c.t e.ten.ive land require.efttl of any
c.poHftt of the urbe et• .,.loPMnt effort. It builcla ftW hol1.iftCJ on
.it•• of 10 ~eetare. or larger. "ruafta. atte.pt. to deal with the fun-
~ntal etlfflsultie. by reque.U", that the local .ayor. anll planfti"CJ
agenei.. cIiIllCJnate three or four alter:ftative .ite. .-hieh Met ',;heir
1'2
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project requirements. Perumnas projects also have maximum land price
limits, which are often quite low because of the target groups to be
served.
Where local area master plans are available these serve as guides
to site selection, along with information frcm Cipta larya and the local
planning agencies on availability of water systems and other utilities.
One. candidate sites have been suqqested, Perumnas does detailed
feasibility analyses and ukes the selection. It then turns the acqui-
sition process over to the local jurisdiction's land purchase committee
which conducts negotiations. Given the basic price limitations and the
problems with ownership identificatial, Perumnas officials contend that
too many of the final si tes are at the far periphery of urbanized
areas. '!'his has often resulted in higher costs for extending infra-
structure, lack of commercial and other services to the sites, and lonq
distance cc.utation for sane residents. Perumnas hopes to alleviate
sa-e of these problems by building complete new communities with commer-
cial and industrial areas as well as residential, but the fundamental
land acquisition problM will be even Jll)re serious for such sites unless
th.y are confined to government-owned land.
IV. Physical Planning in Indonesia
Physical planninq at the city scale is valued in Indonesia and is a
tradition dating back to the Dutch oecupatial. Unlike many other coun-
tries where physical planning has been employed perfunctorily or by ins-
trWlentalities with peripheral relationship. to decision-making, plan-
ning in Indonesia is taken seriously u a guide to urban development.
The aanner in whic:!l planning activity is conducted and its principle.
are of particular intere.t.
t'luring the Dutch period a succe.sion of planni"9 1_. wre enae-
t.t. '!'he final piece of legislation, just before Independence, has
still not been replaced. That.s an canibus act dealing with detailed
prescriptiolW for city .a3ter plaM ani! the establishlMnt of building
eoc!e••
ItO sub.equent wIndonesian- plmning legislation has been adopted,
althouth presidential decrees ha~ endow~ the Ministry of Ra.. Affairl
with respnsibility for plan ~pproval, and MBA haa oontinued to formulate
n.. le~illation (which will, pre.URably, be su~itted next year).
In 10.. respect. the lituation ha. led to oonfusion, but the -luid-
ity and lack of d.finition h_ also perllitted t"O ••trMely ben.neial
eonditiOft. to occur.
Aft infor.al oooperati.. a.aoeiation has lIateriali.ed bet.een MBA a.
the approvin~/o..rsi9h~ body and the planni", ara of Cipta Jarya. Cit
pro.itlls techftical usiltane. in planlli", for city, oounty and provin-
cial 90.erMent throu~bout the country. p~ all intents and purpo•••
thoUCJh, both it anel tb. .. are ~itted to bt11lclinc) up the capacity
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SITUATION IN TH[ MID SIITIES IN INUONISIA
[ONV! NT IONAL "AS1£R PlA'fN 'NC fOR CI11 E~
Source: Presentation by H. Suselo, Head, Planning Division, Cipta Karya, 1981.
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THE ACTUAL RESOURCES AVAlLAILE
7. RAPID CHANGE IN TME CITIES OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTItIES IS
DiffiCULT TO 'REDICT
8. CAUSE fRUSTRATIONS '"DUNG THE PEOPLE
,. URIAN PROILEMS REMAIN UNSOLYED AND IECOME MORE SEVERE
10. "'NY AD HOC nECISIONS WITHOUT CLEAR URIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
1. HEAVY IN PHYSICAL PLANNINC
Z. LONC RANCE PERSPECTIVE. "OSTLY ZO YEARS OR "Un.
3. CENERATED IY SPATIAL PLANNINC ACENCIES
~. NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO TH[ RESOURCES AVAILA81LITY Of THE Cllr
OR EVEN NATIONAL RESOURCES
5. PRESENT THE "OST IDEAL PICTURE OF THE FUTURE CITY
•. IM~EHENTATION Of THE PLAN IS USUALLY VERY SLOW DEPENDING ON
FOkHUlATION OF Uk8AN OlVElO'MlNT PROCRA~S
I. MORE 8ALANCE PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC'~OCIO PLANNING
Z. IMMEDIATE AND SHORT TERM PERSPECTIVE, 5 Vi~R~ PROGRAM
3. COOPERATION 8ETWEEN PLANNING ANO IMPLEMENTATIOh AGENCIES
~. DIRECTLY GEARED TO THE RESOURCES AVAILAIILITY OF THE CIT.
AND HIGHER LEVEL GOVERNMENTS
5. PRESENT THE MOST fEASIILE SOLUTIONS TO THE CITY'S PROILEM
AND ACHIEVEMENT Of THE CITV'S WISH£S
•. I"'LE"ENTATION CAN IE ~ELL PROGRAMMED ACCORDING TO THE RE-
SOURCES WHICN CAN IE NOIILIZED
7. DIRECTLV RELATED TO I"PROVING THE 'RESE~T URIAN SETTLEMENT
CONDITION AND [HVIRO~EHT THROUGH GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
8. STIMULATE PUIL'C PARTICIPATION AND AwARENESS
, SOLVE 'HASE IV 'HASE THE CRITICAL URIAN ENVIRONMENTAL 'RO-
lLENS AND 'REVENT CONDITION IECQI'ING WORSE
10. URIAN DEVELO'MENT IS GUIDED AND 'RDHOTED THROUGH GRADUAL
IUT 'OSITIVE CHANGE
NtW ArPMOACH SINel SElONU flVl YlAN PLAN (lAMtY SlVlNTIE~)
I. FORMULATE AN URIAN OEVELOP"ENT STRATEGY
2. FORMULATE UR8AN OEVELO'"ENT PROGRAM (LONG RANGE)
3. FORHULATE FIRST PHASE UR8AN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
~. INVESTIGATE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL fEASIIILITV
5. PROPOSE INSTITUTIONAL SET UP FOR I~PLEMENTATION
•• 'RELIMINARV ENGINEERING DESIGN
7. RECOMMEND F'RST P"'SE PROJECT
• SCOPE OF THE 'ROJECT
• COMPONENTS 0' IM'ROVEMENTS
- ESTIHATE OF TOTAL COST OF THE 'ROJECT
• EsTINATE FOREIGN EXCMANGE COMPONENT FOR 'OSSIILE
FORE IGil AID ,,*DIIII;
• RECOMMEND 'I..-cI.L ARRANGENENT IETWEEN GOYERNMENT
.... IIREtT tElIE'I[IAR. OF THE ,aDJECT
- TlC..ICAL '''ISTMU 'O!:"rIOll TO IE INCLllou
• fTMlRS
fEATURES OF UR8AN DEVELOPMENT STUDY
;i".,
and long-term responsibility of the subnational planning bodies. Until
that occurs, the meshing of interests and approaches of the two central
government agencies with planning concerns leads to a relatively
straightforward process of plan formulation and approval. In a country
as large and complex as Indonesia, a more rigid, bureaucratic structure
could stifle the planning process.
Substantive approaches to -planning- have evolved in Indonesia in
response to real world circumstances. Free of any bonds under specific,
le:islatively mandated requirements, CK and MBA have been able to eXPer-
iment and improvise in the search for planning instruments and concepts
which fit Indonesian conditions.
u~ttl well into the 1960s, the conventional detailed physical mas-
ter plans, along lines spelled out in th. Dutch legislation, were the
mode. these were for 20-year planning periods. The documents were ela-
borately presented, displaying an idealized pi::ture of a future city.
Thay were prepared by both Indonesians and outside consultants. Short-
COllings of these instr1J1llents are portrayed on the accompanying chart
prepared by the Head of CX's Planning DiviRion for an international con-
ference. They were essentially inapplicable to local circumstances and
produced considerable frustration. Many such master plans were prepared
and are still in existence.
Approximately the same approach was being utilized in liSrger area
-regional- plans for provinces or setions of the country prepared by
foreign consultants under various technical assistance missions. These
large tomes, full of data and prescriptions, were turned over to Indone-
sian officials who Ultimately mncluded that they could I'Dt be imple-
mented.
The new approach, tes~:1 in Bandung, Nedan and a number of ..aller
centers is one of short-term, integrated -comprehensive- planning. The
land \.;;::~ preacriptions are generalised. !Illphalis falls on identifica-
tion .:.r.d linkage of projects that can realistically be accomplished dur-
ing a fift-year period. The two charts whieh follow summarize the
approach: data gathering and analysis where possible, consideration of
.ocial II\d economic .. well a.. physical issues, directed toward short-
tera proble.-lOlving, and tied to illlple..entable projects. The emphasis
i. on urban - and Wiere 1";' levant, regional - develoPlftent, "d ftl)re
directly on guiding the array of remedial actions cited earlier whi":h
repre.ent the national inve.tment tools available to Cipta larya and
other agencie••
fte generaliled lUld u.e plans being prepared a. part of this ae-
tivity ar. largely along th..- lin•• of th. -general framework- lIIap for
Cianjur which follows. CJ.anjur i. a .all city of 50,000 between
.andung and Jakarta. It wa. recently the .ite of a ,pecial int.rnation-
al aonfer.nce called by the "ndu~~ In,titut. of Technology and Bouwcen-
tr_ of the Wetherland. to db 'u.. plann~.ng for lIIaller ciU... The
Cianjur plan ••t.bli,hed r '.ra111.d location. for housing, oommercial,
and other activiti.. along ,lth the principal road syatem for the com-
.unity.
1" .•
'LAN FeR CIANJ1:R TO~oJN FOR '
KE TF. FlhNGhN :
It~~']."::j Hil.h ~I.... housin.
o Middle clus housinl
~ Trade lUT'"
L8. Basic:~ hO~sin.
.. Industrial aft.
I:2::J T ow &II squ_
Source: Sudirahardj a, 1L, "Development Prospects and Programs for Cianj13.r
Town", 1981.
Within this generalized framework, the Indonesians now prepare de-
tailed land use and facilities plans only for those areas such as kam-
p1mgs, where major improvements are to take place wi thin a 5-10 year
Period.
Thus urban plans have become both ncre generalized and nore
project-oriented. At the same time, the Indonesians are seeking to
place these plans wi thin a larger framework. There is a commitment to
prepare a "national" physical plan treating over all distr ibution of
population and resources, and regional plans on provincial and cocnty
levels into which these new efforts at comprehensive local planning will
be fit.
Given Indonesia's personnel and budget capabilities it will prob-
ably be some time before substantial work on these larger level planning
instruJ,tents is in hand, but the objective has been established.
It is also probable that a good deal of the "comprehensive" plan-
ning now encouraged by cr: and MBA will not find its way to implementa-
tion, given the realities of available resources. Although the sights
are now set toward more realistic assessments and recommendations, the
fact that Bandul'l9 alone has the full complem:;:nc cf planning and execu-
tion techniques suggests that these newer approaches may be very long in
coming to all the 200 cities and towns in CR's Repelita III target
~coup. Th~ new comprehensive planning approaches appear far more real-
istic than the conventional master plans they replace. Even so, they
may prove too cumbersome and optimistic for the system to absorb.
Indonesian officials responsible for planning apprc:>vals am plan-
ning assistance are, if anything, pragmatic. Knowing that actaal arban
development actions will be small in relation to need, they are nonethe-
less committed to establishing, on a nation-wide basis, a framework for
rationalizing these actions. Those currently in charge are fally aware
that comprehensive planning will, for the foreseeble fatare, be beyond
any given community'S ability to implement. Nevertheless they want
these frameworks in place, at the same time as they want functioning
alanning agencies at the provin~ial and county levels, in the event that
the limited, remedial arban development improvements under Repelita III
do lead to economic and physical expansion at a larger scale.
Comprehensive planning is in this sense "contingency" planning wi.th
enough linkage to the reality of specific, albeit modest, investments ~e
ensare its atility. Perhaps some of the Indonesian planners harbor nos-
talgic feelings for the old-style master planning they were once trained
to do. Perhaps "here remains some res1.~ual insp:.Latioual quality or some
mystical reassaranc~ in the "black box". On the whole, however, a much
Jn0re pragmatic, policy-oriented attitide prevails -- at least in the
highest realms elf Ind0nesian decis ion-mak ing. They want tools and
stracture in place In the event these at e needed. A multi-faceted
short-term action plan can reduoe the arbitrariness of investment
decisi0ns, shape these decisions, and channel their .i.mpacts. It is a
~etter plan than a rigid "master" scheme lack inC] realistic means (!)f
implementatieln, and it is a better instr,ament than no plan at all.
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Vl. Training
Indonesia is following through on its commitment to more flexible,
project-oriented planning by engaging in a major training effort, assis-
ted by USAID and othe= international agencies. The training is taKing
place in context of a broader attempt to m~ke thoroughgoing improvements
in urb~~ management throughout the na~~~".
Education for urban planning in Indonesia has a long tradition,
stemming from estoblishment in 1959 of an undergraduate planning program
at the Bar-dung Institute of Technology. The program was started linder
United Nations sponsorship, with a number of foreign faclilty over the
years. It ha:! produced over 200 grad\lates. Many of these are now in
responsible positions at !IIBA, CK and other agencies. Three Indonesian
Ilniversi ties now offer df!9~ee programs iT'1 th", field., and are adapting
the content of these progr~ms to reflect the wcomprehensive w short-term
approaches advocated by the national government.
In aidi tion to the formal degree programs, there are a number Gf
short-term trai~ing opportunities both within Indonesia and abroad. Tbe
MBA has a training arm, Badan Diklat, responsible for a wide ra,nqe of
short courses dealing with urban management am plannincJ. under it
are eight regional centers in varyincJ stages of organization distriblited
arolind tile country. The University of Birmin9itam in England has a COn-
tinuinq program -,mich many Ind0nesians have at tended. Several have par-
ticipated in short-term courses at the World Bank's Economic Development
Institute, AID's Washington Shelter Training Workshop? and the Institute
of Social Studies in The BaglJe. Cipta Karya also has a traininq arm
which conducts periodic traininq activities.
These trainiACJ opportlinities notwithstanding, Indonesia has tao few
planners to meet its own perceptions of near-term need for resiclent
staff in provincial, cOlinty and city planning agencies. The gGVernmEAt
has embarked on an ambiti0uS ~Ogram to fill the gap. That gap is, ac-
c0rding to a USAIB-assisted stlidy, over 7,000 ~ple. 5
The Ministry of Bome Affairs and USAla have 00mmitted themselves to
prepare programs and to staff f0lir 0f the regional centers on a contin-
liing basis. CSAID is pr0vicUng faclll ty and technical advisers f0C tIM
first 0f the fGur ~enters (in J~jakarta) a10ng with a $ 7 million grant
and a $ 2. 5 m~.llion lGan. The I:'IdGneei~n g0vernment is itself pr0vicUng
$ 2.5 milliGn.
5. "A National Strategy f0C Training in Regi<:>nal F1anning and Managtt
ment W , prepared fer Balian aiklat 13y G. Hansen, S. Holle, and J.
Taylor. The term "regi0nal W apparently is ~sed te aover geGgra~hi~a1
areas Gf any scale (and all scales) fer which physieal planning is
done.
1'8
The principles of the proposed national training strategy are ex-
pressed in the study report:
The proposed national training stra~eg"l is based on an assumed set
of functions and critical tasks i~ planning and management which the
BAPPEDAS soould perform. These functions and tasks ar e crucial if
the BAPPEDAS are to assume their mandated responsibility for coordi-
nating the line depaI tments in formulation and implementation of
regional development plans and programs. These planning and manage-
ment tasks in70lve a process or sequence of activities which range
fran a description of existing condi tiO'1S and trends, an appraisal
of regional development problems and needs, formulation of develop-
ment goals and objectives, an evaluation of alternative long-term
development strategies, to the development of annual action plans
and programs, and finally the monitoring and evaluation of plan imp-
lementation. It should be emphasized that in combinatiOf these
tasks make up a process which is both continuous and cyclic.
The objectives of the strategy are tQ prQduce planning personnel
capable of making "well-formulated and implementable" plans for physical
improvement and develGlpment 0f areas at each relevant scale. The Indo-
nesians' current g0als are expressed in the precise definiti0n 0f "well-
formulated and implementable".7
1. Indication that the plar.ning process is engaging in an
assessment of regional reS0urces and pr0blems wi thin the oon-
text 0f identified regional and national planning g0als, and
that realistic sh0rt- and long-term 0bjecti ves are being dis-
cussed and established in achieving these goals.
2. Indication that alternative deve10pment strategies for achiev-
inq identified objectives are f0rmulated and reviewed in
arriving at some l0qic and r-ati0nalale in the ch0ice 0f an
optimum 0r desirable pelicy approach.
3. Indication that a development strategy is being translated in-
to a coherent and phased set of pr0grams and projects for b0th
a five-year and annual time dimensien. The critical comP0nent
in this pr0cess would include an emphasis upcn area devel0pment
and most explicitly 0n:
a. tile design of pr0jects and pr0grams which c0mplement and
slipPGrt ea,ch other, 1. e. a more intersectoral appr0ach to
devel0pment needs and pr0Ii.llem~:
b. the a110cati0n 0f reS0urces in some kind 0f spatial pattern
and pri0r ity oonsistent w~. th natural and man-made reS0urce
end0wments, and
6. Ibid., p. x·x.
7. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
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c. the allocation of resources to attain a level of critical
mass in time and space sufficient to generate sustainable
and '.angible social, economic and environmental change.
4. Indicatior. that monitoring and evaluation systems are being
designed to acquire and review feedback on pro;ect implementa-
tion and impact.
S. Indication that attention is being devoted to assuring that
adequate administrative resources are being made available for
plan implementation.
The training progams themselves will be of several weeks' or sever-
al months' duration. They will include on-the-job instructi~n as well
as ooncentra ed periods of classroom activity. If there are more than a
single plann~ng wprofessionalw in an agency, the program ~pes to train
them as a team.
One of the most interesting elements in the training program is a
series of seminars fQr lQCal mayors, goV'ernors and officials of public
wor ks ooilding agencies on the use of planning and planners. These are
geared to creating a receptive and infQrmed mar ket for the planning
approach. This is an important feature, fQr apparently, many planning
agencies are regarded as "low prestige W operati.ons, and the g<llvernment
is eager to elevate the perception <lIf planners' importance as well 40
the planning function itself. 8
8. Given the apparent pr001em 0f acceptance <lIf ~larJnin9 at the 1001.1
level, it is sGmewhat s~rprisin9 that the training pr0Bpect~s ~ives
very little at tef.ttioo to "PGli tical" factor s and to the effects Gf
limited reS<!llireeS in dise~Bsing the s~Bjeet matter af the trainir.l9
c<llurses themselves. Ari arnoi ti0US array 0f technical subjects has
been presented, b~t a p>r0gram dedicated to preparing Ind0nesian )1>ro-
fessi<llnals f0r real-wor ld respc:>nsil3ili ties might pr0vide its parti-
eipants with some lmderstanding 0f h<!llW devel0pment decisi0ns Uf:
actually made and hew planning activity can oo€ur within I;uch a ~r.­
text. These are less0ns that have been learned by the s~ccessflJJ.
planners wh0 lead the nati<llnal agencies.
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I. Introduction
Kenya represents the best example L, sub-Saharan Africa of a
deliberate and well-documented effort at spatial planning. No other
country has such a well-articulated policy, and no other oou.ntry has
received the international attention that has been accocded Kenya. It
has been the si te of a I.umber of major studies by international donor
agencies such as the Wc.rld Ba"k (IBRD), the U.S. Agency fo·r Inter-
national Development (USAID), t."H? Br itish Overseas Development Adminis-
tration (ODA), and a number of other bilateral aonor aqencies. Beqin-
ning in the early 1970s, Kenya has estail)lished what has been referred to
as "the most comprehensive and coordinated spatial planning apparatl1s in
East Africa".1 Yet, questions were raised as to the success of this
policy and the ability and, indeed, the willingness of the Government of
Kenya (OOK) to implement hlly the strateqy which has been developed.
This report reviews the strategy as articulated in ~overnment plans and
examines some of the recent efforts to implement its major features,
particUlarly as they relate to the grG>wth" cievelQpment allCl plannill9 of
secondary cities. 2
II. Kenya's Urban System and Rural Devel0J?l!!ent
The effG>rts of the Government of Kenya to prQ1llQte rl1ral deveicp-
Illent and to pr(j)vide feM the <l>'rClerly develo~nt of an inteqrated
settlement system must be reviewed in terms (j)f the l1rt.an and regiQl\al
context of development in the cG>untry. Without providing a too detailed
analysis of the GOl1ntry's experience during the pre-independence period"
s~ffice it to say that the over all pattern of national development/l1n-
derdevelopment reflecteci the interests of a <Xi)lonial administration and
a wh i te settler class. Nataral reSGIl'l'ces were explG! ted, am a system
Gf administrative headquarters, estaBlished 9@ 88 to prCilmGte and pe·r-
petaate the interests Gf a nQn- iAdiqenGlis eli be. The res~lt was a
highly uneven pattern Qf cie'l7elGlpment. The oolGJRial experien<::e in K'enya
"engrained a frameW<l>rk (j)f social and spatial relatiGlns and an &ssociated
pattern (l)f art.anizatiGln which is inherently antitheti¢al tlG an aut(j)no-
mo~sly contrelled and socially jllst praeess ef Sevel~t."3
Sil'1€@ independence in 1963, Government ef ~eAya p~ans have
stressed the need to prcmGte mGre even develepment and t(J redress the
spatial Unbalance which was pert Gf the aGl~ial heritage.
The distri9~tian Glf peplllatiGft refleets the tistrit.ytien (Jf
nataral reS01lrCeS (particlllacly fertile sails) and rainfall. Three malR
1. SGja and Weaver, 1976.
2. The term "secGlndary cities" as ased in the Kenyan O@Atext
requires some qualification and explanatian. By iRternatiGnal
standards the secGndarv cities a>f Kenya are relatively small and
the term is now being applied ta> 81!ttlements wi th l'0P~latiGne a>f
Gnly a few thGllsand.
3. Seja and weaver, 1976.
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areas of population concentration are found alODg the Indian OCean coast
(centered on Mombasa), in the central highland (aroand the capital city,
Nairobi) and along the shores of Lake Victoria (around the centers of
lUSlUllU" Kakame9a and Kisii). The vast majority of Kenya's population
resi<ies in rural areas. The sixth most populoos country in sao-saharan
Africa with about 15.5 million people in 1979, Kenya has one of the
least IKbanized populatioos in the wrld. Just unQer ten per cent of
the population in 1969 and 12.2 pe-r cent in 1978 was classified as \lrban
(living in towns larger than 2,,(00).
The settlement system is dominated by Nairobi. AlthouCJh it con-
tained little JlKi)re than half million inhabitants in 1969" it was jllst
over twice as large as l'IGmbasa (247, Q73) • Despite its modest size by
world standards for capital cities" Nairobi has ~en the main fOCliS of
investment and development ~n. Qu-rit:tg the periods of the 5eoond and
Third National Development Plans (1970-74 and 1974-78" respectively).
0nly four tQwns were above 2.900 in 1969. In addition to Nairobi. and
l'lombasa., Nakara (47"lSl) and KislUllu (32,43l) are the only ~ters larCJer
than 20,000. The fQrty-eight settlements wi tit PQpylations above 2, GOO
a,re dispersed tht::l>uCJhQ\lt seven of the eiCJht ~eovinces into whicm the
cQuntry is diviQed. 0I\ly the Rli)rtneastern ~~ince had no settlement
above 2,aOO in size in 1969.
l'lIGIre recent pepulation figares place Na irGbi at jlist under QRe
million (959,OGO), 1'lombasa at 401,000., Kis1iJ1\u at 115,000" and Na«-1I1:\I at
78,000. Only two other settlements had PG>Pl1lation greater than 45.,G-OO
and" in fact, most Bad considerably less. Kenya continaes to ble essen-
tially a rlieal .;:Q\intry witA a Rloltnber of small administrative and agri-
e1llt~ral s~rvice centers dispersed thro1lCJhG\it the e@Qntry.
In spite <:If the IM>dest size <:If its IIt~an ¢entees, !tenya has bleen
experiencing many Gf the problems of rapid poP\llatioo ~I:Gwth (its esti-
mated rate <:If increase <:If 3.4 per cent per annl1l1l is amonC) the hii.ghest in
the WGrl,j), na-ral-lir~an mi~ratiQl!l, over~l1eclened I1t~.. serviees a>Ad aft
apparent inability ~f the PIIolie and private sectors bG pr<:lviae adequate
shelter. These anG related prGblems of cievelGlpment haft prGl1ftPted
g<:lvernmen ~ planners tcJ "lJin (!)l1tlining PGli<::ies and ciesilJninlJ strate<Jies
aimed at pr0111GtinIJ rllral development a-Ad deeentralizing industrial and
arl;)an IJrowth.
The effGlrts Gf the government bo premote the emer~en<::e Gf re~i~al
~r<:lwth et::;lters and tG p-rGvicie fQr IIIGre orcieely \lct.aA CJrGwth in the
nati(!)Ral settlement system is partiealarly interestiRC) in K-enya sinee,
<:Iwing to the relatively eacly start and as yet l'ftOdest pt'Glolems in many
smaller t-0Wf-\S, the prGls,eets fGlr sl1c~ssfl111y oontrolling Ill:ban ~I:Glwth
are still CJGOli. The extent tw which present plans aefta aetiGlRS Gf tAe
~QVernmeRt will sll<::eeea still remaiRB ta Be seenJ AC!JWever, the effGrts
tGl ..iatoe ~H'0Vi<ie a IIIGst iAterestin<J ease Stlilty aM yield vallialtle
iAsilJhts iRtG the prGleess Gf planning fGlr, and implementing, seeGndary
eity grGlwth.
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GROWTH RAl'E QF 'I'O"7NS OF p(j)pt,'TJ..A.!IQN 1Q,OOQ A:\"D UOVE
(IN lCJ69) , 1948-6'
Populat:1Qll GrGwth rate
TQWUS 1~48 1%2 1969 1'48-62 19~2~7
NairG.i 118,'76 343,500 SO',286 7.9 s.a
Mombasa 84,746 17',57S 247,Q7J 5.S 4.7
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III. Spatial Planning: Promise and Performance
Tbe past Qecade has seen a shift in emphasis in Kenyan develQPl1lent
plans and policy statements. The Qver all directiClR of this shift has
been tc>warci an emphasis GJn rural cievelGlptlleRt and the prQ11lQtiQR Qf growth
centers Qtber than NairQbi and llIombasa. The second L>evelopnlent plan
(1970-74) outlined the rQle Qf smaller tGlWnS and service cent!=rs in pt'Q-
moting rural cievelQpment and called for steps aimed at creating an
integrated settlement hieracchy oonsistincJ Qf fooc tiers: arban
(lSG.,GOO catchment acea pGlp\Ilation), ru·ral (SO.,GOO), muket (lS .. QGO) and
l0Cal centers (5, ()-G)O) • over I, Q'GO centers were Qesignated as pact of
the settlement system, and it was prQPGlsed that all "l'lIinistries, Local
Authorities and other d1evelopment agencies ••• CQ1\salt the Town Plan.nincJ
oepactment at the initial staeJf! :Ln the CQRsil2e,ratioo of their
schemes." seven "grGWth centers." (Nakara., Kisuma, Thika., Eldoret,
lICaltamega, lfyeri and Emb11) were chosen as the initial foc:i of government
effQCts "tG <leee-ntralize f11tace 11r~an !CQWtlt" and were tea reG:eive
priority in allQCatiClR Qf revenues for plibli<i: works and". in the case Gf
Naqca" Ki 51111111" Thika Ali ElciGret, increased attenticn as fatue
industrial G:eltters. In the Thicci Development Plan (1974-78), the mlmliM![
Qf l2esigRateci gCQWth centers was i.Rcreased tlQ nine by the acIditiGm Gf
lICitale and ~rll~ Despite the lise Qf "gcG>Wth pallett raDrie: i,n the sec:ood
oevelGpment Plan" little attenticn ns given to hc;)w, GIl: even lIhethec,
the g·rQWth Qf Nairobi and lIIlomhasa were to be cCi>I1trQlled. JlGwever, this
isslie was taken yP iR the Th irci DevelGlPflleJ\t Plan. As ~i<i:harcisQft4
e:cmunents, "The philGsGphical cUfferen:<te "tween the SecGRci anci Third
Plans with respect to \lclMn aevelGplfteRt strategy wa.s the shift frGm
enCCll\l~aging t'GI ciisc(j)\lt:aging the grQWth Qf Nair~Bi."
While planning cjQC\ilfteRts emphasize the impcKtaft¢e (j)f a grG)Wth
ce.nter pc»licy tG J:t[QIlIG'te racal devel.(l)pnlent aM avoid oftr-eGRcentratioA
in lair(j)Gi, several GGsecftrs ha". ~inteci GNt that the perfQrmance of
the government has not mat¢hed the J:trGmise Gf decentralized cievelGpmeftt
G\itlined iR ttle J:tlarmiACJ <bc1Jl1lleftts. lIacry ~ietlaccisGR., GIlle (j)f the
several interRatiGRal cQftsaltants bG me invited tIG eaamine the rllca1-
"c~aR IMlance in Kenya., summacizeci the gap between perfCKmance &Ad
prGmise b the fGl10"iAg man,Ret::
Kenya has pt:Gfessecl bG have a !cQWth eeRtet: strate~n'~ !tilt it has
!DeeR 1IIGt:.e RCJftIiRal than reaL •• The gC(j)"th senter pGlicies a.ptedl
iR Ketiya clur iAg the 197G' s hardly mer it the name dnce the clesit-
RatiGRs we~e iAs\lfficiefttly selective., the centers wece Rot iRt3et-
rated into ah ewerall strate,\ fCK tllle CJ0l1fttry ae a whole, andl
implementatiGR was i'Reffective.·
The adeptiGn (j)f cl trGWth eeAter strategy aRei the articlil'!tiGR of
palic:ies at the natiClnal level cb !'let materially alter the pattern Gf
\I~~aR gr'3Wth and regi<:mal avel<!»pllleRt l:IRless aeoolftpaniedl By f<K'<!leflil
4. Ric:marclson., Hury, "Gt:@wth Cet\ter P<!Iliciet!l It@visiteeS", !eiiamal
Science Review, 1978, p. 42.
s. Ri<llharcls(!)R" 0J? c.it., pJ:t. lto anel ISO.
action and deliberate and ooordinated measures by the implementing
a9~ncies of government which determine where and now public revenues
will be allocated. No matter how emphatic the plans, final judgr.:-mt on
the success of a strategy will rest upon the actions of gover~.'1-;' and
their impact at the regional distribution of development. In this
regard" Richard Stren has commented on what he calls the urban policy
bias in Kenya. which is reflected in:
••• the disproportionate share taken by Nairobi in physical
development. While both the 1970-74 plan and its SliCceSSor ha~
sought to spread development nore evenly among the other urban
centers, no trend in this direction i.s evident fran official
statistics. From 1967 thrGUgh 1975, Nairobi's share of the vallie
of nef private CQRstractiGm in the main towns actlially r~se from
78.3 percent to 81.8 percent althQugh there was some variation
from year to year. But frQm 1970 tbCQugh 1975, NairQbi's share
fGr all years stCl>Od at 77.8 percent. I!lk>reover, the value Qf new
pliblic bl1ildiA(js dur il19 the 1970-75 per ioci was only 42 percent of
the valH of private buildin<J: J1IQst Gf this PI1blic buildin<J
aplpears tQ han tak-en place in NairQbi. 6
Despite such or iticism, it is as yet much tQQ SOQn tCil judge the
effectiveness of the ~Gvernment's policies with regard to decentralized
de~lQpment. It is a nost difficl1lt task to Qrchestrate change in any
government bureaacracy, even the JnQst hilJhly centralized. In a parlia-
mentary system, even with me-party dc:>mination, with all the varioos
~litical groups, constituencies and alliances that ate inherent in that
system, it is even nore prGGlematic. Yet. there are real signs that mci)re
and more areas of government are beginning tQ a<::k,nowledge, if not yet
fully to sliPpGrt, the IMve tGward nore ltecentralized planning and
investment.
The internatiGnal dGncn agencies such as IBJm1 USAID and ODA have
infllleAced the speed and airectiGR Cilf government actiCM'l thc(i)uCJh the
guillelines ana r-estricti(i)Rs pgt Oft their lGa-ns a.'\d ,rants fGr pro-
jeets. The increased pressure ~ ~over~meftt represe-nted e, these a~n­
des i:3 not always wlOOlft@. Dilsagreements <lWer standards and criteria
fGr I1cl!lan develGpment were a regular ~rt (i)f early uc~an pr0jects.
These ,ro~lems are likely 110 be iA¢reased as non and smaller tGWftS ace
beiACJ oonsiaered as PGte-ntial sites fGr ur~an projects I!y the WGrla
Bank, AID ana GDA. As lJOver~ment ana donGr atJencies ctevel':>p pr0jects in
the secGndacy cities of Itenya, a severe strai-n will 1M Pl1t <!1ft I:Mth
0r,anizatiGns ana reSGl1cces.
The manner i,n which the Gc:wernme-nt 0f Itenya respc!)nlls t-a this
in<::reased strain will tJ' a lcmg way tCilwacd cle+-erminin<J whether
decentralized develGpment fool1sed GA an inte,rated system Gf seoondary
tGWilS will ~eeGme a reality. In the fGllewing sectiGn" several issues
of implementation ace lIiscllssed.
6. Itiehara Stren" p. 187.
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IV. Implementation Issues
'\
A review of recent planning docwnents and project proposals is
enougn to convince ev-en the most skeptical observer that "the move to
secondary and intermediate-size towns in Kenya certainly is on." The
Government Qf Kenya is currently e119aqed in a series Qf neg<lltiations
in70lving the World Bank, AID and ODA to finalize details Qf a mega-
prQjeet calling fQr $ 4G-SQ million in fanding to provide housing and
infrastr\lCture investment in some thirty-six seccndary towns and rural
service centers. The shift toward the lower end of the settlement
hierarchy represented by these prQjects will mean a real and dratr.atic
shift in emphasis not only for the ~overnment but for the WQrld Bank and
the bilateral donor agencies likewise. 7 In the process, it is most
likely that both the government and the dGnor agencies will learn a
great many lessons ooncerning the most effective ways, and SQme Qf the
least effective ways" of prQmGting secondary city develQpm~nt.
In his critique of the growth center pG>licy in the mid-197Qs"
Richardson endQrsed the policy Qbjectives which prQvided fQ[ dispersing
develQpment togrGlWtl\ centers outside Na irGbi. Bawever, he argued.,. the
case for decen"ralizatiGn is not based on the Gverwhelming primacy Qf
NairQbi. As RichardsQn observes:
The real case fQr a grGlWth center strategy in Kenya cannot bie
based an. the argument that Nair0bi is too large (i.e. net
aqglomet'ation diseoonQmies) t.it rather rests on the view that
policies to promote (or" mGre acc~rately, to maintain) a dispersed
settlement tMtte:cn are fally oonsistent with Kenya's cnmparative
advantaqe in aqricaltare and reso~rce-based iRd~stries.a
Richardson thliS finGs little fault with the objective Qf genya t s
plans" but is cr i tical (l)f the manner i,n wit im growth centers weee
designated. Be arg\iecl that "the desiqnation (l)f nhle CJrQWth ceRters is
too many for effective implementation 1R view of Kenya's scaccity 0f
infrastnt<;:tural capital and resoarce GGnstraints." He sugqested that
KisW11~ be prQmQted as a Rational ~r:ban center in Western Kenya eapable
of proviclinq an effective oollnter-magnet to MairQoi and tIe provilie
balance to the natiQnal system of cities.
In his reeommenclation., Rieharllson Ratecl that any palicy
••• aimed at the redistriblltiGTl Qf ee<llnomie aetivity and manil'u
laU<;>n of tAe p[ejectecl lIistrib~tion of \irbaA pspulati<;>n WGulli
reCftiire a set 0f e0AeeCfllential pGlicy iAstrIJments te effect the
clesired changes.
7. The AIB pr0jec:::t <3R "Kenya Small Towns Shelter and cemmunity
gevelepmeAt" is built ar<;>u,RI a HOllsiA9 Investment Gua,ranty p>r<;>gram
anel represents " ••• a new thr\lst and lIireetioA fer the KG p>[<;>qram."
8. R,iehat;dsal'\, 0».. Cit.
9. I8111., p. 148-14'.
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In summarizing his recommendations regarding implementation of the
growth center strategy, Ricllardson ioentified "three key priorities· for
growth centers:
••• a massive redistri bution of infras tructure r ~sources in the ir
favor, a strong policy for location of industry, and methods to
give the gf~th centers a degree of fiscal autonomy and financial
resources.
Richardson ends his essay with a challenge and a rhetorical
question:
The challenge is to design and implement growth center strategies
to harmonize with the requirements and potential of developing
economies. Is it blindly optimistic tQ believe that this task is
not impossible?ll
While not blindly optimistic, it is perhaps somewhat myopic to
depend upon massive infrastructure resource transfers and increased
industr ial incentives without squarely addressing the ability of
national level institutions to effect, and the ability of :.,>.~d level
insti tutions to absorb, such a transfer. Richardson focuseJ his dis-
cussion on questions of national policy, yet the recommendations will
necessarily be implemented in specific local oofltexts. These are some
of the issues which must be addressed.
In the past decade Kenya has .:d1Iassed a rich storehouse of I!,rper-
ience in a series of urb&-, projects in Nairobi and elsewhere in the
country. Major projects have been flilnded by the World Bank and other
foreign donors. These experiences have been reviewed in il number of
insightful papers prepared for AID, the World Bank, ODA and GOK Minls-
tries. Many of the major issues a.nd pro')lems of implementation have
been identified and subjected to scrutiny. Experiences in the initial
projects were often the basis of revision in approaches taken in sub-
sequent projects although, as one observer oommented, ~atever lessons
have been learned, have been learnt at a cost." Projects have frequent-
ly been delayed, oost everruns have been common, project objectives have
had to be reduced, and major politiclal and institutional obstacles en-
countered. Still Government is oommitted to major projects in the
shelter sector: (both urban and rllral shelter) and inter.nati0nal orC!an-
hations seem eager to provide finaRcial and technical sllpport fGr even
larger and more widespread prGjects. Whether the lessons learned from
early projects have been sllfficiently digested and whether adeqllate
solutions have been found to correct those mistakes and overcome those
obstacles which plagued previolls projects remains a serious question.
Kenya is now entering into a third phase of Ilrban l!'rojects. The
World Bank and the Government of Kenya are in the final staC)es of
10. Ibid., p. 150.
11. Ibid., p. 151.
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negotiation on a project referred to as Urban III. Perhaps what is most
remarkable about the project r aside fram its size -- same $ 40-50 mil-
lion when aDA and AID components are added r is that it aims at providing
infrastructural investments and shelter in more than thirty wsecondaryW
towns scattered around the country. Some of the ~ettlements included in
th~ project have populations of just two or three thousand. This repre-
sents a dramatic shift from the more typical pattern of providing shel-
ter and services only at the top of the urban hierarchy. The attempt to
implement shelter and infrastructllre projects in so many varied local
settings will provide a se~re test of the implementing skills and capa-
city of all parties involved.
Before discussing this third round of I1rban projects in more
detail r it may b~ I1sefl1l to review some of the experiences gained and
lessons learned in the first two roanQs of urban projects. Kenya's
approach to the problems of hOl1sing has altered significantly since the
massive squatter settlement demolii~on and clean-l1p campaign lal1nched by
the government in Nairobi in 19:J.
In that year an estimated lOrOOO dwellings were razed and 50,000
people r laprooted. In the mid-1970s Kenya andertook a large sites-and-
services project in Nairobi which emphasized more economically realistic
standards, provided for social services and comml1nity development com-
ponents. In this program oost recovery principles and related aspects
of the project were to be monitored and evalaated.
Gaining support f0r the si tes-and-services appr0ach was no mean
feat. This approach to shelter se~t0r p.""blems was anathema to many
Kenyan 0fficials wh0 viewed it as nGt only ound0ning, blat actaally con-
structing sub-standard residential areas in the midst 0f their "Green
City in the Sun". Planners, Ministry and0ther 0fficials r f0r the most
part trained and th0r0ughly gr0landed in British c0lGnial planning proce-
dlares and standards, were reluctant to tGlerate anything less.
Even while rec0gnizing the need to ad0pt sites-and-services
schemes and squatter upgrading appr0ache3 in plablic statements 0f
h0using pr-liCYr str0ng resistance persisted amGng some Kenyan 0ffi-
ciais. ThlS ambivalence is evident in the Third Deve10pment Plan r 1974-
78. Dlaring the perioo in which government was beginning to ad0pt the
siles-and-services appr0ach, the plan reaffirmFl the oommitment to:
••• ensure that hGusing design and c0nstructi0n conf0rm to gGvern-
ment standards and that each oousing unit oonstructed in urban
areas shall have at least two rGGms, plus its 0wn kitchen and
toilet.
12. A pattern 0f 0fficial behavior CGnsistent with post-colonial
practice which regularly demolished unc:luthorized African housing
to enforce residential segregation in Nair0bi.
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Moreover, government pledged "to ensure that ••• no additional
unauthorized housing settlements are erected" and determined that "slwms
(be) removed when satisfactory alternative housing has been fotmd ••• "
The gradual chanqe in emphasis in policy &nd implementation of
urban projects was greatly facilitated by World Bank officials and other
expatriate exper ts. New loan guidelines and donor agency requirements
stressed the need for the si tes-and-services approach to housinq low-
income familie$. This pressure, together with mounting physical evi-
dence that the housing problem clear~ was out of hand, has resulted in
a general acceptance of the approach.
Dandora, the location of the first lacge sites-and-se~vices scheme
in Kenya, demonstrated that a shift in government policy did not guaran-
tee successful implementation. The project, which llrgently called for
the constrllction fo 6,000 serviced plots, suffered many setbacks.
Whether one judges the experiment as successful depends on which
aspects of the project one vallles most. On this point, observers differ
widely. One thing that both defenders and critics agree upon, however,
is that Dandora provided valuable lessons for futllre project desiC)ns and
highlighted several major weaknesses in the administrative and implemen-
tins aspects of the process. The delays in implementation and short-
fall in the number of serviced plo~s completed were evidence that there
was still a lack of understanding and commitment to the project in some
agencies of government and on the part of the donors. Problems stemming
from lack of coo~dinatian and outri~ht conflict between government
bodies that ha~ responsibility for various aspects of the project under-
scored the need for institutional ~eform. Similar lessons were learned
in related urban projects undertaken. The AID low-income tenant par-
chase project in Umoja and projects by the European Development Fund in
Muthare Valley and Kawanqware experienced some of the same problems des-
pite safeguards built into the projects. Questions were raised reqard-
ing the timely provision of technical and financial inputs, the mechan-
ism bein~ employed tQ recover CQsts, the alloc.::ation proc.::edures adopted
and the ultimate beneficiaries Qf the project.
The second major phase of urban projects involved the extension of
sites-and-services and squatter upqradinq sc.::hemes to dties outsicle of
Nairobi. The World Bank's Urban II projec.::t inc.::luded Mombasa and lUsumu,
in additi~n to Nairobi. In mGviRCJ to these second-level c.::ities, it was
~roposed that loc.::al authorities WGuld be ~rimarily responsible for imp-
lementinq the sc.::hemes with over all s\1pervision by the Ministry of
Housinq and Soc.::ial Services.
13. Estimates suggested that the short-fall between housing unit
production (by both private and public.:: sec.::tors) and household
formation may be as high as 17,000 per annum. Muc.::h of this demand
is aCC011U11odated in illegal or otherwise sub-standard dwellings and
squatters' ~uarters.
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To facilitate project implementation r.~w Housing Development
Departments were established. These new departments were created to
strengthen local oouncil capacities to plan and manage the low-income
shelter projects being financed# and could not have been established
except for the insistence of the Worl~ Bank. The departments were an
attempt to bring together various aSPeCts of project implementation and
to effect ooordination of shelter sector activities at the local level
and ensure vertical integration between the local and ~ational level.
The new de~rtments cut across established lines of power and res-
ponsibility and were accorded a ra.ther cool reception. Despite a long
period of discussions and negotiations that preceded the establishment
of the department in Kiswnu, it has taken a lone; time to gain accep-
tance.
Staffing the new departm~nts also has been a problem. In KisUIllu,
after three years, the department is still not fally staffed, and there
are still areas in which the action-orientation of the department's
shelter project runs afoul of the established procedures and institll-
tional structures which remain essentially unchanged despite the inser-
tion of this new department.
Central government officials are skeptical about the ability of
local government to man'2ge projects. Local governments feel that,
although they are under increased pressure to acconunodate new programs
and are anxioas to exercise more initiative in matters of arban planninq
and management, they currently lack the financial and technical resaar-
ces to respond positively. Local government officials argue that it is
qui te right that secondary cities shoald develop their own independen:
capacity to conceive of, and implement, projects for their ~ple. As
one official put it, "People need to qrow with the city."
There is a need for a greater measare of cantrol 07er finances and
decisions e:an is currently possible in an institational structure which
still is highly centraliZed. Capital bUdqets and recurrent expenditures
must be approved in Nairobi. Decision-makiACJ needs to be vested in
local aathor i ties so that long delays, occasioned by the need for cen-
tral government approval, can be avoided.
If a sewer breaks or a contractor runs over am~unts budqeted, lonq
delays are experienced in gaining appr0val for needed adjl1stments (l)r
additional expenses. The provision of water tG a l(l)W-cost h(l)using
scheme in Kisumu has been the subject of considerable debate regardinq
resp0nsibility f(l)r a l(l)nq delay in completinC) the connections. Occu-
paf'cy of the oompleted units has been pestponed for an embarrassingly
long time because the (l)riginal contractor failed to complete the I:'ro-
ject, citing inadequate funds. Need for a seocnd contract, invGlving
new requests, appraisals and approvals, has delayed the prGject fl.ir-
there That water should be raliGned in the face Gf an "anlimited" sup-
ply available frGm Lake Vict@ria is a sore PGint f(l)r local Gffieials.
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Kisumu r Kenya's third largest city, is experiencing other problems
of ur ban growth. Besides water r there is a need for other infrastruc-
ture to facilitate the planned industrial expansion in the town. Issues
of land use control and management have arisen and much of the current
expansion is taking place without adequate planning or direction.
Similar problems have been experienced in other secondary
cities. The government and the international donor agencies are recog-
nizing that shelter sector projects mast be related to other facets of
urban growth. Recent project documents have argued for shelter projects
to be linked to employment and economic development strategies r provi-
sion of social services and improvement in local capacity to manage
growth. Yet, despite the increased sensitivity to problems of
institution-building, such changes have proven in Kenya, as in the other
countries that have tried to achieve progress in this area, exceedingly
difficult to effect.
Given the very serious problems which have been en<.:ountered in
implementing projects in Nairobi, KisUIna and Mombasa, the move to
develop projects in more than thirty small towns, tbere local resollrces
and management capability are much more limited, presents a formidable
challenge to the government and international agencies cooperating in
the project. Most of the Gbstacles to sIJccessfal implementation of
arban projects identified in the experiences of Urban I and Urban II
still remain. Although cIJrrent project designs are addressing some of
~hGse issaes and alternative strategies have been pIlt forward to remedy
them, it is anlikely that the will be resGlved adequately prior to the
ini tiation of the secondary city projects -- even thoagh both internal
political and external aid pressures are at work.
The eventaal impact of these oontL1uing problems on the likelihood
of saccess remains a matter of conjectare. However, it seems a fGregone
concllJsion that the projects will proceed given the gGvernment's deter-
mination to mGunt a nationwicie shelter prGgram and the willingness of
lBRD and other donGr agencies to finance the schemes.
The central issIJes involved in the secondary city J!)rojects which
are a oontinuing source of concern tG project planners include:
National Level Mechanisms
Inter-Ministerial and inter-agency ceGrdination, and
Appropriateness of existing national instit\ltions fGr imple
menting the J!)rojects and f~cilitating \lrban develGpment.
Local Institutional Capacity
Ability of local authorities to participate effectively in
planning r a-nd eventually, to manage cr i tical aspects 0f lJrJ:)an
development, and
Service delivery capability and financial management capacity.
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Land Issues
Availability of serviceo land foe the projects and for
artic~pated future growth.
v. NationaL/Level Mechanisms
I
There 2re a host of national, provincial an~ local level auth-
orities ~ire<~tly and indirectly affecting urban development in Kenya, as
indicated ir. the accompanying table. Efforts to ensure that these auth-
orities are not working at cross purposes are reqllired. Areas of res-
ponsibilit.y and definitioo of fanctions for each autoority require
clarification. ,
,
1.Je recent clash involving the MiJ'.ster for Urban DevelQpment and
Housi~, the IWiinister of Local Governm.tnt and the Nairobi City Council
QVer allocation (j)f units in the Kahawa West tena·nt Plirclaase housing
scheme in Nairobi ill~strates tte potential fQ[ conflict.
The nation;lll level ins'.:itutions IIDst directly involved in the
secondary city p~Qjects are:
1. the Ministry (j)f g~ban Development and Ro~sing (MOOR),
2. the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) and
3. the CQrnmissioner (j)f Lands, Office of the President.
The Ministry of Orban Development and Housing (MUDS) is desi~nated
to play a aentral role in the shelter sector plans for seoonciary
oi ties. Tlte Physical Planning Department (PPD) is to be responsible for
cOGrdinat1nq subdivision plans, and approviRCJ the clesign of she1ter and
telated community service facilities. ltec@l'\t transfer of the PhysiQal
Planning De{-.IIlrtment from the l'lliftistry Ci>f LGG:al Govermnent was intended
to faQilitate pl['ojectt <lesign and i-rnplelftflltati-en. A new project Plumin<J
tJnit (PPU) is prGlpt;>sed fCi>c 1'IJmI UGl streACJthen the Ministry's proje¢t
planning, G:Ci)Ci>rclination and impl.ementatiOA aQtivlties. This utdt is t<l
Be established with the assistaftQe <If techniQal advisers prGvicied for in
the 1Gan agreements. It is expect~~ that the PPU will play a majGlr role
in f<lr~iACJ inter-ministerial ti.!s anel QlC!)(nciinatinCJ the activities Glf
natiGlnal, pc<lvincial, elistria:t and 1GQal authorities. It is a1_ ex·p@¢-
ted to I10fti tCi>r the flGlW Gf f mds and exereise GlYer all (JGlntrel Ci>f the
pr<ljeet schedul~. The aaility of this I1nit to Whit the CJcGunci runnin~w
anel ~ickly tc gain the QlC!)nfidenQe anel oollaaGratiCi>n of ~iverse qCi>vern-
ment aathorities seems essential 00 the smooth fllnetioning <If the SeeC!>h-
~ary city initiatives.
The NatiCi>na1 Rousing CGrperation (NBC) is t<l be respt;>nsible within
MUlE for implementing the hOlJsi~ projeets ir. seeenciary ei ties. The NBC
is also bein~ studied M determine 00.. best it might Be reorganized anet
staffed. (The ability to attra¢t and maintai'A qaalifietl staff has Been
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a oontinuing problem for this agency.) Since the NRC is so import-mt in
tbe actual provision of shelter, the nature of the proposed reorgani-
zation and ability of NRC personnel to carry out their tasks under the
secondary city development program will be critical to the program's
success.
The Ministry of Local Government (lIIGL) bas responsibility over
local government authorities' operations and financing and the training
of local government personnel. Tt.e fIIIlLG oversees all aspects of local
government finances, approves budgets, provides loans for infrastructure
projects, and author izes changes in senior staff pes i tions. Recently
the Ministry bas undergone a reorganization aimed at strengthening its
ability to work effectively for local government improvement. ~estions
concerning its ability to manage a major new program have been r ...ised.
The Conunissioner of Lands in the Office of the Presicient is res-
posible for proviciing public lands for shelter projects and must approve
all subdivision plans. Becaase many cnmplex isslJes regarding land
availability and land ase bave yet to be resolved" the cooperation of
this G>ffice will be another critical aspect of the secondary cities
program. Land issues were one of the major sources G>f delay in earlier
arban prG>jects.
The recent reorganizatiG>n and strengthening of these natiG>nal
level institations reflect awareness OR the part of governmen.t that
political and administrative weaknesses that hampered previous projects
mast be corrected. The major qtJestion that still remains to be answered
is whether the p>J:o(i'Osed changes will have a chance to "jell" before
being severely tested by the task of administerin<j a massi-ve new loan
package and coordinating the implementation of simultaneous shelter pro-
jects in several widely separated small towns. It also remains to be
seen whether the currently r-e<:>rganized institutions will prove tQ be
better suited to the dynamics of self-help and apcJrading appr<:>aches to
shelter p>J:ovision. than they were before reorganizati<:>n.
There is a particalar challenge here to
exercise sensitivity in balancing assistance
instituti<:>n-buildi~ objectives and those of
achieve tangible production g<:>als.
VI. Local Institutional Capacity
the donor agencies tG
efforts between their
meetinq pressllres tG
Local authorities in Kenya differ in their size anc! ftmctions,
including city councils (Nai~bi), municipal counties, county CGuncils,
tawn councils and urban councils. Local auth<:>rities ~iffer in their
resJ,lGnsibilities and staffing patter All. Al th<:>uCJh all involve some
deCJree sf responsibility for planning, development and service ~elivery,
ties with eeAtral government agencies are still strong.
Tewns are gsverned Dy elected aeuneils and derive revenues from a
variety of local ta~es, levies and fees. Capital Budget is p>rl!lvicied
thr0~gh the central government (NBC Gr MGL).
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Most observers agre~ that current resources and staff would be
inadequate to the task of administering the type of shelter projects
envisaged in the secondary city plans. A greatly expanded training
pr09ram would be required to provide local authority with requisite
skills to exercise greater control over project implementation and man-
agement. Experience in past urban projects sU9gests that local capacity
to absorb major projects is limited and may be a source of difficulty
and delay in implementation. Since most international donor agencies
now stress the need for local participation and strengthened local
institutional capacity in their policy statements, at least some atten-
tion must be given to this area of concern..
Some observers qtJestion whether the lessons of the previous urban
projects have been SUfficiently "internalized" by the international
donor agencies. In the effort to "deliver" infrastructure and shelter
projects, wi 11 the government and donor agencies have the patience to
foster real local participatim and encourage local institution-
building? As with 11Gst projects of this type, there is a tensiQA
between process and product. The government is anxious to produce
housing units, the donors are eager to finance them and there will be a
strong temptation to implement the projects without significant partici-
pation of local authorities.
Although current project documents call for increased training of
local authorities, it does not appear to be a major item in the budgets,
and the details of the training are very sketchy. The nature and extent
of training required are currently linder study by a government task
force, blit details still are not clearly defined. It appears mst
likely that training of local officials aAd staff is to be lindertak~n
concomitantly with project implementation.
The experience of previolis urban pni)jects in secoRdary cities,
such as those undertaken by AID's Office of Urban Development in Ghana,
Th~iland and Nicara~ua, suggests that training of lGCal authorities and
upc;Jrading skills of looal staff are essential aspects of instit\ltion-
alizing a land lise programming process. These experiences also suggest
that b\lilding a firm insti t\ltic:mal capacity for urban administration,
planning and management requires more than on-the-job training.
Under present thinking, many important aspects (;)f the secondary
city projects will rely on central governmeRt personnel and o\ltside COA-
sultaRts. The projects are intended tG enhance looal capacity rather
than create full prGject management capability at the local level.
VII. Land Iss\les
Land ownershir and use has a eomplex history in Renya. Complica-
tions arise fram the fact that several different land tenlJre systems
operate. Land is elassified as public laRds, whieh are owned by the
Government of Kenya or the local gGvernmental authorities, anG private
lands. Availability ef public lan~s fGr use in aceGmmGdating housing or
\Irban services is becc:mting a problem in many of the secGAdary eities.
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Areas previously set aside in townships and municipalities have been
exhausted quickly by urban expansion, and these "urban land banks" have
not been augmented, owing to inadequate financial resources and politi-
cal problems surrounding compulsory purchase of land.
Land registration is chao~ic with two and three claim~'ts to par-
ticular parcels of land. These issues of land are the subject of cur-
rent study by government, but a national land policy has yet to be
annolinced.
The land use plans wh ien have been produceG; as part of physical
planning exercises at the provinci31, district and municipaJ. levels are
rarely implementable. Plans for cities such as Kisumu are not tied to
sectoral plannir1 and project planning activities of the central gover~­
ment ministries. Thus they are frequently of little use when p.tblic
sector investments and prGjects are being planned or imrlemented. The
private sectGr frequently is either ignGrant that a plan exists an that
a particular procedure is required befGre land is develGPed, Gr chQOses
tG ignGre trGubleSQme Gr incGnvenient aSPeCts of the plans and prGce-
dures. In mGst cases the lGCal authorities are too understaffed and
insufficiently financed to monitor land develGpment. Although there are
legal instruments fGI enforcing compliance with the local plans,
including the ul timate threat Gf demGliticm, in fact this occurs less
and less frequently due to political pressures. The plans are becGming
simply "advisGry" documents, prepared "in the hopes that private
developers will fGllow the plan". Evidence suggests Gverwhelmingingly
that, <::>n. the contrary, development not in accordance with the plans is
very rapidly occurring, thus rendering the plans GbsGl\~tP.. Urban
development is calling fGr, and shaping, revisiGns in the plans
CQmpletely reversing the relatiGns~ip which had been intended.
Planning and implementatiGn Gf Frojects are still highly central-
ized in Kenya. There is an GAgGing prGject aimed at decentralizatiGn of
re<Jional planning and ooilding planning capacity at the district level
in Kenya. This prGject, prGviding technical support thrGugh the Harvard
Institute Gf InternatiGnal DevelGpment, has just been renewed fGr a
secGnd phase. There is apparently 11 tt1le ceGrdiRation betweeR this
effert to establish strong district level planRing capacity and the
project planRing activities being undertakeR for secondary cities.
There still is a great deal of uncertaiRty aBGut the appropriate
type Gf planRing for Kenya, and contiRuiRg conflict betweeR thGse pur-
suing the more traditional ferms of re~ional/physical planning exercises
and these pUBhing for CJreater action-Grlented, projeet-based pllannin~.
The physical planninCJ of the past was wedded tGO literally to central
place concepts and lexicon. Such plans proved teo rigid and rarely were
implemented. All the actiGn tGGk place in spite of the plaRs.
On the other hand, planning linked selely to a single ~roject fre-
quently preved my0pic and implementation of projects was del~yed. werse
still, are projects which were C0m~leted in splendid iS01ation and sat
idle ewing to the absence of other, suppcrting institutions, services or
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activities. Errors of both types must be avoided. But to do so will
require a new concept of plar..ning, neither so ambitious as the
conprehensive physical plan nor so narrow as the project plan. The
outlines of such a planning process can be seen in the recent planning
documents being written in Kenya today. but it is still very much in the
drawing board stage.
VIII. COncluding Comments
Kenya is in tr..e midst of a major effort to restructure its abil.";ty
t~ plan and implement a s~~ndary city policy. It:5 relatively easy t~
tind fault with various aspects of previous urban projects and to raise
questions about current plans. However. or,e cannot help belong impressed
with the genuine progress that has been made in a relatively short time
and the determination that marks curre~t go~rnment effor~s to cope with
a myriad of long-term issues lbile energetically Plrsuing stort-term
projects with the host of daily crises that beset such efforts.
Kenya's struggle to define its secondary city policies and design
an efficient system for delivering shelter and services to growing
settlements is being conducted with the surveillance and participation
of numerous international agencies. The reslilts of Kenya's experiment
with secondary city development undolibtedly will be of interest to other
countries, and the amount of review and analysis to which it is being
subjected ensllres that ample lIDnitoring and documentation of the suc-
cesses and faillires will be available for others to study.
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VI. AID Office of Urban DeVelopment Land Use Programming
Demonstration Program
In the early 1970s, when AID's Office of Urban Development (05100)1
turned to focus on secondary cities of the developing world they ~o~€saw
the possibility of many Agency interests converging in this subject.
The secondary cities appeared to offer opportunity for strengthen-
ing a hierarchy of links between the nations' industrial and agricul-
tural growth centers. These cities seemed to be strategic locatiors for
decentralizing national administrative machinery and development resour-
ces. The idea that they might be a.i.ternative ma9nets for rural migrants
was yet another consideration in light of the major metropoli~an areas'
overwhelming growth.
Moreover, many of the se~nda~y ci~ies ~~r~, themselves, experienc-
ing rapid growth. Lacking the planni!'l9 sl(ilJ;:; and other institlitional
resolirces to manage their expansion in Ql. c :cerly -.y, these municipal-
ities were exhibiting signs of strain an'~ (eterioratiQ'1. Their problems
had mt yet reached the poir.t of S€\Terity evidenced in the largest
cities. There seemed still t;O be time to influence the course of devel-
opment but few on the local :';C'l!ne were really able to do so. This
seemed to be a real opportunity for USAID to make an impact through
technical assistance w~thir. ti~e scope of both its mandate and its
resollrces.
Al though the literaturE" on lirbanization at the time was flill of
material on the largest -- or primate -- cities of developing cOlintries
and their problems, relatively little was known about the secondary
cities. In order to have solid grounding for an assistance program, the
Office of Urban Development undertook a systematic inql1iry into the
situatioo and trends of the secondary cities. The research effGrt en-
compassed wide-ranging interests: frGm the nature of the secondary
cities' economic bases and roles in their respective national economi~s,
to identificatiGn of the forces generating their growth and emergent
issues associated with it, their management, and the decision prGCesses
affecting flit\lre develGpment. Questions of appropriate forms Gf assis-
tance, specifically thGse which uSAID could offer, were aleG addressed.
The idea of l;~d \lse programming grew out Gf one of these stlidies. 2
DS/UD saw it as a potentially useful techniqlie, ap~licable in the !hGrt
term, for helping intermediate dties remGve impediments to growth and
prepare tG accommodate it. Land use prGgramming was a logical COIIlple-
ment ~ ~le Agency's ether interests in urban finance, urban and
regional planning and building the capacity of local government. It was
1. Developtnent Sli~rt Sunall, U.S. Agency for International Develo~
mente
2. Rivkin? Land Use and the Intermediate Size City in ~evelGpin,
Countries, Praeger, l'7ti.
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envisioned originally as operating in the context of, anc in support of,
national development strategies such as the creation of "growth poles"
or "concentrated decentralization of investment" that were becoming more
and more prevalent at the time. It was not presented as a strategy for
secondary city economic development, or even amelioration, in its own
right. Rather, it was originally conceived as a means of enabling the
larger development st=atc~gies to be more effective and more easily
assimilated.
Land use came under the spotlight because serious land development
problems were becoming apparent in. the secondary cities cf countries
where programs for decentralizing economic development were in effect,
and where substantial physical develC'pment and population growth were
occurring as result of development investments. Some of these problems
- for example, conflicts of activities competing for land, preemption
of expansion land on the urban fringe by uncontrolled sprawl of squatter
settlements, rampant speculation, overloaded infrastlucture systems and
insufficiel"t urban services, infringement of new develoFment on the
existing, projects poorly coordinated in space and time etc. - were
clearly threatening to the success of the development effort.
Thoughtful provision for solutions in advance of actual construc-
tion pr(')j~c':s would rot only help avoid these problems, but oould also
enhance the :!ffic:iency or economic benefi t.~ of the development inv~st­
ments. This war; the rationale for intervening in land use matters.
Because the laid use management program was conceived as an aspect of
national secondary cities policy and progranuning, it was envisioned as
operating within such a context, not as as isolated effort separate from
other development activities.
No particular weighting of land use problems relative to otners of
the secondary cities was implied. Other problems, it was assumed, would
be dealt with through other techniques, very likely at the same time and
in the same places as application of the land use programming approach.
Meanwhile, the research program of the Office of Urban Development
itself was pursuing separate, additional avenues of inquiry. They
sought to develop a broad base of comparative information about the
economic functions of secondary cities in developing countries world-
wide. They undertook to examine the role of urban areas in rural
development, and to discover through experimentation effective means of
stimUlating small enterprise development. The Office also sponsored
res\~arch on alternative approaches to the physical development of urban
areas in a manner which incorporate economic and social development
objectives as well.
Approach to be Demonstrated
Traditional master plans with their static approach were proving to
be ineffective instruments for guiding rapid secondary city expansion in
the oontext of the decentralized development programs under way. Pre-
pared by fore ign consliltants or national government offidals in the
225
capi tals, these plans may have once recognized actual local o::>ndi tions
and possibly have involved contact with local authorities. But by and
large they were not being regularly reviewed and adjusted in light of
changi~g circumstances.
These traditional master plans were never really designed to serve
as guides for the selection of specific project sites or for actions to
stimulate economic development. N01= were they linked to capital
budgets, schedules or clearly drawn institutional responsibilities for
implementation. Consequently, they were poor guides for coordinating
diverse development projects. In many cases these master plans did not
even o::>ver the urban frine;.: ~reas where growth pressures were becoming
particularly heavy.
The master plans were not really enforceable by local officials
either - sometimes because of limited jurisdictional authority, often
because of insufficient manpower, resources and provision for the full
range of urban activity seeking accommodation. Even central government
agencies tended to honor the plans m:>re in the breach than in the
following.
By ex>ntrast, land use prOCjranuning was oonceptualized as a oontin-
uous process, locally based in the secondary cities themselves. It was
to involve analysis, planning, development and evaluation. Its product
was not to be a set of fine maps and documents stored away for the fut-
ure appreciation of archivists but rather an on~oin9 series of rational
interventions in the crucial decisions affecting physical development of
the cities.
In the process, local officials would gain skills in assessing pro-
jects proposed by central g0vernment and other outside sources Gf in-
vestment. They would learn tG anticipate impacts and contribute to the
resGlution Gf prGblems. USAID alsG hoped to stimulate local initiative
in secur ing develGpment investments by teaching municipal Qfficials tQ
fQrmulate worthwhile prGjects and make persuasive presentatiQns.
Real, immediate Vmd use prQblems and develQP!"~nt issues were thlJS
the central concerns of land lJse prGgranuning as d:.stinglJished from the
lQng range, theQretical and OGmprehensive master plans with their
schemes Qf how everything Qught Gne day tG laok.
AID's Office Gf Urban DevelGpment undertOQk tG dem0nstrate the con-
cept Gf land lJse prQgramming thrQugh a gr0lJp Gf three pilQt prGjects --
Gne in Leon, Nicara9ua~ anGther, in ChGneuri, Thailand, the thir<J, in
Tamale, Ghana. They took place Gver a perioo 0f six years (H76-81).
Though a rodest activity by AID standards, this effGrt invQlving three
c 1 ties on three cQnti nents, dozens Qf prGfessiGnals and mGre than a
decade Gf man-years, came to represent a sizable intellectual invest-
ment.
The three pilQt projects are row oompleted, but fer a fGllGw-lilp
phase ef technical assistanCe! in Tamale. In keeping with DS/OD's
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mission to advance the ·state of the art" in urban developm~nt, certain
lessons from tl~ experience are recorded below.
Design of the Demonstration Project
Each of the demonstration projects pivoted around a sinc;le field
representative of a u.s. contractor who, together with technical support
from his parent firm, was responsible for establishing a land use pro-
granuning process in a given city.3 These were cities selected by the
USAID Office of Urban Development in consaltation with the resPeCtive
host cotmtry govetnments.
Gaidelines for the two-year resident technical advisers 4 called for
them to work with and train local officials as they went alonc;, incor-
porating the principal elements of land ase prO<jranuning into the pilot
city's ongoing institational framework. The project design incladed
activities O\1tlined in the original 1974 staGy: goal setting, assembly
and analysis of relevant data, preparation of a flexible, shcxt-term
gaide plan, es tablishmen t of techniques far shaping land ase, project
"packaging·, i.e. devising specific development prajects and other
actians which woald be early steps in plan implementation, and setting
up procedares for CQntinll10us moni tc:>r ing of develapment and keeping the
land use program up to date.
Inasmlich as this project was designed to test ideas aoout inter-
vention in urban development (specifically, teChnical assistance as a
means c:>f instit\1ting the approach in secandary cities) rather than as a
research praject ta gather data abaut the cities, it contributes more to
aur evolving notiGns Glf land use prc:>gramminq and technical assistance
than tc:> c:>ur general understanding c:>f the natare and eC0n0mic faActi0ns
Gf intermediate size cities.
Beyc:>nd this, the pilGt effQrts have shed li~ht on questions of pra-
ject design, i.e. the translati0R 0f the land ase ~rQgrammiACJ cancept
iAtQ a demoAstratiQn exercise and QA praject implementatiM, i.e. the
actual applicatiGn Glf the ideas in specific sitliatic:>ns.
The Off ice Qf Urban DevelGlpment oonvened a day-lGng seminar QA
March 5, 1981 in Washingt0A, D. C. tG assess the Gver all pilc:>t effort
and discliss fatare <iirectiGns f",r seeondary cities develQpment plaRAing.
Field personnel and DS!UD personnel whc:> were involved in all three pilot
projects partieipated., as <i.i.d c:>ther USAID staff, representatives Gf the
WGrld Bank and memaers c:>f lU"kin Associates who e0n<i\icted the initial
study in 1974.
3. The Ch0nauri projeet was an exeeptic:>n in that it incllided a grC:>\ip
Gf three small eities sitaated quite clc:>sely te eaeh ether.
4. Backgr011nd af the field persGnnel in Le0A and Tamale was I1rl!lan
planning. The Chenauri prGject ineluded aGth an uraan planner and a
specialist in l1£ban fiAa~ce.
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Dr. Eric Chetwynd, Deputy Director of DSjUD, introduced the seminar
with a chronology of AID's interest in the field, leading to this pre-
sent "state of the art" review. Dr. Michael McNulty, ~o helped
formulate and organize the three pilot projects whi:Le on assignment to
DS!OD, delivered a theme setting paper. The remainder of the discussion
was devcted to the Land Use Programming demonstration experience by the
participants. 5
'.I.he chief adviser-participants Presented the chief features of
their respective pilot efforts - the situation of the place where eacn
was assigned and the manner in which eacn set about his task. These
individuals were very different in style, and the local contexts in
which the~' worked were also very different. They offered quite dif-
ferent perspectives on the over all SUbject. These lessons are worth
noting in brief outline without encouraging either direct comparison or
global generalization.
Leon, Nicaragua
This pilot project was the first to start. It ran between January
1976 and September 1977.
Setting
Leon was Nicaragua's second largest city witn population of 100,000
(incll1ding 75,000 in the city and another 25,000 in the rl1ral hinter-
land). It was the center of an agricl1ltl1ral area mainly engaged in cot-
ton production. Although Leon's popl1lation had recently become swollen
by refl1gees from the earthquake in Managua, 50 miles to the sol1thwest,
it was not really a growing I1r~an center. Its population had actl1ally
been declining. OWing to industrialization Chinandega, 40 miles to the
north, was the region's fastest grc:>wing city even though it lacked the
complement of existing infrastructure present in Leon.
Leadership
Leadership by Leon's dynamic, aggressive mayor was the J1Dst dis-
tinctive characteristic of the Leon situation. A business partner of
the then-presidlent, and well-conn~cted to the decisic:>n-makiACJ structure
in the capital, he was looking tG obtain both prestieJe and investment
f0r his city.
5. Dr. McNulty observed in revising his paper after the seminar that
the presence of no more than c:>Ae of the developing cc:>untry partici-
pants frc:>m the pilot projects meant a valuable S(;)urce of insights
and important perspective on the program was missing. Ultimate
judgment as to whether land use proqramming is a worthwhile approach
for guidirlg the growth of their secc:>ndary cities and just what sc:>rt
of framework the developing countries will utilize, if any, he be-
lieves, rests with national and loeal offieials of those cC:>lJntcies.
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Conflicting Perceptions
Initially it seemed that local, national and international agencies
had a similar conception of the pilot land use programming project.
This turned out, however, not to be the case. Central government was
interested in obtaining external financial assistance, but saw the pro-
ject as a convent':'onal P'lysical planning exercise. The USAID Mission
was interested in advancing development in Nicaragua and saw the project
as a means of supporting its strategy to foster a policy of decentra-
lization out of the capital city. Together, the mayor and other key
sponsors of the project seemed united and compatible. Independently,
and in practice. their views were actually divergent.
Chonburi, Siracha and Phanat Nikom, Thailand
The second of the demonstrations to get under way, the Thailand
project was conducted between January 1977 and August 1979.
Setting
Three cities ranging in size from 20,000 to 40,000 were involved in
this project, Chonburi being the largest. None of them was growing
although their hinterland (comprised of unincorporated "sanitary dis-
tricts") was experiencing a great deal of spillover growth from Bangkok,
only 1 1/2 hour's drive away. The region was generally prosperous with
this new industrial and commercial development spreading out from the
capital added to its agricultural base.
The most salient "fact" of the project setting (the intransigence
of which was not fUlly revealed or appreciated during the ~ocess of its
selection) was that the three urban jurisdictions had no authority over,
or responsibility for, develGpment in the sanitary districts outside
their bGundaries. Consequently they had little or no influence over th'e
urbanizing region's physical pattern of expansion. The demonstratiGn's
objective, i.e. prOViding a framework for guiding urbanization, was thus
jeopardized from the outset. The provincial administration, also a
part.' tG the technical assistance agreement, had auth0rity tc:> extend the
project's influence over the sanitary districts but apparently did oot
chGOse to d0 so.
Nati0nal Instituti0n
Thailand has had central g0vernment agencies expressly ooncerned
wit!':! decentralizinCJ development outside the primate city of Bangkok.
There were two operatinCJ at the time of the pilot project: The National
E00n0mic and 500ial Devel0l?tnent BGard (NF'..sDB), a planninCJ and pri0rity-
setting arm of the Prime Ministry, and the T0WA and CGuntry Planning
Office 0f the Ministry 0f Interior. NESDB was ostensibly trying to
f0ster decentralized CJrGWth through a proCJram 0f "re9i0nal cities". The
Town and CGuntry PlanninCJ Offiee was oharCJed with preparinCJ local
plans. While the 0rganizational structure f0r nati0nal sUi>p0rt ef the
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secondary cities project existed, conflicts between the two key institu-
tions apparently nullified potential support for the Chonburi project
once it was under way.
Staff Selection Issues
To be effective, a technical assistance effort requires abi lity on
the part of project staff to convey ideas. In the case of ChonOOri, an
American adviser had been selected who appeared to have appropriate pro-
fessional background as well as the advantages of long residency in
Thailand and knowledge of its language and institutions. Once on the
job, however, the individual (who had had close ties with the Town and
Country Planning Board) came into sharp conflict wi th N~DB, the princi-
pal sponsor of the project. After a few months, he was withdrawn at the
request of NESDB. His successor was never able to establish sufficient
rapport with the agencies involved to overcome the residual hostility.
Project Identification
One objective of the demonstration was identificatiGn of specific
development projects which could be implemented in support ,.,f the area's
growth. In Chonbur i, certain pet projects already \mder ccnsideration
by local officials were presented to the advisers for imp1ementatiGn.
An already-difficult situation was aggravated since the main proposal, a
reclamation project to create development land within ful1y-built-up
Chonburi, proved infeasible when subjected to analysis. Similar pro-
jects in the other communities, hotel and market developments for exam-
ple also posed seriolis problems. Acoordinq tQ the field persQRne1,
lQca1 Qfficia1s were so committed to their ini~ial ideas that they were
not open tQ the fQrmulatiQR and potential implementation of Qther pro-
jects that might have been more worthwhile.
Financial Com20nent
Chonburi was the only pilot project to include staff with special
expertise in public finanoe. The additional analysis therehly oontri-
buted proved extremely important in revea1inq Loth the heavy dependence
of local government on transfer payments from the national level and the
iAabili ty of local government independently m undertake deve1GJ"II1ent
projects at its own discretion. Unfortunately, inter-institutiGnal C3n-
fHcts prevented the team's financial analyst from obtaining essential
information and bringing his recommendations into the policy forwmlation
prooess at ooth the Aati~Aal and 1aeal levels. I:.aeal GfUcia1s had the
miscGnception that he was there to justify and obtain fiAancinq to imp-
lement their pet projects. They seemed disappoiAted to learn he was
there to subject these schemes to systematic aAalysis.
Assistance to Local DecisioA-flIa~rs
Another 0bjective was to provide continl!iAg assistanee to local
decision-makers on day-to-day issl!es Qf land \:lBe and Itevelopment. Appa-
rently, these issues were ooAsidered llllsignd.fieant by 100al officials in
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the three communities and
personnel were unwelcome.
USAID field team were thus
of the land use programming
Site Selection Issues
potential advisory services of the project
Unable to function in this capacity, the
unable to demonstrate some central elements
approach.
In the case of Chonbur i, USAID faced the same fundamental problem
in site selection as it had in Leen. The principal sponsoring agency of
central government, NESDB, represented from the outset that the Chonburi
area was a key target location for national decentralization efforts.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary during the selection mission~
Chonburi seemed an eminently loqical choice to USAID.
Tamale, Ghana
Tamale was the last of the three demonstration projects to get
going, having been ~layed by internal disruption in the country.
setting
Tamale is a "free standing", rapidly growing center of a large
agricultural district more than 400 miles north of the Accra, the
national capital. The ur:banized area oontains about 300,000 PeOple,
about half of whom live in Tamale itself. USAID and the Gover~ent of
Ghana decided to place the technical assistance project at the District
level and have it encompass the whole 4S by 38 mile area rather than the
\lrban center alone.
Tamale nas been the only one of the three pilot cities actually to
extPerienoe the kind Gf rapid grGwth the land use proqranuning apprGach
was develGped to help manaqe. S Althouqh the other pilot sites initially
appeared to the USAID site selection teams at the time of their field
visits to meet the basic criterion put forward for choice of d~monstra­
tion sites, Tamale, alone, turned out truly to have met this basic cri-
terion. In addition, it was the only pilot situation which was arranged
fran the outset to deal with the entire urbanizinq regi<:.n. In this
respect, tiGe, it was distinct from the Chonbur i and Leon cases.
5. Data and maps of the settlement pattern in Leon had presented the
USAID site selection team a picture of rapid recent population
growth. That this was a relatiwly tempc!)racy f;)heAomenGn, oowever,
due to the sl:ldden infllJK Gf earthquake refHgees frGI/II ManaglJa, became
clear only later, when the oontraeter who WGlJld direct the pilot
project went to Leon for a menth-long pre-preject reconnaissance.
In the case of the Thailand project, the USAIa site selection team
recegnized that the region's ra~id grewth was net occurring in
either Chonoori or the other twe t(!)WRS bl1t rather in the sanitary
district outside. They had expected, however, that a major
eontriblJtieA ef the pilot prClject itself WGIJl<i be a ratienaliziACJ af
the ~roeess and resulting pattern Clf regional ~rowth.
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The Reconnaissance Mission
Although the U.S.-based program manager made reconnaissance
missions to each of the countries - and the cities - which were
selected for pilot projects r the case of Taanale differed from its pre-
decessors in that there were r in effect, two such visits. The purpose
of the second visit was to provide current inforntat-ion on the project
situation because a three and a half years had elapsed since the ori-
ginal terms of reference for the project had been negotiated. The
designated field director participated in the second advance visit r
preceding his actual technical assistance assignment. 6
Between the two visits of the program manager r the idea of land use
programming -- how the pilot project would work, the ways in which it
could help Tamale's development problems -- and r indeed r the development
problems themselves seem to have had time to "sink in" with local and
district officials. When they were called on to reaffirm their interest
in the project r and willinqness to SUPPOlt it, they seem to have been
able to do so wi th a considerably greater degree of understanding and,
consequently, receptivitYr than was possible the first time around.
Governmental/Institutional Interest
During the project the Government of Ghana underwent a number of
internal upheavals and major currency manipulations. Nevertheless,
there appeared to be consistent interest on the part of central govern-
ment agencies in the growth of Tamale as a major secondary center, in
securing and continuing USAID financial and technical assistance for the
project, and in regarding Tamale as a test case for local and district
organizational reform. This interest r plus a considerable degree of
stability at the local level of government and consistent support by the
AID/Ghana mission despite severe logistic and comnnmicatioAS difficul-
ties, sustained the project.
The Implementation F~cus
While the project was represented ~. the Office of Urban Develop-
ment as one concerning land use p>lanniRC) ~nd p>rogranuning, the intense
interest of all levels of government involved WCll:l 1.1 implementation and
project ~eneration, nGt Q\ plannillCJ. Indeed, the prGject team Gbserved
a general negative attitl1de iR government t0wara planning per see As lA
6. A reconnaissance visit to the project site had been arranged in
advance for each designated contrac;tor-prGject direetor in advance
of the actual start 0f his technical assistance missi0n. This per-
mitted the contractor's team to develop a work pr0gram based on
first-han~ impressions 0f conditi0ns to be addressed in the ~urse
of the project. In the Leon and Chonburi cases the o. S. -based pr0-
~~am m~na~er was nat alang, h0wever, tB share directly the data r
o~servations, '.!xpectatians, and cHscIJssi0AS of 0ther matters per-
tinent ~0 the project.
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Nicaragua and Thailand, government officials expected the pilot planning
project to be linked to capital assistance which would follow. In the
Ghana case, however, there were no strongly-held pre-conceived notions
about what the projects should be (as there were in Thailand). Project
recommendations generated in the course of the work were expected,
produced and welcomed.
Counterparts
In Tamale a fairly senior level professional counterpart was
assigned to work with the project team fran the outset. Be worked as a
true oounterpart, establishing the channels to decision-makers that
would have been diff:Jcult to open otherwise. After a year on the pro-
ject he was replaced temporarily so he cou.ld oome to the United States
for advanced training. He will reslJme his post in Tamale when his
course is completed.
Targets of Opportunity
From the outset the staff director adopted a strategy that empha-
sized "targets of opportunity", Le. seeking in the daily pattern of
events, places and ways he could make helpful cxmtril:>u.tions. This
resulted in activities which did not necessarily follow the logical
sequence of a preplanned work program., but did serve the fundamental
purpose of making the project valuable to local authorities. Some of
his "targets" were:
1. District level organization and performance
To effect improvements in this area the resident adviser orga-
nized a series of 35 management workshops for Distri~t offi~ials in both
political de~ision-making roles and various te~ni~al positions. Impar-
ting knGWledge was one obje~tive of these sessions. Others were
coordination and simply aommunication to overcome the fragmented insti-
tutional framework for district and lo~al de~ision-makiACJ. In this
effort, the land use progununinq re~resentative joined fQr~es with
another AID-sponsored program, the ECQnomic Rural Management DevelQpment
Program (EDRP).
2. Sites and servi~s as the vehicle for dire~tin9 growth
This was a ~ase of choosing a tangible, visible way of demon-
strating land use programming tQ lo~al officials. Settlement patterns
in Tamale were rand0m and helter-skelter. This made it extremely dif-
ficult to provide them with roads and other infrastru~ture improvements.
In view 0f severe ecQnomic oonditions, a minimal cost project was pro-
l~sed, i.e. only rough road grading and ~rovisiQn of water su.pply. The
Leasoning was that the [0ad access and water lines would at tract flJture
I:1rban expansion of Tamale into the m0st sl:1i table areas, and set a
pattern f0r deve10pment whi~h would lend itself tG effi~ient servieing
and mana<jement over time.
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Two project sites were selected, one for upgrading and the other,
for establishing new settlement. The project staff had direct in-
service training in performing the surveys and studies necessary to
bring this projects to implementation. Students, too, had opportunity
to learn through being hired to conduct the household interviews.
No external assistance other than provision of construction equip-
ment, training and building materials was proposed.
3. Tax collection
Working with the District Council, the team organized groups of
students to conduct local tax collection. Like the other pilot project
cities, Tamale is heavily dependent on national transfer payments. Such
revenue sources as it did haw locally were u·nderutilized beca,use of
inadequate oollection. Students were paid "bounties" on the amounts
collected and the results far exceeded initial expectations.
Expectation and Performance
Despite the effectiveness of the project team in winning respect
and accomplishing tasks, physical evidence of their work is yet to be
seen. The sites and services construction work has not begun yet. It
has been scheduled, however, and, depending on conditions of civil sta-
bility, will be part of a follow-on project with the same director and
consultant team as the land use programming project.
Logistical and financial problems in Ghana have had a great deal to
de; with the lack of tangible physical results in the short term. An-
ocher unforeseen Ltpediment has been the dimmed promise of agricultural
development in the Tamale region (Western Dagomba). Without the econo-
mic growth it has been extlemely difficul t, if not impossible, for the
District council to maintain even basic services much less undertake new
projects to improve housing and urban services.
Sitl1~tions of this sort are not unusl1al in a develGping CGuntry.
Institution-building and mobilizing perfGrmance in a third-WGrld setting
is a long process under even the best of circumstances.
Raving succeedeCl in pass ing major obstacles that blocked the Leon
and Chonburi efforts, the Tamale projeet eame to the point of CGnfron-
Hng this biggest ooe of all -- the reality of how long it takes to
achieve visible results in matters of land use intervention. Tamale
illustrates ~e difficulty inherent 1n evalaating short-term technical
assistance support missions shortly after their completion, particularly
when tney have been primarily direeted to institutiGn-builciing or inc-
reasing the capaeity of institutiGns to manage their responsibilities.
!n the Tamale setting the J1Dst important projeet rontril!llition was
improving the operatiGn of district and city administration. A basis
for direction and aontrol of urban eJtpansiGn was established, bat it
will preGaely be sMle time before the full extePlt (!)f its effeetiveness
can be measared.
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One source of optimism might be founa in the increased role of
elected District Council membets in local decision-making. Political
considerations are growing more important in urban land use planning and
control, as a result, but the converse may also come about, i.e. that
urban land use planning and controls will become increasingly signifi-
cant issues in local politics.
Timing
Timing helped the project team considerably. It apparently was not
favorable in either Leon or Chonburi. In Tamale, however, the project
team entered the picture when there was considerable pressure for a re-
organiZed clistrict government and when the growth problems of the city
were so acute that a sites and services and upgrading project could
legi timatE!ly become the capstone of the demonstration.
Common Threads Running through the Three Demonstrations
In retrospect several aspects of the demonstration program proved to
be significant.
Institution-building
In the case of Leon, relatively little institution-building work
was achieved. The mayor there, described as an overwhelmingly dynamic
leader of the city, wanted the project director to report directly to
him and to "service" his office. Although the director complied, he
also tr ied to establish working relationships with other agencies and
groups, particularly the Chamber of Commerce. These "outreach" efforts
were made difficult by the mayor. The project director considered his
working relationship with the mayor to have been successful in the short
term. However, the political upheaval that followed resulted in a new
government which did away with institutions of the former regime.
Local officials in Chonburi rejected the offers of project person-
nel to provide day-to-day assistance. In thei.r minds the technical
advisers were ag~nts of the NESDB who, therefore, did not represent the
principal central government ministry to which they were acccountable.
no productive advisory relationship was established between the project
personnel and their Thai Government sponsor, the NESDB, mainly because
of extraordinarily high turnover of staff in that agency.
Tamale, it turned out, enj0yed the m0st extensive efforts and
abiding resul ts in respect to institution-building. Its situation at
the 0utset of the pilot project was different fran the others in that
most maj0t' institutional relationships were in flux or were flexible
when the project began. Government had decided to decentralize adminis-
trative authority, the designated personnel and organizational entities
were in place, and all actors were ready for the project to help shape
their programs and working relationships. District departments wre
receptive to the technical support of the pt'Gject staff, iAsasm~ch as it
contributed to their strength. A regional land use committee was formed
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in the course of the project: and a technical coordinating committee,
chaired by the District Countil chairman, was established to advise the
District Council on land use mattes. The project counterpart and his
assistant, who was acting counterpart while he was in the United States
for advanced university training, will be permanent staff to the tech-
nical committee. Ghana's Ministry of Local Government was pleased with
these organizational arrangements and has considered advancing the
~ale experience as a model to be followed elsewhere in the country.
Training
On-the-job training efforts received a major investment of the Leon
project director's time. These were informal for the most part. They
did include, however, short-term residencies by colleagues from the dir-
ector's parent consultant firm and a trip to examine one of the firm's
projects in neighboring El Salvador. In addition, two staff mt"mbers
were sent as participants in a regional housing conference. More formal
seminars in which officials of Nicaragua's central government lectured
were too sophisticated for the project staff and proved less successful.
The Chonbur i project had no Thai counterpaz r- Hence informal 0"1-
the-job training could not occur. A formal training program for :Local
officials, prepared largely by university ~rsonnel, proved to be un-
successful. Content focused on analysis of the three municipalities as
individual case studies, but training materials were nct well-relate~ to
the subject matter. Sessions were scheduled two to three days each week
for a full month, and attendance at the sessions was irregular. A study
tour to Manila, Singapore and Malaysia was organized for local officials
of the three Thai cities. The fact that the officials involved regarded
it as a tourist outing undermined the trip'S training value, however.
Thai staff who did have the experience of working on the project were
transfered to other jobs, and none if:> currently in place following
through on a land use programming effort.
Training was a major component of the Tamale project and a success-
ful one. Apart from the advanced formal education arranged for the pro-
ject counterpart, who will return to a key post in the District, the
seminars with District personel proved to be a most viiluabl@ forum for
exchange of information and ideas. Also, students were trained in
household survey work and building inspectors, in techniques relevant to
their survey and record-keeping responsibilities. Project staff were
disappointed they oould rot work directly with members of the District
Council itself, but generally they consider that their training efforts
have oontributed significantly to the institution-building objective of
the demonstration project.
Linkages with Enterprise Development
In the original formulation of the land use programJ1l~ng approach,
considerable attention was given to the role of industrial and other
economically productive enterprise, both public and private, in genera-
ting some of the land use pressures that warranted intervention. Land
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use programming was to contribute to the shaping of their development
decisions as well as major public works investments, provision of com-
munity facilities and residential settlement patterns.
Experience of the pilot projects in this respect was varied. The
team in Leon, at the mayor's request, reviewed plans of a number of pri-
vate sector projects, including a bus terminal and a new hotel. The
mayor wanted to maximize the city's benefits from these investments, and
he considered that the project team's analysis did help him negotiate
better arrangements for the city.
Although there was much private development going on in Chonburi
and vic:..nity during ..he course of the demonstration effort, the project
team had very little, if any, contact with it or influence over it.
Tamale's technical advisers were involved exclusively with govern-
ment at various levels. The single major project to grow from their
efforts - the sites and services scheme - should, however, attract
private residential development to the areas prepared for growth throug
installation of water supply and public rights cf way.
Factors Bearing on Performance in the Demonstration Program
Retrospective examination of the Leon arid Chonburi project exper-
ience by their participants shed more light on the performance of the
demonstration program in achieving its objectives as a test than on
merits or faults inherent in the idea of land use pr09ranuning itsplf.
These projects had been set into circumstances which permitted no more
than pieces of the program to be introduced. Only the third pilot pro-
ject, the one in Tamale, Ghana, really had a chance to demonstrate the
principal features of the land use progranuning idea.
A number of factors can be identified that bear on the question of
demonstration performance.
Nature and Speed of Urban Growth and Severity of Physical
Development Problems Related to It
One of the original criteria for selecting pilot project sites
was the existence of the problems toward which land use progranuning was
addressed. Where very rapid growth and concomitant land use pr0blems
were present, there was a climate of receptivity to the technical advis-
ers and their pr0gram. Tamale was such a case, and administrati0n sub-
divisions 0f g0vernment at all levels were lJenuinely eager to receive
the technical assistance. Leon was not.' Chonburi had growth and land
,. Perhaps at an earlier stage, when Le0n was just receiving the
0utpouring of earthquake refugees, the mayor and others in the city
might have been receptive to assistance in handling their emergency
settlement problems. But by the time the land use programming
ciiem0nstration pr0gram got under way the emergency hacii subsiciied and
C0nt'd
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use problems but not in the same jurisdictions. The land use problems
or greatest concern to the towns had to do with scarcity or lack of
suitable land for development, '<ltlicb was contributing to uncontrolled
sprawl in the provincial territory outside their boundaries and keeping
them from attracting some of that investment to their central areas.
Geographical Scope of the Demonstration Project
!'he Tamale project focused on the area where growth was occurring,
and the host institutions had the power and respon~::'bility to act. In
Chonburi, the principal local institutions of the three towns lacked
jurisdiction and influence over the territory beyond their boundaries,
which was where the urbanization was taking place. Leon's jurisdiction
was sufficienl broad, but wit virtually no economic or population growth
its problems were primarily those of stimulating, rather than guiding
and controlling growth. The latter, of course, were what land use pro-
gramming was designed to address.
Flexibili ty of the Institutional Structure to Receive and Support
the Project
The key institutional actors were apparently highly flexible and
responsive in Tamale, quite rigid in Chonburi. Leon's structure was
also rigid, as evidenced by the mayor's unwilligness to permit the pro-
ject team to help other institutions improve their effectiveness even
while he was happy enough to have them enhance his own position in
development matters.
Relationships between the Technical Adviser and Decision-Makers at
Various Levels
Personality and persuasive power of the team leader was critical to
success. The staff director in Tamale was able to establish rapport
with officials at all levels of government. In Leon, the director could
do this at the level of local administration, but opted to minimize his
contact with central government officials. Personnel problems in Chon-
buri operated to compound the difficulties caused uy structural problems
of rival central government agencies and absence of participatior by an
important intermediate level of administrative authority.
Designation of Project Counterparts
Only in Tamale was there a strong, respected local counterpart to
establish and maintai.n links between the project team and decisian-
makers. His appointment was evidence of Ghanian commitment to the
effort and intention to maintain continuity even after departure of the
technical adviser.
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Targets of Opportunity
None of the project oontexts permitted establishemnt of an order,
step-by-step process of lar.J use analysis, formulation of growth manage-
ment strategy and application of programming techniques. Project direc-
tors felt compellled to identify specific undertakings in which their
intervention would be useful to decision-makers. This Wtarget of oppor-
tunityW strategy for setting out their respective work programs was cer
tainly appropriate inasmuch as one of the original principles of the
land use programming approach was that it should help improve the day-
to-day Processes of local decision-making. Lo':al officials responded
positively in Leon and Tamale but not in Chonburi, and o:"ly in Tamale
were specific targets chosen which were important to numerous decision-
makers at different levels of government.
Congruence of Prl');ect Goals of Local, National and International
Agencies
In each project various of the sponsors perceived the project objec-
tives differently. Consequently their expectations of the project dif-
fered as well. In all cases, project teams had problems serving multi-
ple masters. Only in Tamale was there a sufficient degree of mutual
understanding to keep this problem from seriously harming performance.
Timing
Many positive aspects of the Tamale project were attributable to
staff presence at just the right time in the stream of events to offer a
suggestion or carry through an idea. To some degree timing was an
important factor in Leon also, as the project team waQ able to solidify
support from the mayor by responding expeditiously to his needs. With
all the other obstacles in the Chonburi situation, the project personnel
were unable to find the opportunity or al1spicious I1Dment when local or
central government officials were receptive.
Choice of the pilot Project Locations
Because this was a demonstration program the study which outlined
its basic rationale and methods of approach dwelt at considerable length
on criteria for selecting the locations where technical assistance pro-
jects should l:le c(:>Rducted. This was important so that the ideas pro-
pGsed might have a good test, but also so that the limited resources
availabl~ for fielding the projects miCJht have the best possible ~hances
of maKing an effective oo~tribution. Although in this case the reSGur-
ces were primarily those of an external assistance agency, similar prin-
ciples would pertain in placing the develGping countries' own d0mestic
resources. Perhaps later, the concept of land use programming might
find other, worthwh5le applications in situations somewhat different
from those which inspired its conception, but at the time of the U74
study, the authors were very specific ln their recommendations about
criteris for selecting the pilot project sites.
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Given. the time available for anal}'Ses on which site selection could
be based and given the represen'tations by each of the host governments
and resident USAID missions r each of the sites ultimately chosen by the
program managers for a pilot project seemed initially to satisfy the
criteria. Once pilot efforts were under waYr however r and staff were in
a positic.l to understand local conditions f 1 llYr the picture appeared
quite different. Tamale was unique in offering all the characteristics
that were relevant to an effective demonstration of land use program-
ming.
It is almost too easy to reach a simple, pat conclusion that the
land use programming demonstration program had only qtlalified success
because the project sites were not well chosen. ActuallYr evidence
shows that personnel of USAID's DS/OD made a genuine effort to select
project sites that met the five original criteria. Those criteria are
still valid. The experience of DS/UD's demonstration program has shown
that the site selection criteria, in and of themselves, are necessary,
but not sufficient indicators of a potentially successful land use pro-
g"amming effort. What has emer<jed through the pilot projects is a more
sophisticated understanding of where land use programming is worth
trying and the bases it requires for success.
Rapid Urbanization (Le. population growth with concomitant
land use problems
Rapid growth of the secondary city had been idel'\tified as the
main rationale for a land use programming effort. A rapicUy growing
community, it was ~~sumed, ~~l~ perceive the need for land use manage-
ment and control. It is clear now that increase of population numbers
alone cioes not reveal enQugh about the setting. Rapid growth, we have
learned r can Qccur for a variety of reasons and does not always bring
with it the sorts of land use problems that land use programming is
meant to address. Nor does sheer increase in numbers alone reveal the
potential of a city for making significant oontributiQn to the national
or regional economies.
More qualitative analyses of the nature and extent of grCllwth.
grQwth potential and associated land use problems. as well as official
perception of these de 'Ie lopments - both present and fl:1ture -- are
needed to give the depth to the picture.
Central GCllvernment Objective and Institl:1tional Backins
All th£ee of the pilo~ ~ojeet eGuntries represented that their
central gO'lernments were cCllncerned to foster secc:>ndary city develc)Jnent,
that they had institutic:>ns c:>r mechanisms eK:Pressly charged with carryinq
Qut natiCllnal polic::y of this sort, and that they intended tB direct
financial resources to specific secondary cities in support Cllf this
polic::y. They all produced policy doollments with worels tCll this effect.
The Wc:>rds in policy doc::uments, oowever, wre oot always bac::keel Ill' when
it ~ame time for actic:>n and project fundin~.
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The status of the institutions and of the personnel assigned res-
ponsibility for secondary city development are telling clues in this
respect, as are actual budgetary commitments. It is by no means unusual
that national planning objectives expressed in connection with one
sector are over-ridden or undermined ~ the efforts to achieve
objectives in another, higher-priority secto~-
Central Government Commitment to Build Local Capacity
Land use programming cannot work tmless there is a commitment by
the central government, as well as local and intermediate administrative
subdivisions to develop planning and management capacity at the second-
ary city level.
In every case of a pilot project country the 9O·.rernm~nt assured
DS/UD that it ~id, indeed have such a commitment, and, perhaps to oblige
USAID, consented to include mention of this commitment in the project
agreement. When it came to implementation, however, the commitment
seemed to dissolve. There needs to be more evidence of a commitment to
building local government capacity, as represented by training programs,
for example, specific examples of conSultation between central govern-
ment decision-makers and those with responsibility for land use mana~e­
ment at the local level, etc. Moreover, there needs to be some mechan-
ism for achieving coordination, if not CQllaboration and for resolving
conflict among various arms of government that operate at the local
leveL
Priority in Allocating Resources for Implementation
With0ut an established priority, either formal 0r informal, at
the level of central government to channel resources f0r investment in
infrastructure or other development projects to the community engaging
in land use programming, the local effQrt becomes an exercise in
futility.
Whether the planning addresses questiQns of precisely hew to e~ecute
prQjects for wh ich funds are already committed or whether there is a
willingness by thQse who allocate develQpment reSQurces at the center to
resPQnd tQ wQrthy prQject prQposals grQwing out of the land use program-
ming WQrk, is nQt SQ critical (although both are desirable) as the need
for a clear, cHrect cQnnection between the planning and implementa-
tion. The setting aside of funds explicitly for financing prQjects
formlilated at local initiative or other provision for funds to be used
at the ciiscretiQA of looal <jovernment, ~'I:11d be perslil1sive evidence of a
commitment in this area.
LeadershiJ:?
1.<:>cal pelitical leadership is impQrtant to any pllanning and
development control effort. But local leadershipl encomplasses more than
a sinqle official, however plOwerful. This did appear to be plresent in
each of the pilot plroject cities. If, however, <levelopment ol:Jjectives
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broader than merely the provl.sl.on of some public 'IlOrks projects are to
be pursued, or if there is intention that the works projects foster
additional dey~lopment investment (public sector, as in expanding ser-
vices for a rural hinterland, or private, as in new commercial and
industrial enterprise) there needs to be evidence of potential partici-
pation of leadership from a variety of local institutions and from among
influential local entrepreneurs and private citizens as well.
Each of the demonstration project settings met these criteria in
some degree, at least so far as the governments involved represented to
USAID program managers. Nicaragua seemed to have a national commitment
to strengthening the capacity of local government. It did not, however,
necessarily extend into the area of physical, or la·nd lise, planninq.
Leon also had a strong-man mayor, blit the proj ect had ne i ther a broadly-
knit base of local leadership slipport, nor commitment from the central
government to supplement the city's own resources when it came to imple-
menting projects that the pilot effort could formulate. There had been
growth, but it was il1lJsory.
Thailand did have an institlitic:>nal mechanism for overseeing the
progress c:>f the land lise prc:>gramming prc:>ject, blit it had anc:>ther with
respc:msibili ties fc:>r local planning which perceived the land lise prc;>-
gramming prc:>ject as impinqing on its c:>wn authority. Central government
suppc:>rt was oot to become available for locally-cc:>nceived ~c:>jects.
Blirgeoning growth in the Chonbliri regim was manifesting itself in
seric:>us land use prc:>blems but land lise assistance focused within the
three cities, at least as the prc:>ject was executed, was doc:>med to have
little imp>act m the management c:>f sprawling, chaotic tievelc:>pment oot-
side their bc:>undaries.
Most c:>f the site selectic:>n criteria were best met in the case of
Tamale.
DS/t1D added several c:>ther site selection cr i teria tc:> the c:>r iginal
set. One had to do with city size. The prc:>gram managers looked nc:>t
specifically for the secendary city 0r cities of a colintry bIlt rather
amen':J those Gf intermediate size relative to the respective country's
existin':J settlements. They targeted cities ranging in P0P>lilatic:>n from
50,000 tG 200,000, with an established base of some urban infrastruc-
tlire. Another added oonsirlleration was that the pilGt site should be a
substantial distance from the majc:>r metr()poli tan area and cape,ale of
serving as a growth center in a less developed regic:>n, particularly a
place that fl:lnctioned as a majc:>c agricultural market center. They
wished to excllJde oomml:lni ties that -ere actl:lally satellites of the
primate, and tc:> work, instead, in cities where cc:>llection, distributiGn
and pr0cessin':J 0f prodl:lce fr0m the rural hinterland and the provisiGA of
services te that hinterland were imp0rtant cc:>mp0nents of the econG1llie
base. More0ver, they S0u<Jht places sl:lfficiently typical that the
appr0aeh~s and techni<lues developed thr0~gh the pilot pr0ject C(;)uld Be
I:lsefl:ll fer replication in a number 0f places elsewhere.
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It is not clear in any of the cases whether, or how, the land use
programming project contributed to integration of regional economic rel-
ationships. Leon, for example, although it did have the basic urban
infrastructure in place, was not the growing agricultural processing
center of its region. A faster-growing town to the north was expanding
in that capacity. Moreover that town still lacked much of its basic
armature of urban services, wh ieb meant it might have been a fruitful
location for planning. Yet, Tle i ther the Nicaraguan government nor the
USAID mission suggested that town as a possible site for the pilot pro-
ject, and its potential became clear only in the course of the Leon
effort. Chonbur i and the other two small towns may have fit the bill
superficially with respect to regional economic functions but substan-
tial expansion of their roles in regional development seemed to be ham-
pered by lack of developable land within their jurisdictions. Tamale
was certainly the agricultural market and processing center for its
region, but again, there is no indication that the land use programming
project there was geared specifically to enhance its economic function.
Resources for Implementation
In each case host country and local government officials regard-
ed the land use programminq effort as a prelude to external donor finan-
cing of local construction projects, although DS/UD had not contrived to
give such an impressioo. Only in Tamale did such a link actually come
into being -- with the USAID mission's oommi tment to bring in heavy
earth-moving equipment to prepare the sites and services project area.
The land use programming demonstration did not succeed in the other
cases as a means of secur ing national government funds for local pro-
jects or attracting financing for locally-initiated development
schemes. Nor did it emerge as a basis for redirecting limited local
resources into nore effective utilization. This may have be~'" the
source of the qreatest disappointment to local officials, and it may
explain the cases where the land use programming prGject failed to
engage the attention of the officials it was intended to influence.
Lessons and Recommendations
In introducing the seminar on review of the pilot program exper-
ience, AID representatives states they contemplated no additional pilot
projects in land '.~e prolJramming. As part of the evaluation effort,
however, they posed three key qu~stions:
1. Is the ooncept of land use programming relevant to secondary
city development and should it C0ntinue to be fostered by USAID
and other internatlooal aq~neies?
2. Should the type of effort represented by the pilot p>ro;ects
now be advocated as one of the standard technical assistance
tools which international agencies can offer third wGrle!
cGu,ntries7
3. Are major c:han~es needed in c:oncept Gr exec~tion?
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There was general agreement in the seminar on a number of points~
and some specific recommendations. By and large these are incorporated
in earlier chapters of this studyp particularly in the sections con-
taining recommendations for international a;encies. Briefly, they
concerned the following matters.
1. A clear linkage needs to be made between assistance in planning
and actual project implementaticn. The two mQst be perceived as going
together in this kind of demonstration effort.
2. A longer period should be stipulated fran the outset of the
effort to permit the institution-bllilding that is critical to success.
This does not mean that a specific technical assistance program shollld
be of several years' duration or that particular indiviauals have to be
involved continuously foe extended periodS. Rather, it should be clear
that an eighteen-month to two-year mission is a beginning, from which
dramatic results can not be expected. Provision fCl>l: continuity of
process and ins ti tlitions should be clear ly es tabl ished by the several
government and international agencies involved.
3. The programming approach shol1ld be as.;ocated not with project
execution., but with basic on-~ing manageme;lt of the cQl'lllftuAities
involved. If tied too much to implementation, the process can disappear
once a pa~ticular project is completed. The pr0Cess, as it stands now,
is not suffiCi:iently distinguishable frQm the oormal kind ef prc:>ject
planning fostered by. internatianal lending aeJencies. If it is to have
long-term validity as something distiACt~ the pr(i)CJramming prooess has to
be rooted further back in the decision-ma«iACJ stream and has to have a
broader f<i>Cus. The land lJSe element is impo~ taf.lt and shG\lld be main-
tained in any reformulatian.
4. A mae explicit oompoRent of {Nblic finance is recruired. The
Chanl:>lJri prC!lject was the only pilet preject tG pay fc:>rmal attentian tG
this facet ef l<:Jeal administratiGn. WGrk revealed the eJttraGCdinary
diffic\llties that secondary cities haft in obltainiR9 the fiseal resG\lr-
ces tC!l s~PPQrt either grGWth Q[ grGwth management.
$. The nGmenclatl1ce shG\lld Be cnanC)etl, since la,ncI I!I!Ie prQC)ramming
is a oonfllsing term te sc:>me. 0ther appt'Gaches tG planning (capital
imprGvements planniACJ, strl:1ctllre planfting, devel0pment !:'ro'!,rammiACJ,
etc.) have a mere ready reoognitiGn I!7y ooth denlapment prGfessionals
and !public 0ffit!ials. A lM'C)eI pictlJce is need@e! than sllgCJested by lane!
\lse a10ne. If the ooncept is t<:l Be ad0pted JlGre widely it has to Be
clearly IJAderstGGG and Bt'Gadened tG add-ress the ranCJe ~f relevant
<:lGACerAS.
6. A methoo<:llGCJY is needed with whieh te cliagnGse bath ~e\lrately
and rapicUy the C)l'ewth mana~me>At lK'<:Iblems <:If a seeQAda-ry city, and te
bas'e selecticm amcn9 cities far the placement ef ftmds and technical
assistance reSG\lrees. "AetiGn" plar-ming fer the <!:ity is the real
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strength of the land use L 09ramming concept. The necessary actions
could well occur on a variety of fronts (i.e. land use control, finan-
cing, sectoral development) and any strategy for action has to be based
on the objective reality of prevailing conditions demographic,
social, economic, political, etc. There is no instrument at present
with whidl a short reconnaissance of city conditions can be conducted,
appropriate date collected and analyzed, and relevant strategies, for-
mulated. Efforts to carry the pr09ramming process further should
involve the development of such an instrument.
7. AID and the World Bank can not finance the major continuing
effort in the growth management field. One objective of future activity
should be to encourage developing countries to institutionalize tech-
nical assistance to secondary cities at a national level and to allocate
sufficient resources to do the job.
8. Clearer links must be drawn between the institation of a pro-
gramming process and external financial incentives. It will only be
done if there are "carrots" , e.g. projects or the hope of major finan-
cial assistance for the secondary cities.
9. The views of the host country participants definitely shoald be
taken into account in any effort to refine the programming concept.
10. Discussion of the issues inspired by review of the pilot program
was a good exercise, and one which USAID should continue by bringing to-
gether the same people and others -- fo£ farther exploration of ideas
Appendix
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C'UTLINE FOR SECONDARY CITY APPRAISAL REPORT
Objectives
To develop sufficient infornation about a city (urbanizing area)
to determi~ whether it is suitable for Land Use Programming
assistance, and
To formulate a preliminary strategy for the Land Use Programming
assistance effort.
Performance SChedule
Two to three weeks in the field, plus
Follow-up to the field work.
Basis for Assessment
Documentation review at national, provincial and local levels,
Interviews at national, provincial and local levels and
On-si te visual
I*1ot0graphy) •
reconnaissance (with or without aerial
I. GROWTH CHARACTERISTICS AND ISSUES
A. Population
1. Growth (during the previous five-year and ten-year
periods)
2. Relative size and relative growth rate, 00mpared with
primary center and 0ther secondary cities.
3. Explana tic,lRS for growth, e.g. immigratiGn, Al!ltural
increase, particular stimulating factors.
B. ECGnomic Base
1. MajGl' fGrmal sector ecGnomic activities, their national
significance and grGwth.
2. MajGr informal sectGr
significance and CJLowth.
ElC::Gnomic activities, their
3. EmplGYment and ~emplGyment data.
4. IncGme levels.
5. Nat~re and extent of local entreplene~rship.
c. Physical Development
1. Review of land use and topographic pattern (preferably
with aerial photos taken over time to indicate changes in
development and extension of urbanized area.
2. Conunercial/industrial land uses
a. location
b. scale
c. rate of development
3. Identification of land assembly and land cost problems
(public sector and private).
D. Shelter
1. Examination of existing patterns, especially informal
sector.
2. Production rates, types, producers.
3. Identification of problems, if any, associated with the
production of shelter.
E. Land Ownership
1. Present patterns.
2. Current and anticipated needs for various uses
a. Land availability
b. Suitability: aneunt, oost, tOp0CJraphy and SGil condi-
tion, accessibility to infrastructl1re and other ser-
vices, transportatien, related land \ilses, aR'<S ether
lecational featl1res -- advantages er problems asseei-
ated with acquisitien and use in the manner anticipa-
ted
c. Extent and serieusness of squattin9, if any
F. iHnancial
1. Review ef municipal bud~et
a. Revenl1es and expenditl1res, deficits, surplus
b. Revenue sources, amounts and potential for additional
productivity (for recurrent and capital expenditures)
c. Nature and extent of finance for capital projects,
i. e. infrastructure
d. Availability (cur.rent and potential) of discretionary
funds for financing local projects
G. Utilities
1. Review wi tb municipal officials of adequacy of existing
systems to accommodate growth
a. Water/sewer (water sources and quality, distribution
and treatment capacity, areas serviced)
b. Electricity/telephone
c. Solid waste collection and disposal
d. Transport systems
2. Identification Gf problems or limitations associatec with
expansion of any of these systems, particul~rly ~hose that
would be instrumental in fostering the growth and develop-
ment of local business and industrial enterprises or
attraction of investment from outside.
R. Planning
1. Review of adequacy of present systems
a. Land plannin<j
b. Land oontrol instruments and administration
2. Qualitative judgments of growth issues
3. Assessment af the desirability of applying the Land Use
Programming approach (e. g. are there problems of land use
conflicts, land availability, incipient ~ well-
established squatter settlements, mUltiple construction
projects under sponsarship af a variety of agencies, majar
de-;relopment investments programmed for the vicinity,
special resources that can be developed in the nea,r, to
middle-range future, etc.?)
II. ~TIONAL MECHA~ISMS (and Provincial, where applicable)
A. Review of national framework and importance of cancHdate
cities within that framework with national planning aCJency,
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public works, interior and other ministries and agencies
concerned with secondary cities.
B. Identification of agencies and their responsibilities bearing
on planning and land development in candidate cities.
III. CAPACITY-BUILDING CDMMI'J'MENT
A. Review of extent of decentralized decision-making and basic
responsibilities of municipal authorities.
B. Investigation of university and public agency programs (inclu-
ding international technical assistance) to train and upgrade
staff and political leadership within the candidate cities.
IV. PRIORITIES FOR MAJOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT,
ORGANI ZATION, LIKELY IMPACT CN GROWTH PATTERNS
SCALE, TIMING,
A. Scheduled infrastructure and community facilities projects at
the local level.
B. Economic investment in process or prospect.
C. National plan commitments to candidate cities and regional
development programs.
D. National/provincial sectoral commitments to candidate cities.
E. International agency loan/grant commitments to candidate
cities and/or regional development programs.
V. RECEPTIVITY AT LOCAL LEVEL
A. Interviews with mayor, principal administrators, principal
private entrepreneurs (where relevant) be probe:
1. Present planning Qpproaches
2. Willingness be work with international/national technical
personnel
3. Willingness to provide logistic support
4. Particular cultural/political or local issues to be
highlighted in technical assistance team orientation.
B. Initial sounding of objectives for the community.
1. Pet pr•.)jects and likely feasibility.
2. Preconceptions toward land use assistance.
252
C. Probing of relationships with adjoining jurisdictions affected
by urbanization.
VI. srRATEGY FORMULATION FOR ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE CITY
A. Over all problems and possibilities statement.
B. Objectives to be met by technical assistance team during the
stipulated time frame.
C. Make up (skills requirements) of the technical assistance
team.
D. Institutional association or sponsorship of the technical
assistance team.
E. sequence of initial tasks for the technical asssistance team.
F. National/provincial/local policy and support commitments
required.
G. Linkages to be established with other governmental agencies
and other technical assistance programs.
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